| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"words of truth" |
| Date: |
26 Sep 2005 07:29:29 AM |
| Object: |
Atheism Is Built On A Leap Of Blind Faith |
http://imagoveritatis.myatts.net/comments.php?id=24_0_1_0_C
Don't Believe It
I ran into a blog that claims to be based on "reason" alone and it
turned out to be, predictably, run by an Objectivist (with a capital
"O" that means a disciple of Ayn Rand). Objectivism is a form of
atheism, though they tend to focus much more on the positive aspects of
their system rather than getting hung up on the God thing, unlike the
folks over at infidels.org. Anyway, that prompted to me to pull off the
shelf one of the many books that I have bought and put away for future
reading, (whenever that is - heh, heh) and before I knew it I was well
into it. The book is John Robbins' Without A Prayer: Ayn Rand and the
Close of Her System, available here.
Well, the book is a masterpiece, and though I don't follow every detail
of Gordon Clark's philosophy which figures heavily in Robbins'
argument, by the end of the chapter on epistemology he has reduced
Rand's system to a pile of rubble that is hopelessly beyond salvaging.
In fact, one cannot but conclude, after reading this analysis, that
Rand's system, rather than being founded upon reason, is profoundly
irrational. It surely requires a blind leap of faith to grasp. I won't
repeat the arguments here; the reader is encouraged to get the book and
see.
So, in that vein, I have been scrounging around the web to see what
else there is in the blogosphere (hey I'm getting into this new lingo!)
when I came across this piece from Tertius, who complains about
atheists who pretend that they do not have a world view, but rather
that they simply lack a belief in God. He calls this atheism lite -
well put I think - because it IS a cop out, as he shows. I have run
across this kind of thing, of course and after analyzing atheism I came
up with at least four positive philosophical assertions that
necessariliy follow from the denial of the existence of God, which are
discussed on page 10 of my conversations with atheists and which I will
quote here:
So when the atheist denies or says he does not believe in a God, he is
necessarily making a number of positive world view presuppositions
about the nature of the universe. What are some of these? At least the
following:
1) The universe is self-sufficient in its existence and operations. It
is autonomous and not dependent upon another external entity, but
functions based on the laws of nature which determine its character.
2) The principles of knowledge or interpretation of the universe are
contained within and derived from the universe itself. There is no need
for a revelation or interpretation of the universe from a vantage point
outside of the universe. Since there is no outside the universe,
according to the atheist, no such revelation could exist in any case.
Therefore, the ultimate reference point for predication and
interpretation is a principle such as logic, sense perception,
intuition, all of which must exist in the universe, and which were
derived ultimately from human reason. The human mind is autonomous and
is adequate to discover truth on its own, using its own methods. All
truth claims must pass the test of human reason. There is no higher
authority.
3) Right and wrong are relative terms that describe social norms
developed by humankind to enhance its survival and pleasure. There is
no absolute right and wrong and in the end, it is the autonomous human
mind that legislates morality.
4) There is no discernible purpose to history or in the operations and
existence of the universe. The universe is the ultimate reality and it
is impersonal and unconcerned about us or our fate. It is simply there
and appears to be what it is largely as a result of chance. The human
future is undetermined, since there is no divine plan governing it. The
meaning of life is what we make of it based on the decisions of our
autonomous wills, and there is no final meaning in the end.
Each of these four notions corresponds to an interpretation of the four
areas that define a world view: ontology (the nature of reality or
being), epistemology (the theory of how we have and justify knowledge),
ethics (the theory of the ultimate good and of moral action), and
teleology (the theory of the purpose of it all). Thus, we see that the
denial of belief in God necessarily implies a basic set of world view
assumptions (axioms or presuppositions) that form a positive
interpretation of the state of affairs.
So the atheist really has no excuse and nowhere to hide. The assertion
that atheism is just a denial is merely a smokescreen to avoid having
to mount a defense of his position. But that emperor is stark naked.
The atheist who wants any intellectual respect is both philosophically
and morally obligated to defend his beliefs as a system, and that means
defending the above assertions. And that puts his whole system up for
discussion. Once we open that door then it is only a matter of time
before the inherent irrationality of atheism reveals itself and the
atheist has to look squarely in the face that fact that his whole
system is built on a leap of faith, and a blind one at that.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
18 Oct 2005 06:56:02 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 03:51:04 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <divvmt$gd3$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Sun, 16 Oct 2005 18:10:36 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <diutme$4ss$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
I don't yet see that. It seems to me that the BB *is* the causal entity.
(Whether we talk in terms of enities or events, I'm not sure matters.)
It caused the expansion of the universe, for example, detectable in red
shift.
You misunderstand the explanation. The Big Bang is not a causal
entity, it is a name for the early expansion of the Universe. The
initial cause is beyond our observation, the subsequent causes are the
standard laws of physics.
[snip]
Hmmm. So it seems that you think that scientific hypotheses cannot be
legitmately criticised on religious grounds.
Not in a science class. And not with the standards of science. Science
tells us hurricanes are caused by heated air, a rotating Earth, etc. A
religion may tell us that hurricanes are caused by the breath of God.
We only teach the former in science class and, in the public schools,
at the least, and in any school that wants to provide a high quality
education, we do not teach the second.
Are you willing to maintain
the symmetry and suggest that science has no place in the religion class?
There is no particular need for symmetry here. Science gives us
explanations regarding observations in the world. Within its domain it
is pretty much the champion. If religious teachings contradict the
scientific view people are free, of course, to choose the answer they
like. But only one of those answers can be tested and checked in the
world. A religion may well teach that contagious diseases are caused
by burns, science tells us otherwise. We do and should only teach the
latter in health class.
Religiion and science both offer explanations for observations in the world.
To some extent, sure. But religion has been retreating as an
explanation of the world for hundreds of years.
In the west, at least, that seems to me to be true. And many other
regions of the world.
Look at the
hurricanes. No one has suggested that it was God, and not heat, that
fueled the storms.
I doubt that's true. But I've no direct evidence. And I suspect many
appealed to both explantions.
Sure, some add God to the exploration and try to
make a moral point, but this is far from what was thought 1,000 years
ago.
Yes. It seems to me that the hold that religion once had over belief has
at least partly (perhaps largely) been supplanted by science. Again, at
least in the west, and in other regions as well.
