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(December 15, 2005 -- 07:09 PM EDT)
President Bush says Congress saw the same intelligence he did in the lead-up
to the war in Iraq. So Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) asked the non-partisan
Congressional Research Service to look into the matter and report back
whether or not what the president said is true.
They reported back today. The verdict: not true.
Read it yourself.
-- Josh Marshall
This document is available online at this url.
Memorandum December 14, 2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TO: Sen. Dianne Feinstein
FROM:
Alfred Cumming
Specialist in Intelligence and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
SUBJECT: Congress as a Consumer of Intelligence Information
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This responds to your request for a discussion of Congress and its role as
a consumer of national intelligence, and for a listing and a description of
some of the U.S. Intelligence Community's principal intelligence products,
including an identification of those which the executive branch routinely
shares with Congress, and those which it does not.
Limitations on Congressional Access to Certain National Intelligence
By virtue of his constitutional role as commander-and-in-chief and head of
the executive branch, the President has access to all national intelligence
collected, analyzed and produced by the Intelligence Community. The
President's position also affords him the authority - which, at certain
times, has been aggressively asserted (1) - to restrict the flow of
intelligence information to Congress and its two intelligence committees,
which are charged with providing legislative oversight of the Intelligence
Community. (2) As a result, the President, and a small number of
presidentially-designated Cabinet-level officials, including the Vice
President (3) - in contrast to Members of Congress (4) - have access to a
far greater overall volume of intelligence and to more sensitive
intelligence information, including information regarding intelligence
sources and methods. They, unlike Members of Congress, also have the
authority to more extensively task the Intelligence Community, and its
extensive cadre of analysts, for follow-up information. As a result, the
President and his most senior advisors arguably are better positioned to
assess the quality of the Community's intelligence more accurately than is
Congress. (5)
In addition to their greater access to intelligence, the President and his
senior advisors also are better equipped than is Congress to assess
intelligence information by virtue of the primacy of their roles in
formulating U.S. foreign policy. Their foreign policy responsibilities often
require active, sustained, and often personal interaction, with senior
officials of many of the same countries targeted for intelligence collection
by the Intelligence Community. Thus the President and his senior advisors
are uniquely positioned to glean additional information and impressions -
information that, like certain sensitive intelligence information, is
generally unavailable to Congress - that can provide them with an important
additional perspective with which to judge the quality of intelligence.
Authorities Governing Executive Branch Control Over National Intelligence
The President is able to control dissemination of intelligence information
to Congress because the Intelligence Community is part of the executive
branch. It was created by law and executive order principally to serve that
branch of government in the execution of its responsibilities. (6) Thus, as
the head of the executive branch, the President generally is acknowledged to
be "the owner" of national intelligence.
The President's otherwise exclusive control over national intelligence,
however, is tempered by a statutory obligation to keep Congress, through its
two congressional intelligence committees, "fully and currently informed of
all intelligence activities..." (7) Current law also prevents the executive
branch from withholding intelligence information from the committees on the
grounds that providing the information to the congressional intelligence
committees would constitute the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information or information relating to intelligence sources and methods. (8)
In 2004, Congress further strengthened its claim to access to national
intelligence when in approving legislation reforming the intelligence
community it directed that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
provide the legislative branch access to national intelligence. (9)
Previously, the head of the Intelligence Community was legally charged with
providing the legislative branch national intelligence, but only "where
appropriate." (10) Congress never defined, either in statute, report
language or during debate, what it considered to be "appropriate,"
essentially leaving the executive branch free to adopt its own
interpretation of congressional intent in this instance. The impact of the
newly enacted, and unqualified directive, is dependent, as is generally the
case, upon how aggressively Congress asserts it statutory prerogative.
Despite conflicting legal authorities governing congressional access to
national intelligence, the U.S. Judicial Branch has not addressed the issue,
since no case involving an executive-legislative branch dispute over access
to intelligence has reached the U.S. courts. (11) Absent a court ruling more
clearly defining executive and legislative branch authorities in this area,
which most observers view as unlikely, the executive branch has contended
that it is under no legal obligation to provide Congress access to all
national intelligence. By contrast, Congress, through its congressional
intelligence oversight committees, has asserted in principle a legal
authority for unrestricted access to intelligence information. The
Committees, historically, have interpreted the law as allowing room to
decide how, rather than whether, they will have access to intelligence
information, provided that such access is consistent with the protection of
sources and methods. In practice, however, Congress has not sought all
national intelligence information. (12) Unless there has been a compelling
need, the intelligence committees generally have not routinely sought access
to such sensitive intelligence information as intelligence sources and
methods. When they have cited such compelling need for access, the
committees generally have reach an accommodation with the executive branch
usually, but not always.
Perhaps, in part, because of these differing legal views, the executive
and legislative branches apparently have not agreed to a set of formal
written rules that would govern the sharing and handling of national
intelligence. (13) Rather, according to one observer:
