As George Orwell noted more than 50 years ago, control of people's
language is a way to control their thought. Control definitions, and
one controls the language.

That is why those whose aim is propaganda often use a tactic called
'definition-switching.' An agnostic-basher, for instance, can simply
redefine agnosticism as some other position, and go on to (validly)
argue for the absurdity of that position instead.

Definition-switching is a logical fallacy known as the "Strawman":
"The Straw Man fallacy is committed when a person simply ignores a
person's actual position and substitutes a distorted, exaggerated or
misrepresented version of that position. This sort of "reasoning" has
the following pattern:
Person A has position X.
Person B presents position Y (which is a distorted version of X).
Person B attacks position Y.
Therefore X is false/incorrect/flawed.

"This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because attacking a distorted
version of a position simply does not constitute an attack on the
position itself."
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/straw-man.html

Fallacy or not, though, definition-switching is often effective tactic
in discrediting a position.

Ironically, the example we'll be looking at is an anonymous article
from http://www.objectivethought.com/atheism/agnostic.html entitled
"The agnostic fallacy".

The agnostic fallacy

Agnosticism is mostly considered a vague middle ground in the debate
surrounding the god question. Some people see it as the most rational
alternative, given the sheer weight of debate going on from both
theists and atheists.

Thomas Henry Huxley, who coined the term agnosticism, defined it thus :

Agnosticism is not a creed but a method, the essence of which lies in
the vigorous application of a single principle. Positively, the
principle may be expressed as in matters of intellect, follow your
reason as far as it can take you without other considerations. And
negatively, in matters of the intellect, do not pretend that matters
are certain that are not demonstrated or demonstrable.
Thomas Huxley, "Agnosticism"

Ironically, the example we'll be looking at is an anonymous article
from http://www.objectivethought.com/atheism/agnostic.html entitled
"The agnostic fallacy".

As George Orwell noted more than 50 years ago, control of people's
language is a way to control their thought. Control definitions, and
one controls the language.

That is why those whose aim is propaganda often use a tactic called
'definition-switching.' An agnostic-basher, for instance, can simply
redefine agnosticism as some other position, and go on to (validly)
argue for the absurdity of that position instead.

Definition-switching is a logical fallacy known as the "Strawman":
"The Straw Man fallacy is committed when a person simply ignores a
person's actual position and substitutes a distorted, exaggerated or
misrepresented version of that position. This sort of "reasoning" has
the following pattern:
Person A has position X.
Person B presents position Y (which is a distorted version of X).
Person B attacks position Y.
Therefore X is false/incorrect/flawed.

"This sort of "reasoning" is fallacious because attacking a distorted
version of a position simply does not constitute an attack on the
position itself."
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/straw-man.html

Fallacy or not, though, definition-switching is often effective tactic
in discrediting a position.

Ironically, the example we'll be looking at is an anonymous article
from http://www.objectivethought.com/atheism/agnostic.html entitled
"The agnostic fallacy".

The agnostic fallacy

Agnosticism is mostly considered a vague middle ground in the debate
surrounding the god question. Some people see it as the most rational
alternative, given the sheer weight of debate going on from both
theists and atheists.

Thomas Henry Huxley, who coined the term agnosticism, defined it thus :

Agnosticism is not a creed but a method, the essence of which lies in
the vigorous application of a single principle. Positively, the
principle may be expressed as in matters of intellect, follow your
reason as far as it can take you without other considerations. And
negatively, in matters of the intellect, do not pretend that matters
are certain that are not demonstrated or demonstrable.
Thomas Huxley, "Agnosticism"

To his credit, the author at least begins with an agnostic's definition
of agnosticism; however, it's not an easily understood one. What, for
instance, does "follow your reason as far as it can take you" mean?
Any clearer paraphrase would necessarily involve some interpretation.

Fortunately, Huxley himself has provided his own perfectly clear
paraphrase (which is the actual definition we will use here):
"Agnosticism simply means that a man shall not say he knows or believes
that for which he has no grounds for professing to believe."
http://encyclopedia.laborlawtalk.com/Weak_agnosticism

However, the anonymous author rejects the above as 'bad definition'
(signalling that definition-switching will soon be in order):

Some people think he formed the word as a joke, a wordplay on the old
gnostic sects. I can't really say.

At any rate, the definition above is enlightening, but is also a bad
definition.

So why is it bad?

It defines a process instead of a result. As such, it is a
good rational guideline, in terms of following the objective evidence,
but it does not tell us what agnosticism is as a position.