By whose explanatory standards is it judged the victor? (yes, a loaded
question). Apparently, because only science is testable? Well, that
rather presupposes that testability is more important, and that is a
scientific criterion.
You are free to use other criteria, you are free to have any belief
you want. What bothers me is when people want the reputation of
science for their religious views. If you have standards other than
prediction, then say so. Try to convince me that there is some better
way to judge competing ideas.
Ah yes - just as I thought - the *reputation* of science. "Science", for
you, is a priveliged epistemic badge - one that relion does not deserve.
It is for many religionists as well, which is why they want that badge
for their views.
By by what standard should I try to convince you that there is a better
way? Tell you what, you tell me of an explanatory standard that you
accept as a better standard to that of science to judge between
competing ideas, and I'll try to use the standard to persuade you that
there is some better way to judge competing ideas. My point, of course,
is that you are not going to accept anything I offer as a better
standard. It is supreme for you, and so I would have no persuasive
leverage. But the same can be said by the religionist regarding their
explanatory standards. For example, what explanatory standard could
there be that is better at judgeing competing ideas that which coheres
most with the revealed word of God?! Prediction? Pah! (They will say.)
As for me, since you ask, I am rather pluralistic in my explanatory
standards. With regards to natural phenomena, I'm rather partial to
scientific standards for proximal explanation. I'm more open for distal
explanation. With respect to human behavaiour I'm partial to folk
psychology (whose scientific status is questionable, depending on what
you mean by "science"). For philosophical epxlanation I prefer logical
rigour and consistency. Etc. It varies on a case by case basis.
For me, when I want to go outside I rather have a accurate prediction
of the weather rather than a morally favorable one. When I take
medicines to cure a disease I prefer double blind trials rather than
following some religious belief. When I fly in an airplane or go to
the 40th floor of a building or drive over a bridge, I prefer the
predictive ability of science to the moral indignation of religion.
Where prediction matters regarding natural behaviour then I prefer
science as well. Of course. But what does that tell us? Does it tell us
anything more than that science is uniquely good at predicting how the
world will behave? And that we should listen to sciences predictions if
we want to know how the world will behave? (Which we all do.) I don't
yet see how any of the above examples provides grounds for preferring
scientific standards of *explanation* over, say, religious standards for
explanation. It does provide general grounds for preferring scientfiic
predictions to people gazing at crystal balls.
You are free, as they say, to let your religious beliefs tell you it
is ok to step in front of a bus or step out of the window of that 40th
floor, but I think we both know you will be dead no matter your
religion.
I'd agree. But I'm not sure what that shows other than that science is
very useful for predicting behaviour.
I don't necessarily disagree with your answers, but I think we need to
be aware that if science is judged a winner, it is because we endorse
its explanatory criteria (such as testability) over those of religion
(such as, in keeping with the Bible). There is nothing a priori, in my
view, that necessitates such a victory.
I agree, that is exactly *why* I stated the criteria. I pointed out
the testability of science *because* I want people to see and judge
the criteria. In this particular case I want it clear that if
prediction is the criteria, then ID is nonsense. It is only if you
want religion, and are willing to put up with the inherent dishonesty
of ID to get it into the schools, is ID of any value.
If predictability is *the* criteria, then ID is simply not useful.
Predicatability is something everyone values because it is so useful.
But predictability is one thing, *truth* another. Is there a link
between the two? Science supposes so. But that risks taking us into even
deeper terrain.
But a problem arises when they offer competing explanations for the very
same phenomena, which often happens, not just in explaining the fit of
form to function. Then it seems that we usually have to choose between
different explanatory methodologies and criteria. In most cases, I
think, it makes little sense to say that both the religious and the
scientific epxlanations are correct. ID explanation is a perfectly good
explanation by religious criteria, not very good by scientific criteria
(and vice versa). Do we have any neutral basis to prefer one over the other?
One can be checked, the other can't. One can be shown to fit with
observations, the other can't.
But *that* is a scientific criterion. Why is checkability more important
than, say, consistency with religious authority?
One is likely to save your life. Choose what you want. The ability to
test is a neutral criterion, you can separately decide how important
it is to you.
Firstly, religionists will typically reject your claim - science will
not save your life (science cannot ultimately stop you from dying) but
religious belief can. (They will say.)
I see we cannot avoid drifting into deeper water! Here I want to raise a
distincion I've skirted over. The ability to *test* (or "check") and the
ability to *predict* are different criteria. Science asumes that its
hypotheses are shown to be true (or are at least partially confirmed,
or, on some accounts, survive falsification) if its predictions occur.
I'm not entirely convinced that science tests its claims in the sense
that the correctness of its predictions constitutes evidence for the
truth of its hypotheses. But I'm open to persuasion.
You and I, not matter our religious beliefs, can judge
how well competing models do at predicting future observations.
Yes. By the way, I'm not religious.
If you
don't care about that, you don't care.
Oh I care - so does everyone. Even religionists.
That is your subjective
judgment of the criteria, not a quality of the criteria itself.
I agree. Science really does predict very well. But does *that* make it
better as a criterion for good explanation for observable phenomena? If
*all* we are interested in explanation for is prediction, then it's
pretty much a done deal.
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| User: "Mani Deli" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
15 Oct 2005 10:34:25 PM |
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On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, Goober <go.away@nowhere.com>
wrote:
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the
of evolutionary theory
Bible babble has nothing to do with what might be as you call it any
"scientfiic adequacy."
whether from ID theorists or not. One doesn't
have to be an ID theorist to see weaknesses or difficulties in
evolutionary explanation.
If you see any weakness write a scientific paper explaining it.
It may yet be entirely coherent and rational for
someone to suggest that the best explanation for the manifest fit of
form to function is ID theory even if far and away the best *scientific*
theory is evolutionary theory.
Who made the designer in D? What evedence is there for such an entity?
Why don't you stop you circumloctions and tell us that.
Again, religion has a place -- theology -- for such inquiries.
It has no place in public education. Even if god exists there is still
no reason to believe any theology or set of instructions concocted by
any branch of the superstition business. No one knows anything about
god. All theology is a figment of someone's imagination. Imagination
is not evidence.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
16 Oct 2005 08:39:23 PM |
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Mani Deli wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, Goober <go.away@nowhere.com>
wrote:
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the
of evolutionary theory
Bible babble has nothing to do with what might be as you call it any
"scientfiic adequacy."