The current system is entirely the product of experience, shaped by the
needs and concerns of both branches over the last 20 years. While some
aspects of current practice appear to have achieved the status of mutually
accepted "policy," few represent hard- and-fast rules. "Policy" will give
way when it has to. (14)
In 2001, and again in 2002, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI) directed that the Director of Central Intelligence (15) prepare a
comprehensive report that would examine the role of Congress as a consumer
of intelligence, and explore the development of mechanisms that would
provide Members tailored intelligence products in support of their
policymaking responsibilities. (16) The Director never produced such a
report.
More recently, the SSCI included language in its version of the fiscal
year (FY) 2006 intelligence authorization bill (S. 1803) requiring that the
Intelligence Community, upon the request of the either the chairman or
ranking member of either of the congressional intelligence committees,
provide "any intelligence assessment, report, estimate, legal opinion, or
other intelligence information," within 15 days of the request being made,
unless the President certifies that the document or information is not being
provided because the President is asserting "a privilege pursuant to the
Constitution of the United States." (17)
Congressional Access to Intelligence Information Not Routinely Provided in
Four Areas
The executive branch generally does not routinely share with Congress four
general types of intelligence information:
a.. the identities of intelligence sources;
b.. the "methods" employed by the Intelligence Community in collecting
and analyzing intelligence;
c.. "raw" intelligence, which can be unevaluated or "lightly" evaluated
intelligence, (18) which in the case of human intelligence (19) sometimes is
provided by a single source, but which also could consist of intelligence
derived from multiple sources when signals (20) and imagery (21) collection
methods are employed; and,
d.. certain written intelligence products tailored to the specific needs
of the President and other high-level executive branch policymakers.
Included in the last category is the President's Daily Brief (PDB), a
written intelligence product which is briefed daily to the President, and
which consists of six to eight relatively short articles or briefs covering
a broad array of topics. (22) The PDB emphasizes current intelligence (23)
and is viewed as highly sensitive, in part, because it can contain
intelligence source and operational information. Its dissemination is thus
limited to the President and a small number of presidentially-designated
senior administration policymakers. (24)
Reasons for Congress Not Receiving Routine Access to Certain Intelligence.
In not providing Congress routine access to source identities, executive
branch officials cite the need to protect against "leaks" or unauthorized
disclosure of information that the Intelligence Community generally
considers to be the most sensitive in its possession. As more individuals
are briefed about sources, it is contended, the greater is the risk that
this information will be disclosed, inadvertently or otherwise. Such leaks
could jeopardize current or future access to possibly valuable intelligence,
and endanger the lives of intelligence sources providing the information.
Executive branch officials similarly point to security-related concerns in
explaining why Congress is not routinely provided intelligence methods,
particularly collection methods. As in the case of source protection,
officials argue that effective intelligence collection demands that the
methods - human and technical -- used to collect the intelligence be
protected by limiting the number of individuals witting of those methods.
Officials, in part, also cite security concerns in withholding raw
intelligence. Because raw intelligence sometimes is derived from a single
source, the source is arguably more vulnerable to identification and
ultimate exposure. Even when intelligence is collected from multiple
sources, as is sometimes the case when signals and imagery intelligence
collection efforts are employed, knowledge of those collection methods can
sometimes be determined from the underlying raw intelligence.
They cite two additional reasons for restricting congressional access to
raw intelligence. First, they contend that it would be "dangerous" if a
Member of Congress were to gain access to, and possibly make policy
decisions based upon, raw, unevaluated intelligence that has not been placed
in context. Second, they argue that as a practical matter Congress lacks the
physical capacity to securely store the volume of raw intelligence the
Intelligence Community generates. (25)
Finally, executive branch officials restrict congressional access to
written intelligence products - including the PDB - that are tailored to the
needs of individual policymakers. They assert that it would be inappropriate
to provide these products to Congress because they are tailored to the
specific needs of individual policymakers, and often include information
about the policymaker's contacts with foreign counterparts, as well as the
reactions of those counterparts. (26)
Although PDB consumers have access to all such intelligence, it should be
noted that intelligence sources, methods and operational information
historically have been tightly restricted within the executive branch, as
well. Intelligence Community analysts, for example, have rarely if ever have
had access to such information. To the limited extent that they have, their
access has been based largely upon their need to know the information for
the purposes of conducting analysis. (27)
While congressional intelligence officials have not routinely requested
access to the types of intelligence information discussed above, they have
questioned the executive branch's security concerns with regard to certain
raw intelligence, noting that it generally is more widely available to
executive branch officials. (28) Their comments suggest that they dispute
whether Congress is less capable than is the Executive in its ability to
evaluate and safeguard sensitive intelligence. (29)
Exceptions to The Practice of Not Routinely Sharing Certain Intelligence
With Congress
Although Congress generally has not had access to information pertaining
to intelligence sources and methods, raw intelligence or intelligence
products tailored to high-level policymakers - including PDBs - it is
noteworthy that Congress occasionally has sought and obtained such
intelligence information from the executive branch.
For example, while investigating Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covert
action operations in Nicaragua in the 1980s, the intelligence committees
requested and were provided the identities of certain intelligence sources.
