| Topic: |
Science > Abortion |
| User: |
"Sound of Trumpet" |
| Date: |
22 Feb 2006 08:12:17 AM |
| Object: |
Reply To Ayn Rand: Abortion Rights Are NOT Pro-Life |
Abortion and Followers of Ayn Rand
Abortion Rights Are NOT Pro-Life:
A Response to Dr. Leonard Peikoff's editorial, "Abortion Rights Are
Pro-Life"
Kevin James Bywater
"Abortion rights are pro-life. They give a woman the right to control
her own body, which is part of her right to her own freedom and life.
An embryo, in contrast, is pre-human, only potential, not actual, life.
As such, it cannot possess any rights." -a summary of Leonard
Peikoff's editorial
Dr. Leonard Peikoff-the self-proclaimed "foremost authority on
Objectivism, the philosophy of Ayn Rand"-has written an editorial
entitled, "Abortion Rights Are Pro-Life." He argues that fetuses
are potential human beings, whereas women are actual human beings. Thus
women have rights, while fetuses do not. The pre-born, being pre-human,
have no right to life, according to Peikoff. Little in his editorial is
unique. But this should not surprise us, given the volume of material
available on all sides of the abortion debate. Our hope in interacting
with Dr. Peikoff's editorial is that readers will gain a greater
understanding of the rational and scientific issues involved in the
issue of abortion.
What is Peikoff's thesis?
Peikoff's thesis is simple and to the point: "The embryo is clearly
pre-human..." He justifies his thesis along several lines, noting the
location and dependence of the fetus, the issues of genetics, as well
as the travails parenthood. As "pre-human," the fetus has no right
to life. The mother, on the other hand, as a human person, has a right
to life. Thus, abortion rights are pro-human (the woman's) life.
How helpful is Peikoff's rhetoric?
At the beginning of his editorial, Peikoff insightfully notes the
failure of common rhetoric to bring a solution to the abortion debate.
Far too easily we fall prey to overused slogans and cliches that have
gained proverbial status in public discourse. Such devices are vacuous
and stifle our thought processes.
Unfortunately, though, Peikoff immediately muddles the elegance of his
thesis by lathering his piece with his own Randian rhetoric. For
example, he attributes opinion contrary to his own to "the mystical
notions of religious dogma [that] treat this clump of cells as
constituting a person." Yet such superficial swipes at religious
sentiments are irrelevant to the issues at hand. Indeed, there are
non-theistic pro-life advocates, such as those found at the Atheist and
Agnostic Pro-Life League (www.godlessprolifers.org) and Libertarians
for Life (www.l4l.org). They are not pro-life because of any particular
"mystical notions."
Simply put: Peikoff's own rhetoric clouds the real issues. Consider
some examples.
He describes a fetus as a "clump of cells," "a mass of relatively
undifferentiated cells," a "tiny growth," "a far-less developed
growth" than one's pet, and a "mass of protoplasm." These
descriptions encourage an impression that is irrelevant to the actual
nature of the fetus. Such antiaesthetic descriptions could be used to
denigrate the nature of anything or anyone; but they fail to address
the nature of the entity itself. Just ponder the plight of John
Merrick, commonly knows as the "elephant man." Some described him
as less-than-human; others recognized his full humanity. Regardless of
the descriptions of his adversaries, and regardless of what he looked
like, he was only and always human.
This strikes at the heart of Peikoff's rhetoric. Neither size, nor
simplicity, nor shape determines the nature of the fetus. The
superficial observations of untrained eyes often fail to detect the
intricate design resident in various entities, rendering them
unimpressive to the observer. Thus, asserting that a three-month-old
fetus is "something far more primitive than a frog or a fish" is
equivocal at best. Sure it is in the early stages of development, but
that does not change its actual nature. Peikoff asserts "To compare it
[the fetus] to an infant is ludicrous." But here Peikoff merely begs
the question. What is the essential difference between a fetus and an
infant? Indeed, what is the essential difference between a toddler and
an adult?
In the end, such rhetoric is prejudicial and irrelevant to the issue at
hand. In addition, as we will see, neither Peikoff's thesis, nor his
supporting arguments are valid.
What is the difference between potential and actual human beings?
The central justification of Peikoff's thesis rests on the
distinction between the "actual" and the "potential": "An embryo is a
potential human being," he writes. This distinction might be
instructive if it could be sufficiently justified and appropriately
applied. Peikoff offers an inept analogy: "If we are to accept the
equation of the potential with the actual and call the embryo an
'unborn child,' we could, with equal logic, call any adult an 'undead
corpse' and bury him alive or vivisect him for the instruction of
medical students."