Prejoratives aside, any arguments or criticisims need to be assessed in
their own terms, regardless of their source.
whether from ID theorists or not. One doesn't
have to be an ID theorist to see weaknesses or difficulties in
evolutionary explanation.
If you see any weakness write a scientific paper explaining it.
I don't need to, many others have already done that. For example, the
Gould/Dawkins debate on whether there is group selection. Debates on
explaining why there is sex, etc. Exaptations versus adatations.
It may yet be entirely coherent and rational for
someone to suggest that the best explanation for the manifest fit of
form to function is ID theory even if far and away the best *scientific*
theory is evolutionary theory.
Who made the designer in D?
Why do you think that is a relevant question for assessing the merits or
otherwise of ID theory explanation for ...
What evedence is there for such an entity?
.... the fit of form to function manifest in the natural world?
I've argued that it is not a relevant question, anymore than one needs
to explain why oxygen has the electron structure that it does in order
to appeal to that structure to explain its chemical properties.
(Note: I'm not saying that's remotely conclusive evidence, and I'm not
saying that there are no better explanations for the same phenomena ...
or any other pheneoman adduced in support of the existence of a divine
being.)
To re-iterates the basics: ID is a hypothesis to explain the manifest
fit of form to function observable in the natural world (a phenomena
that evolutionary theory also purports to explain). Like evolutionary
theory, it purports to be an inference to best explanation (IBE). That
was the central point with which I entered this thread.
Whether ID is the "best" explanation really depends on which standards
one chooses. By scientific standards, evolutionary theory clearly wins
out, imo. But there are other standards for explanation - perfectly good
standards that we use every day of our lives.
Why don't you stop you circumloctions and tell us that.
If you had been following my posts you would have found answers to both
your questions.
Again, religion has a place -- theology -- for such inquiries.
It has no place in public education. Even if god exists there is still
no reason to believe any theology or set of instructions concocted by
any branch of the superstition business. No one knows anything about
god. All theology is a figment of someone's imagination. Imagination
is not evidence.
I think religious education - as in education *about* the worlds
religions - has a vital place in public education. We cannot understand
the greater part of humanity without an understanding of their religious
beliefs. I think education *of* the world's religions should be kept out
of public education. (In other words, I think the public school system
should be universally secular.) I am not arguing for belief in any
theology. Imagination is not evidence, but the products of our
imaginations can be explanations for phenomena if it's the best
explanation for that phenomena.
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
16 Oct 2005 08:38:44 PM |
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On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
One doesn't
have to be an ID theorist to see weaknesses or difficulties in
evolutionary explanation.
Such as what?
And I think, in the broader educational
setting (perhaps not in science class) that it is very appropriate to
point out that scientfic explanation is not the only reasonable
explanatory strategy.
If you have an alternative approach then let us know what it is. Don't
hide behind claims that you have better science.
It may yet be entirely coherent and rational for
someone to suggest that the best explanation for the manifest fit of
form to function is ID theory even if far and away the best *scientific*
theory is evolutionary theory.
What is your standard of "best" here? That is, how is your alternative
the "best" explanation?
[snip]
--
Matt Silberstein
Do something today about the Darfur Genocide
Genocide is news | Be A Witness
http://www.beawitness.org
"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"
www.darfurgenocide.org
Save Darfur.org :: Violence and Suffering in Sudan's Darfur Region
http://www.savedarfur.org/
.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
17 Oct 2005 06:20:50 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
One doesn't
have to be an ID theorist to see weaknesses or difficulties in
evolutionary explanation.
Such as what?
I had in mind debates concerning exaptation, group selection,
explanation for sex, tautological aspects of 'survival of the fittest'.
But it's not that I think such issues can't be answered adequately.
And I think, in the broader educational
setting (perhaps not in science class) that it is very appropriate to
point out that scientfic explanation is not the only reasonable
explanatory strategy.
If you have an alternative approach then let us know what it is. Don't
hide behind claims that you have better science.
Oh I'm not saying that I do have "better science". I mean, for example,
everyday explanations.
For example, "the reason I had trouble getting an erection was that it
was my first time". That does not satisfy scientific standards for an
explanation. It is not testable or repeatable, so far as I can see. More
importantly, even if we could dream up a way to test it - we do not
apply such tests before we accept it as a perfectly good explanation.
Rarely do we apply such scientific standards as testability and
entailing testable predication before we accept an explanation.
Or how about, "the reason you shouldn't have an abortion is because a
feotus is a person". How are we to test that claim (that a foetus is a
person) and what testable predictions follow? None, so far as I can see.
Yet that counts as an explanation (whether we accept the premise is
another matter).
Religion also has its own standards, typically including consistency and
coherence with the pronouncements of a religious authority, or with a
sacred text, or with articles of faith, etc.
It may yet be entirely coherent and rational for
someone to suggest that the best explanation for the manifest fit of
form to function is ID theory even if far and away the best *scientific*
theory is evolutionary theory.
What is your standard of "best" here? That is, how is your alternative
the "best" explanation?
With regards to the ID debate I don't think there is an objective
standard for determineing "best" amongst the competing standards. It all
comes down to preference.
The explanatory strategies I *prefer* vary by context. In a religious
discussion it is not science. In a scientific discussion it is not
religion. In the case of explaining natural phenomena I prefer
scientific where a conflict arises. But that's my preference.
[snip]
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
17 Oct 2005 09:30:35 AM |
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On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 04:20:50 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dj01en$gu2$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
One doesn't
have to be an ID theorist to see weaknesses or difficulties in
evolutionary explanation.
Such as what?
I had in mind debates concerning exaptation, group selection,
explanation for sex, tautological aspects of 'survival of the fittest'.
The first three are not weaknesses of evolution but, rather, areas of
exploration. Having an active area of exploration is not a weakness of
science. "Survival of the fittest" is a misleading shorthand for what
evolutionary theory actually says and the actual part of the model is
not a tautology. I do think that a quality biology course would
explain that.
But it's not that I think such issues can't be answered adequately.
Sure they can.
And I think, in the broader educational
setting (perhaps not in science class) that it is very appropriate to
point out that scientfic explanation is not the only reasonable
explanatory strategy.
If you have an alternative approach then let us know what it is. Don't
hide behind claims that you have better science.