The committees also sought and obtained access to certain raw intelligence.
On other occasions, committee members have requested and obtained raw
intelligence in order to verify certain Intelligence Community judgements
contained in various National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). (30)
Intelligence committee staffers, occasionally, have successfully obtained
access to PDBs, and PDB articles, during the course of conducting
investigations and general oversight. (31) The Bush Administration, however,
appears to have been more reluctant to share such information than have some
of its predecessors. In 2002, for example, President Bush rejected a request
by the Congressional Joint Inquiry investigating the September 11th
terrorist attacks to review the August 6, 2001, PDB, which contained an
article titled Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in U.S. (32) The Bush
Administration also denied a request by the SSCI to review PDBs relevant
only to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities and links to
terrorists as part of the Committee's review of the Intelligence Community's
prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq. (33)
While denying Congress access to certain PDB articles, the Bush
Administration has provided such access - albeit limited - to two
commissions: the 9/11 Commission (34) and the Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
(hereafter, cited as the WMD Commission). (35)
Congress Generally Has Routine Access to Most "Finished Intelligence"
Congress generally receives access to most finished intelligence products
that are published for general circulation within the executive branch. (36)
A finished intelligence product is one in which an analyst evaluates,
interprets, integrates and places into context raw intelligence. (37)
Although congressional access is limited to such finished products, the
volume of such products provided to Congress has increased over time. (38)
Between 1947, when the National Security Act establishing the CIA was
enacted, and the mid-1970s, the executive branch shared relatively little
intelligence with Congress, and access to it was quite limited. But after
two special congressional investigative committees headed by former Sen.
Frank Church and Rep. Otis Pike launched investigations of the Intelligence
Community in the mid-1970s, the executive branch permitted the Community to
increase the volume of intelligence information it provided to Congress.
(39)
Congress Also Has Access to Intelligence Information Through Briefings
Although Congress receives numerous written intelligence products, it
receives the preponderance of its intelligence information through
briefings, which generally are initiated at the request of congressional
committees, individual members or staff. (40)
Such briefings can include a discussion of more sensitive information
pertaining to intelligence sources and methods, particularly when the
briefings involve the congressional intelligence committees. But even then,
if the intelligence analyst determines that such information is particularly
sensitive, he may choose to brief only the chairmen and ranking members of
the two intelligence committees, or in lieu of the committee leadership, the
committees' majority and minority staff directors. (41) Or, based upon the
executive branch's perspective that it is not legally obligated to provide
Congress access to all intelligence, the analyst could choose not to share
the sensitive information with anyone in Congress.
Classified Intelligence Products Which Generally Are Routinely Shared With
Congress
a.. National Intelligence Community (NIC).(42)
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) express the coordinated judgments
of the Intelligence Community, and thus represent the most authoritative
assessment of the DNI with respect to a particular national security issue.
NIEs are considered to be "estimative" intelligence products, in that they
present what intelligence analysts estimate (not predict) may be the course
of future events. Coordination of NIEs involves not only trying to resolve
any interagency differences, but also assigning confidence levels to the key
judgments and rigorously evaluating the sourcing for them. Each NIE is
reviewed and approved for dissemination by the National Intelligence Board
(NIB), which is comprised of the DNI and other senior Intelligence Community
leaders within the Intelligence Community.
Intelligence Community Assessments (ICAs) are research papers 20-30-pages
or more in length that provide a detailed data logic trail on key national
security issues. They differ from NIEs in that they are less "estimative."
National Intelligence Officers are expected to coordinate ICAs with other
Community analysts, noting any disagreements in analytic judgements. Thus,
ICAs are Community-coordinated, and are disseminated only after NIC Chairman
approval.
Intelligence Community Briefs (ICBs) are estimative intelligence products
that are formatted as six-page, quick-turn-around, analytic papers focusing
on particular issues. Before ICBs are disseminated to intelligence
consumers, National Intelligence Officers overseeing their drafting and
coordination are expected either to resolve any analytic disagreements or
note any such continuing disagreement between Intelligence Community
analysts. Thus this product is classified to be "Community-coordinated."
Sense of Community Memos are one-page memoranda that evaluate current or
day-to-day events. They are Community-coordinated and approved by the NIC
chairman for dissemination.
Conference Reports are memoranda-for-the-record of conferences that the
NIC sponsors on various topics. In addition to Intelligence Community
personnel, participants can include experts from outside the Community.
CIA Directorate of Intelligence. (43)
The Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), known for decades as the
National Intelligence Daily and viewed by the CIA as one of its flagship
products, (44) is a daily publication containing six to eight relatively
short articles or briefs covering an array of topics. The SEIB's format and
content, although generally similar to that of the President's Daily Brief,
usually contains less information in order to protect intelligence sources
and methods. (45) It is disseminated to several hundred senior executive
branch policymakers and to the congressional oversight committees, and
although prepared by the CIA, the SEIB is produced in coordination with
other Intelligence Community producers. It is viewed as a current
intelligence product in that it focuses on the events of the past day or
two, or on issues expected to arise over the next few days. (46)
Serial Fliers (SFs) are short and concise memorandum-style products,
generally a few pages in length, on a discrete topic of current relevance.
SFs generally do not contain summaries, but may contain graphics or maps.
