| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"George Dance" |
| Date: |
13 Nov 2005 12:59:38 PM |
| Object: |
Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
As George Orwell noted more than 50 years ago, control of people's
language is a way to control their thought. Control definitions, and
one controls the language.
That is why those whose aim is propaganda often use a tactic called
'definition-switching.' An agnostic-basher, for instance, can simply
redefine agnosticism as some other position, and go on to (validly)
argue for the absurdity of that position instead.
Definition-switching is a logical fallacy known as the "Strawman":
"The Straw Man fallacy is committed when a person simply ignores a
person's actual position and substitutes a distorted, exaggerated or
misrepresented version of that position. This sort of "reasoning" has
the following pattern:
Person A has position X.
Person B presents position Y (which is a distorted version of X).
Person B attacks position Y.
Therefore X is false/incorrect/flawed.
"This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because attacking a distorted
version of a position simply does not constitute an attack on the
position itself."
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/straw-man.html
Fallacy or not, though, definition-switching is often effective tactic
in discrediting a position.
Ironically, the example we'll be looking at is an anonymous article
from http://www.objectivethought.com/atheism/agnostic.html entitled
"The agnostic fallacy".
The agnostic fallacy
Agnosticism is mostly considered a vague middle ground in the debate
surrounding the god question. Some people see it as the most rational
alternative, given the sheer weight of debate going on from both
theists and atheists.
Thomas Henry Huxley, who coined the term agnosticism, defined it thus :
Agnosticism is not a creed but a method, the essence of which lies in
the vigorous application of a single principle. Positively, the
principle may be expressed as in matters of intellect, follow your
reason as far as it can take you without other considerations. And
negatively, in matters of the intellect, do not pretend that matters
are certain that are not demonstrated or demonstrable.
Thomas Huxley, "Agnosticism"
To his credit, the author at least begins with an agnostic's definition
of agnosticism; however, it's not an easily understood one. What, for
instance, does "follow your reason as far as it can take you" mean?
Any clearer paraphrase would necessarily involve some interpretation.
Fortunately, Huxley himself has provided his own perfectly clear
paraphrase (which is the actual definition we will use here):
"Agnosticism simply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes
that for which he has no grounds for professing to believe."
http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Weak_agnosticism
However, the anonymous author rejects the above as 'bad definition'
(signalling that definition-switching will soon be in order):
Some people think he formed the word as a joke, a wordplay on the old
gnostic sects. I can't really say.
At any rate, the definition above is enlightening, but is also a bad
definition.
So why is it bad?
It defines a process instead of a result. As such, it is a
good rational guideline, in terms of following the objective evidence,
but it does not tell us what agnosticism is as a position.
Indeed, those interested in the 'god-question' are interested in what
agnosticism has to say about god. What agnosticism has to say about
gods depends on what knowledge there is about gods (which is not a
matter of definition, but an empirical claim about the state of human
knowledge). Given as an empirical fact that no one has grounds - no
actual evidence, no valid arguments, no means to even test - any
assertions about gods, then an agnosticism (by Huxley's definition)
implies not saying that one knows or believes anything about them:
However, the author has already rejected Huxley's definition as bad;
and now he switches the above knowledge claim as (at least part of) his
new, allegedly 'modern', definition:
The modern definition of agnosticism turns around a lack of knowledge
about the god question. The word a-gnosticism itself means not-knowing,
just like a-theism means not-belief in god.
Indeed; agnosticism presupposes that there are some things that no one
- not just the agnostic, but no one at all - knows; some things for
which one has no grounds for knowing or believing at all - and
therefore, just as Huxley says, one has no grounds for professing to
know or believe any of them. However, according to the author, the
'modern definition of agnosticism' (which tells us a bit about, but
does not give) says nothing of the kind. By it, agnosticism becomes
not a general position on belief and knowledge, but a 'position' on one
question only: "the god question."
It's one thing to say that there is an 'agnostic position' on the 'god
question'; it's quite another to say that agnosticism as being
concerned with nothing but that question, by definition. For one
thing, it defines those who are agnostic about other things - ET, the
Loch Ness monster, universes other than our own, eg - completely out
of existence. For another, it allows agnostic-bashers to claim that
agnostics are concerned only with 'gods' - that they "treat God
differently from everything else," as many such bashers like to claim.
For a third, it turns 'lack of knowledge on the god-question' from an
empirical, falsifiable claim (as the agnostic treats it) into itself a
presupposition, which (allegedly) the agnostic is trying to smuggle
into the debate by definition (allegedly as it's supposed to be the
'modern' agnostic's own definition, not the author's own).
Yet another problem with the author's definition is that it prevents
him from explaining (or evidently, understanding) the next definitions
that he offers:
Graham Oppy distinguishes between strong and weak agnosticism. This is
his thesis :
strong agnosticism, i.e. the view which is sustained by the thesis that
it is obligatory for reasonable persons to suspend judgement on the
question of God's existence. (...) weak agnosticism, i.e. the view
which is sustained by the thesis that it is permissible for reasonable
persons to suspend judgement on the question of God's existence.
"Weak Agnosticism Defended", Graham Oppy
If agnosticism were nothing but a claim about the 'god-question'; that
there's a 'lack of knowledge' about it - then what in the world does
'suspend judgement' mean? Just why does 'lack of knowledge' imply
'suspend[ing] judgement?' Just what does 'suspend[ing] judgement' even
mean?
To answer those questions in reverse order:
When confronted with a proposition P, a person can judge P to be true;
which means only that he thinks that P is true, or IOW that he believes
P. Or he can judge P to be false, which means only that he thinks that
the contradictory of P (not-P) is true, or IOW that he believes non-P.