Oh I'm not saying that I do have "better science". I mean, for example,
everyday explanations.
For example, "the reason I had trouble getting an erection was that it
was my first time". That does not satisfy scientific standards for an
explanation. It is not testable or repeatable, so far as I can see.
There are certainly testable aspects of it. There certainly are
studies of first time sex and erectile dysfunction and so on. You are
right that specific personal historical experiences are not easily
studied scientifically. SFW?
More
importantly, even if we could dream up a way to test it - we do not
apply such tests before we accept it as a perfectly good explanation.
We are unlikely to accept "Josey put a curse on me" as an explanation
today. Nor would we accept "the stars were not favorable". Nor "I
should not have had milk for breakfast, you can't have sex if you have
milk for breakfast". There is a large number of explanations, some
quite acceptable in the past, that science has rejected.
Rarely do we apply such scientific standards as testability and
entailing testable predication before we accept an explanation.
Because it permeates our life to some large extent. And to the extent
that the situation is not important then we don't need to test our
model. But as far as I can tell, testing explanatory models against
future occurrences is what is going to happen no matter what we happen
to like. Things will fall down at a particular acceleration whether or
not I think about it.
Or how about, "the reason you shouldn't have an abortion is because a
feotus is a person". How are we to test that claim (that a foetus is a
person) and what testable predictions follow? None, so far as I can see.
Yet that counts as an explanation (whether we accept the premise is
another matter).
It is not an explanation, it is a moral statement. You leave out lots
of supporting words and distort the claim. (Though the "should" should
give you a clue.) Here is your statement expanded: "In my view a fetus
is a person, it is wrong to kill a person, this makes abortion wrong,
and since you should not do wrong things you should not have an
abortion."
Religion also has its own standards, typically including consistency and
coherence with the pronouncements of a religious authority, or with a
sacred text, or with articles of faith, etc.
Yep. And when religious statements are made with testable consequences
we can test then. Your final judgment is yours, but the criteria is
objective.
[snip]
--
Matt Silberstein
Do something today about the Darfur Genocide
Genocide is news | Be A Witness
http://www.beawitness.org
"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"
www.darfurgenocide.org
Save Darfur.org :: Violence and Suffering in Sudan's Darfur Region
http://www.savedarfur.org/
.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
18 Oct 2005 04:29:29 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 04:20:50 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dj01en$gu2$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
One doesn't
have to be an ID theorist to see weaknesses or difficulties in
evolutionary explanation.
Such as what?
I had in mind debates concerning exaptation, group selection,
explanation for sex, tautological aspects of 'survival of the fittest'.
The first three are not weaknesses of evolution but, rather, areas of
exploration. Having an active area of exploration is not a weakness of
science. "Survival of the fittest" is a misleading shorthand for what
evolutionary theory actually says and the actual part of the model is
not a tautology. I do think that a quality biology course would
explain that.
I tend to agree.
But it's not that I think such issues can't be answered adequately.
Sure they can.
And I think, in the broader educational
setting (perhaps not in science class) that it is very appropriate to
point out that scientfic explanation is not the only reasonable
explanatory strategy.
If you have an alternative approach then let us know what it is. Don't
hide behind claims that you have better science.
Oh I'm not saying that I do have "better science". I mean, for example,
everyday explanations.
For example, "the reason I had trouble getting an erection was that it
was my first time". That does not satisfy scientific standards for an
explanation. It is not testable or repeatable, so far as I can see.
There are certainly testable aspects of it. There certainly are
studies of first time sex and erectile dysfunction and so on. You are
right that specific personal historical experiences are not easily
studied scientifically. SFW?
I'm not sure what "SFW" means, but I'll guess. ...
Not all perfectly good explanation is scientific. That is the point. In
biology classes it seems to me that any and all perfectly good
explantions for biological phenomena are potentially admissable.
More
importantly, even if we could dream up a way to test it - we do not
apply such tests before we accept it as a perfectly good explanation.
We are unlikely to accept "Josey put a curse on me" as an explanation
today.
"We"? Well, yes, you and me, perhaps. But is this just a popularity
issue? There are plenty of people who would accept that as an
explanation. Millions (though far fewer in the science influenced west).
Nor would we accept "the stars were not favorable". Nor "I
should not have had milk for breakfast, you can't have sex if you have
milk for breakfast". There is a large number of explanations, some
quite acceptable in the past, that science has rejected.
Ah yes, that *science* has rejected. That millions of others have not.
Rarely do we apply such scientific standards as testability and
entailing testable predication before we accept an explanation.
Because it permeates our life to some large extent. And to the extent
that the situation is not important then we don't need to test our
model. But as far as I can tell, testing explanatory models against
future occurrences is what is going to happen no matter what we happen
to like. Things will fall down at a particular acceleration whether or
not I think about it.
The phenomena is rarely the issue. The issue is the explanation. For
then the question arises: what explains that acceleration? Science has
its answers. Religion has other answers.
Or how about, "the reason you shouldn't have an abortion is because a
feotus is a person". How are we to test that claim (that a foetus is a
person) and what testable predictions follow? None, so far as I can see.
Yet that counts as an explanation (whether we accept the premise is
another matter).
It is not an explanation, it is a moral statement. You leave out lots
of supporting words and distort the claim. (Though the "should" should
give you a clue.) Here is your statement expanded: "In my view a fetus
is a person, it is wrong to kill a person, this makes abortion wrong,
and since you should not do wrong things you should not have an
abortion."
I disagree. True, one can read it as a justification of a moral claim.
But also, that the foetus being a person is an explanation for why one
ought not have an abortion. This can be seen from your own expansion.
Notice the key phrase you used: "this *makes* abortion" wrong (emphasis
added). It being a person *causes*, in a moral sense of that term, it to
be immoral to abort it. It is offered to *explain* why it is wrong to do
it.
Religion also has its own standards, typically including consistency and
coherence with the pronouncements of a religious authority, or with a
sacred text, or with articles of faith, etc.
Yep. And when religious statements are made with testable consequences
we can test then. Your final judgment is yours, but the criteria is
objective.
I'm not suggesting otherwise. Science makes predictions, it conducts
experiments intended to test those predictions, and those predictions (a
lot of the time at least) turn out to be correct. The question remains:
which explanatory strategy shall we use? Shall we use an explanatory
strategy that requires us to make predictions and test them, or one that
appeals to (say) personal experience, religious authority, atrological
readings, moral commitments, etc. Not everyone uses the scientific
strategy, and a great many use a religious explanatory strategy.