Peikoff attempts to identify the pre-born with the pre-human-as well
as attempting to justify an actual-potential distinction with the
attendant oxymoron of the "undead corpse." We will return to this
analogy a little later, for now, we have a question: What does it mean
to be "pre-human"? There could be at least two responses: He could mean
something that simply is not human at all (e.g., something that is
canine or reptilian); or he could mean something that falls short of
being a particular human being (e.g., a fingernail, a surgically
removed appendix, a spermatazoa).
Surely Peikoff does not intend to say that the fetus is non-human in
essence, as though it were of some alternate species. Rather, he seems
to be saying that the pre-born is not a human being. Thus the fetus is
viewed as a potential human being, rather than a human being with
potential. How does he attempt to justify such a position?
Does one's location determine one's essential nature?
Peikoff asserts that the fetus is "part of the woman's body."
Contrary to his earlier discouraging of the use of slogans, "part of a
woman's body," is but a slogan-mantra-like in its repetition,
seldom offered with any justification. Yet Peikoff attempts to offer
some justification. He approvingly quotes Ayn Rand, stating that a
fetus becomes a "child" at birth. Thus, the location of the fetus
inside the mother's womb disallows the fetus that status of being a
"child" or a "human being."
But is geography really the issue, whether the fetus in inside or
outside the mother? Does the location of the fetus determine its
essential nature? Fetuses of various ages and stages of development are
brought into the light every day. Through medical science and
technologies, we recognize there is no essential difference between a
premature baby, delivered eight weeks early, and a baby delivered at
full-term. If location does not determine one's essential nature, how
could one justify saying that the pre-born is pre-human?
Does the fetus's dependence upon the mother show that the fetus is
pre-human?
Writes Peikoff, "That tiny growth, that mass of protoplasm, exists as a
part of a woman's body. It is not an independently existing,
biologically formed organism, let alone a person. That which lives
within the body of another can claim no right against its host. Rights
belong only to individuals, not to collectives or to parts of an
individual."
The individual-collective dichotomy is common in Objectivist critiques
of Socialism and Communism. Peikoff here employs it equivocally. There
are differences between the social relationships within a state-say,
for example, in the relationship of an average congressman to an
average housewife-and the relationship of a mother to a son or
daughter. One relationship is biological, genetic and maternal, the
other is not (at least not necessarily).
But when Peikoff writes that a fetus is one among many "parts of an
individual," he is begging the question again. Is the baby simply
"part" of the mother, merely an appendage or a tumorous growth? Surely
it would be a unique kind of "part," having a distinct (though
attached) life, a unique genetic code, possibly a different blood type,
and potentially a different gender!
He qualifies his claim: "'Independent' does not mean
self-supporting-a child who depends on its parents for food, shelter,
and clothing, has rights because it is an actual, separate human
being." So, the issue, in his mind, is not whether or not the fetus is
"self-supporting," but whether or not the fetus is "separate."
Is it the location of the fetus that is the issue? We already noted
that location does not determine nature. So, is it the umbilical cord?
Is it the placenta? Is the issue really located in the fetus's
attachment to the mother? If the fetus is delivered and the umbilical
cord severed, does it then become "independent" enough for Peikoff to
consider it a human person? If so, would breast-feeding reestablish the
dependence and remove the personhood? And how would this assumption
regarding independence apply to siamese twins? They are not "separate"
from each other. Are they therefore not two human beings?
To the point, Peikoff admits that "independent" does not mean
"self-supporting." So, why the prejudice regarding human beings at a
younger stage of development, when they lack "selfsupporting"
abilities; that is, while they are in their mother's womb?
Scientifically, biologically, genetically, the change from pre- to
post-birth is not a change from the non-human to the human.
Peikoff's assumption must reside in the location or the attachment of
the fetus. Or maybe it resides in the question of abilities. We have
addressed the location, noting that location does not change the nature
of the fetus from something non-human to something human (at least not
in a scientifically determined sense; though possibly in some
philosophically eccentric perspective). We have also addressed the
question of attachment. There is no compelling reason to think that an
umbilical cord determines whether or not one is a human being. So,
wwhat about one's abilities? Is that the issue?
Is to behave as a human to be a human?
Peikoff may very well harbor a confusion shared among many
pro-abortionists: confusing what an entity is and what an entity does.
In other words, he may have a desire to define personhood with
reference to manifest social abilities. Since the pre-born do not
function in a certain way, they are deemed pre- or non-human. But such
a definition is self-serving...and dangerous.