Alternately, a person can suspend judgement on P - neither judge it to
be true, nor either judge it to be false. In which case he believes
neither P nor non-P.
By Huxley's definition, if an agnostic "no grounds for believing either
P or non-P, then he "shall not say he knows or believes" either P or
non-P; IOW, he must suspend judgement on P. All he can say is, "I
don't believe P, and I don't believe non-P either."
Which, specifically in regard to the 'god-question', is what agnostics
(at least those who know enough about agnosticism to have heard of
Huxley) do say: "I don't believe that there are any gods, and I don't
believe that there aren't any gods." Which is the exactly what Oppy
means by "suspend[ing] judgement on the question of God's existence."
Howeer, the author either misunderstands or ignores this point, as he
immediately goes on to declare that agnosticism has nothing to say
about belief in gods:
It is important to note, at this point, that agnosticism is not in fact
part of the atheism-theism gradient. Both atheism and theism are
concerned about belief, not knowledge. The basic atheist proposition
can be formulated as follows :
A1 : I lack belief in gods.
Which in turn is consistent with two further propositions:
A3: "I don't believe there are any gods, and I believe there are no
gods."
A4: "I don't believe there are any gods, and I don't believe there are
no gods."
A3 and A4 are commonly used to distinguish 'strong' and 'weak' atheism.
Notice, though, that the two statements do not differ only in degree -
in part of what they say, they are clearly inconsistent as well.
Note, too, that A4 is exactly what Oppy means by 'suspend[ing]
judgement on the question of God's existence' - not professing to 'know
or believe' either answer; while A3 entails claiming something that
(lacking grounds for it) an agnostic 'shall not' profess to believe.
Since an agnostic is restricted (given his knowledge) to 'suspending
judgement' - ie, to professing A4 - and since to profess A4 is to
profess A1 - and since A1 is 'the basic atheist belief' - it follows
that anyone who applies Huxley's definition correctly does profess A1:
IOW, that everyone 'agnostic' who properly applies that definition is
also professing atheism. The 'method' of agnosticism, consistently
applied, leads to the 'position' of atheism.
And the theist proposition as follows : T1 : I believe in gods.
Like A3, T1 is a profession to 'know or believe' a proposition: 'There
are gods.' To 'believe' a proposition means to hold it as true, or IOW
to think that it is true. So T1 means: "I think it is true that there
are gods." Given the 'lack of knowledge of the god-question' (and
Huxley's definition of agnosticism), an agnostic 'shall not' conclude
any such thing; an agnostic has no grounds for believing there are
gods, and therefore "shall not profess to know or believe" that there
are any. So agnosticism is not, in fact, unconcerned with propositions
like T1; agnosticism in fact rejects T1. An agnostic simply is not
allowed to say, by his own principle, something like, "I have no
grounds for believing in gods, but I believe in one anyway."
Both are inherently personal propositions. We are talking here about
what the person believes, not about reality itself. If we look at this
ontologically, we can translate it in the following way :
A2 : I know that there is no god-belief in my mind.
T2 : I know that there is god-belief in my mind.
The atheist and the theist are not making statements about what exists
in reality, only on what they believe.
No, someone who says "I think it is true that there are gods" is not
talking only about what's in his mind. He is restricting himself to a
true statement (that he thinks there are); but he certainly is not
saying nothing about 'what exists in reality'; he is saying that he
thinks that some gods do exist in reality (the only possible case in
which "there are gods" would be true).
However, there are positions
which pertain to knowledge about reality. Monotheistic religions, and
strong-atheism (also called positive atheism) share this gradient. We
can define them as follows :
R : I know a god exists.
P : I know no god exists.
These statements concern what actually exists out there in reality.
Agnosticism is part of that gradient : it claims that the kind of
knowledge stated in propositions R and P is irrational.
Indeed, atheism does declare that claiming that 'knowledge' is
irrational; but it does not stop there, as the author claims. As
Huxley makes clear, an agnostic shall not profess to 'know *or*
believe' either "A god exists" or "No god exists," given (as is
apparently the case) no grounds for knowing or believing either one.
To an agnostic, professing T1 is as 'irrational' as professing R.
Similarly for the T1-analog of P (call it P2): "I believe no god
exists."
P2 is, as we've seen, the second conjunct of A3, which has already been
discussed at length (some might say 'excessive length').
Thus,
agnosticism is actually compatible with both atheism and theism. An
agnostic atheist is someone who does not believe in gods regardless of
their lack of knowledge on the question.
IOW, who 'suspends judgement' on the 'god question' and therefore
believes A4.
An agnostic theist is someone
who believes in gods regardless of their lack of knowledge on the
question.
Which, as we've seen is incompatible with Huxley's definition - to
believe in gods is to 'know or believe' in them, and by definition an
agnostic 'shall not' profess to 'know or believe' such a thing - he
must 'suspend judgement' on the question. However, it is fully
compatible with the author's definition, under which agnosticism means
only believing there's no knowledge to answer the question - and
'suspend[ing] judgement' apparently means nothing at all.
Which is yet another consequence of the definition-switching: it
defines 'atheistic theism' (something that had no place in agnosticism
as Huxley defined it) into existence. In this way, the author succeeds
in defining agnosticism in a completely opposite way than at the
beginning: as the belief that it's quite in order to profess to believe
a proposition on pure faith (ie, on no grounds at all).
That ends the formally definitional part of the article - though as
we'll see, there's a bit of defining left to go. In the next section,
the author begins to critique his strawman:
Given these facts, why is agnosticism a fallacy ? While it parades as a
"moderate" option which is most "reasonable", it is little more than an
example of the cult of compromise.