[snip]
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
18 Oct 2005 12:55:45 PM |
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On Tue, 18 Oct 2005 02:29:29 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dj2f9u$dqf$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 04:20:50 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dj01en$gu2$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
One doesn't
have to be an ID theorist to see weaknesses or difficulties in
evolutionary explanation.
Such as what?
I had in mind debates concerning exaptation, group selection,
explanation for sex, tautological aspects of 'survival of the fittest'.
The first three are not weaknesses of evolution but, rather, areas of
exploration. Having an active area of exploration is not a weakness of
science. "Survival of the fittest" is a misleading shorthand for what
evolutionary theory actually says and the actual part of the model is
not a tautology. I do think that a quality biology course would
explain that.
I tend to agree.
But it's not that I think such issues can't be answered adequately.
Sure they can.
And I think, in the broader educational
setting (perhaps not in science class) that it is very appropriate to
point out that scientfic explanation is not the only reasonable
explanatory strategy.
If you have an alternative approach then let us know what it is. Don't
hide behind claims that you have better science.
Oh I'm not saying that I do have "better science". I mean, for example,
everyday explanations.
For example, "the reason I had trouble getting an erection was that it
was my first time". That does not satisfy scientific standards for an
explanation. It is not testable or repeatable, so far as I can see.
There are certainly testable aspects of it. There certainly are
studies of first time sex and erectile dysfunction and so on. You are
right that specific personal historical experiences are not easily
studied scientifically. SFW?
I'm not sure what "SFW" means, but I'll guess. ...
So _strong word_ What?
Not all perfectly good explanation is scientific. That is the point. In
biology classes it seems to me that any and all perfectly good
explantions for biological phenomena are potentially admissable.
I agree, but science offers the most predictive practical causal
explanations. There may well be other things occurring and there
certainly are other domains of explanation. Saying "your immoral ways
caused X" is a valid explanation in a different domain, but it does
not contradict that scientific answer. That is, whenever we have tried
moral/religious/? predictions and compared them to scientific, the
scientific are more accurate. And that is all that science offers.
More
importantly, even if we could dream up a way to test it - we do not
apply such tests before we accept it as a perfectly good explanation.
We are unlikely to accept "Josey put a curse on me" as an explanation
today.
"We"? Well, yes, you and me, perhaps. But is this just a popularity
issue?
It is to a large extent testable and has been tested. And it is my
strong "belief" (as in judgment and prediction based on evidence seen)
that the world continues to test those kinds of ideas.
There are plenty of people who would accept that as an
explanation. Millions (though far fewer in the science influenced west).
Yep. And when we test these ideas in the world the scientific answers
win out overwhelmingly. They may not be right, but they sure are
accurate. I find that it works for figuring out what clothes to wear
and what food to eat and what buildings are safe. Others are free to
have different standards, but honesty (another concept that people are
free to have a different view on) demands that they make it clear that
they had different standards than science. If ID is presented as
non-science, then we can discuss it that way. But as long as it is
presented as science then I have to point out that it fails every
single step.
Nor would we accept "the stars were not favorable". Nor "I
should not have had milk for breakfast, you can't have sex if you have
milk for breakfast". There is a large number of explanations, some
quite acceptable in the past, that science has rejected.
Ah yes, that *science* has rejected. That millions of others have not.
Millions have. Viagra sales do quite well.
Rarely do we apply such scientific standards as testability and
entailing testable predication before we accept an explanation.
Because it permeates our life to some large extent. And to the extent
that the situation is not important then we don't need to test our
model. But as far as I can tell, testing explanatory models against
future occurrences is what is going to happen no matter what we happen
to like. Things will fall down at a particular acceleration whether or
not I think about it.
The phenomena is rarely the issue. The issue is the explanation. For
then the question arises: what explains that acceleration? Science has
its answers. Religion has other answers.
Religion has no answers that give me a resultant acceleration.
Religion can incorporate the science, but they have no useful
independent accurate predictions.
Or how about, "the reason you shouldn't have an abortion is because a
feotus is a person". How are we to test that claim (that a foetus is a
person) and what testable predictions follow? None, so far as I can see.
Yet that counts as an explanation (whether we accept the premise is
another matter).
It is not an explanation, it is a moral statement. You leave out lots
of supporting words and distort the claim. (Though the "should" should
give you a clue.) Here is your statement expanded: "In my view a fetus
is a person, it is wrong to kill a person, this makes abortion wrong,
and since you should not do wrong things you should not have an
abortion."
I disagree. True, one can read it as a justification of a moral claim.
But also, that the foetus being a person is an explanation for why one
ought not have an abortion.
Ought statements are not scientific ones, they are moral claims.
Science tells you nothing of what you ought to do.
This can be seen from your own expansion.
Notice the key phrase you used: "this *makes* abortion" wrong (emphasis
added). It being a person *causes*, in a moral sense of that term, it to
be immoral to abort it. It is offered to *explain* why it is wrong to do
it.
Then it becomes a moral explanation and outside of science. And to
some extent we are equivocating on what "explanation" means. They
really are different terms in science and in moral philosophy.
Religion also has its own standards, typically including consistency and
coherence with the pronouncements of a religious authority, or with a
sacred text, or with articles of faith, etc.
Yep. And when religious statements are made with testable consequences
we can test then. Your final judgment is yours, but the criteria is
objective.
I'm not suggesting otherwise. Science makes predictions, it conducts
experiments intended to test those predictions, and those predictions (a
lot of the time at least) turn out to be correct. The question remains:
which explanatory strategy shall we use? Shall we use an explanatory
strategy that requires us to make predictions and test them, or one that
appeals to (say) personal experience, religious authority, atrological
readings, moral commitments, etc. Not everyone uses the scientific
strategy, and a great many use a religious explanatory strategy.
Ignore the science if you wish, the world does not seem to care. My
first concern is that people make it clear that they are ignoring the
science rather than trying to adopt the authority. Then we can discuss
which standards to use. But I suspect that the world will still have
things fall with a particular acceleration no matter what moral rules
we have about that.
