"Ray Fischer" <rfischer@bolt.sonic.net> wrote in message
news:chff3t$uvf$1@bolt.sonic.net...

1) No. 2) Who knows? Can't read the future. <

We can't know the future with certainty, but we can (and do) make reasonable
guesses based upon experience, reason, and science. The more we know, the
better our guess will be. In your example, we know only that there are three
people, and that either one will die or two will die. But you've given
nothing of the circumstances.

Consider these two similar circumstances:
A) Two thieves each have a .45 pointed at the man behind the counter of the
convenience store they are about to rob. The man behind the counter has a
shotgun, and it will kill both thieves. Is it better for one person to die
or for two persons to die?
B) Same scenario, except there is one thief, with the shotgun, and two store
clerks have the two revolvers. Is it better for one person to die or for two
persons to die?

What remains constant, and what makes this a "moral" issue rather than some
other kind of issue, is that it is all about achieving the best good with
the least harm.

species extinction is one of those a priori harms.<<

Why? <

Because there must be life in order to have good.

Where "best result" is a personal opinion. ... You're still resorting to

person opinion. ... And so morality is determined by the individual opinions
of people. ... Not that that's bad. I happen to think it's the only option.
People who have tried to come up with an objective basis for morals have
never succeeded. <

But 1) the objective basis for morals is already known and 2) we actually
employ that objective criteria in a practical way on a daily basis. The
objective basis of morals is to create the best good with the least harm.
And we know that if we allow thieves to rob stores, we will eventually lose
the stores. The good/harm can be assessed in the same way one assesses
cost/benefit. We may not know to the penny what the measure of good and harm
are, but we can know objectively at a grosser level that one principle
(anyone may steal anytime) is morally inferior to another (no one may steal)
at producing good.

"Ray Fischer" <rfischer@bolt.sonic.net> wrote in message

1) No. 2) Who knows? Can't read the future. <

We can't know the future with certainty, but we can (and do) make reasonable
guesses based upon experience, reason, and science. The more we know, the
better our guess will be. In your example, we know only that there are three
people, and that either one will die or two will die. But you've given
nothing of the circumstances.

Consider these two similar circumstances:
A) Two thieves each have a .45 pointed at the man behind the counter of the
convenience store they are about to rob. The man behind the counter has a
shotgun, and it will kill both thieves. Is it better for one person to die
or for two persons to die?

What remains constant, and what makes this a "moral" issue rather than some
other kind of issue, is that it is all about achieving the best good with
the least harm.

species extinction is one of those a priori harms.<<

Why? <

Because there must be life in order to have good.

Where "best result" is a personal opinion. ... You're still resorting to
person opinion. ... And so morality is determined by the individual opinions
of people. ... Not that that's bad. I happen to think it's the only option.
People who have tried to come up with an objective basis for morals have
never succeeded. <

But 1) the objective basis for morals is already known

and 2) we actually
employ that objective criteria in a practical way on a daily basis.

"Liberator Veritatis" <LiberatorVeritatis@houston.rr.com> wrote in message
news:cplhj0tnpfkcpm96njljtm3p1g08th2ebu@4ax.com...

... when we apply this definition of a "good will" we are already making

assumptions about what it means to be "good". ... <

We are presuming a reliable definition of "good" prior to defining "good
will" (just like we are presuming a reliable definition of "will"). But this
does not mean that we know whether any specific thing or action is always
good or not. We do not have to know whether the ultimate result of outlawing
abortion is more good than harm. We may never know that with any certainty.
But we do know that the yardstick is our best guess or estimate of the
ultimate result. Different people may reach different estimates by including
different factors and weighting them differently. But each person is seeking
the "better" principle or rule to follow, based upon which they expect will
produce the more good and less harm.

Something is "good" if it meets a real need we have as individuals,

society, or species. <<

... that is *A* definition of "good". Morality is simply not defined that

way. And, that is why it is perilous to try to use "good" to define
morality -- it doesn't really distinguish purely personal prudential matters
from moral issues.<

The only difference between "prudential matters" and "moral issues" is the
size of the issue. But they are made of the same semantic stuff, varying
only in degree, but not in substance. A matter of prudence may escalate into
a moral issue. A moral issue may de-escalate to a matter of prudence.
Abortion, for example, is viewed by some as a matter of prudence, by others
as a moral issue.

Morality, as a discipline, is about how we achieve the best good and least

harm for everyone. <<

Well, it should be obvious by now that I think this characterization of

morality is simply false. I'm open to the possibility of it, but I
certainly cannot just accept that as the *definition* of "morality". <

However, the definition appears to hold up in all cases...so far. Do you
have a moral issue which falls outside this definition?

No -- in fact, Kant was quite clear about his views on utilitarianism. He

very explicitly rejects it. The "good will" is not about seeking the best
good and least harm for all. <

Yet I would assert that all of Kant's principles will be defended in terms
which reduce to a search for the better good and/or the lesser harm. I say
that with no special knowledge of Kant, because I believe it will be true
for all moral theories.