Intelligence Assessments (IAs) are the primary vehicle for in-depth
research, and can focus on larger analytic questions or provide great detail
on a more narrow, but complex issue. IAs generally are from 5 to 25 pages or
more in length; they always contain a "Key Findings" or "Summary" section
and often include graphics, maps and other supporting material.
Strategic Perspective Series (SPSs), like IAs, are based on extensive
research, but are focused on a key strategic issue - frequently at the
direction of the Directorate of Intelligence leadership. SPS papers often
cut across analytic disciplines or regions. Examples include Muslims in the
EU: Reshaping Islam and Transforming Europe, and China's Global Strategic
Ambitions. SPSs use an IA format, but carry the SPS moniker. SPS papers a
"Key Findings" or "Summary," and may include graphics, maps and other
supporting material.
Research Projects/Papers (RPs) are the primary vehicle used to explore new
analytic research areas and to develop the Directorate of Intelligence's
corporate knowledge of a given issue. A research project may culminate in a
SF, IA or SPS - or, depending upon the results, may be disseminated only
within the Intelligence Directorate and Intelligence Community, serving as a
"capital-building" research paper.
Leadership Profiles (LPs) are biographic assessments of foreign leaders,
generally 1-2 pages in length. They often are tailored for a particular
meeting or event. Whenever possible, LPs contain a photo of the leader being
assessed.
Situation Reports are short reports that comment on current, fast-breaking
events. Up to two or three situation reports can be issued daily, if
warranted.
Department of Defense.
Military Intelligence Digest (MID) is produced by the Defense Intelligence
Agency and is seen as a military-oriented counterpart to the SEIB. It is
viewed as a current intelligence product in that it focuses on the events of
the past day or two, or on issues expected to arise over the next few days.
The MID can include analysis of topic covered in the SEIB, but it also
includes articles of particular interest to the defense department, and can
provide a different analytic perspective. It is principally prepared for the
use of defense department policymakers, but is circulated elsewhere in the
executive branch and provided to the congressional intelligence committees.
(47)
Classified Intelligence Products Which Generally Are Not Routinely Shared
With Congress
The President's Daily Brief (PDB) is a written intelligence product which
is briefed daily to the President orally by a small cadre of senior
Intelligence Community analysts. As previously mentioned, it consists of six
to eight relatively short articles or briefs covering a broad array of
topics (48) and is viewed as a current intelligence product, in that it
focuses on the events of the past day or two, or on issues expected to arise
over the next few days. (49) The PDB is viewed as highly sensitive, in part,
because it can contain sensitive intelligence source and operational
information. Thus its dissemination is limited to the President and a small
number of presidentially-designated senior administration policymakers.
Presidential Daily Brief Memoranda are products containing responses to
questions posed by the President and any of the small number of designated
senior policymakers who receive the PDB. After briefing the handful of
designated policymakers, members of the analytic briefing team return to CIA
each morning, and task Intelligence Community personnel to provide answers
to the various inquiries posed during the each briefing session.
Senior Executive Memoranda are tailored analytic products that also can be
produced in response to policymaker questions arising from PDB briefings.
(50)
National Terrorism Brief (NTB) is prepared by the National
Counterterrorism Center, is appended to the daily PDB, and is briefed to the
President by the DNI.
The Director's Daily Report is prepared by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and is used by the FBI Director to verbally brief the
President. (51)
Red Cell analyses are products that are speculative in nature and
sometimes take a position at odds with the conventional wisdom. (52)
Raw intelligence is unevaluated intelligence.
TDs (Telephonic Disseminations) are raw intelligence reports disseminated
by the CIA's Directorate of Operations. TDs are slightly finished
intelligence, in that they contain some commentary as to the credibility of
the source providing the intelligence.
Chief of Station (COS) Reports are reports prepared by the CIA's chief
representative in a particular country and contain the COS's views of the
current situation. The COS can share his reports with the resident
ambassador for comment, but is under no obligation to incorporate any
comments by the ambassador into his final report.
1. Reportedly "furious" about what he apparently believed to be
unauthorized disclosures of classified information by Congress, President
Bush on Oct. 5, 2001, ordered that the provision of classified information
and sensitive law enforcement information be restricted to the Republican
and Democratic leaders of both the Senate and House, and to the chairmen and
ranking members of the two congressional intelligence committees. Until the
President issued his order, and in keeping with prior practice, all Members
of the intelligence committees had access to most such information. Bush
agreed to rescind his order after several days, following a personal
telephone conversation between the President and Sen. Bob Graham,
then-chairman of the Senate's intelligence committee, and after negotiations
between White House staff and Graham. See Bob Woodward, Bush at War, pp.
198-199. (Simon and Schuster).
2. The Senate established its intelligence oversight committee, the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), in May 1976. The House of
Representatives followed suit in July 1977, creating the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).
3. Central Intelligence Agency website
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/analytica_products_section.html].
4. To the extent that Members of Congress are entitled access to
intelligence information, it is by virtue of their elected positions.
Members are not subject to background checks, nor are they issued security
clearances, as are congressional staff who are provided access to classified
information.
5. This memorandum does not directly address the quality of Intelligence
Community (IC) collection and analysis, but rather limits its focus to the
degree of access to intelligence information enjoyed by federal government
policymakers - including Members of Congress - and the degree to which that
access enables them to assess its quality.
There exists extensive commentary which does address the quality of the