--
Matt Silberstein
Do something today about the Darfur Genocide
Genocide is news | Be A Witness
http://www.beawitness.org
"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"
www.darfurgenocide.org
Save Darfur.org :: Violence and Suffering in Sudan's Darfur Region
http://www.savedarfur.org/
.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
19 Oct 2005 03:31:54 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Tue, 18 Oct 2005 02:29:29 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dj2f9u$dqf$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 04:20:50 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dj01en$gu2$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
One doesn't
have to be an ID theorist to see weaknesses or difficulties in
evolutionary explanation.
Such as what?
I had in mind debates concerning exaptation, group selection,
explanation for sex, tautological aspects of 'survival of the fittest'.
The first three are not weaknesses of evolution but, rather, areas of
exploration. Having an active area of exploration is not a weakness of
science. "Survival of the fittest" is a misleading shorthand for what
evolutionary theory actually says and the actual part of the model is
not a tautology. I do think that a quality biology course would
explain that.
I tend to agree.
But it's not that I think such issues can't be answered adequately.
Sure they can.
And I think, in the broader educational
setting (perhaps not in science class) that it is very appropriate to
point out that scientfic explanation is not the only reasonable
explanatory strategy.
If you have an alternative approach then let us know what it is. Don't
hide behind claims that you have better science.
Oh I'm not saying that I do have "better science". I mean, for example,
everyday explanations.
For example, "the reason I had trouble getting an erection was that it
was my first time". That does not satisfy scientific standards for an
explanation. It is not testable or repeatable, so far as I can see.
There are certainly testable aspects of it. There certainly are
studies of first time sex and erectile dysfunction and so on. You are
right that specific personal historical experiences are not easily
studied scientifically. SFW?
I'm not sure what "SFW" means, but I'll guess. ...
So _strong word_ What?
Not all perfectly good explanation is scientific. That is the point. In
biology classes it seems to me that any and all perfectly good
explantions for biological phenomena are potentially admissable.
I agree, but science offers the most predictive practical causal
explanations. There may well be other things occurring and there
certainly are other domains of explanation. Saying "your immoral ways
caused X" is a valid explanation in a different domain, but it does
not contradict that scientific answer. That is, whenever we have tried
moral/religious/? predictions and compared them to scientific, the
scientific are more accurate. And that is all that science offers.
I don't find much to disagree with there. But I'm not sure what you
think religous explanation of the fit of form to function actually even
pretends to predict. So I'm not sure what you have in mind when you
speak of camparing them. I don't notice much ion the way of predictions
coming from religious (or moral) explanations. And that is precisely a
point of criticism that many raise. But that is also part of mt point: a
moral explanation can be a perfectly good explanation without making any
predictions. Accurate predictions are great ot have - it certainly makes
science valuable. But that is not the only thing that explanations are
supposed to deliver. Even good causal explanations need not deliver any
testable predictions (as happens with unique or unrepeatable events).
More
importantly, even if we could dream up a way to test it - we do not
apply such tests before we accept it as a perfectly good explanation.
We are unlikely to accept "Josey put a curse on me" as an explanation
today.
"We"? Well, yes, you and me, perhaps. But is this just a popularity
issue?
It is to a large extent testable and has been tested. And it is my
strong "belief" (as in judgment and prediction based on evidence seen)
that the world continues to test those kinds of ideas.
I think that the link you suppose between predictability and truth
(i.e., that hypotheses are *tested* for truth through their predictions)
is at least open to question. You seem to suppose that if hypothesis H
offers predictions P and if those predictions turn out to be correct,
that the truth of H is threby confirmed (or, at the very least,
supported). I don't have any hard views on this that I'm inclined to
defend, but having studied some philosophy of science I'm led to the
conclusion that matters are far from simple. (I'm thinking Kuhn,
Feyerabend, Quine, Van Fraasen). Your position is intuitive and commonly
accepted, but I don't think it is entirely secure.
There are plenty of people who would accept that as an
explanation. Millions (though far fewer in the science influenced west).
Yep. And when we test these ideas in the world the scientific answers
win out overwhelmingly. They may not be right, but they sure are
accurate.
And you can see my point, yes? You make the immediate inference from
science making correct predictions to the hypotheses upon which those
predictions were based being correct (or at least, more likely). In
fact, you seem to treat them as virtually synonymous. On your view,
science wins in the truth stakes simply (or essentially) bevcause it
wins in the accurate predication stakes.
I find that it works for figuring out what clothes to wear
and what food to eat and what buildings are safe. Others are free to
have different standards, but honesty (another concept that people are
free to have a different view on) demands that they make it clear that
they had different standards than science. If ID is presented as
non-science, then we can discuss it that way. But as long as it is
presented as science then I have to point out that it fails every
single step.
I'm in sympathy. The braoder question is whether failing those steps
means that it fails as an explanation. In other words, in losing out in
the predication stakes against science that it loses out in the
explanation stakes or the truth stakes. I don't see a very persuasive
reason to make that inference. At least, not yet. And perhaps you're not
arguing that it does.
Nor would we accept "the stars were not favorable". Nor "I
should not have had milk for breakfast, you can't have sex if you have
milk for breakfast". There is a large number of explanations, some
quite acceptable in the past, that science has rejected.
Ah yes, that *science* has rejected. That millions of others have not.
Millions have. Viagra sales do quite well.
Rarely do we apply such scientific standards as testability and
entailing testable predication before we accept an explanation.
Because it permeates our life to some large extent. And to the extent
that the situation is not important then we don't need to test our
model. But as far as I can tell, testing explanatory models against
future occurrences is what is going to happen no matter what we happen
to like. Things will fall down at a particular acceleration whether or
not I think about it.
The phenomena is rarely the issue. The issue is the explanation. For
then the question arises: what explains that acceleration? Science has
its answers. Religion has other answers.
Religion has no answers that give me a resultant acceleration.
Religion can incorporate the science, but they have no useful
independent accurate predictions.
Indeed. But I always find myself returning to the same point. Is losing
in the prediction stakes sufficient to dismiss an explanation as false
or as a bad explanation?
Or how about, "the reason you shouldn't have an abortion is because a
feotus is a person". How are we to test that claim (that a foetus is a
person) and what testable predictions follow? None, so far as I can see.
Yet that counts as an explanation (whether we accept the premise is
another matter).