It's not because a debate is raging
from both sides of an issue that both must be wrong. Or as Richard
Dawkins eloquently writes :
I think it's important to realize that when two opposite points of view
are expressed with equal intensity, the truth does not necessarily lie
exactly halfway between them. It is possible for one side to be simply
wrong.
"Richard Dawkins' Evolution", The New Yorker (September 9th, 1996)
Where did this come from? Who has declared that, "because a debate is
raging, ... both [sides] must be wrong"? No answer, no cite (except
the one from Dawkins refuting that absurdity). That is a separate
strawman from the author's own definition-switching, but it is a direct
consequence of that switch: by redefining agnosticism as a 'position
.... on the god-question' rather than as a process, the author has
eliminated the reason (that was fully given in Huxley's own definition)
why agnostics have any such position - which leaves him room to
speculate on other possible reasons instead.
If we examine the agnostic premise, we find that it is quite
unreasonable. Agnosticism is based on the notion that we can have no
knowledge on the god question.
And where does the idea that 'we can have no knowledge on the god
question' come from? None of the author's cites have mentioned that
claim, not has he made any argument for it previously. There are only
two sentences, in the entire article so far, that could possibly
support it:
The modern definition of agnosticism turns around a lack of knowledge
about the god question. The word a-gnosticism itself means not-knowing,
just like a-theism means not-belief in god.
Defining an agnostic as someone who believs that 'we can have no
knowledge about the god question' is certainly a definition 'that turns
aroung a lack of knowledge about the god question.' In addition, it
looks fully consistent with the author's etymology. Therefore, this
claim apparently must be in the 'modern definition' of agnosticism that
the author proposes to switch for Huxley's own, to wit: "Agnosticism
is the claim that we can have no knowledge of the god question."
(Indeed, IME, many of those who bash agnosticism assume that very
definition.)
The author's revised (or fully revealed) definition suffers from all
the same problems as his earlier attempt - it defines agnosticism about
anything but gods out of existence, and defines 'agnostic theism' into
existence'. But it goes further than that: it completely redefines a
simple statement of empiricism - don't profess to know or believe
anything without grounds - into an example of its opposite: a
metaphysical claim about the possibility of knowledge which is itself
based on no grounds.
But for this to be true, the agnostic must know all possible arguments
of atheism and theism, since he discards them all out of hand. If any
single argument is valid, then agnosticism must crumble. Many such
arguments are available in the atheist literature, and it is
disingenuous to deny them.
This does not refute the author's strawman agnosticism, of course - as
it's not illustrated by even one variant - but it does illustrate the
conceit and implausibility of claiming that no one can have no
knowledge of the god question. No person can have enough information
about what was true in the past, what is true now, and what will be
true in the future, to have 'grounds' for making such a claim. Rather,
it's just an irrational belief that agnostics happen to hold for no
reason: presumably, if the Rapture happened and the agnostic were
transported to heaven, he would *still* insist that it's impossible to
know one way or another.
Huxley himself pointed out the incompatibility with this 'position' of
unknowability and his own 'process' or 'method' (ie, agnosticism as he
defined it:
"I do not very much care to speak of anything as "unknowable."2 What I
am sure about is that there are many topics about which I know nothing;
and which, so far as I can see, are out of reach of my faculties. But
whether these things are knowable by any one else is exactly one of
those matters which is beyond my knowledge, though I may have a
tolerably strong opinion as to the probabilities of the case."
http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE5/Agn-X.html
Which is the final problem with the author's switched definition: it
defines agnosticism as belief in a 'position' which the man who
admittedly coined the term quite clearly did not believe. IOW, the
author is no longer talking about Huxley's agnosticism at all, but
about a strawman that is clearly inconsistent with it.
Furthermore, the lack of knowledge inherent in agnosticism is
self-contradictory. If we know nothing about the god-concept, then we
cannot claim it exists, or discuss it rationally.
If we claim not to know anything about the concept, then we still know
something about it : that it is beyond human understanding, and
rational discussion. Therefore agnosticism is contradictory, and must
inevitably lead to strong-atheism.
Impeccable logic, a reader might think; but where did the idea that we
'know nothing about the god-concept' come from? He'd be advised to
reread the 'modern definition': "Agnosticism is the claim that we can
have no knowledge of the god question." The reader might have thought
that meant we can have no knowledge of whether gods existed - not that
we cannot even know what the word 'god' means - but if so then he has
simply misread. The definition is quite explicit: "No knowledge,"
period. Therefore, agnostics believe definition that we cannot know
what the word 'god' means, or even whether it can mean anything - in
which case it is quite absurd for them to even use the word - much less
make it the only tenet of their entire 'position' (as the definition
also tells us they do).
Furthermore, agnosticism must be self-contradictory, as identity is
necessary for anything to exist, and there is no such thing as an
undefined object.
Whatever exists in reality has attributes. If we
admit that we have no knowledge about the god-concept, including how to
define it, then it cannot exist. Thus assuming agnosticism is true
leads to a contradiction.
Indeed, the absurdities start piling up at this stage. Since (by the
author's 'modern definition') agnostics believe that the word 'god'
cannot mean anything, they must also believe that any object it could
describe - any possible god at all - must have no properties at all.
IOW, the agnostic's conceived 'god' must not have the properties
theists attribute to their god - and so is irrelevent to theism. Nor
can it be any god that an atheist imagines - and so is equally
irrelevant to atheism. Indeed, it is even irrelevant to itself: an
agnostic, by the author's definition, cannot even know any grounds for
believing that his god is unknowable - he just has to
believe, for no reason and knowing he has no reason, that it is, so
there.
Agnostics have to answer the following question, if their position is
to make any sense at all :
How can you presume that "god" has some possible meaning if you have no
knowledge about "god" ?