Why do we need to live? <

Well, the a priori answer is that we need to live because when life ceases
WE cease. In fact, a living organism may be expressed as "a bundle of
organized needs in a cycle of satisfaction, rest, agitation, seeking,
acquiring, satisfaction, rest, etc."

Kant counts suicide as certainly lacking in virtue, but there is no

particular reason why living or surviving should be a *moral* imperative.
Clearly the vast majority of us seek as a personal end, but how does it make
someone immoral for not doing so? <

Except in the most extreme circumstances, it is irrational for a living
being to seek death. The living being has no experience of anything except
life. Whatever it imagines itself to be when dead is therefore incorrect.
There is nothing there to seek! There is no "good" in an unnecessary death.
So we would expect all moral theories to reach the same conclusion (in their
own roundabout way).

Again, when living things see water and air as "good", they are not making

a moral assertion about it. I'm not just saying that maybe they aren't or
that it is usually accepted that they aren't. They clearly are not. If
this sort of a thing is included in your moral philosophy, then it isn't a
*moral* philosophy -- you aren't talking about morality here. <

You keep saying that. But there is no basis for distinguishing "moral good"
from any other kind of "good".

For example, we agree that depriving a child
of food and water is morally wrong. Why? It is because there is harm when
real urgent needs of life are denied a living being. It is morally wrong to
do unnecessary harm, because we may deduce that not doing this harm improves
the overall good for that person (or society, or species).

... Focusing on the first section of the Groundwork is not a good way to

try to understand Kant. The best way is to read the Metaphysics of Morals
which is a two section book laying out his moral philosophy and not just
some preliminary groundwork for it. <

But, like I say, I'm less interested in understanding Kant than I am in
discerning the correct answer.

So, more to what I think is the basis for morality, then is what Kant

really discusses, namely the Categorical Imperative in "strong" and "weak"
forms. Particularly, in the Metaphysics of Morals, he discusses the weak
form of the CI which is more or less what I have already presented. He goes
on to say that this form of the CI is equivalent to a "universal law of
freedom" which he says is the only innate right we truly have (in contrast
to John Locke's rights of life, health, liberty and property). This right
to freedom must be consistent with everyone else's right to the same as a
universal law. <

Am I correct that Kant defines "freedom" as the ability to follow the
"categorical imperative"? In other words, we are only free to do what is
good and right.

Or basically, Kant argues that Justice (morality as it applies to distinct

individuals interacting with one another) is based on the idea that one has
the right to do anything they wish so long as they do not interfere with
someone else's right to the same. <

Sounds like a libertarian spin on Kant. This skeptic doubts it is accurate.

David Boaz of the CATO Institute refers to this in modern lingo as

"co-possible liberty" which is probably a good way to refer to it and how I
will talk about it from now on. <

Good! We can stop trying to get Kant to speak for CATO at this point and
discuss the issues more directly.

So, you want to maximize "the good", but I am claiming that the end of

moral philosophy is really more about maximizing co-possible liberty. <

One simple question: Why do you wish to maximize co-possible liberty? Is
there some other reason than "maximizing co-possible liberty" will likely
improve the life of individuals, the society, and the species?

What one chooses to do with that is another matter. If we all ruin

ourselves, then that would not be "good" (in my opinion) but it would be
morally permissible for the same reason that choosing to improve oneself is
"good" but not morally required. <

For the benefits of personal liberty, and the satisfaction of personal
responsibility, society should generally avoid unnecessarily regulating the
daily lives of individuals. We believe we are all better off in a "free
society", thus there is greater good in this principle than one that says,
"the state shall design a toothbrush and every citizen will brush from 40 to
80 strokes twice a day". The harm done to those who develop cavities is less
than the harm done to the choice of a personal toothbrush.

Now, let me just stop here and remind us of what you originally said about

the principle of morality being easy to state but very hard to apply
properly. The same or something similar is just as true about co-possible
liberty (aka the weak categorical imperative, the principle of autonomy, the
principle of universal freedom). <

Of course. However, "maximize co-possible liberty" is an ethical or moral
principle, but not a definition of morality. Morality may be defined as the
intent, philosophy, science, craft, and art of achieving good, for others as
well as for ourselves.

... You simply cannot be talking about morality if you aren't talking

about something that is consistent with the CI. ... <

The Categorical Imperative is about one mechanism for deriving principles
which are more likely to produce good results.

Requiring that a principle be
applied equitably, such that the person advocating the principle must also
be willing to be governed by it, helps to eliminate principles that produce
good results for a few people but bad results for everyone else.

... those "good"s are mostly personal or aesthetic good. But, let us

suppose for the moment that you are right. Wouldn't that mean that every
move you make is subject to moral evaluation? Is that really what you are
trying to say? Whether I decide to major in math or philosophy is a moral
issue, whether I use starch or no starch in my dry cleaning is a moral
issue, everything is a *moral* issue? <

And the Buddhist monk, inserting his foot into his sandle, practices his
religion. Or to be less mystical, hell yeah! Everything we experience as
good or bad has moral implications. To the degree that "aesthetic good"
meets a real need we have as living persons, it is a moral good.