When one thinks that fetuses do not act as human beings, one fails to
see that fetuses act just as humans of that age and stage of maturity
naturally act. Why should we expect or demand anything esle of them?
Indeed, humans act differently at different stages of development; but
they don't become humans at some point in the process of development.
In addition, some human beings lack certain abilities otherwise
generally distributed among our species. Do such deficiencies make them
sub-human? Does such a lack make them less than persons? Life certainly
may be more difficult for them; but it would be truly wicked to deny
their humanity or personhood. Such an elitist attitude provided a basis
for eugenics. I doubt Peikoff would support that.
Please permit me ask you a question: "Did you come from a fetus?" I
know it may sound like a strange question; but please ponder it for a
moment: "Did you come from a fetus?" If you answered in the
affirmative, then please permit me a follow-up question: "Did you come
from a toddler?"
While you may have been tempted to answer the first question in the
affirmative, you likely thought the second question quite strange. Why
is that? Simply put, because human beings do not come from toddlers. We
once were toddlers. We just grew up! In the same way, human beings do
not come from fetuses. We once were fetuses! All we did is exit our
mother's warm and watery womb and continue to mature. And we continue
to mature even after we are born.
What about the question of genetics?
"If anti-abortionists object that an embryo has the genetic equipment
of a human being," writes Peikoff, "remember: so does every cell in the
human body." But this argument is exhibits a category fallacy. It is
also a caricature of the pro-life position.
Is it really the case that an abortionist is merely trimming the excess
from the mother's body, like excising a tumor or cutting her hair? Not
at all. When one completely destroys a human, in which such a unique
genetic code resides, one is not merely trimming away some excess
growth from an individual, one is not simply disposing of some unwanted
body part, one would be ending the life of a distinct, growing human
being. It is not generic human genetics, or parts of human beings that
are in discussion here-it is the destruction of a whole human being,
one who bears a distinct genetic code.
Think of the logical absurdities in Peikoff's position. What sense
does it make to say that the penis of a male fetus is "part" of the
woman's body? Does the mother really have two blood types? What would
we call a woman with four arms, four legs, two heads, and sexual
duplication? Indeed, in these respects, the mother would be twice the
human she once was! Peikoff's persistently eccentric philosophy has
landed him in a pool deep with absurdities.
Are fetuses actual or potential human beings?
So, the foundation of Peikoff's actual-potential distinction is
deeply flawed. If he has spoken to the separate existence of sperm and
ovum as a potential human, then he would have made good sense. But he
didn't do that.
Simply put, Peikoff has offered no valid argument supporting his claim
that the fetus is somehow not a human being. Location does not
determine nature--neither does attachment. Indeed, the fetus is
genetically distinct from his or her mother. He may be of a different
gender than his mother. She may have a different blood type. She
certainly has a different genetic code. And he or she certainly has a
distinct body (though he or she is located within the mother for a
time). He or she may come from the mother's body, but it is not part
of the mother's body in the sense that the mother's finger is part of
her body, or her leg is, or her hair, or her lung, or her spleen.
Peikoff asserts that a fetus "can, granted the woman's choice, develop
into an infant." Here we cannot but agree with Peikoff. Even so, this
is different than the assumption that the pre-born develop into human
beings. There is no change of essence throughout such development. Once
fertilization occurs, as scientific and medical observations have
shown, a new human life has begun. Surely it is the choice of the
mother that can allow that human fetus to develop into a human infant.
But it is the same basic choice that can allow a human infant to
develop into a human toddler, then into a human pre-teen.
Thus Peikoff's appeal to the "undead corpse" is simply a false
analogy. After all, there are such things as unborn humans. The sad
fact is that unlike Peikoff's mythical "undead corpse," millions of
pre-born human beings are killed every year in the name of "choice" and
"rights." What sufficient justification could there be for such
violence against innocent, pre-born human beings? It is not right to do
that which is wrong.
Do pro-life advocates care about parents?
Peikoff marshals his strongest rhetoric, his most evocative language,
and his grossest caricatures at the conclusion of his editorial, as he
describes the struggles of parenthood. "But, tragically, the lives of
the parents are completely ignored by the anti-abortionists," he
claims. "Yet that is the essential issue. In any conflict it's the
actual, living persons who count, not the mere potential of the
embryo." He continues, "The anti-abortionists' attitude, however,
is: 'The actual life of the parents be damned! Give up your life,
liberty, property and the pursuit of your own happiness.'" He even
accuses pro-life advocates of "Sentencing a woman to sacrifice her
life." Indeed, "You cannot be in favor of life and yet demand the
sacrifice of an actual, living individual to a clump of tissue.