In other cases, an agnostic could note that this is a form of the
logical fallacy known as Compound Question, which involves asking two
questions in one - in this case
1) Do you believe you have 'no knowledge about "god"'?
2) How can you believe that and presume that "god" has a possible
meaning?
- and answer the first in the negative, while dismissing the second as
question-begging. However, he cannot do that here. After all, he
admits that he is an agnostic: therefore, he has to believe that he can
have
'no knowledge of the god question', including no knowledge of what the
word 'god' could already mean, by *(the author's) definition*.
Therefore he has to assert the contradiction (and admit his
irrationality, or repudiate agnosticism.
To claim that "gods could exist" is possible, one must attribute some
meaning to "god" in order for this proposition to be meaningful. To say
that "gods cannot exist", from this semantic viewpoint, is to say that
there can be no referent to "god", because the word "god" is
meaningless.
But the agnostic has no knowledge about "god" from which he can
attribute it meaning.
By (the author's) definition, as an agnostic can have 'no knowledge of
the god question' at all: not just none about gods but none about what
the word 'god' could possibly mean.
Therefore agnosticism contradicts itself on this
crucial issue.
Indeed, the author's strawman agnostic cannot say anything about the
'god question' at all - not even state his own position that gods are
unknowable - without contradicting himself.
Which should properly end the example; but there is a relevant coda.
The author follows up his injury to Huxley's system with one final
insult to the man himself:
A number of arguments can be proposed in favour of agnosticism. I will
now examine the most important arguments.
* Argument from the limits of human reason
Based on Huxley's equivocation between a judicious use of reason and
agnosticism, some thinkers have proposed that atheism oversteps the
boundaries of human reason.
Spelled out in full, the first part of this sentence implies:
1) What Huxley called 'agnosticism' - "a man shall not say he knows or
believes that for which he has no grounds for professing to believe" -
is actually called 'a judicious use of reason'.
2) Agnosticism is clearly not 'a judicious use of reason' but something
else (presumably, as per the author's 'modern definition', the
completely unfounded belief that 'we can have no knowledge at all on
the god question.')
3) Huxley was aware of the difference, and therefore his definition was
pure 'equivocation.'
Thus Huxley, and presumably all other atheists, are exposed as secretly
in agreement with the author's straw definition, and proveably
'equivoating' if and when they try to deny it. Not only is their real
'position' both groundless and 'contradictory,' a logical mess that no
one, even them, could take eriously; they know all that, and have to
resort to 'equivocating' about what they believe.
By this point, the author has pretty much finished off his straw man;
it would be unseemly to stay to watch its final death-throes.
snip
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
14 Dec 2005 09:24:02 AM |
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On Wed, 14 Dec 2005 07:54:22 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
I am aware that the Pauli Exclusion Principle applies only to fermions,
so are bosons matter or not?
What do you think they are? Concepts?
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
15 Dec 2005 04:27:55 PM |
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Bob wrote:
On Wed, 14 Dec 2005 07:54:22 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
I am aware that the Pauli Exclusion Principle applies only to fermions,
so are bosons matter or not?
What do you think they are? Concepts?
I take bosons to be material objects, but that would contradict your
position
that material objects take up space. While bosons have positions, they don;t
take up space in the usual sense.
Colin Day aa #1500
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
16 Dec 2005 07:31:03 AM |
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On Thu, 15 Dec 2005 22:27:55 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
While bosons have positions, they don't take up space in the usual sense.
Please provide an authoritative reference (link) for that claim.
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
16 Dec 2005 10:18:33 PM |
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Bob wrote:
On Thu, 15 Dec 2005 22:27:55 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
While bosons have positions, they don't take up space in the usual sense.
Please provide an authoritative reference (link) for that claim.
http://www.pa.msu.edu/courses/1997spring/PHY232/lectures/atomic/bosons.html
From Quanta, by P. W. Atkins entry Boson,
It follows that (in contrast to fermions), bosons are not restricted by
the Pauli
Exclusion Principle, and any number of bosons may occupy a single state.
Does that mean that bosons do not take up space?
Colin Day aa #1500
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
17 Dec 2005 07:34:51 AM |
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On Sat, 17 Dec 2005 04:18:33 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
It follows that (in contrast to fermions), bosons are not restricted by
the Pauli Exclusion Principle, and any number of bosons may occupy a single state.
Does that mean that bosons do not take up space?
No it does not.
If bosons could occupy the same location in space, then they would be
capable of creating a substance with infinite density.
It would also mean they would be able to collide with one another and
not scatter. If you put them in a container that is made out of
bosons, they would leak out. Etc.
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
17 Dec 2005 04:20:03 PM |
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Bob wrote:
On Sat, 17 Dec 2005 04:18:33 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
It follows that (in contrast to fermions), bosons are not restricted by
the Pauli Exclusion Principle, and any number of bosons may occupy a single state.
Does that mean that bosons do not take up space?
No it does not.
If bosons could occupy the same location in space, then they would be
capable of creating a substance with infinite density.
Except that one would still need infinitely many bosons.
It would also mean they would be able to collide with one another and
not scatter. If you put them in a container that is made out of
bosons, they would leak out. Etc.
Do photons (for example) scatter each other?
And how could one have a container made of bosons?
Colin Day aa #1500
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
18 Dec 2005 08:14:33 AM |
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On Sat, 17 Dec 2005 22:20:03 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
If bosons could occupy the same location in space, then they would be
capable of creating a substance with infinite density.
Except that one would still need infinitely many bosons.
Then let's put it this way:
If bosons could occupy the same location in space, then they would be
capable of creating a substance with unbounded density.
Do photons (for example) scatter each other?
Not in free space. But they do in materials that have an index of
refraction.
And how could one have a container made of bosons?
There are atoms and nuclei that have integer spin.
Any object which is comprised of an even number of fermions is a boson
A 4He atom is made of 2 protons, 2 neutrons and 2 electrons, hence it
is a boson.
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
08 Dec 2005 11:49:21 PM |
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Bob wrote:
On Mon, 05 Dec 2005 21:27:42 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Are you saying that Platonic idealism is valid?
I have said that since the beginning, but you came to the party late.
Idealism is valid when the objects you are discussing are conceptual.
Mathematical objects are conceptual so it is appropriate to adopt the
Worldview of Idealism to discuss them.
But are the objects of mathematics conceptual?
Nope. One way of approaching math is set theory. Sets are collections of
objects, and though our awareness of them is conceptual, the sets themselves
are not.
Cantor committed suicide because of set theory.
But the sets are still here.
Colin Day aa #1500
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
09 Dec 2005 05:21:43 AM |
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Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On Mon, 05 Dec 2005 21:27:42 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Are you saying that Platonic idealism is valid?
I have said that since the beginning, but you came to the party late.
Idealism is valid when the objects you are discussing are conceptual.
Mathematical objects are conceptual so it is appropriate to adopt the
Worldview of Idealism to discuss them.
But are the objects of mathematics conceptual?
Nope. One way of approaching math is set theory. Sets are collections of
objects, and though our awareness of them is conceptual, the sets themselves
are not.
Cantor committed suicide because of set theory.
But the sets are still here.
Yep; in mainstream math, the sets are always there; they exist
necessarily.
Colin Day aa #1500
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
09 Dec 2005 11:15:17 AM |
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|
In article <1134127303.836953.130230@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote:
Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On Mon, 05 Dec 2005 21:27:42 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Are you saying that Platonic idealism is valid?
I have said that since the beginning, but you came to the party late.
Idealism is valid when the objects you are discussing are conceptual.
Mathematical objects are conceptual so it is appropriate to adopt the
Worldview of Idealism to discuss them.
But are the objects of mathematics conceptual?
Nope. One way of approaching math is set theory. Sets are collections of
objects, and though our awareness of them is conceptual, the sets
themselves
are not.
Cantor committed suicide because of set theory.
But the sets are still here.
Yep; in mainstream math, the sets are always there; they exist
necessarily.
To Platonists, yes. But not everyone is a Platonist.
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
11 Dec 2005 09:26:58 AM |
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Virgil wrote:
In article <1134127303.836953.130230@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote:
Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On Mon, 05 Dec 2005 21:27:42 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Are you saying that Platonic idealism is valid?
I have said that since the beginning, but you came to the party late.
Idealism is valid when the objects you are discussing are conceptual.
Mathematical objects are conceptual so it is appropriate to adopt the
Worldview of Idealism to discuss them.
But are the objects of mathematics conceptual?
Nope. One way of approaching math is set theory. Sets are collections of
objects, and though our awareness of them is conceptual, the sets
themselves
are not.
Cantor committed suicide because of set theory.
But the sets are still here.
Yep; in mainstream math, the sets are always there; they exist
necessarily.
To Platonists, yes. But not everyone is a Platonist.
Not everyone, but it looks like the mainstream view. Then again,
that's only an impression I've picked up - I really haven't looked at
the 'metaphysics of math.'
I for one would certainly appreciate it if you could give a brief
account (or point me to one via a link) of some of the alternative
views.
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
11 Dec 2005 12:59:37 PM |
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|
In article <1134314818.770032.201450@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote:
Virgil wrote:
In article <1134127303.836953.130230@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote:
Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On Mon, 05 Dec 2005 21:27:42 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Are you saying that Platonic idealism is valid?
I have said that since the beginning, but you came to the party late.
Idealism is valid when the objects you are discussing are conceptual.
Mathematical objects are conceptual so it is appropriate to adopt the
Worldview of Idealism to discuss them.
But are the objects of mathematics conceptual?
Nope. One way of approaching math is set theory. Sets are
collections of
objects, and though our awareness of them is conceptual, the sets
themselves
are not.
Cantor committed suicide because of set theory.
But the sets are still here.
Yep; in mainstream math, the sets are always there; they exist
necessarily.
To Platonists, yes. But not everyone is a Platonist.
Not everyone, but it looks like the mainstream view. Then again,
that's only an impression I've picked up - I really haven't looked at
the 'metaphysics of math.'
I for one would certainly appreciate it if you could give a brief
account (or point me to one via a link) of some of the alternative
views.
As they are not my own views, I do not feel able to give a reliable
account of them, but you might consider
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_intuitionism
as an example of them.
For further references, you could Google any of
L. E. J. Brouwer
Arend Heyting
Stephen Kleene
Michael Dummett
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
11 Dec 2005 02:13:58 PM |
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Virgil wrote:
In article <1134314818.770032.201450@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote:
Virgil wrote:
In article <1134127303.836953.130230@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote:
Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On Mon, 05 Dec 2005 21:27:42 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Are you saying that Platonic idealism is valid?
I have said that since the beginning, but you came to the party late.
Idealism is valid when the objects you are discussing are conceptual.
Mathematical objects are conceptual so it is appropriate to adopt the
Worldview of Idealism to discuss them.
But are the objects of mathematics conceptual?
Nope. One way of approaching math is set theory. Sets are
collections of
objects, and though our awareness of them is conceptual, the sets
themselves
are not.
Cantor committed suicide because of set theory.
But the sets are still here.
Yep; in mainstream math, the sets are always there; they exist
necessarily.
To Platonists, yes. But not everyone is a Platonist.