Indeed, those interested in the 'god-question' are interested in what
agnosticism has to say about god. What agnosticism has to say about
gods depends on what knowledge there is about gods (which is not a
matter of definition, but an empirical claim about the state of human
knowledge). Given as an empirical fact that no one has grounds - no
actual evidence, no valid arguments, no means to even test - any
assertions about gods, then an agnosticism (by Huxley's definition)
implies not saying that one knows or believes anything about them:

However, the author has already rejected Huxley's definition as bad;
and now he switches the above knowledge claim as (at least part of) his
new, allegedly 'modern', definition:

The modern definition of agnosticism turns around a lack of knowledge
about the god question. The word a-gnosticism itself means not-knowing,
just like a-theism means not-belief in god.

Indeed; agnosticism presupposes that there are some things that no one
- not just the agnostic, but no one at all - knows; some things for
which one has no grounds for knowing or believing at all - and
therefore, just as Huxley says, one has no grounds for professing to
know or believe any of them. However, according to the author, the
'modern definition of agnosticism' (which tells us a bit about, but
does not give) says nothing of the kind. By it, agnosticism becomes
not a general position on belief and knowledge, but a 'position' on one
question only: "the god question."

It's one thing to say that there is an 'agnostic position' on the 'god
question'; it's quite another to say that agnosticism as being
concerned with nothing but that question, by definition. For one
thing, it defines those who are agnostic about other things - ET, the
Loch Ness monster, universes other than our own, eg - completely out
of existence. For another, it allows agnostic-bashers to claim that
agnostics are concerned only with 'gods' - that they "treat God
differently from everything else," as many such bashers like to claim.
For a third, it turns 'lack of knowledge on the god-question' from an
empirical, falsifiable claim (as the agnostic treats it) into itself a
presupposition, which (allegedly) the agnostic is trying to smuggle
into the debate by definition (allegedly as it's supposed to be the
'modern' agnostic's own definition, not the author's own).

Yet another problem with the author's definition is that it prevents
him from explaining (or evidently, understanding) the next definitions
that he offers:

Graham Oppy distinguishes between strong and weak agnosticism. This is
his thesis :

strong agnosticism, i.e. the view which is sustained by the thesis that
it is obligatory for reasonable persons to suspend judgement on the
question of God's existence. (...) weak agnosticism, i.e. the view
which is sustained by the thesis that it is permissible for reasonable
persons to suspend judgement on the question of God's existence.
"Weak Agnosticism Defended", Graham Oppy

If agnosticism were nothing but a claim about the 'god-question'; that
there's a 'lack of knowledge' about it - then what in the world does
'suspend judgement' mean? Just why does 'lack of knowledge' imply
'suspend[ing] judgement?' Just what does 'suspend[ing] judgement' even
mean?

To answer those questions in reverse order:

When confronted with a proposition P, a person can judge P to be true;
which means only that he thinks that P is true, or IOW that he believes
P. Or he can judge P to be false, which means only that he thinks that
the contradictory of P (not-P) is true, or IOW that he believes non-P.
Alternately, a person can suspend judgement on P - neither judge it to
be true, nor either judge it to be false. In which case he believes
neither P nor non-P.

By Huxley's definition, if an agnostic "no grounds for believing either
P or non-P, then he "shall not say he knows or believes" either P or
non-P; IOW, he must suspend judgement on P. All he can say is, "I
don't believe P, and I don't believe non-P either."

Which, specifically in regard to the 'god-question', is what agnostics
(at least those who know enough about agnosticism to have heard of
Huxley) do say: "I don't believe that there are any gods, and I don't
believe that there aren't any gods." Which is the exactly what Oppy
means by "suspend[ing] judgement on the question of God's existence."

Howeer, the author either misunderstands or ignores this point, as he
immediately goes on to declare that agnosticism has nothing to say
about belief in gods:

It is important to note, at this point, that agnosticism is not in fact
part of the atheism-theism gradient. Both atheism and theism are
concerned about belief, not knowledge. The basic atheist proposition
can be formulated as follows :

A1 : I lack belief in gods.

Which in turn is consistent with two further propositions:

A3: "I don't believe there are any gods, and I believe there are no
gods."
A4: "I don't believe there are any gods, and I don't believe there are
no gods."

A3 and A4 are commonly used to distinguish 'strong' and 'weak' atheism.
Notice, though, that the two statements do not differ only in degree -
in part of what they say, they are clearly inconsistent as well.

Note, too, that A4 is exactly what Oppy means by 'suspend[ing]
judgement on the question of God's existence' - not professing to 'know
or believe' either answer; while A3 entails claiming something that
(lacking grounds for it) an agnostic 'shall not' profess to believe.