Intelligence Community's collection and analytic capabilities, including
more recently that contained in a report issued by the Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction Commission. See WMD Commission, Report to the President of the
United States, March 31, 2005 [Hereafter, cited as the WMD Commission
Report].
6. L. Britt Snider, "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User
of Intelligence," Center For The Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Feb., 1997, p. 17.
7. Sec. 501 [50 U.S.C. 413] (a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended. [ct (50 U.S.C. 501[a][1]). Some observers have asserted that
this language was intended to create an obligation to provide information
for oversight purposes rather than establishing a legal requirement that the
executive branch provide Congress substantive intelligence information. But
they have noted that the congressional intelligence committees have viewed
this as a "distinction without a difference," and that the committees have
asserted a need for access to substantive intelligence in order to conduct
oversight. See L. Britt Snider, "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as
a User of Intelligence," Center For the Study of Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, February 1997, p. 11.
8. Sec. 501 [50 U.S.C. 413] (a)(2)(e).
9. P.L. 108-458, Sec. 102A.(a)(1)(D) [50 U.S.C. 403-1].
10. In 1992, Congress enacted legislation spelling out the duties of the
then-titled position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), requiring
that the DCI provide Congress substantive intelligence information "where
appropriate." See Title VII of the FY 2003 Intelligence Authorization Act.
11. L. Britt Snider, "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User
of Intelligence," Center For The Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Feb., 1997, p. 17.
12. Ibid, pp. 17-18.
13. Ibid, p. 23.
14. Ibid, p. 23. With regard to an "experience-based" system and
providing the congressional intelligence committees with operational
intelligence, the executive branch generally limits the provision of such
information to the Committees's Chairmen and Ranking Members. This despite
there being in law only one provision - Section 503 of the 1947 National
Security Act as amended - permitting the Executive to do so, and only the
limited cases pertaining to the notification of covert action activity.
15. In 2004, Congress eliminated the position of Director of Central
Intelligence and established a new position, the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), to head the Intelligence Community. See P.L. 108-458,
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Sec. 1001,
Subtitle A, Sec.1011.
16. S.Rept. 107-63, p. 6 (accompanying S. 1428) , and S.Rept. 107-149, p.
10 (accompanying S. 2506).
17. In the 109th Congress, S.1803, Sec.508.
18. Unevaluated raw intelligence consists of intelligence that has not
been analyzed; lightly evaluated raw intelligence can include, for example,
a brief description of the credibility of the source providing the
information.
19. Human intelligence, or "HUMINT," is espionage i.e. spying, which
consists largely of sending agents to foreign countries, where they attempt
to recruit foreign nationals to spy. See Mark L. Lowenthal, Intelligence:
From Secrets to Policy, CQ Press, 2003, p. 74.
20. Signals Intelligence, or "SIGINT," refers to the interception of
communications between two parties, but also can refer to the pick-up of
data relayed by weapons during tests and electronic emissions from modern
weapons and tracking systems. See Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From
Secrets to Policy (Second Edition), CQ Press, 2003, p. 71.
21. Imagery Intelligence, or "IMINT," also referred to as photo
intelligence, is generally considered to be a picture produced by an optical
system akin to a camera, but can also refer to images that can be produced
by infrared imagery and radar. See Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From
Secrets to Policy (Second Edition), CQ Press, 2003, pp. 63-64.
22. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, July 22, 2004, p. 254. (Hereafter, cited as
the 9/11 Commission Report.) The PDB format does change to suit the
preferences each president. See Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From
Secrets to Policy, (Second Edition), CQ Press, 2003, p. 48.
23. See the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,
Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005, p. 181.
Current intelligence is defined by the Intelligence Community as being that
intelligence which; addresses day-to-day events; apprises intelligence
consumers of new developments and related background; warns of near-term
consequences; and, signals potentially dangerous situations that may occur
in the near future. See U.S. Intelligence Community web page
[http://www.intelligence.gov/2-business_cycle5.shtml].
24. According to the 9/11 Commission, the exact number of policymakers
who receive the PDB varies by administration. In the Clinton administration,
up to 25 officials had access to the PDB. By contrast, the Bush
administration, prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, limited the
distribution of the PDB to six officials. See 9/11 Commission Report, p. 254
and p. 533.
25. L. Britt Snider, "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User
of Intelligence," Center For The Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Feb., 1997, p. 26.
26. Ibid, p. 25.
27. In the wake of the Intelligence Community's much-criticized October
2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the status of Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction, the Intelligence Community is now more rigorously
evaluating the credibility and authentication of intelligence sources, from
whom information is derived and used to form and support NIE judgements.
Moreover, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Deputy Director for
Intelligence Jami Misick, in a speech to analysts in March, 2004, said,
"Analysts can no longer be put in a position of making a judgment on a
critical issue without a full and comprehensive understanding of the
[intelligence] source's access to the information on which they are
reporting...We are not brushing aside the Agency's [CIA] duty to protect
sources and methods, but barriers to sharing information must be
removed....If you [the analyst] work the issue[,] you need to know the
information. Period." She also stated that then- Director of Central
Intelligence George Tenet had instructed senior CIA officials to devise a
"permanent and lasting" solution to the problem of failing to adequately
share intelligence source information with analysts. See
[http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/021104miscik.pdf].