Not everyone, but it looks like the mainstream view. Then again,
that's only an impression I've picked up - I really haven't looked at
the 'metaphysics of math.'
I for one would certainly appreciate it if you could give a brief
account (or point me to one via a link) of some of the alternative
views.
As they are not my own views, I do not feel able to give a reliable
account of them, but you might consider
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_intuitionism
as an example of them.
Thank you for that link. It in turn led me to:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics
which gives a good intro to the debate (which, I'm glad to see, the
author acknowledges is primarily a metaphysical debate) over the
foundations.
At first glance, the 'emergent mind' theory looks like the most
attractive one, in that it fits my previous conclusions; but I can't
conclude that it is *the* correct theory on such a superficial
examination. So, in contrast to some others here, I'd conclude that I
have one more thing "to be agnostic about", at least temporarily. .
I certainly won't go further than that without taking your advice and
doing some further reading:
For further references, you could Google any of
L. E. J. Brouwer
Arend Heyting
Stephen Kleene
Michael Dummett
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
11 Dec 2005 10:50:53 AM |
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On 11 Dec 2005 07:26:58 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
I really haven't looked at the 'metaphysics of math.'
There is no such thing.
Metaphysics requires adopting the Worldview of Existential Realism.
Mathematics requires adopting the Worldview of Idealism. Those two
Worldviews are contradictory. Therefore there can be no metaphysics of
mathematics
--
to read things upside down.
because it forces the reader
Top posting is really stupid
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
11 Dec 2005 03:57:03 PM |
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(Bob) wrote in news:439c587a.88166546@news-
server.houston.rr.com:
Metaphysics requires adopting the Worldview of Existential Realism.
Mathematics requires adopting the Worldview of Idealism. Those two
Worldviews are contradictory. Therefore there can be no metaphysics of
mathematics
LOL. Metaphysics requires adopting the Worldview of Existential Realism
only if you've adopted the worldview of Existential Realism. If you've
adopted the worldview of Idealism, then metaphysics requires that you adopt
the worldview of Idealism.
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
12 Dec 2005 07:57:27 AM |
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On Sun, 11 Dec 2005 15:57:03 -0600, Publius
<m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
If you've
adopted the worldview of Idealism, then metaphysics requires that you adopt
the worldview of Idealism.
There is no such thing. Metaphysics is about the real objective world,
not the imaginary subjective world.
--
to read things upside down.
because it forces the reader
Top posting is really stupid
.
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
13 Dec 2005 11:30:07 AM |
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Bob wrote:
On Sun, 11 Dec 2005 15:57:03 -0600, Publius
<m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
If you've
adopted the worldview of Idealism, then metaphysics requires that you adopt
the worldview of Idealism.
There is no such thing. Metaphysics is about the real objective world,
not the imaginary subjective world.
Are you saying that Idealism is not a metaphysical position?
Colin Day aa #1500
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
13 Dec 2005 01:15:26 PM |
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On Tue, 13 Dec 2005 17:30:07 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Are you saying that Idealism is not a metaphysical position?
I am saying it is not a position of Existential Metaphysics
(ontology).
Pythagoras would have undoubtedly argued with me.
The problem with subjective concepts is they are not empirically
verifiable.
The only reason I can claim that the Supreme Being must exist is
because the Universe is empirical evidence.
There is no empirical evidence that a Perfect Circle exists or that a
Set exists in the real objective world.
--
"Well I don't know how else to say it in a diffrent way, but
why don't you just fade away, 'cause there's a battle going
on down south of Babylon, so why don't you just fade away."
.
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
14 Dec 2005 01:57:06 AM |
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Bob wrote:
On Tue, 13 Dec 2005 17:30:07 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Are you saying that Idealism is not a metaphysical position?
I am saying it is not a position of Existential Metaphysics
(ontology).
Pythagoras would have undoubtedly argued with me.
The problem with subjective concepts is they are not empirically
verifiable.
The only reason I can claim that the Supreme Being must exist is
because the Universe is empirical evidence.
There is no empirical evidence that a Perfect Circle exists or that a
Set exists in the real objective world.
There isn't?
Colin Day aa #1500
.
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| User: "Christopher A. Lee" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
12 Dec 2005 08:37:55 AM |
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On Mon, 12 Dec 2005 13:57:27 GMT, (Bob) wrote:
On Sun, 11 Dec 2005 15:57:03 -0600, Publius
<m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
If you've
adopted the worldview of Idealism, then metaphysics requires that you adopt
the worldview of Idealism.
There is no such thing. Metaphysics is about the real objective world,
not the imaginary subjective world.
Keep telling yourself that.
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
11 Dec 2005 12:24:16 PM |
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Bob wrote:
On 11 Dec 2005 07:26:58 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
I really haven't looked at the 'metaphysics of math.'
There is no such thing.
Metaphysics requires adopting the Worldview of Existential Realism.
Here you're simply equating metaphysics (the study of reality) with one
particular metaphysical worldview.
Mathematics requires adopting the Worldview of Idealism.
And here you're simply equating mathematics (the study of the truths
about numbers) with one particular mathematical worldview (Platonism).
Those two
Worldviews are contradictory. Therefore there can be no metaphysics of
mathematics
Oh, nonsense. Your own view of the reality of numbers - that they are
nothing but ideas - is a metaphysical one, just as (for example)
Christopher Lee's view of the reality of gods (that they are nothing
but ideas) is a metaphysical one. And I'd suspect that your reasons
for denying that is the same; by denying that your belief is
metaphysical, you attempt to relieve yourself of the responsibility of
supporting it.
--
to read things upside down.
because it forces the reader
Top posting is really stupid
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
11 Dec 2005 03:28:16 PM |
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On 11 Dec 2005 10:24:16 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
Metaphysics requires adopting the Worldview of Existential Realism.