Since an agnostic is restricted (given his knowledge) to 'suspending
judgement' - ie, to professing A4 - and since to profess A4 is to
profess A1 - and since A1 is 'the basic atheist belief' - it follows
that anyone who applies Huxley's definition correctly does profess A1:
IOW, that everyone 'agnostic' who properly applies that definition is
also professing atheism. The 'method' of agnosticism, consistently
applied, leads to the 'position' of atheism.

And the theist proposition as follows : T1 : I believe in gods.

Like A3, T1 is a profession to 'know or believe' a proposition: 'There
are gods.' To 'believe' a proposition means to hold it as true, or IOW
to think that it is true. So T1 means: "I think it is true that there
are gods." Given the 'lack of knowledge of the god-question' (and
Huxley's definition of agnosticism), an agnostic 'shall not' conclude
any such thing; an agnostic has no grounds for believing there are
gods, and therefore "shall not profess to know or believe" that there
are any. So agnosticism is not, in fact, unconcerned with propositions
like T1; agnosticism in fact rejects T1. An agnostic simply is not
allowed to say, by his own principle, something like, "I have no
grounds for believing in gods, but I believe in one anyway."

Both are inherently personal propositions. We are talking here about
what the person believes, not about reality itself. If we look at this
ontologically, we can translate it in the following way :

A2 : I know that there is no god-belief in my mind.
T2 : I know that there is god-belief in my mind.

The atheist and the theist are not making statements about what exists
in reality, only on what they believe.

No, someone who says "I think it is true that there are gods" is not
talking only about what's in his mind. He is restricting himself to a
true statement (that he thinks there are); but he certainly is not
saying nothing about 'what exists in reality'; he is saying that he
thinks that some gods do exist in reality (the only possible case in
which "there are gods" would be true).

However, there are positions
which pertain to knowledge about reality. Monotheistic religions, and
strong-atheism (also called positive atheism) share this gradient. We
can define them as follows :

R : I know a god exists.
P : I know no god exists.

These statements concern what actually exists out there in reality.
Agnosticism is part of that gradient : it claims that the kind of
knowledge stated in propositions R and P is irrational.

Indeed, atheism does declare that claiming that 'knowledge' is
irrational; but it does not stop there, as the author claims. As
Huxley makes clear, an agnostic shall not profess to 'know *or*
believe' either "A god exists" or "No god exists," given (as is
apparently the case) no grounds for knowing or believing either one.
To an agnostic, professing T1 is as 'irrational' as professing R.

Similarly for the T1-analog of P (call it P2): "I believe no god
exists."
P2 is, as we've seen, the second conjunct of A3, which has already been
discussed at length (some might say 'excessive length').

Thus,
agnosticism is actually compatible with both atheism and theism. An
agnostic atheist is someone who does not believe in gods regardless of
their lack of knowledge on the question.

IOW, who 'suspends judgement' on the 'god question' and therefore
believes A4.

An agnostic theist is someone
who believes in gods regardless of their lack of knowledge on the
question.

Which, as we've seen is incompatible with Huxley's definition - to
believe in gods is to 'know or believe' in them, and by definition an
agnostic 'shall not' profess to 'know or believe' such a thing - he
must 'suspend judgement' on the question. However, it is fully
compatible with the author's definition, under which agnosticism means
only believing there's no knowledge to answer the question - and
'suspend[ing] judgement' apparently means nothing at all.

Which is yet another consequence of the definition-switching: it
defines 'atheistic theism' (something that had no place in agnosticism
as Huxley defined it) into existence. In this way, the author succeeds
in defining agnosticism in a completely opposite way than at the
beginning: as the belief that it's quite in order to profess to believe
a proposition on pure faith (ie, on no grounds at all).

That ends the formally definitional part of the article - though as
we'll see, there's a bit of defining left to go. In the next section,
the author begins to critique his strawman:

Given these facts, why is agnosticism a fallacy ? While it parades as a
"moderate" option which is most "reasonable", it is little more than an
example of the cult of compromise.

It's not because a debate is raging
from both sides of an issue that both must be wrong. Or as Richard
Dawkins eloquently writes :

I think it's important to realize that when two opposite points of view
are expressed with equal intensity, the truth does not necessarily lie
exactly halfway between them. It is possible for one side to be simply
wrong.
"Richard Dawkins' Evolution", The New Yorker (September 9th, 1996)

Where did this come from? Who has declared that, "because a debate is
raging, ... both [sides] must be wrong"? No answer, no cite (except
the one from Dawkins refuting that absurdity). That is a separate
strawman from the author's own definition-switching, but it is a direct
consequence of that switch: by redefining agnosticism as a 'position
... on the god-question' rather than as a process, the author has
eliminated the reason (that was fully given in Huxley's own definition)
why agnostics have any such position - which leaves him room to
speculate on other possible reasons instead.