28. L. Britt Snider, "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User
of Intelligence," Center For The Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Feb., 1997, p. 26.
29. With regard to protecting classified information, the executive and
legislative branches each have criticized the other for failing to
adequately guard against unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Neither branch, however, has suggested it is without fault. Rather, the
debate, as often as not, has centered, to varying degrees, on the relative
number of unauthorized disclosures that can be traced to each branch, the
degree of sensitivity of such disclosures, and whether each branch has been
sufficiently aggressive in its attempts to identify and penalize the
perpetrator.
30. L. Britt Snider, "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User
of Intelligence," Center For The Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Feb., 1997, p. 12. An NIE expresses the coordinated judgments of the
Intelligence Community, and thus represents the most authoritative
assessment by the Director of National Intelligence with respect to a
particular national security issue. It is considered to be an "estimative"
intelligence product, in that it addresses what intelligence analysts
believe may be the course of future events.
31. Ibid, p. 25.
32. The Joint Congressional Inquiry was known formally as the Joint
Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11
, 2001[the Joint Inquiry's full report is available at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm]. Leadership of the Joint
Inquiry unsuccessfully sought access to the August 6, 2001, PDB. After
several days of discussions with executive branch representatives, Members
decided not to pursue the request. The 9/11 Commission did gain access to
this particular PDB article, and it was later declassified. See 9/11
Commission Report, p. 533 and p. 261 for the declassified text of the
article.
33. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,
S.Rept. 108-301, July 9, 2004, p. 3.
34. The 9/11 Commission received access to about four years of articles
from the PDB related to Bin Ladin, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and key countries
such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, including all the
Commission requested. The White House declined to permit all commissioners
to review these documents. The Commission selected four representatives,
including its chairman, vice chairman, and executive director to review the
documents. The executive director prepared a detailed summary, which was
reviewed by the White House for constitutional and especially sensitive
classification concerns, and then made available to all commissioners and
designated commission staff. See 9/11 Commission Report, p. 533.
35. The WMD Commission was provided limited access to a number of PDB
articles relating to Iraq's WMD programs. See WMD Commission Report,
p. 18.
36. L. Britt Snider, "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User
of Intelligence," Center For Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, Feb., 1997, p. 24.
37. U.S. Intelligence Community web page
[http://www.intelligence.gov/2-business_cycle5.shtml].
An NIE represents an example of a finished intelligence product.
38. CIA estimates that in 2004 it provided Members of Congress more than
1,000 briefings and 4,000 publications, including finished intelligence,
books, maps, etc.
39. L. Britt Snider, "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress as a User
of Intelligence,"
Center For Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Feb., 1997,
p. iii. According to Snider, most of the voluminous number of finished
intelligence reports provided to the congressional intelligence committees
is read by no one. (p. 25 of Snider's monograph). He cites intelligence
members and staff who say they are too busy to read all the finished
intelligence reports that provided daily, and some who state that it is not
worth their time, or the time of the Member, to do so. Although the context
of the comments is not entirely clear, they could, among other
possibilities, represent a commentary on the quality of some of the
intelligence products received by the two intelligence committees, or simply
indicate that the products in every instance simply do not address the
particular issues of concern to a Member or staff.
40. Ibid, p. 26.
41. Ibid, p. 27.
42. Congress has access to most intelligence products produced by the
National Intelligence Council (NIC), a center of strategic thinking within
the U.S. Government, reporting to the DNI and providing the President and
senior policymakers with the analysis of foreign policy issues that have
been reviewed and coordinated throughout the Intelligence Community. The
Council is headed by a chairman and is comprised of National Intelligence
Officers (NIOs), who are viewed as the Intelligence Community's senior
substantive specialists. NIOs are assigned areas of functional or geographic
responsibility, and are responsible for producing a variety of written
intelligence products, ranging from brief analyses of current issues to
"over- the-horizon" estimates of broader global trends.
43. The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence is responsible for analyzing
intelligence.
44. CIA web site
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/di/analytica_products_section.html].
45. 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 254-255.
46. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, CQ Press,
2003, p. 48.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid, p. 254.
49. WMD Commission Report, p. 181. The WMD Commission criticized the
quality of PDBs, asserting that, "...many of the same problems that occurred
with other intelligence products occurred with the PDBs, only in a magnified
manner." According to the Commission, PDBs "often failed to explain, or even
signal, the uncertainties underlying their judgments..." and "...PDB
articles discounted information that appeared to contradict the prevailing
analytical view..." The Commission also said that by emphasizing current
intelligence, the PDB could "...adversely affect the consumers of
intelligence..." by creating over time "...a greater perception of certainty
about ...judgements than is warranted."
50. WMD Commission Report, p. 182.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid, p.
--
^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^
Michelle Malkin (Mickey) aa list#1
BAAWA Knight & Bible Thumper Thumper
^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^
begin 666 pdf.gif
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M_P```````````````````"'Y! $```H`+ `````8`!(```1F4,E)J[TGZWVN
M/4@HAH#0>5NBK@D"&"9JS#3=`O@@UW4KGA\-:S4">@:C0F&$,%Z0H@"!Z;1
M0P7"\N>97!$$:;$KN0:6666A6H%*U5D"@4T!I9DANC>.SY,5`W)]?F0#'(=Z
%?W\1`#L`
`
end
.