Here you're simply equating metaphysics (the study of reality) with one
particular metaphysical worldview.
You are too pedantic for me.
--
to read things upside down.
because it forces the reader
Top posting is really stupid
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
09 Dec 2005 10:41:57 AM |
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On Fri, 09 Dec 2005 05:49:21 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
But are the objects of mathematics conceptual?
Absolutely.
--
to read things upside down.
because it forces the reader
Top posting is really stupid
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
05 Dec 2005 10:04:40 AM |
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Richo wrote:
Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On 3 Dec 2005 03:12:43 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
Bob et al reject the idea of infinite causal chains, and therefore opt
for a belief in uncaused and therefore non-contingent things (even if
only one).
I reject the notion of "infinity" in metaphysics.
The notion of infinity comes from mathematics. In order to do
productive mathematics, you must adopt the Worldview of Idealism,
because mathematics is completely conceptual. None of the things
concocted in mathematics exists in the real objective world. Therefore
the notion of infinity, which works in mathematics, is not a part of
the real objective world.
What justification do you have for your claim that mathematics is
completely conceptual? Do you belive that sets are conceptual?
Not our awareness of them, mind you, but the sets themselves.
If mathematics is NOT purely conceptiual - then in what way does the
number 1 exist?
The number 1 and all the other numbers are properties or Universals.
Metaphysicians have provided a number of theories of how universals
exist; and the major problem with those is not (as some people have
been saying) that they're all nonsense or all false, but simply (unlike
say in science) there's no agreed method of telling the true ones from
the false ones.
The number one exists in no particular place, occupies no space, has ho
mass, no spin, no charge, no temperature, etc etc etc...
Same as for any universal. Where does mass exist? Or hardness? Or
colour?
The beauty and power of mathematics is that it is pure abstraction.
Stick " the square root of two" on a beam balance and tell me how many
I get to a pound.
8-)
Mark.
No more possible than putting blue and green on a beam balance and
determining which is heavier. But it doesn't follow from that that
'blue' and 'green' are imaginary constructs.
.
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
08 Dec 2005 11:51:39 PM |
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George Dance wrote:
Richo wrote:
Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On 3 Dec 2005 03:12:43 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
Bob et al reject the idea of infinite causal chains, and therefore opt
for a belief in uncaused and therefore non-contingent things (even if
only one).
I reject the notion of "infinity" in metaphysics.
The notion of infinity comes from mathematics. In order to do
productive mathematics, you must adopt the Worldview of Idealism,
because mathematics is completely conceptual. None of the things
concocted in mathematics exists in the real objective world. Therefore
the notion of infinity, which works in mathematics, is not a part of
the real objective world.
What justification do you have for your claim that mathematics is
completely conceptual? Do you belive that sets are conceptual?
Not our awareness of them, mind you, but the sets themselves.
If mathematics is NOT purely conceptiual - then in what way does the
number 1 exist?
The number 1 and all the other numbers are properties or Universals.
Metaphysicians have provided a number of theories of how universals
exist; and the major problem with those is not (as some people have
been saying) that they're all nonsense or all false, but simply (unlike
say in science) there's no agreed method of telling the true ones from
the false ones.
The number one exists in no particular place, occupies no space, has ho
mass, no spin, no charge, no temperature, etc etc etc...
Same as for any universal. Where does mass exist? Or hardness? Or
colour?
Our awareness of them is conceptual, but are mass, hardness, color, and
so on
just ideas?
The beauty and power of mathematics is that it is pure abstraction.
Stick " the square root of two" on a beam balance and tell me how many
I get to a pound.
8-)
Mark.
No more possible than putting blue and green on a beam balance and
determining which is heavier. But it doesn't follow from that that
'blue' and 'green' are imaginary constructs.
Colin Day aa #1500
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
09 Dec 2005 11:03:44 AM |
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On Fri, 09 Dec 2005 05:51:39 GMT, Colin Day <cday3@sc.rr.com> wrote:
Same as for any universal. Where does mass exist? Or hardness? Or
colour?
Our awareness of them is conceptual, but are mass, hardness, color, and
so on just ideas?
Of course not. Mass exists as a property of matter, in the real
objective world.
Physics has an epistemological component and an ontological component.
The epistemological component consists in the ideas, concepts, models
we employ to describe and characterize the real objective world.
Everyone in this discussion appears to agree with this.
The ontological component consists in the laws of physics which are
part of the essence of the physical world. These laws are responsible
for the behavior of the physical world.
The motion of the planets can be described and characterized, but
those descriptions and characterizations are not responsible for the
particular motion the planets exhibit. The laws of physics are
responsible for the behavior of the planets.
The orderly motion of the planets is a real objective fact. It is not
solely restricted to the description of the motion. Planets can be
described as travelling in near elliptical paths around the Sun. The
fact that they do orbit the Sun in such manner is not the result of
the description but of the laws governing the behavior of real
objective physical entities.
This is the position taken by physicists who are trained in direct
realism. Attempts to drag the subjective into the picture has lead to
nothing but confusion. The objects in the real objective world are
real. They are not concoctions of our imagination. And these objects
in the real objective world behave according to the laws of physics
which are part of their very nature (essence).
--
to read things upside down.
because it forces the reader
Top posting is really stupid
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
05 Dec 2005 10:55:23 AM |
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|
On 5 Dec 2005 08:04:40 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
Where does mass exist?
Mass is a physical property that exists in the real objective world.
In quantum field theory, mass arises because of spontaneous symmetry
breaking. In Mach's Theory, mass arises because of a potential term in
the equations of General Relativity. In fact the structure of the
potential, an integral over space, tells us that the largest
contribution to mass is from matter at the most distant reaches of the
Universe. The contribution to inertia from out galaxy is very small, a
percent or so.
Gravitation and Inertia (Princeton Series in Physics)
by Ignazio Ciufolini, John Archibald Wheeler (Editor)
Hardcover - 498 pages (July 1995)
Princeton Univ Pr; ISBN: 0691033234
--
"One must realize that the world is a network of real and virtual
combat zones where the stakes are high, struggle is the primary
mode of being and only total victory is acceptable.
-- Sun Tzu, "The Art Of War"
.
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
05 Dec 2005 03:30:30 PM |
|
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Bob wrote:
On 5 Dec 2005 08:04:40 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
Where does mass exist?
Mass is a physical property that exists in the real objective world.
In quantum field theory, mass arises because of spontaneous symmetry
breaking. In Mach's Theory, mass arises because of a potential term in
the equations of General Relativity. In fact the structure of the
potential, an integral over space, tells us that the largest
contribution to mass is from matter at the most distant reaches of the
Universe. The contribution to inertia from out galaxy is very small, a
percent or so.
Didn't Mach die the same year that Einstein published his work on
General Relativity?
Gravitation and Inertia (Princeton Series in Physics)
by Ignazio Ciufolini, John Archibald Wheeler (Editor)
Hardcover - 498 pages (July 1995)
Princeton Univ Pr; ISBN: 0691033234
Colin Day aa #1500
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
04 Dec 2005 07:11:02 AM |
|
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Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On 3 Dec 2005 03:12:43 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
Bob et al reject the idea of infinite causal chains, and therefore opt
for a belief in uncaused and therefore non-contingent things (even if
only one).
I reject the notion of "infinity" in metaphysics.
The notion of infinity comes from mathematics. In order to do
productive mathematics, you must adopt the Worldview of Idealism,
because mathematics is completely conceptual. None of the things
concocted in mathematics exists in the real objective world. Therefore
the notion of infinity, which works in mathematics, is not a part of
the real objective world.
What justification do you have for your claim that mathematics is
completely conceptual? Do you belive that sets are conceptual?
Not our awareness of them, mind you, but the sets themselves.
It can be argued (and I've certainly argued) that some finite sets or
collections exist objectively. I didn't simply imagine or
conceptualize the five fingers on my right hand, for instance. OTOH,
'infinite' sets do look purely conceptual; that is, there's no actual
evidence of them being anything but concepts.
In some instances you can use the notion of "unbounded" which has
nothing to do with "infinity". Thus a time a computer program can run
is unbounded if there is no Halt instruction present. But no program
can run for an infinite amount of time in the real objective world.
So what? how does this refute George Dance's claims? Also, you could
have an infinite causal sequence occur in a finite time.
Colin Day aa #1500
Only if every cause-effect step in the sequence required no time at
all. If only one step in a million say needed a time greater than zero
in which to occur, there would not be enough time for an infinite
number of steps to happen.
So I'm afraid that, by accepting the idea of infinite causation, I have
to accept that of infinite time as well. Not something I want to do -
remember the agnostic principle I'm working on - but there doesn't seem
any way around it; as the only possible alternatives appear to be: a
necessary existent (whether Bob's "Supreme Being" or your "Universe")
that has exists without beginning or end, or: an endless series of
contingent (ie, non-necessary) existents succeeding each other, again
with no beginning and no end.
.
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| User: "Colin Day" |
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| Title: Re: Agnostic-bashing (I): "The agnostic fallacy" |
04 Dec 2005 04:20:41 PM |
|
|
George Dance wrote:
Colin Day wrote:
Bob wrote:
On 3 Dec 2005 03:12:43 -0800, "George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca>
wrote:
Bob et al reject the idea of infinite causal chains, and therefore opt
for a belief in uncaused and therefore non-contingent things (even if
only one).
I reject the notion of "infinity" in metaphysics.
The notion of infinity comes from mathematics. In order to do
productive mathematics, you must adopt the Worldview of Idealism,
because mathematics is completely conceptual. None of the things
concocted in mathematics exists in the real objective world. Therefore
the notion of infinity, which works in mathematics, is not a part of
the real objective world.
What justification do you have for your claim that mathematics is
completely conceptual? Do you belive that sets are conceptual?
Not our awareness of them, mind you, but the sets themselves.
It can be argued (and I've certainly argued) that some finite sets or
collections exist objectively. I didn't simply imagine or
conceptualize the five fingers on my right hand, for instance. OTOH,
'infinite' sets do look purely conceptual; that is, there's no actual
evidence of them being anything but concepts.
In some instances you can use the notion of "unbounded" which has
nothing to do with "infinity". Thus a time a computer program can run
is unbounded if there is no Halt instruction present. But no program
can run for an infinite amount of time in the real objective world.
So what? how does this refute George Dance's claims? Also, you could
have an infinite causal sequence occur in a finite time.
Colin Day aa #1500
Only if every cause-effect step in the sequence required no time at
all. If only one step in a million say needed a time greater than zero
in which to occur, there would not be enough time for an infinite
number of steps to happen.
Have you forgotten your Zeno? What if each step required only half the time
of the next step?
So I'm afraid that, by accepting the idea of infinite causation, I have
to accept that of infinite time as well. Not something I want to do -
remember the agnostic principle I'm working on - but there doesn't seem
any way around it; as the only possible alternatives appear to be: a
necessary existent (whether Bob's "Supreme Being" or your "Universe")
that has exists without beginning or end, or: an endless series of
contingent (ie, non-necessary) existents succeeding each other, again
with no beginning and no end.
Colin Day aa #1500
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