Anti-abortionists are not lovers of life-lovers of tissue, maybe. But
their stand marks them as haters of real human beings."
"Haters of real human beings"? I think Peikoff should be ashamed as
his bald-faced misrepresentations of pro-lifers. Indeed, many
pro-lifers are deeply involved in the lives of the women (and men) who
struggle through parenthood. The crisis pregnancy centers, the adoption
providers, and the pro-life counselors do care about the lives of
parents. This is so easily verified that Peikoff's caricature is shown
to be a farce.
In addition, the issue is not one of "sacrifice," but of
responsibility-the same responsibility expected of you in your
relationship to your infant, your toddler, your adolescent. Raising a
child can cost a great deal, to be sure. Notes Peikoff,
Being a parent is a profound responsibility-financial, psychological,
moral-across decades. Raising a child demands time, effort, thought
and money. It's a full-time job for the first three years, consuming
thousands of hours after that-as caretaker, supervisor, educator and
mentor. To a woman who does not want it, this is a death sentence.
Really? A death sentence? This is an abuse of language, and all for the
purpose of abusing pre-born humans to death. While it is true that
raising a child may cost the proverbial "arm and a leg," the
reality is that abortion is a death sentence. The fetus always dies! We
can only wish Peikoff would use the word "death" with accuracy, and
with a conscience.
Parenthood is a great challenge. It can be extremely difficult. Certain
psychological and emotional preconditions may lead some women into very
traumatic times of life. But we believe that women are strong; often
stronger than men. And we believe that we can help them. We believe
they can make it through these trying and painful times. If they are
not convinced they can, then adoption services are always available.
One need not sentence one's pre-born child to death.
It comes down to a question of freedom and liberty.
Throughout his essay, Peikoff unsuccessfully attempts to identify the
fetus as part of the mother's body. He also fails to establish that
to be pre-born is pre-human. In contrast, we have supplied good
evidence (both rational and scientific) to acknowledge that the fetus
is a distinct and very young human being, whether she is inside or
outside her mother. "[A] fundamental principle of freedom," notes
Peikoff, "is that one has the right to do with one's body as one
pleases." But surely this must be qualified. One cannot rightfully
drive while innebriated. One cannot properly use one's body in such a
way as to cause the death of innocent human beings. Indeed, any
so-called "liberty" that unjustly destroys the life and liberty of
others is a manifestation of an "Attila"[1] mentality, not an
innocent pursuit of happiness. And Peikoff's use of equivocations and
false analogies to demean the nature of a pre-born human is nothing
more than a rhetorically cloaked desire to justify harming and
destroying the lives of those smaller than we. It is to "loot" the
life of others.
Having a child is not a death sentence; yet abortion always is.
Abortion clinics are the most dangerous places on earth for human
beings. If you think the violence outside the abortion clinic is
greater than the violence inside, consider that on average just under
half the people who enter an abortion clinic fail to leave it alive!
Endnotes
[1] This terminology is unique to Objectivist writings. Ayn Rand
writes, "Attila, the man who rules by brute force, acts on the range
of the moment, is concerned with nothing but the physical reality
immediately before him, respects nothing but man's muscles, and
regards a fist, a club or a gun as the only answer to any problem..."
(For the New Intellectual, 14).
http://www.kevinbywater.com/weblog/archives/2004/07/abortion_and_fo.html
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Reply To Ayn Rand: Abortion Rights Are NOT Pro-Life |
23 Feb 2006 02:35:30 AM |
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Jeez, Ron, there ya go again, pal, showing off how yev mastered the
obscure art of recycling thin air.
Ya just sicked up the same terminally monotonous crap masquerading as
an argument on about fifty different sites on Google. Ya gotta leave
the teabag in a bit longer, son.
Fer yer own good, Ronnie baby, see if yer can get over it 'cos it's a
fact that ya get born if yer lucky, ya eat, ya sleep, ya screw, ya die.
And Jeez, mate, ya got somefing ter say about every bleedin' fing, if
yer will pardon me pun.
Take me advice, Ron, find yerself a nice bar and fer gawd's sake keep
yer mouth shut and drink. I hope all the other boozers in this little
bar ignore ya and don't leave any messages. Ya gotta go cold wild
turkey, mate. Ya gotta get over this.
Yer Ozzy Pal,
Johno Howard
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