User: "johac"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	18 Dec 2005 02:10:04 AM

In article <ytSdnXY_ufvPyj7eRVn-rA@comcast.com>,
"Michelle Malkin" <hypatiab7@comcast.net> wrote:

Sadly this is about all we can expect from this administration these
days. Lies.

Read it yourself.

<snip>
--
John Hachmann aa #1782
"Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities"
-Voltaire
Contact - Throw a .net over the .com
.

User: "stoney"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	19 Dec 2005 11:54:13 AM

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 00:10:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <ytSdnXY_ufvPyj7eRVn-rA@comcast.com>,
"Michelle Malkin" <hypatiab7@comcast.net> wrote:

Sadly this is about all we can expect from this administration these
days. Lies.

Gosh. I'm sure glad *morality* is back in the former White House.
--
Contempt of Congress meter reading-offscale.
Hello, theocracy with a fundamentalist US Supreme
Court who will ensure church and state are joined
at the hip like clergy and altar boys.
America 1776-Jan 2001 RIP
"As democracy is perfected, the office of president
represents, more and more closely, the inner soul
of the people. On some great and glorious day the
plain folks of the land will reach their heart's
desire at last and the White House will be adorned
by a downright moron." --- H.L. Mencken (1880 - 1956)
Religion is the original war crime.
-Michelle Malkin (Feb 26, 2005)
.

User: "johac"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	20 Dec 2005 12:05:22 AM

In article <dtsdq1dqng1q6nhlh3hlqcsgnd5il43qqa@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 00:10:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <ytSdnXY_ufvPyj7eRVn-rA@comcast.com>,
"Michelle Malkin" <hypatiab7@comcast.net> wrote:

Sadly this is about all we can expect from this administration these
days. Lies.

Gosh. I'm sure glad *morality* is back in the former White House.

And this was the guy who was going to 'change the tone in Washington'
and restore dignity to the office. Hah!
--
John Hachmann aa #1782
"Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities"
-Voltaire
Contact - Throw a .net over the .com
.

User: "stoney"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	20 Dec 2005 08:42:40 AM

On Mon, 19 Dec 2005 22:05:22 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <dtsdq1dqng1q6nhlh3hlqcsgnd5il43qqa@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 00:10:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <ytSdnXY_ufvPyj7eRVn-rA@comcast.com>,
"Michelle Malkin" <hypatiab7@comcast.net> wrote:

Sadly this is about all we can expect from this administration these
days. Lies.

Gosh. I'm sure glad *morality* is back in the former White House.

And this was the guy who was going to 'change the tone in Washington'
and restore dignity to the office. Hah!

The sad thing is he's really that clueless in believing he has.
--
Contempt of Congress meter reading-offscale.
Hello, theocracy with a fundamentalist US Supreme
Court who will ensure church and state are joined
at the hip like clergy and altar boys.
America 1776-Jan 2001 RIP
"As democracy is perfected, the office of president
represents, more and more closely, the inner soul
of the people. On some great and glorious day the
plain folks of the land will reach their heart's
desire at last and the White House will be adorned
by a downright moron." --- H.L. Mencken (1880 - 1956)
Religion is the original war crime.
-Michelle Malkin (Feb 26, 2005)
.

User: "johac"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	20 Dec 2005 11:39:04 PM

In article <k06gq15e428inh8eif45r26hvvrc18ju3l@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Mon, 19 Dec 2005 22:05:22 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <dtsdq1dqng1q6nhlh3hlqcsgnd5il43qqa@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 00:10:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <ytSdnXY_ufvPyj7eRVn-rA@comcast.com>,
"Michelle Malkin" <hypatiab7@comcast.net> wrote:

http://feinstein.senate.gov/crs-intel.htm

Ť previous | Talking Points Memo Home | next ť

(December 15, 2005 -- 07:09 PM EDT)
President Bush says Congress saw the same intelligence he did in the
lead-up
to the war in Iraq. So Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) asked the
non-partisan
Congressional Research Service to look into the matter and report back
whether or not what the president said is true.

They reported back today. The verdict: not true.

Sadly this is about all we can expect from this administration these
days. Lies.

Gosh. I'm sure glad *morality* is back in the former White House.

And this was the guy who was going to 'change the tone in Washington'
and restore dignity to the office. Hah!

The sad thing is he's really that clueless in believing he has.

Well, at least he has changed the tone in Washington. For the worse.
--
John Hachmann aa #1782
"Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities"
-Voltaire
Contact - Throw a .net over the .com
.

User: "stoney"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	21 Dec 2005 08:34:01 AM

On Tue, 20 Dec 2005 21:39:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <k06gq15e428inh8eif45r26hvvrc18ju3l@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Mon, 19 Dec 2005 22:05:22 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <dtsdq1dqng1q6nhlh3hlqcsgnd5il43qqa@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 00:10:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <ytSdnXY_ufvPyj7eRVn-rA@comcast.com>,
"Michelle Malkin" <hypatiab7@comcast.net> wrote:

http://feinstein.senate.gov/crs-intel.htm

Ť previous | Talking Points Memo Home | next ť

Sadly this is about all we can expect from this administration these
days. Lies.