It is not an explanation, it is a moral statement. You leave out lots
of supporting words and distort the claim. (Though the "should" should
give you a clue.) Here is your statement expanded: "In my view a fetus
is a person, it is wrong to kill a person, this makes abortion wrong,
and since you should not do wrong things you should not have an
abortion."
I disagree. True, one can read it as a justification of a moral claim.
But also, that the foetus being a person is an explanation for why one
ought not have an abortion.
Ought statements are not scientific ones, they are moral claims.
Science tells you nothing of what you ought to do.
I accept that. But my point seems to be untouched. We regularly give and
accept explanations (both causal ones and moral ones) that do not
require the provision of accurate predictions. I'm suggesting that
whilst you are entirely correct to say that science wins hands down for
making accurate predictions over, say, religious explanations, that does
not suffice to make non-predictive explantions bad explanations. And I
would say that that is true even if those non-predicative explanations
are in direct competition with scientific explanations.
This can be seen from your own expansion.
Notice the key phrase you used: "this *makes* abortion" wrong (emphasis
added). It being a person *causes*, in a moral sense of that term, it to
be immoral to abort it. It is offered to *explain* why it is wrong to do
it.
Then it becomes a moral explanation and outside of science. And to
some extent we are equivocating on what "explanation" means. They
really are different terms in science and in moral philosophy.
I accept that. Explanation has several different senses, one of which is
epitomosed by science. Other's are not. My point would be that
non-scientific explanation can be different but *just as valid*, qua
explanations.
Religion also has its own standards, typically including consistency and
coherence with the pronouncements of a religious authority, or with a
sacred text, or with articles of faith, etc.
Yep. And when religious statements are made with testable consequences
we can test then. Your final judgment is yours, but the criteria is
objective.
I'm not suggesting otherwise. Science makes predictions, it conducts
experiments intended to test those predictions, and those predictions (a
lot of the time at least) turn out to be correct. The question remains:
which explanatory strategy shall we use? Shall we use an explanatory
strategy that requires us to make predictions and test them, or one that
appeals to (say) personal experience, religious authority, atrological
readings, moral commitments, etc. Not everyone uses the scientific
strategy, and a great many use a religious explanatory strategy.
Ignore the science if you wish, the world does not seem to care. My
first concern is that people make it clear that they are ignoring the
science rather than trying to adopt the authority. Then we can discuss
which standards to use. But I suspect that the world will still have
things fall with a particular acceleration no matter what moral rules
we have about that.
It really isn't a question of ignoring the science, imo, but of two things.
Firstly, ID theorists often challenge evolutionary theory on the
predicatability criterion. This is because evolutionary theory has a
much harder time testing hypotheses than most other sciences (issues of
timescale, and the complexity of real world evolutionary systems are
foremost). It seems to me that the explanatory strength of evolutionary
theory does not rest on predictive success. This is why there yet
remains a great deal of dispute within evolutionary theory regarding
some very general issues, such as exaptation, group selection, sex. The
rival theories offered are very difficult to test in an unambiguous way.
Evolutionary theory's strength, imo, rests almost solely on it being a
really simple and powerful idea that explains a helluvalot of phenomena.
But the main point (for me, anyway), is that even if a science does do
fantastically well at making predictions, one might recognise
alternative explanations as entirely legitimate, if sometimes very
different and non-predictive. If an individual says that a science does
not make accurate predictions, or that their theory makes more accurate
predictions we can often put it to the test. I suspect that science will
win out in almost every case. But what would that show? Certainly that
science is *useful*. But it also seems to me that religionists and ID
supporters simply place more value on criteria other than
predictability. I don't think that religionists are typically saying
that their ID theory makes better testable predications that
evolutionary theory. (Some might, but it takes all sorts.) My impression
is that when it comes to assessing the quality of an explanation or the
truth of a claim, most supporters of ID simply care more about other
criteria, such as moral significance, coherence with religions
orhtodoxy, with revealed word, etc., than they do about predictive success.
For example, an ID supporter might say: "sure, science predicts very
accurately that if X then Y will occur. But the revealed word [or
whatever] is a much better guide to *truth*." Such a person is not
denying the predictive power of science, nor are they ignoring science,
nor are they denying that by predictive criteria of explanatory quality
such explanations are good (scietific) explanations. (Of course, this
might be a relatively sophisticated ID supporters that I just dreamed up.)
.
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| User: "Christopher A. Lee" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
16 Oct 2005 08:42:04 PM |
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On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 01:38:44 GMT, Matt Silberstein
<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
Very good point.
.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
17 Oct 2005 06:31:07 AM |
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Christopher A. Lee wrote:
On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 01:38:44 GMT, Matt Silberstein
<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
Very good point.
Is it not their place even if it is their kids in the high school? I'm
not sure I'd agree. After all, they may believe that the teachings are
deeply immoral (as well as mistaken).
And would you take the same 'hands-off' approach regarding the teachings
in certain religious schools? I'm thinking of fundamentalist Islamic
schools that (I'm told) tell children that it is the duty to wage Jihad,
by violence if necessary, against infidels. Is it no one's busniess
outside of the school? Or should they take it up with the religious
authorities only? Should those who oppose such teachings fund Islamic
religious scholarship to argue their point, rather than attempt to get
the teaching changed?
.
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
17 Oct 2005 09:15:31 AM |
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On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 04:31:07 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dj0222$h3m$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Christopher A. Lee wrote:
On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 01:38:44 GMT, Matt Silberstein
<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
Very good point.
Is it not their place even if it is their kids in the high school? I'm
not sure I'd agree. After all, they may believe that the teachings are
deeply immoral (as well as mistaken).
Then they should make that claim, not the other ones. That is, if they
think that evolution is bad science, they should make that claim *in
the appropriate venue*. Asking for high school students to discuss the
"controversy" is not that place. And I don't much care that people
think evolution is "immoral", the world is what it is. To my mind it
is both immoral and dangerous to refuse to look at parts of the world
because I dislike the morality. Rocks fall, sometimes they kill
people, sometimes they don't. Gravity is not a moral actor.
And would you take the same 'hands-off' approach regarding the teachings
in certain religious schools? I'm thinking of fundamentalist Islamic
schools that (I'm told) tell children that it is the duty to wage Jihad,
by violence if necessary, against infidels.
I don't see the connection here. We were discussing teaching of
science, particularly in the public schools. I wish that religious
schools would teach factually correct things to their students, be it
religion or history or whatever. But I also want the government to
stay away from interfering with religion. That is a balancing at that
depends strongly on the specifics of the case. Teaching Jihad by
violence is a danger, so is teaching that gays are evil people. More
people are hurt by the latter in the U.S. than the former.
Is it no one's busniess
outside of the school? Or should they take it up with the religious
authorities only? Should those who oppose such teachings fund Islamic
religious scholarship to argue their point, rather than attempt to get
the teaching changed?
Mote, beam, eye.
--
Matt Silberstein
Do something today about the Darfur Genocide
Genocide is news | Be A Witness
http://www.beawitness.org
"Darfur: A Genocide We can Stop"
www.darfurgenocide.org
Save Darfur.org :: Violence and Suffering in Sudan's Darfur Region
http://www.savedarfur.org/
.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: ID and Science |
18 Oct 2005 04:03:04 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote:
On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 04:31:07 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dj0222$h3m$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
Christopher A. Lee wrote:
On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 01:38:44 GMT, Matt Silberstein
<RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
On Sat, 15 Oct 2005 14:01:46 -0700, in alt.atheism , Goober
<go.away@nowhere.com> in <dirqo0$1in$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca> wrote:
[snip]
Ahhh! Sorry for being a bit dense - this happens when one jumps into a
thread without reading all that went before.
I think we may be in closer agreement than I thought. I grant that ID
theory fails numerous scientific desiderata and might (on those grounds
as well as others) be a scientifically weaker explanation than
evolutionary theory.
Neverthless, the science class is an appropriate forum to raise any
criticisms that might be forthcoming concerning the scientfiic adequacy
of evolutionary theory, whether from ID theorists or not.
Yes and no. A high school science class is certainly the place for a
high school student to bring up concerns regarding the material
presented in that class. It is not the place for others, outside the
school, to bring up their concerns. If you and I (assuming you are no
longer in high school) have issues with evolutionary biology, we
should bring it up in the places where scientists deal with concerns.
More to the point Behe and Dembski and Johnson and all those guys, if
they have problems with evolutionary biology, they should support
scientific research that deals with their points. Instead they try to
change the high school curriculum.
Very good point.
Is it not their place even if it is their kids in the high school? I'm
not sure I'd agree. After all, they may believe that the teachings are
deeply immoral (as well as mistaken).
Then they should make that claim, not the other ones.
I'm wondering whether you would object to such a justification, if it
were presented.
That is, if they
think that evolution is bad science, they should make that claim *in
the appropriate venue*. Asking for high school students to discuss the
"controversy" is not that place. And I don't much care that people
think evolution is "immoral", the world is what it is.
I shall try to be clearer, because my inital comment only scratched the
surface and was not very clear. (And my views are evolving as I think
things through a little more).
The world is what it is - religionists would presumably agree. But they
would disagree concerning what the *is* is in that remark. Now, by
*scientific* standards they might be on very weak grounds, but science
is *not* the only explanatory framework by which people judge the way
that the world *is*. Many use a religious framework in which the
pronouncements of science are not the only and often not the final
arbiters of how the world is. If a biology class purports to teach how
the world is, yet refuses to entertain discussion of competing
explanations for how the world is, then the parents' endorement of those
competing explanations seem to me to raise some legimate grounds for its
inclusion within such a class. Thus, the question is, in part, whether
their views on the morality or appropriateness of the education their
children are being given matters in determining its content. By
'immoral' (perhaps not the best way to express my point) I'm supposing
that they might reason that any class that purports to teach how the
world is but teaches only the *scientific* explanation for how the world
is and refuses to discuss alternative explanations (especially the
reiligious) for how the world is, offers, at best, an incomplete and
narrow education.
To my mind it
is both immoral and dangerous to refuse to look at parts of the world
because I dislike the morality. Rocks fall, sometimes they kill
people, sometimes they don't. Gravity is not a moral actor.
I understand and agree, but you're missing my point (which may have been
my fault). Is the explanation of why a rock falls and kills someone
gravity (as science suggests) or god (as many religionists suggest)? I
can guess *your* answer, and you will (presumably) adopt that answer
because you endorse the scientfic methodology and reject the religious
one for explaining the natural world. Others - and many of them are
parents with children in the public school system - disagree. Thus, from
their perspective, a class purporting to teach students how the natural
world *is* fails in that purpose unless it considers (in their
estimation) viable alternative explanations.
And would you take the same 'hands-off' approach regarding the teachings
in certain religious schools? I'm thinking of fundamentalist Islamic
schools that (I'm told) tell children that it is the duty to wage Jihad,
by violence if necessary, against infidels.
I don't see the connection here. We were discussing teaching of
science, particularly in the public schools. I wish that religious
schools would teach factually correct things to their students, be it
religion or history or whatever. But I also want the government to
stay away from interfering with religion. That is a balancing at that
depends strongly on the specifics of the case. Teaching Jihad by
violence is a danger, so is teaching that gays are evil people. More
people are hurt by the latter in the U.S. than the former.
I suspect you fail to see the connection because you assume that the
*only* 'factually correct' means to explain the natural world is via the
scientific method. You see, from my perspective a central point of a
biology class is to teach students about how the biological world is.
But that is *not* identical to teaching them how *science* explains the
biological world. For science is only one strategy for explaining the
biological world. Religion offers another.
Therefore I, at least, am *not* discussing the teaching of *science*,
but rather the teaching that goes on in classes devoted to studying and
explaining biological phenomena. The two are distinct, but often
confounded. Science teaches that the biological world works by
evolution. Hence any such *science* class is naturally restricted to
teaching only theories as science endorses. But teaching *biology* (i.e.
the study and explanation of the biological world, as distinct from the
dominant teachings of the *science* called 'biology') is not (or at
least need not) be solely concerned with teaching scientific orthodoxy.
It seems to me that the broader goal of a class that goes by the title
of "biology class" is to study biological phenomena and to seek to
explain, and to discuss, competing explanations for such phenomena.
Within this broader goal, a central place must surely be given to the
science of biology. It is, after all, western culture's most systematic
body of literature investigating the biological. But there is room, in
the study and explanation of biological phenomena, imo, for
non-scientific explanations. Where those alternative non-scientfic
explanations are endorsed by the parents, there is some justification
for its inclusion in a biology class. | | | | | |