If we examine the agnostic premise, we find that it is quite
unreasonable. Agnosticism is based on the notion that we can have no
knowledge on the god question.

And where does the idea that 'we can have no knowledge on the god
question' come from? None of the author's cites have mentioned that
claim, not has he made any argument for it previously. There are only
two sentences, in the entire article so far, that could possibly
support it:

The modern definition of agnosticism turns around a lack of knowledge
about the god question. The word a-gnosticism itself means not-knowing,
just like a-theism means not-belief in god.

Defining an agnostic as someone who believs that 'we can have no
knowledge about the god question' is certainly a definition 'that turns
aroung a lack of knowledge about the god question.' In addition, it
looks fully consistent with the author's etymology. Therefore, this
claim apparently must be in the 'modern definition' of agnosticism that
the author proposes to switch for Huxley's own, to wit: "Agnosticism
is the claim that we can have no knowledge of the god question."
(Indeed, IME, many of those who bash agnosticism assume that very
definition.)

The author's revised (or fully revealed) definition suffers from all
the same problems as his earlier attempt - it defines agnosticism about
anything but gods out of existence, and defines 'agnostic theism' into
existence'. But it goes further than that: it completely redefines a
simple statement of empiricism - don't profess to know or believe
anything without grounds - into an example of its opposite: a
metaphysical claim about the possibility of knowledge which is itself
based on no grounds.

But for this to be true, the agnostic must know all possible arguments
of atheism and theism, since he discards them all out of hand. If any
single argument is valid, then agnosticism must crumble. Many such
arguments are available in the atheist literature, and it is
disingenuous to deny them.

This does not refute the author's strawman agnosticism, of course - as
it's not illustrated by even one variant - but it does illustrate the
conceit and implausibility of claiming that no one can have no
knowledge of the god question. No person can have enough information
about what was true in the past, what is true now, and what will be
true in the future, to have 'grounds' for making such a claim. Rather,
it's just an irrational belief that agnostics happen to hold for no
reason: presumably, if the Rapture happened and the agnostic were
transported to heaven, he would *still* insist that it's impossible to
know one way or another.

Huxley himself pointed out the incompatibility with this 'position' of
unknowability and his own 'process' or 'method' (ie, agnosticism as he
defined it:

"I do not very much care to speak of anything as "unknowable."2 What I
am sure about is that there are many topics about which I know nothing;
and which, so far as I can see, are out of reach of my faculties. But
whether these things are knowable by any one else is exactly one of
those matters which is beyond my knowledge, though I may have a
tolerably strong opinion as to the probabilities of the case."
http://aleph0.clarku.edu/huxley/CE5/Agn-X.html

Which is the final problem with the author's switched definition: it
defines agnosticism as belief in a 'position' which the man who
admittedly coined the term quite clearly did not believe. IOW, the
author is no longer talking about Huxley's agnosticism at all, but
about a strawman that is clearly inconsistent with it.

Furthermore, the lack of knowledge inherent in agnosticism is
self-contradictory. If we know nothing about the god-concept, then we
cannot claim it exists, or discuss it rationally.

If we claim not to know anything about the concept, then we still know
something about it : that it is beyond human understanding, and
rational discussion. Therefore agnosticism is contradictory, and must
inevitably lead to strong-atheism.

Impeccable logic, a reader might think; but where did the idea that we
'know nothing about the god-concept' come from? He'd be advised to
reread the 'modern definition': "Agnosticism is the claim that we can
have no knowledge of the god question." The reader might have thought
that meant we can have no knowledge of whether gods existed - not that
we cannot even know what the word 'god' means - but if so then he has
simply misread. The definition is quite explicit: "No knowledge,"
period. Therefore, agnostics believe definition that we cannot know
what the word 'god' means, or even whether it can mean anything - in
which case it is quite absurd for them to even use the word - much less
make it the only tenet of their entire 'position' (as the definition
also tells us they do).

Furthermore, agnosticism must be self-contradictory, as identity is
necessary for anything to exist, and there is no such thing as an
undefined object.

Whatever exists in reality has attributes. If we
admit that we have no knowledge about the god-concept, including how to
define it, then it cannot exist. Thus assuming agnosticism is true
leads to a contradiction.

Indeed, the absurdities start piling up at this stage. Since (by the
author's 'modern definition') agnostics beli