Gosh. I'm sure glad *morality* is back in the former White House.

And this was the guy who was going to 'change the tone in Washington'
and restore dignity to the office. Hah!

The sad thing is he's really that clueless in believing he has.

Well, at least he has changed the tone in Washington. For the worse.

Da Shrub looked upon the devastation and it was good.
--
Contempt of Congress meter reading-offscale.
Hello, theocracy with a fundamentalist US Supreme
Court who will ensure church and state are joined
at the hip like clergy and altar boys.
America 1776-Jan 2001 RIP
"As democracy is perfected, the office of president
represents, more and more closely, the inner soul
of the people. On some great and glorious day the
plain folks of the land will reach their heart's
desire at last and the White House will be adorned
by a downright moron." --- H.L. Mencken (1880 - 1956)
Religion is the original war crime.
-Michelle Malkin (Feb 26, 2005)
.

User: "johac"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	22 Dec 2005 12:09:27 AM

In article <5upiq1difn9dibaqs0m8tgmo3ge7okhjs5@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Tue, 20 Dec 2005 21:39:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <k06gq15e428inh8eif45r26hvvrc18ju3l@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Mon, 19 Dec 2005 22:05:22 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <dtsdq1dqng1q6nhlh3hlqcsgnd5il43qqa@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 00:10:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <ytSdnXY_ufvPyj7eRVn-rA@comcast.com>,
"Michelle Malkin" <hypatiab7@comcast.net> wrote:

http://feinstein.senate.gov/crs-intel.htm

Ť previous | Talking Points Memo Home | next ť

(December 15, 2005 -- 07:09 PM EDT)
President Bush says Congress saw the same intelligence he did in the
lead-up
to the war in Iraq. So Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) asked the
non-partisan
Congressional Research Service to look into the matter and report
back
whether or not what the president said is true.

They reported back today. The verdict: not true.

Sadly this is about all we can expect from this administration these
days. Lies.

Gosh. I'm sure glad *morality* is back in the former White House.

And this was the guy who was going to 'change the tone in Washington'
and restore dignity to the office. Hah!

The sad thing is he's really that clueless in believing he has.

Well, at least he has changed the tone in Washington. For the worse.

Da Shrub looked upon the devastation and it was good.

And Da Shrub said "Let there be *****!" and it covered the whole
Earth and it was good.
--
John Hachmann aa #1782
"Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities"
-Voltaire
Contact - Throw a .net over the .com
.

User: "stoney"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	22 Dec 2005 07:57:21 AM

On Wed, 21 Dec 2005 22:09:27 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <5upiq1difn9dibaqs0m8tgmo3ge7okhjs5@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Tue, 20 Dec 2005 21:39:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <k06gq15e428inh8eif45r26hvvrc18ju3l@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Mon, 19 Dec 2005 22:05:22 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <dtsdq1dqng1q6nhlh3hlqcsgnd5il43qqa@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote:

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 00:10:04 -0800, johac <jhachmann@sbcglobal.com>
wrote:

In article <ytSdnXY_ufvPyj7eRVn-rA@comcast.com>,
"Michelle Malkin" <hypatiab7@comcast.net> wrote:

http://feinstein.senate.gov/crs-intel.htm

Ť previous | Talking Points Memo Home | next ť

(December 15, 2005 -- 07:09 PM EDT)
President Bush says Congress saw the same intelligence he did in the
lead-up
to the war in Iraq. So Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) asked the
non-partisan
Congressional Research Service to look into the matter and report
back
whether or not what the president said is true.

They reported back today. The verdict: not true.

Sadly this is about all we can expect from this administration these
days. Lies.

Gosh. I'm sure glad *morality* is back in the former White House.

And this was the guy who was going to 'change the tone in Washington'
and restore dignity to the office. Hah!

The sad thing is he's really that clueless in believing he has.

Well, at least he has changed the tone in Washington. For the worse.

Da Shrub looked upon the devastation and it was good.

And Da Shrub said "Let there be *****!" and it covered the whole
Earth and it was good.

Awww....now if it was Doberman......
[/cue Cheech and Chong's "Up In Smoke"]
--
Contempt of Congress meter reading-offscale.
Hello, theocracy with a fundamentalist US Supreme
Court who will ensure church and state are joined
at the hip like clergy and altar boys.
America 1776-Jan 2001 RIP
"As democracy is perfected, the office of president
represents, more and more closely, the inner soul
of the people. On some great and glorious day the
plain folks of the land will reach their heart's
desire at last and the White House will be adorned
by a downright moron." --- H.L. Mencken (1880 - 1956)
Religion is the original war crime.
-Michelle Malkin (Feb 26, 2005)
.

User: "johac"
Title: Re: Bush Lied . What Else is New?	23 Dec 2005 12:10:27 AM

In article <k4clq19afn6ceq47c1n49n7fu4lit7d4bi@4ax.com>,
stoney <stoney@the.net> wrote: