| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Scott" |
| Date: |
07 Mar 2006 02:56:48 PM |
| Object: |
Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? |
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
<quote>
In a cartoon-strip of Calvin and Hobbes, the mischievous imp Calvin is
listening to the tune, "Santa Claus Is Coming to Town":
He sees you when you're sleeping.
He knows when you're awake.
He knows if you've been bad or good;
So be good, for goodness' sake!
Reflecting deeply on this theme of Santa, Calvin reports his musings to
Hobbes, his striped sidekick and co-conspirator. "This Santa Claus stuff
bothers me . . . especially the judge and jury bit," Calvin mutters. He
wonders why Santa carries such moral authority: "Who appointed Santa? How do
we know he's impartial? What criteria does he use for determining bad or
good? And what about extenuating circumstances? Kids should have the benefit
of legal counsel, don't you think?"
In the spirit of this particular brand of "Calvinism," the atheist
philosopher Michael Martin is also bothered?by this "God stuff." In his
essay "Atheism, Christian Theism, and Rape," he finds the theistic belief
that God is the locus of objective moral values problematic. Who appointed
God ? How do we know he's impartial? What criteria does he use for
determining good or bad?
At the outset of his essay, he states that the theistic claim that "atheists
can provide no objective reason for not raping people" is "startling." He
argues against the Mackian thesis that atheistic morality is necessarily
subjective. Furthermore, he maintains that the commonly-held theistic
position on morality (rooting objective morality in God's character rather
than his commands) still does not escape the Euthyphro dilemma. Moreover,
the Bible itself is "insensitive and chauvinistic" in its treatment of rape
victims.
Sed contra, I shall respond that Martin's argument is flawed both
philosophically and biblically. Regarding the philosophical shortcomings,
(a) Martin offers no substantive ontological foundation for an objective
morality within an atheistic framework (which would account for human
dignity, human rights, moral obligations, and moral responsibility), and he
confuses the order of knowing with the order of being. Thus I shall argue
that Martin can be a moral realist epistemologically but not ontologically.
Furthermore, (b) Martin fails to realize (i) that God's essentially perfect
nature is not subject to the accusation of arbitrariness sometimes justly
leveled against divine commands (ii) that, if true, his challenge leaves his
own naturalistic moral realism in the same state of arbitrariness. Finally,
(c) his argument is flawed biblically in its handling of Deuteronomy 22:23-9
and other biblical passages pertaining to rape. So I shall, in each section,
present a particular aspect of Martin's position and then respond to it.
I. "Is Atheistic Morality Necessarily Subjective?" A Question of
Epistemology vs. Ontology
Martin points to two Oxonians, Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie, to
reinforce his emphasis that an atheistic ethic need not be subjective.
Martin claims that a case can be made for an objective morality that is
independent of what particular human beings happen to believe or practice
with regard to morals. Positively, Martin approvingly cites Swinburne's
argument: "Genocide and torturing children are wrong and would remain so
whatever commands any person issued." Martin adds: "[Swinburne] assumes that
it is possible to objectively settle moral disputes concerning this topic if
God did not exist." General moral principles are necessarily true given
their allegedly analytic nature, he argues. Thus there is no possible world
in which such moral truths cannot be coherently conceived.
Martin rightly notes that not all theists share Swinburne's perspective.
These theists, Martin adds, "maintain that atheistic morality must be
subjective," and they usually assert this "without argument."
What is the position of these theists? In Atheism: A Philosophical
Justification, Martin lays out their premises, which we'll call Theistic
Argument A ( TA-A ):
If morality is objective and absolute, then God exists.
Morality is objective and absolute.
Therefore, God exists.
To make their case, Martin argues, theists must refute the following
argument (Atheistic Argument A, or AA-A ) before their views on theistic
morality can be taken seriously:
In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists
must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic
basis fail.
But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on
a nontheistic basis fail.
Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily
subjective.
One is led to believe that Martin will provide just such a basis, but, as we
shall see below, his attempts to "ground objective morality on a nontheistic
basis" do indeed fail. In addition, the challenge Martin offers can be taken
up by theists, who can show that atheism lacks a sufficient basis for
objective morality and, going further, show how theism furnishes precisely
the necessary moral context. We shall proceed to take up this two-fold
challenge.
To cite J. L. Mackie as the atheistic perspective on ethics, Martin claims,
is unfair, as his is not the only one to consider. Mackie's views "certainly
do not represent the views of all atheists." Nor do Mackie's arguments for a
subjectivist ethic work, Martin holds. For instance, Mackie argues from
disagreement (disagreement in ethical opinions supports ethical
subjectivism) and from strangeness (moral properties are so strange that
they would not fit into a naturalistic worldview). Martin disagrees with
both of these arguments.
In response, Martin directly addresses the matter of disagreement, but his
response to the strangeness argument is that, contra Mackie's internalist
account, "moral realism is compatible with externalism." Martin does not
give much of an argument for the latter except for a passing footnote
However, in the next section of his essay ("Is Theistic Morality Necessarily
Objectivist?"), Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position.
I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear:
God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because
it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various
reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it
traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All
of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide
objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide
objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold
even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the
victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did
not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide
objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God.
Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does
not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist.
Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He merely
addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping there.
That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the good is
another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does not
furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are moral
truths and that we are able to know them.
Let me reiterate. Martin's working assumption seems to be this: If a
nontheist can simply recognize or know that objective moral values?and thus
universal moral obligations?exist, the job of justification is complete. We
can be good without God! But this does not go far enough. The theist does
not dispute that nontheists can know moral truths or principles. Whether
atheists, Confucians, or Theravada Buddhists, nontheists can properly affirm
that the Holocaust or Stalin's purges were immoral.
However, Martin does not tell us why such moral knowledge is possible. At
the epistemological level, Martin and Swinburne are correct: One need not
appeal to God to know whether or not cruelty, rape, genocide, or torturing
children is wrong.
But if Martin thinks his task is completed, this is where he makes his major
mistake. He gives no ontological foundation at all for his reasons to oppose
child molestation, torture, or rape . It is unquestionable that rape is
wrong because it violates the victim's rights and traumatizes the victim.
But to affirm this is still not to offer the ontological basis for such
affirmations. In his popular-level book The Big Domino in the Sky, Martin
makes the same sorts of pronouncements, but again without ontological
justification. For instance, he rightly declares that there have been
"atheists of high moral character." Thus there is no reason to think that
atheists are less moral than believers. Of course, Martin concedes, the
question is not one about the moral character of atheists, but "whether they
can justify their actions."
So does Martin justify his vantage point? Hardly. The sort of
"justification" Martin offers is to claim that "there have been many secular
moralities." "There have been various attempts to construct a naturalistic
foundation of ethics that is both objective and absolute." Certain ethical
philosophers "have given objective accounts of morality that are compatible
with atheism."
Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes the dignity of human
beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose (e.g., that life has
meaning if lived in a particular way), moral accountability, and the like.
When Martin speaks of "bad making properties," he simply assumes that human
beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails and sea urchins do not. But
on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can human dignity or human
rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's worldview that furnishes us
with such an ontology or metaphysic of personhood as being of intrinsic
value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can see. Moreover, Martin makes no
effort. He merely claims that "ethical absolutism is compatible with
atheism." Martin suggests, following Roderick Firth, an ideal observer view
of ethics (in which a "good" is what "an ideal observer would approve under
ideal condition") is an atheistic alternative. Another suggestion Martin
makes is William Frankena's "sophisticated version of non-cognitivism." Even
if such views could carry the day for the atheistic moral realist, the
problem still remains?namely, accounting for the metaphysical or ontological
status of personhood and its attendant intrinsic goodness still remains.
While moral truths can be known and moral judgments made in both systems,
these systems still presume upon ?without justification?the foundation human
dignity, human rights, and obligations. But why suppose that human persons
have moral worth?
Throughout his writings, Martin offers no reasons. He simply states that it
is so:
I see no reason to suppose that if the cultural and intellectual
accomplishments of X are worthless, then X's life is worthless. A mother who
has raised intelligent, healthy, morally upright children, a doctor whose
life has been devoted to caring for the indigent, a teacher who has spent a
lifetime teaching pupils to be just and compassionate?each may have
accomplished little from a cultural or intellectual point of view, but each
has led a worthwhile life nevertheless.
But if Martin is going to insist that "it has not been shown that all
attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail," he must
do more than repeat the mantra: "But human beings do have dignity."
Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess
intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They
share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being,
and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell
puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns
only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their
having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect
this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made
as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God
personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods
find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to
function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery,
theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social
contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the
furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate
personal Being. Mackie's problem about the queerness of morality in a
non-theistic universe persists; objective morality is just as strange as
mental properties: just as mental properties are distinct from physical
ones, so goodness belongs to persons rather than impersonal objects.
Martin, who frequently cites David Brink as offering a model of moral
realism without appealing to God, may likely argue: "But why can't moral
properties be viewed as comparable to supervening mental properties? After
all, many nontheistic contemporary philosophers of mind hold this view."
Brink himself reasons: "Assuming materialism is true, mental states
supervene on physical states, yet few think that mental states are
metaphysically queer." However, such optimism is misguided, as it assumes a
smooth transition from the nonmental to the mental (and the nonmoral to the
moral). But to use mental supervenience as a plausible analogy for moral
supervenience is astonishingly bold and, so far as contemporary philosophy
of mind goes, unwarranted. Take the mental property of consciousness. Ned
Block forcefully asserts:
We have no conception of our physical or functional nature that allows us to
understand how it could explain our subjective experience . . . [I]n the
case of consciousness we have nothing?zilch?worthy of being called a
research programme, nor are there any substantive proposals about how to go
about starting one. . . . Researchers are stumped ."
The same could be said for moral properties. Just as consciousness is easily
accommodated within a theistic framework (in which a maximally-aware Creator
creates conscious beings), so moral properties fit into a theistic scenario
(in which a supremely-good/moral personal Being creates morally-constituted
persons). Therefore affirming human dignity and universal human rights is
not simply a brute fact. A theistic universe helps make far better sense of
human dignity or human rights than a non-theistic, naturalistic universe.
The Christian offers a superior contextual framework?a "richer metaphysical
account as to why the cosmos is such that there are objective values."
Martin might reply: "You theists might claim that God is the sufficient
reason for the existence of morality, but you are still just positing God in
terms of a brute fact, some ultimate stopping point. So what prevents the
atheist from claiming that objective morality and intrinsic human dignity
simply exist as brute facts?" Up to a point, the atheist is correct:
justification must end somewhere. But this does not mean that the theist and
atheist are at an impasse.
Again, context is important. For instance, a hundred dollar bill has a
greater value than a single dollar bill?even though they are the same size
and contain (roughly) the same amounts of ink. It is the context (in this
case, a conventional one) which enables us to ascribe varying values to
these pieces of paper. What then is Martin's context for making sense of
human worth? From his atheistic viewpoint, "There is no cosmic purpose if
there is no God." We have before us the two relevant alternatives: (a) There
is no cosmic purpose if there is no God and (b) There is a cosmic purpose if
there is a God. At least prima facie, the existence of an objective human
purpose is more obvious if God exists than if he does not.
Now Martin takes position that moral properties do exist independently of
human beings:
Atheists not only can but have rejected this view [that human beings create
values and do not discover them]. There is no reason why atheists cannot
argue that values are discovered. For example, atheists such as Bertrand
Russell in his early ethical writings argued that ?good and bad are
qualities which belong to objects independent of our opinions just as much
as round and square do.' Such qualities were discovered not created.
Now correlated to this affirmation is that somehow, intrinsic worth and a
moral constitution supervene upon human beings through their having achieved
a certain level of organismic complexity . According to David Brink, to whom
Martin approvingly refers, this position is the most plausible position to
take: "it is best for the [nontheistic] moral realist to claim that moral
properties supervene upon physical properties."
So with this moral constitution, human beings have some inherent purpose,
and therefore one ought to live one's life in a certain way (Says Martin:
"Like Kant, I believe that one has a duty to fulfill one's talents.")
But if Martin's claim that there is "no cosmic purpose" is true, the
relevant context for affirming a limited purpose is far from obvious. Martin
moves from purposeless, impersonal, amoral, materialistic or naturalistic
processes to? viol? !?the emergence of intrinsically-valuable, personal,
moral beings. Again, I simply do not see that his worldview has the
ontological resources to bring about this remarkable transformation. Within
theism, on the other hand, there exists a continuity, a smooth transition of
intrinsic dignity?from a maximally-great personal Being to valuable created
persons?as opposed to the naturalistic shift from the nonmoral to the moral.
This moral continuity ?the transference of moral properties from one moral
Being to beings made in his image?has greater explanatory power than the
disjunction between them on the naturalistic view. In the theistic view,
moral properties have an ontological simplicity?as opposed to the
naturalistic construal, in which moral properties are not ontologically
simple.
Thus theists can take up Martin's challenge and offer a far more plausible
basis for objective morality than the atheist can. We noted earlier Martin's
argument ( AA-A ) against the theist who claims to have an objectivist ethic
that the atheist does not have:
In order to show that atheistic morality necessarily is subjective, theists
must show that all attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic
basis fail.
But theists have not shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on
a nontheistic basis fail.
Hence, theists have not shown that atheistic morality is necessarily
subjective.
On the epistemological level, Martin is rightly shocked by "Christian
apologists"?whoever they may be?who claim that "atheists can provide no
objective reason for not raping people." Theists and atheists alike can
affirm the same moral principles as objectively true. But at the ontological
level, it is the theistic apologist who is rightly shocked at Martin's
claim. For Martin's worldview offers no obvious resources to affirm the
uniqueness and dignity of the human being, individual human rights, personal
responsibility, moral obligation, and the moral value of a cohesive social
fabric. Thus, we can reply to Martin with the following syllogism (Theistic
Argument B, or TA-B ): To ground an objective moral order, the atheist must
show how naturalism furnishes an ontological framework for the intrinsic
dignity of human beings, universal human rights, and moral responsibility.
The atheist has shown no such ontological foundation (based on naturalism)
to account for intrinsic human dignity, human rights, etc. Therefore, the
atheist's attempt to ground an objective morality fails.
On the other hand, the theist (as we saw above) can make a plausible moral
connection between God and human beings. It is this personal and moral
connection which grounds the dignity/value, rights, purpose, and
responsibility of human beings. It is only on this assumption ?at the
ontological level?of humans' being intrinsically valuable that we can rise
to the next level?the epistemological ?to know that rape, for instance,
"violates the victim's rights . . . traumatizes the victim . . . undermines
the fabric of society, and so on."
What we have before us is then is a matter of theism's greater contextual
probability. Furthermore, there are certain additional facts about the world
which are much more probable or make much more sense if God exists than if
he does not: The fact of consciousness/subjectivity, intentionality, and
various mental properties: Thomas Nagel writes, "Consciousness is what makes
the mind-body problem really intractable." John Searle notes that "the
leading problem in the biological sciences is the problem of explaining how
neurobiological processes cause conscious experiences." Moving from purely
naturalistic, unconscious processes to the existence of consciousness
appears to require a much greater leap than consciousness' deriving from an
ultimate, conscious Being. the existence of moral beings, which is better
explained by a moral and personal Being than by their emerging through
non-moral processes. the existence of non-utilitarian beauty, which seems to
be better explained by theism than by metaphysical naturalism. We could more
easily expect "useless" beauty if God exists than if he does not. the
beginning of the physical space-time universe, prior to which there was
nothing physical at all. Thus there was lacking (from the naturalist's point
of view) even the potentiality for anything to come into existence from
nothing. The metaphysical principle "out of nothing nothing comes" still
holds. the delicately balanced cosmic constants in the world that make
conditions "just right" for human existence ("the Goldilocks effect,"
astrophysicists have called it). Freeman Dyson notes: "As we look out into
the Universe and identify the many accidents of physics and astronomy that
have worked together for our benefit, it almost seems as if the Universe
must in some sense have known that we were coming." the existence of evil,
which not only presupposes objective moral goodness but also entails design
(i.e., evil is a departure from the way things ought to be ).
As William Davis argues, the skeptic may be able to offer naturalistic
explanations for these features of the universe (or he could insist that
features like objective morality and beauty do not exist at all). "But the
best the skeptic can hope for is to show that metaphysical naturalism
explains as much of what needs explaining as the existence of God explains .
.. . . In no case is it plausible that metaphysical naturalism explains the
data better."
Moreover, the theistic foundation for morality has the virtue of greater
simplicity on its side in that it offers a plausible linking of two distinct
entities that, in an atheistic world, must be joined in some ad hoc fashion.
These two entities are objective moral values and human persons.
On the one hand, a metaphysical naturalist like Martin apparently
presupposes that moral properties supervene on "correctly-related" or
"complexly-conjoined" non-moral ones. Then somehow two apparently
unconnected components within the universe?namely, (a) these emergent moral
properties and (b) the moral principles of justice, mercy, and kindness,
which are analytically-true brute givens whether or not any human beings
exist?happen to be, by fantastic coincidence, intimately related. Now Martin
holds that moral truths exist as part of the cosmic furniture, and he also
maintains that humans (independent of these standards) evolved
naturalistically to such a point at which they became moral beings.
But why think that these moral principles which exist even apply to us or
morally obligate us? To say that moral values are "just there" seems
insufficient. Isn't it an extraordinary coincidence that out of all possible
creatures that have evolved, human beings should just happen to have
obligations to these pre-existing, analytically-true objective moral values?
It seems that the evolutionary process somehow anticipated the arrival of
human beings on the scene. But a less ad hoc candidate is the theistic
alternative. (And, we could add, even if moral properties did exist on a
naturalistic scheme of things, why think that moral obligation
exists?particularly when such a duty conflicts with my self-interest?)
Whereas these are two unconnected entities appear to pose a problem for the
metaphysical naturalist, theism brings them together in a much more concise
way: A personal God, who is the source of moral values, makes human persons
in his image, and thus they share important moral and spiritual
characteristics with God. Theism provides a match between our moral make-up
and the structure of ultimate reality.
Thus objective moral values are quite at home in a theistic universe. Given
God's existence, moral realism is natural. But given an atheistic universe
(despite Martin's claims to the contrary), objective morality?along with its
assumptions of human dignity, rights, and moral responsibility?is unnatural
and surprising and "queer."
Furthermore, theism serves a very useful place in philosophy, as it suggests
answers where there would likely be only conundrums or brute facts. As Alvin
Plantinga maintains, theism "offers suggestions for answers to a wide range
of otherwise intractable questions."
Earlier, we gave the (negative) syllogism as to why the atheist fails to
account properly for objective morality ( TA-B ). Positively, however, we
could put forth another theistic argument (Theistic Argument C, or TA-C ):
To ground the existence of an objective moral order, which assumes human
dignity, human rights, human responsibility, and so on, the theist must show
how this is so. A theistic universe (and not, we have seen, an atheistic
one) furnishes the ontological resources to explain these data?namely, a
good and personal God in whose image humans have been made. Therefore, the
theistic account of morality succeeds where the atheistic one fails.
So while the atheist, who has been made in God's image, correctly believes
( epistemologically ) in moral realism, his own ontological foundation
furnishes no basis for this belief.
II. The Euthyphro Dilemma... Again
We are familiar with the Euthyphro dilemma raised by Socrates: "Is what is
holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is
holy?" Socrates rightly rejected the former--an inferior view--but accepted
the latter. Martin asks us to suppose that rape is wrong because God
condemns it. This raises the arbitrariness horn of the Euthyphro dilemma.
(The other one is the autonomy horn.) He rejects--correctly, in my view--a
divine command theory, which (in its weaker version) views the sinful and
the morally forbidden as coextensive. It appears to me that unless the
commands are tethered to the goodness of God's character, then these
commands can appear arbitrary. But even contemporary divine command
theorists like Philip Quinn and Robert M. Adams seem to go beyond divine
commands to emphasize their grounding in God's character, which is the
proper move to make.
Simply defining moral obligation in terms of being simply "that which God
commands" runs into the problem of tautology, in which "good" and "right"
are redefined. "Goodness" comes to mean nothing more than "God commanded X."
Obedience to divine commands would thus appear to be arbitrary. As Alasdair
McIntyre once asked: "what other reason can there be for such obedience but
the appeal to divine power and to the consequences of flouting it?"
Thus many theists have argued that appealing to God's character as the
source and standard of moral goodness helps us to avoid the horns of the
dilemma. However, Michael Martin claims that theists who root objective
morality in the character of God rather than the commands of God only
postpone the problem since the dilemma can be formulated in terms of his
character. I quote Martin at length:
Is God's character the way it is because it is good or is God's character
good simply because it is God's character? Is there an independent standard
of good or does God's character set the standard? If God's character is the
way it is because it is good, then there is an independent standard of
goodness by which to evaluate God's character. For example, suppose God
condemns rape because of his just and merciful character. According to this
independent standard of goodness, being merciful and just is precisely what
a good character involves. In this case, even if God did not exist, one
could say that a merciful and just character is good. Human beings could use
this standard to evaluate peoples' character and action based on this
character. They could do this whether or not God exists.
Suppose God's character is good simply because it is God's character. Then
if God's character were cruel and unjust, these attributes would be good. In
such a case God might well condone rape since this would be in keeping with
His character. But could not one reply that God could not be cruel and
unjust since by necessity God must be good? It is true that by necessity God
must be good. But unless we have some independent standard of goodness then
whatever attributes God has would by definition be good: God's character
would define what good is.
So Martin wonders why the non-existence of God would adversely affect the
goodness of mercy, compassion, and justice.
In response to Martin's revised Euthyphro dilemma, however, the theist can
offer the following responses.
First, we noted earlier that the "reasons" Martin offers for why rape is
wrong already assume the dignity of human beings, the existence of universal
human rights, an objective purpose/end for human existence, moral
obligation, and moral responsibility. Thus Martin needs to offer a more
robust explanation for these assumptions, but we have seen that the
atheistic worldview lacks such resources while the theistic perspective
anticipates a moral universe.
Martin's position on morality reminds me of what Bertrand Russell said in
his BBC debate with F. C. Copleston. After being asked how the universe came
into being, Bertrand Russell asserted, "I should say that the universe is
just there, and that's all." Similarly, Martin appears to be saying, "The
objective moral principles are there, and that's all." But is that really
all? To paraphrase Father Copleston's response, "Why objective morality
rather than none at all? That is the question."
To present a defeater against theism's claim to ontologically ground
morality, Martin must do more than simply say that moral properties exist or
that we can have moral knowledge or that moral properties supervene on
physical entities. Nor will it do to say, "I offer the same reasons the
theist does against rape." For the theist already presupposes?and has a
foundation for presupposing?human rights, human dignity, and the like. We've
already noted even if the theist and atheist end up pitting "brute facts"
against each other, the "brute fact" of a personal, good God who has made
human beings in his image offers a more natural context for affirming human
dignity than does an impersonal, unguided process.
Second, by presenting the revised version of the Euthyphro argument, Martin
simply postpones the inevitable?that is, applying a similar dilemma to his
own atheistic version of moral realism . If Martin thinks that he is forcing
the impalement of the theist on one of the horns of the dilemma, how does
Martin think that he can escape a similar dilemma, mutatis mutandis ?
Now obviously, the atheist's moral position does not deal with the matter of
commands issued by a personal being; so the Euthyphro argument is
inapplicable in this regard. But, in principle, the atheist who raises the
horns of this argument against the theist (whether pertaining to divine
commands or divine character) must himself deal with the horns of autonomy
or arbitrariness. So we can ask Martin, "Are the supervening moral
properties?or even moral principles like justice?good simply because they
are good, or is there some independent standard of good to which they
conform?" Thus the alleged dilemma Martin claims the theist faces is the
very same one the atheist does. So there is no actual advantage for the
atheist in presenting this challenge. The same potential charges of
arbitrariness or the existence of some autonomous moral standard (such as
platonic Forms) still apply. If the atheist claims that he is not being
arbitrary, then why should the theist's viewpoint be considered any less
arbitrary? The sword cuts both ways.
We could carry the argument further by comparing Martin's view of
supervenience with the common view that morality is the result of social as
well as biological forces at work within human evolution. Bertrand Russell
noted that ethics arises from the pressures of the community on the
individual. Man . . . does not always instinctively feel the desires which
are useful to his herd. The herd, being anxious that the individual should
act in its interests, has invented various devices for causing the
individual's interest to be in harmony with that of the herd. One of these .
.. . is morality.
In such a scenario, it seems plausible to argue that rape?because of its
enhancement of human survival and reproduction?could easily have developed
into a good activity rather than a reprehensible one. (Male mallards, for
instance, commit acts that look much like rape.) And ethnic or social-class
cleansing, in which apparent "parasitic" or "unwanted" elements of human
society could be eliminated, might also enable the human race to become
hardier and thus better survive. But this obviously would render morality
subjective and arbitrary. Similarly, I do not see how Martin's belief in
intrinsic human dignity via supervenience is any more objective than a herd
morality that develops due to socio-biological forces. It seems that both
scenarios are on par. Martin's own version of atheistic moral realism does
not evade the charge of arbitrariness based on the mindless, impersonal
emergence of morality.
Third, in one sense, Martin's query is pointless. After all, we must
eventually arrive at some self-sufficient and self-explanatory stopping
point beyond which the discussion can go no further. Assume for a moment
that God does not exist and that we have, instead, a Platonic form of the
Good from which all values derive. At this point, it would appear silly to
ask, "Why is the Good good?" It seems evident that Martin's argument is
wrongly conceived. Rather, we have a metaphysical ultimate, and everything
is good in approximation to this. This leads us to ask the question once
more: Why is atheism's basis for morality any less arbitrary a
stopping-point than God's character? Using Martin's own argument, can't we
always push the atheistic moral realist back further, questioning even the
sufficient stopping point for his morality? What makes the objective moral
values that human beings have come to affirm right? To rephrase what I
pointed out above: if these moral values exist (a) externally and
independently of any human beings at all or (b) only in conjunction with the
formation of human beings, then we can ask, "What makes them good?" Some
stopping point will be necessary for both the theist and the atheist. So if
the atheist charges the theist with circularity, the theist can turn the
tables on the atheist. Since the atheist is not off the Euthyphronic hook
(or horn!), the next step would be to examine moral justification in terms
of which worldview provides a more fitting context for affirming the
intrinsic dignity of human beings.
Fourth, Martin presupposes that even if God did not exist, he could still
imagine a moral universe in which moral obligation, human dignity, and human
rights and responsibility would still exist. But this is precisely the point
of contention. In the first place, the question, Why is there something
(including human beings) rather than nothing at all?, is the more
fundamental one. Second, if this fundamental problem could be overcome, the
atheist must be questioned on his assumption that human beings would be
essentially the same if God did not exist. But the theist maintains that
human beings would be radically different (if they were to exist at
all)?more like brutes ?and certainly without a moral constitution. The
problem is still unresolved of how human beings became endowed with
intrinsic value and rights and in the first place.
The theist has a plausible basis for this: human beings have value by virtue
of their personhood, which is derived from the personhood of God?the
ultimately valuable Being. Having been created in the image of God gives
human beings their value. Their nature?with its moral, rational, and
spiritual capacities?resemble God's. So to assume morality without God seems
to miss the ontological implications of the question. That is, if there is
no personal God to bestow personhood?and its attendant intrinsic dignity and
moral responsibility, then we can't rightly say, "I can be a person with
intrinsic dignity and moral responsibility even if God doesn't exist."
So for Martin to ask, "Why should I think God is good instead of an evil
creator?", is a wrong-headed attempt to drive a wedge between God and his
image-bearers. This is something Martin persists in doing, but to question
the character of God is to question the moral capacities of human beings.
Martin simply assumes that his moral faculties are intact and that he can
make sound moral judgments. Yet this very capacity is a reflection of the
imago Dei, which offers prima facie reasonable assurance that God's
character is non-arbitrary. If Martin has a correct grasp of what is good,
then this reflects that his moral faculties are functioning properly?as God
intended. If he then proceeds to ask about God's capacity to be evil, then
Martin would then have to be a skeptical about the proper functioning of his
own moral faculties. Thus his objection becomes a moot one.
Fifth, Martin also presupposes that in order to avoid the arbitrariness horn
of the revised Euthyphro dilemma, the theist must opt for some moral
standard independent of God. Thus to do what is good, God would have to
conform to that standard. In other words, God is obligated to "obey" or
conform to that standard.
However, the appropriate response to this kind of claim is that God does
not, say, keep promises because he ought to (which would imply some external
moral standard). Rather, the theist claims that God will keep promises. It
is impossible that he not act morally. What we have here is the Anselmian
notion of God's "essential perfection." God is a sui generis being, whose
will operates according to God's very nature .
This view, I believe, brings together the two horns of the Euthyphro
dilemma. It states that, on the one hand, goodness is not independent of God
but rather is part of God's nature and depends upon him for its existence.
On the other hand, God's will operates according to a moral standard. That
standard is God's very nature . The essential perfection view maintains that
God is necessarily good ; he could never will evil, as this is a logical
impossibility. This view avoids the arbitrariness charge, and it avoids the
autonomy charge in that God does not consult a certain moral standard
external to himself before acting. Moral justification ends with God, the
absolute starting point for morality. So God's goodness does not derive from
his adhering to a certain moral standard.
Because God is necessarily good and thus acts in conformity to his nature,
the standards by which he acts are descriptive of his own nature rather than
somehow prescribed to him. As philosophers have done, we can draw a
distinction between following a rule and merely acting in accordance with a
rule . Although empirically indistinguishable, they are logically distinct.
It seems that if we speak in terms of "God ought to do X," then it appears
that there is at least a metaphysical possibility that he not do X. But if
God is essentially good, then no such moral obligations attach to God as
they do to human beings. After all, it appears that when moral laws are in
force (i.e., "one ought to do X"), there is the possibility that they will
be disobeyed.
So God's goodness should not be viewed as his fulfilling moral obligations
but as expressing the way he is . God does not "consult" ontologically
independent moral principles before acting. No, he simply acts as he is
inclined to--which is in accordance with his good character, and this will
necessarily be the best . "No preliminary stage of checking the relevant
principles is required." In this sense, God's goodness should be thought of
along axiological rather strictly moral lines.
Part of God's goodness does consist in his acting in perfect accord with
those principles which would provide duties for a lesser being. This use of
the model would be an explication not of God's moral goodness, but of his
axiological goodness. When religious people claim that God is morally good,
meaning that he acts in accord with moral principles, they are merely using
that axiological conception with which they are most familiar, moral
goodness, to describe or model an aspect of divinity functionally isomorphic
with, though ontologically different from, human goodness.
In other words, although, morally speaking, God acts in the same manner that
humans ought to act (or as the ideal moral agent would act), his goodness is
not a matter of fulfilling moral duties as it is for us. For instance, we
speak of God's making a promise to Abraham to make his descendants as
plentiful as the sands on the shore. Given this understanding of God's not
being morally obligated to act--in this case, to keep a promise, we should
more accurately describe God as expressing his intention, which is
tantamount to a promise from our vantage point. William Alston writes,
Just as we can express intentions without obligating ourselves (provided we
don't promise) so it is with God. The difference, of course, is that we can
count on an expression of intention from God as we can on the promise from a
human being, indeed can count on it much more, because of the utter
stability and dependability of God's character and purposes.
Mark Linville states that "this is not merely an ad hoc construal of God's
relation to moral duties as a result of trying to solve the problem of
essential perfection and divine freedom. Rather, it follows naturally from
the concept of an essentially perfect being." So contrary to Martin's claim,
God is not obligated to some standard of goodness external to himself and
thus does not consult it before acting; rather, he simply does what is in
accordance with his nature.
Now Martin might, for the sake of argument, grant that God's nature is
necessarily good. But this would not entail that God's character is the
standard for human beings or that he is the source of objective morality.
However, in light of the connection between human beings and God via the
imago Dei, then we have good reason to suppose that there is indeed a
necessary link between God's character and our moral constitution. Thus God
would serve as both the standard and source of objective morality.
Sixth, another Anselmian point that follows from the preceding one is this:
God by definition is a being worthy of worship. It is a necessary truth that
he is the standard of goodness. If God were not absolutely good, then he
would not be worthy of worship. The meaningful question to ask, then, is:
Why should we regard God as the standard of goodness? Anselm's perfect-being
theology maintains that God must be absolute goodness itself, the very
embodiment of goodness. Thus he is worthy of worship. But if a being is not
absolute goodness itself, then it would not be worthy of worship.
Getting back to Michael Martin, we had mentioned earlier Martin's tacit
approval of the notion that certain moral truths are analytically true.
However, it appears that some naturalists?relativists and nihilists, for
instance?can easily imagine a world in which objective moral standards do
not exist. Bertrand Russell was one such atheist who seemed to be quite
consistent in this regard.
In sum, Martin's revised Euthyphro dilemma does not raise inescapable
problems for the theist. This brings us to the matter of rape in the Bible.
III. The Bible and Rape
We come to the section, in which it becomes quite evident that Martin is not
interested in doing serious study of the biblical text and its context.
Although I could say much more, I'll let the arguments below speak for
themselves.
Martin claims that in the Bible, "God seems to be tacitly approving of rape"
in some places while in others "rape is condemned but without regard for the
victim's welfare." The main example Martin gives is Deuteronomy 22:23-29.
The text reads:
23 If there is a girl who is a virgin engaged to a man, and another man
finds her in the city and lies with her, 24 then you shall bring them both
out to the gate, and you shall stone them to death; the girl, because she
did not cry out in the city, and the man, because he has violated his
neighbor's wife. Thus you shall purge the evil from among you. 25 But if in
the field the man finds the girl who is engaged, and the man forces her and
lies with her, then only the man who lies with her shall die. 26 But you
shall do nothing to the girl; there is no sin in the girl worthy of death,
for just as a man rises against his neighbor and murders him, so is this
case. 27 When he found her in the field, the engaged girl cried out, but
there was no one to save her.
28 If a man finds a girl who is a virgin, who is not engaged, and seizes her
and lies with her and they are discovered, 29 then the man who lay with her
shall give to the girl's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall
become his wife because he has violated her; he cannot divorce her all his
days (NASB).
Martin makes the following criticism concerning this passage:
Here [in vv. 28-29] the victim of rape is [treated as] the property of the
father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father's property he must pay a
bridal fee. The [girl] apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to
marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no
negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if
you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.
Before getting further into the discussion, we note that Martin displays a
lack of exposure to the historical and social context in which the Bible was
written. With regard to the Deuteronomy 22 passage, we should note three
distinct scenarios:
#1: Consensual sex/adultery between a man and a betrothed girl: v. 23: "He
lies with her"; this need not imply force or violence. This act is
tantamount to adultery as engagement is tantamount to marriage (?he has
violated his neighbor's wife').
#2: Rape of an engaged girl: v. 25: "[he] forces her [an engaged girl] and
lies with her, then only the man who lies with her shall die."
#3: Rape of an unengaged/single girl: v. 28: "[he] seizes her [a girl who is
single and not engaged] and lies with her and they are discovered": the word
seize literally means "handle/take hold of." Although rape (as in the NIV)
may be too strong a translation, according to Christopher Wright, this act
does appears to be that of rape.
In response, then, to Martin's criticism, one must point out that only in a
legal sense were children considered "property" of the father in Old
Testament Israel. So, to violate a girl?even with her consent?would be an
offense against her father/parents as well. This is not so foreign as Martin
would make it appear. In the United States, it is not uncommon to hear of
attempts at legislation which a parent should be notified before a young
teenage girl can have an abortion. This is a reasonable demand?even though
this teenager is not the property of her parents.
With regard to the claim that the girl has no say in the matter and must
marry the man, Martin overlooks the cultural background to such a command.
In the latter case (v. 28), the sexual encounter appears to be that of a man
taking advantage of a "minor." Christopher Wright argues: the girl would no
longer attract a potential bridegroom and the exchange of gifts and dowry
that went along with the marriage. It is for this loss that the man must
compensate the father (29a). . . . [This law] gives the offender no option
but to marry the girl (and the father no right to refuse), with no easy way
out through a quick subsequent divorce. The girl is thus assured of security
and provision, in place of virtual widowhood if she had been abandoned after
the loss of her virginity .
In addition, the law offers a further protection to both the girl and the
(possible) child born from this union.
Martin misses the point and engages in an argument from silence when he
says, "Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is
forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an
unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught." First of all, in the case of
casuistic law in the Pentateuch, not all contingencies are accounted for.
Thus it is commonly understood among Old Testament scholars that the
Israelite laws are exemplary rather than exhaustive . So there is no reason
to think that all conditions should be spelled out. Furthermore, common
sense tells us that not much can be done if there is no evidence to act on!
We could rephrase what Martin says and apply it to the crime of a
well-planned murder: "Notice also if a murder is not discovered, no negative
judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you murder
someone, be sure not to get caught." But this is so obvious that Martin's
point seems silly. Thirdly, the mention of the word discovered in the
biblical text (v. 28) is significant. It implies that if a man's taking
sexual advantage of an unengaged single girl becomes public knowledge, then
the girl would certainly not be viewed as a prospective candidate for
marriage within her society.
Let us continue with Martin's argument:
In the case of the rape of a betrothed virgin in a city, the Bible says that
both the rapist and the victim should be stoned to death: the rapist because
he violated his neighbor's wife and the victim because she did not cry for
help [vv. 25-27]. Again, the assumption is that the rapist despoiled the
property of another man and so must pay with his life. Concern for the
welfare of the victim does not seem to matter. Moreover, it is assumed that
in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would
be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious. . . .
On the other hand, according to the Bible, the situation is completely
different if the rape occurs in "open country." Here the rapist should be
killed, not the victim. The reason given is that if a woman cried for help
in open country, she would not be heard. Consequently, she could not be
blamed for allowing the rape to occur. No mention is made about the
psychological harm to [the victim]. No condemnation is made of a rapist in
open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.
We must clarify this notion of property in the first of the two paragraphs
just cited. In verse 22, the penalty for adultery (to which a betrothed
could be subject) is death (Dt. 22:22; Lev. 20:10). This fact argues against
the assumption that women were nothing more than the property of their
husbands in Old Testament Israel. After all, why destroy the "property" as
well as punish the guilty man? Moreover, there is no other property offense
in Old Testament law that is punishable by death. Thus Martin is simply
wrong when he says "the [dubious] assumption is that the rapist despoiled
the property of another man." Again, contrary to Martin's claim that concern
"for the welfare of the victim does not seem to matter," we have seen how
the law provided security and material provision for young women who were
sexually violated.
The other "dubious" assumption Martin mentions is similarly flawed: "it is
assumed that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she
did, she would be heard and rescued." Again, Wright addresses this issue,
urging us to consider both intention, circumstances and action : . . . the
circumstances in which [sexual intercourse] occurs affect the assumptions
the court might make regarding intention and thus also affect its allocation
of guilt and punishment. The contrast between a busy town and a deserted
countryside makes an obvious difference to what could be assumed regarding
the woman's consent. The difference is also expressed in the vocabulary
[i.e., consent in v. 23 vs. rape in v. 25] . . . . In the latter case, the
court should accept what could only be the woman's own testimony in the
matter and assume her innocence .
Regarding the first instance mentioned in our Deuteronomy 22 passage (i.e.,
adultery between an engaged girl and another man), there is a certain
legitimate assumption: Although rape could take place in the city, this
particular case is not one of rape because if the woman had cried for help,
then help most certainly would have come. But because she did not call for
help, it can be assumed that she consented to the man's advances. But pace
Martin, this Deuteronomy 22 passage is not assuming that in all cases the
rape victim would be heard if she cried out, as Wright states. Thus given a
few important facts about the biblical text and the cultural context,
Martin's arguments lose their force.
There is another passage Martin mentions, to which we now turn?Numbers
31:18, where, Martin alleges, "Moses encourages his men to use captured
virgins for their own sexual pleasure, i.e., to rape them" (5). At first
sight, the passage does seem quite harsh: "Now kill all the boys. And kill
every woman who has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who
has never slept with a man" (NIV). However, the context for this command?as
in various other OT commands of this nature?should not be overlooked. In
light of the rampant adultery at Baal Peor and its potentially corrupting
influence, this command is put in perspective. It is these young girls who
have not debased themselves in the orgiastic worship of Baal (Num. 25).
Furthermore, Martin's assumption that rape is presupposed here is mistaken.
A similar passage in Deuteronomy 20:13-14 is worth noting:
When the Lord your God gives it [i.e., the city which has rejected Israel's
terms of peace] into your hand, you shall strike all the men in it with the
edge of the sword. Only the women and the children and the animals and all
that is in the city all its spoil, you shall take as booty for yourself.
John Sailhamer comments: "The present law ensures the well-being of those
captured women [and children] by giving them protection against being sold
into slavery. It also provides for the assimilation of the captive women
into Israelite society by allowing marriage to them." Thus it was
permissible in such instances to, not rape, but take a wife,who would be
incorporated into the people of Israel through marriage. It seems far less
likely that men could be as readily integrated into early Israel.
Martin again fails to make his case regarding the biblical perspective on
rape. In a number of ways, then, the psychological well-being of the raped
girl is taken into account: (a) she is provided for rather than abandoned to
virtual widowhood because she has been sexually violated; (b) easy divorce
by the man is not possible; (c) a potential child from this union has the
security of a two-parent family. Also, by failing to account for many of the
cultural dimensions of Old Testament Israelite culture, the force of
Martin's point is vitiated.
Conclusion
Michael Martin's use of philosophical argument and the biblical text is
insufficient to make his case. First, he has not established?from an
ontological point of view?the objectivity of naturalistic morality; he has
only dealt with the epistemological dimension. We also saw that theism
rather than atheism furnishes a more fitting context for moral values, which
themselves presuppose human dignity, purpose, rights, and the like. Second,
Martin's raising the Euthyphro dilemma seems purposeless since his atheistic
position is vulnerable to just such a dilemma. Furthermore, Anselm's
perfect-being theology offers a sufficient way out of the Euthyphro dilemma.
In this scenario, we see a God who acts morally naturally and without
consulting any exterior moral standards (i.e., without obligation). Finally,
Martin's argument against the Bible's view on rape fails to make any case
for the atheistic position.
So can Martin be a moral realist? Yes, with regard to the order of knowing;
no, with regard to the order of being.
.
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| User: "Jim07D6" |
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| Title: Re: Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? |
07 Mar 2006 05:19:34 PM |
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"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
<...>
Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position.
I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear:
God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape because
it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various
reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it
traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on. All
of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide
objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide
objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold
even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the
victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God did
not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could provide
objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God.
Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God does
not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist.
Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He merely
addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping there.
That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the good is
another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does not
furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are moral
truths and that we are able to know them.
Straw man. It is not the intent of this argument, as quoted, to
support the contention that we have "the basis for explaining how it
is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them." We
might in fact have no such basis, and his argument still stands.
To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?"
<snip elaboration of the Straw man argument WRT the quoted material
above it.>
But if Martin is going to insist that "it has not been shown that all
attempts to ground objective morality on a nontheistic basis fail," he must
do more than repeat the mantra: "But human beings do have dignity."
No, he need not provide a basis for grounding objective morality
nontheistically, in order to support the contention that "it has not
been shown that all attempts to ground objective morality on a
nontheistic basis fail". What he needs to do show a reason to believe
that it has not been shown that they do fail.
Here the theist offers just such a foundation: Human beings possess
intrinsic or inherent worth because they are made in the image of God. They
share the moral likeness of a personal God in their very nature or being,
and, by virtue of their personhood, they are moral agents. As Keith Yandell
puts it: "nothing which is not a person is a moral agent. Morality concerns
only persons." Their personhood derives from the personhood of God. Their
having basic moral intuitions about justice, goodness, and kindness reflect
this moral connection. Thus we ought to be moral because we have been made
as moral beings in the likeness of a good God. We have been made to know God
personally, and when we are in right relationship with God, all other goods
find their proper place; that is, we function the way we were designed to
function. Thus, when human beings experience guilt (for murder, adultery,
theft), it is not because they have simply violated societal laws, a social
contract, or some set of Neoplatonic laws that are somehow part of the
furniture of the universe. They have violated the character of the ultimate
personal Being. Mackie's problem about the queerness of morality in a
non-theistic universe persists; objective morality is just as strange as
mental properties: just as mental properties are distinct from physical
ones, so goodness belongs to persons rather than impersonal objects.
This goes off into an argument for mind-body dualism and all that
flows from that flawed philosophical position. I am not interested in
this aspect, so will snip the rest.
--- Jim07D6
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| User: "Scott" |
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| Title: Re: Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? |
07 Mar 2006 09:32:06 PM |
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"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:n13s02d8peg3nn45qarvvnr23isk6cs3an@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
<...>
Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position.
I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear:
God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape
because
it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various
reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it
traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on.
All
of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide
objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide
objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold
even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the
victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God
did
not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could
provide
objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God.
Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God
does
not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist.
Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He
merely
addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping
there.
That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the good
is
another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does
not
furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are moral
truths and that we are able to know them.
Straw man. It is not the intent of this argument, as quoted, to
support the contention that we have "the basis for explaining how it
is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them." We
might in fact have no such basis, and his argument still stands.
I don't see it. Martin's argument is based on belief in moral realism -
moral truths. Copan considers Martin a materialist (he may not be, doesn't
matter). If materialism/naturalism/physicalism all hold that nature is
amoral (as in atheistic), how do such things as moral realism/truths come
about in such a metaphysical, amoral monism? It seems to me the only
possible coherent moral theory with materilism is Relativism (aka moral
anti-realism).
If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of this
nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in moral
realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil exists
(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
real?
To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?"
No. No god need be invoked. The problem here of moral realism is squarely in
metaphysical materialism: "Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes
the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose
(e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral
accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties,"
he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails
and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can
human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's
worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of
personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can
see." - P Copan
I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question. If a
person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral realism
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
materialism.
Scott
.
|
|
|
| User: "Jim07D6" |
|
| Title: Re: Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? |
07 Mar 2006 10:41:47 PM |
|
|
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:n13s02d8peg3nn45qarvvnr23isk6cs3an@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
<...>
Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position.
I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is clear:
God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape
because
it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various
reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it
traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on.
All
of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide
objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide
objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold
even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the
victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God
did
not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could
provide
objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God.
Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God
does
not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist.
Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He
merely
addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping
there.
That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the good
is
another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does
not
furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are moral
truths and that we are able to know them.
Straw man. It is not the intent of this argument, as quoted, to
support the contention that we have "the basis for explaining how it
is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them." We
might in fact have no such basis, and his argument still stands.
I don't see it. Martin's argument is based on belief in moral realism -
moral truths. Copan considers Martin a materialist (he may not be, doesn't
matter). If materialism/naturalism/physicalism all hold that nature is
amoral (as in atheistic), how do such things as moral realism/truths come
about in such a metaphysical, amoral monism? It seems to me the only
possible coherent moral theory with materilism is Relativism (aka moral
anti-realism).
It may or may not be true that he is a moral realist, but the thesis
of moral realism does not appear in his argument as you quoted it. I
do not believe we adequately rebut the Euthyphro Dilemma by rebutting
materialism.
If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of this
nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in moral
realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil exists
(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
real?
The question is whether the Euthyphro Dilemma is a genuinely troubling
problem. He attacks one side of it. We need not be materialists to do
this, We can even be theists and do this, if we wonder what it is that
God does in the moral sphere, when he commands us to do or not to do
something. What is His basis?
To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?"
No. No god need be invoked. The problem here of moral realism is squarely in
metaphysical materialism: "Notice that Martin's position simply presupposes
the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective purpose
(e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral
accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making properties,"
he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which snails
and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis can
human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's
worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of
personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can
see." - P Copan
That may or may not be true of some argument he makes, but it is not
true of the segment you quoted.
I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question. If a
person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral realism
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
materialism.
I'm sorry, I was only commenting on the part I commented on. I am not
defending materialism. I think materialism comes from dualism, by
accepting mind-body dualism and then rejecting one half -- and I don't
buy that dualism. You seem to accept mind-body dualism, and reject
neither. I don't accept the dualism. THere is only one reality.
--- Jim07D6
.
|
|
|
| User: "Scott" |
|
| Title: Re: Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? |
08 Mar 2006 10:44:08 AM |
|
|
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:tans02941mgrg933p4q7mg46qf14odrtsh@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:n13s02d8peg3nn45qarvvnr23isk6cs3an@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
<...>
Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position.
I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is
clear:
God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape
because
it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various
reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it
traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on.
All
of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide
objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide
objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold
even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the
victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God
did
not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could
provide
objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God.
Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I
criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God
does
not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist.
Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He
merely
addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping
there.
That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the
good
is
another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does
not
furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are
moral
truths and that we are able to know them.
Straw man. It is not the intent of this argument, as quoted, to
support the contention that we have "the basis for explaining how it
is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them." We
might in fact have no such basis, and his argument still stands.
I don't see it. Martin's argument is based on belief in moral realism -
moral truths. Copan considers Martin a materialist (he may not be, doesn't
matter). If materialism/naturalism/physicalism all hold that nature is
amoral (as in atheistic), how do such things as moral realism/truths come
about in such a metaphysical, amoral monism? It seems to me the only
possible coherent moral theory with materilism is Relativism (aka moral
anti-realism).
It may or may not be true that he is a moral realist, but the thesis
of moral realism does not appear in his argument as you quoted it. I
do not believe we adequately rebut the Euthyphro Dilemma by rebutting
materialism.
I never said that rebutting materialis did rebut ED. The ED problem is only
valid if one assumes moral realism. The ED vanishes in materialism since
both gods and morals aren't real in this metaphysic.
If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of this
nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in
moral
realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil exists
(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
real?
The question is whether the Euthyphro Dilemma is a genuinely troubling
problem. He attacks one side of it. We need not be materialists to do
this, We can even be theists and do this, if we wonder what it is that
God does in the moral sphere, when he commands us to do or not to do
something. What is His basis?
This is a theological issue that I'm not interested in. I don't debate
theolgoy.
I dont' see how the Euthyphro Dilemma is relavant to materialists. They
should not only not believe in gods but also not believe in the moral
realism the ED is based upon.
To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?"
No. No god need be invoked. The problem here of moral realism is squarely
in
metaphysical materialism: "Notice that Martin's position simply
presupposes
the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective
purpose
(e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral
accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making
properties,"
he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which
snails
and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis
can
human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's
worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of
personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can
see." - P Copan
That may or may not be true of some argument he makes, but it is not
true of the segment you quoted.
I simply quoted the whole thing. It's the part of his argument on
materialism that relates to my question:
Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? I don't see how they honestly
can be. But I do see so-called self-procalimed materialist make moral
realist statment all the time. At least CC and Les just in my reviewing
their post so far.
I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question. If
a
person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral realism
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
materialism.
I'm sorry, I was only commenting on the part I commented on. I am not
defending materialism. I think materialism comes from dualism, by
accepting mind-body dualism and then rejecting one half -- and I don't
buy that dualism. You seem to accept mind-body dualism, and reject
neither. I don't accept the dualism. THere is only one reality.
there is only one reality. The metaphysical problem is whether it is
monistic, dualistic, other. We can't prove our meta. I'm not defending or
condemning materialism. But I do base my moral epistemic argument on
materialism and then point out that I observe materialists making statements
that are implicitly moral realistic in nature. Moral realism is not
compatible with materialism. I and Copan cannot see how it could be
compatible. Materialists/atheists simply presuppose, as Martin does, there
moral realism without a *rational* justification for their knowledge. My
pointing out the incompatibility doesn't encumber me to present an
alternative argument for moral realism.
Scott
.
|
|
|
| User: "Jim07D6" |
|
| Title: Re: Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? |
08 Mar 2006 11:11:18 AM |
|
|
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:tans02941mgrg933p4q7mg46qf14odrtsh@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:n13s02d8peg3nn45qarvvnr23isk6cs3an@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
<...>
Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position.
I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is
clear:
God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape
because
it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has various
reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights, it
traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so on.
All
of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide
objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they provide
objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would hold
even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize the
victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if God
did
not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could
provide
objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God.
Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I
criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God
does
not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the atheist.
Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He
merely
addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping
there.
That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the
good
is
another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this does
not
furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are
moral
truths and that we are able to know them.
Straw man. It is not the intent of this argument, as quoted, to
support the contention that we have "the basis for explaining how it
is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them." We
might in fact have no such basis, and his argument still stands.
I don't see it. Martin's argument is based on belief in moral realism -
moral truths. Copan considers Martin a materialist (he may not be, doesn't
matter). If materialism/naturalism/physicalism all hold that nature is
amoral (as in atheistic), how do such things as moral realism/truths come
about in such a metaphysical, amoral monism? It seems to me the only
possible coherent moral theory with materilism is Relativism (aka moral
anti-realism).
It may or may not be true that he is a moral realist, but the thesis
of moral realism does not appear in his argument as you quoted it. I
do not believe we adequately rebut the Euthyphro Dilemma by rebutting
materialism.
I never said that rebutting materialis did rebut ED. The ED problem is only
valid if one assumes moral realism. The ED vanishes in materialism since
both gods and morals aren't real in this metaphysic.
You seem to be saying the Euthyphro Dilemma poses a real problem for
theistic moral realism. If so, I previously misconstrued your
position.
If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of this
nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in
moral
realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil exists
(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
real?
The question is whether the Euthyphro Dilemma is a genuinely troubling
problem. He attacks one side of it. We need not be materialists to do
this, We can even be theists and do this, if we wonder what it is that
God does in the moral sphere, when he commands us to do or not to do
something. What is His basis?
This is a theological issue that I'm not interested in. I don't debate
theolgoy.
I dont' see how the Euthyphro Dilemma is relavant to materialists. They
should not only not believe in gods but also not believe in the moral
realism the ED is based upon.
I have the same attitude toward materialism that you have toward
debating theology. ;-) BTW I assume that you encompass physicalism
under this category, classical materialism is untenable even in
science, as it leaves out fields.
To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?"
No. No god need be invoked. The problem here of moral realism is squarely
in
metaphysical materialism: "Notice that Martin's position simply
presupposes
the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective
purpose
(e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral
accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making
properties,"
he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which
snails
and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis
can
human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's
worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of
personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I can
see." - P Copan
That may or may not be true of some argument he makes, but it is not
true of the segment you quoted.
I simply quoted the whole thing. It's the part of his argument on
materialism that relates to my question:
Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? I don't see how they honestly
can be. But I do see so-called self-procalimed materialist make moral
realist statment all the time. At least CC and Les just in my reviewing
their post so far.
When you say "atheist/materialist" are you saying "an atheist who is
also a materialist?" or are you saying "a person who is either an
atheist, a materialist, or both"? It is this term that got me
interested.
I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question. If
a
person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral realism
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
materialism.
I'm sorry, I was only commenting on the part I commented on. I am not
defending materialism. I think materialism comes from dualism, by
accepting mind-body dualism and then rejecting one half -- and I don't
buy that dualism. You seem to accept mind-body dualism, and reject
neither. I don't accept the dualism. THere is only one reality.
there is only one reality. The metaphysical problem is whether it is
monistic, dualistic, other. We can't prove our meta. I'm not defending or
condemning materialism. But I do base my moral epistemic argument on
materialism and then point out that I observe materialists making statements
that are implicitly moral realistic in nature. Moral realism is not
compatible with materialism. I and Copan cannot see how it could be
compatible. Materialists/atheists simply presuppose, as Martin does, there
moral realism without a *rational* justification for their knowledge. My
pointing out the incompatibility doesn't encumber me to present an
alternative argument for moral realism.
Your "making statements that are implicitly moral realistic in nature"
bears some thought. It is really the underlying attitude and belief
set that matters. While the argument that materialism and moral
realism are incompatible may be sound, there might be very few people
actually falling under this category. Many supposed moral realists
might be actually adherents of an exhortative, emotive ethics.
--- Jim07D6
.
|
|
|
| User: "Scott" |
|
| Title: Re: Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? |
08 Mar 2006 11:43:26 AM |
|
|
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:lt2u021l2m5n3nl5tc00ha8i0qs76h6brk@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:tans02941mgrg933p4q7mg46qf14odrtsh@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:n13s02d8peg3nn45qarvvnr23isk6cs3an@4ax.com...
"Scott" <scott@nospam.net> said:
http://www.paulcopan.com/articles/can-michael-martin-be-a-moral-realist.html
<...>
Martin offers a more substantive argument for his position.
I quote him at length:
Let us assume for the moment that the Biblical position on rape is
clear:
God condemns rape. But why? One possibility is that He condemns rape
because
it is wrong . Why is it wrong? It might be supposed that God has
various
reasons for thinking rape is wrong: it violates the victim's rights,
it
traumatizes the victim, it undermines the fabric of society, and so
on.
All
of these are bad making properties. However, if these reasons provide
objective grounds for God thinking that rape is wrong, then they
provide
objective grounds for others as well. Moreover, these reasons would
hold
even if God did not exist. For example, rape would still traumatize
the
victim and rape would still undermine the fabric of society [even if
God
did
not exist].
Thus on this assumption, Martin claims, in this case, atheists could
provide
objective grounds for condemning rape?the same grounds used by God.
Elsewhere Martin makes a similar statement about cruelty: "If I
criticize
Jones for being cruel, the criticism might well be correct even if God
does
not exist."
Here a major deficiency emerges in the objectivist ethic of the
atheist.
Martin completely ignores the ontological level of the discussion. He
merely
addresses the epistemological level and appears content with stopping
there.
That is, what counts as being good is one thing, but how we know the
good
is
another. Atheists may be aware of the content of morality, but this
does
not
furnish them with the basis for explaining how it is that there are
moral
truths and that we are able to know them.
Straw man. It is not the intent of this argument, as quoted, to
support the contention that we have "the basis for explaining how it
is that there are moral truths and that we are able to know them." We
might in fact have no such basis, and his argument still stands.
I don't see it. Martin's argument is based on belief in moral realism -
moral truths. Copan considers Martin a materialist (he may not be,
doesn't
matter). If materialism/naturalism/physicalism all hold that nature is
amoral (as in atheistic), how do such things as moral realism/truths
come
about in such a metaphysical, amoral monism? It seems to me the only
possible coherent moral theory with materilism is Relativism (aka moral
anti-realism).
It may or may not be true that he is a moral realist, but the thesis
of moral realism does not appear in his argument as you quoted it. I
do not believe we adequately rebut the Euthyphro Dilemma by rebutting
materialism.
I never said that rebutting materialis did rebut ED. The ED problem is
only
valid if one assumes moral realism. The ED vanishes in materialism since
both gods and morals aren't real in this metaphysic.
You seem to be saying the Euthyphro Dilemma poses a real problem for
theistic moral realism. If so, I previously misconstrued your
position.
Of course it's are real problem for it. It *is* a theolgical problem for
theists.
But the Euthrphro Dilemma is not something I'm interested in. It was only a
side comment in relation to it's lack of validity assuming materialism. You
keyed in on the side comment as being the major point I'm making.
You're a smart guy, Jim. Think about. If materialism is true then gods and
morals are not real. They don't exist indpendently of human subjectivism -
of an inventive mind. Within the ED morals are assumed to be...real...,
independent of human subjectivism. For a person to use the ED as a valid
argument he, in that moment, must be assuming materialism is false. That is
an epistemic observation.
ED = morals are real
materialism = moral are not real.
If I say God is real, you would expect me to produce my knowledge of
this
nonphysical thing's existence. Well, the same holds for such things in
moral
realism. The difference being God is a nonphysical objecitve being and
morals are a nonphisical objective quality.
I see no difference in saying God exists (is real) and saying evil
exists
(is real). They both beg an ontological question: can you prove they are
real?
The question is whether the Euthyphro Dilemma is a genuinely troubling
problem. He attacks one side of it. We need not be materialists to do
this, We can even be theists and do this, if we wonder what it is that
God does in the moral sphere, when he commands us to do or not to do
something. What is His basis?
This is a theological issue that I'm not interested in. I don't debate
theolgoy.
I dont' see how the Euthyphro Dilemma is relavant to materialists. They
should not only not believe in gods but also not believe in the moral
realism the ED is based upon.
I have the same attitude toward materialism that you have toward
debating theology. ;-) BTW I assume that you encompass physicalism
under this category, classical materialism is untenable even in
science, as it leaves out fields.
Correct. In this argument materialsim = physicalism = naturalism since the
focus is on moral theory.
To refute this argument, one need only reject the premise, which is
the first horn of the Euthyphro Dilemma , that says (in the original
dialog) "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it
pious because it is loved by the gods?"
No. No god need be invoked. The problem here of moral realism is
squarely
in
metaphysical materialism: "Notice that Martin's position simply
presupposes
the dignity of human beings, universal human rights, some objective
purpose
(e.g., that life has meaning if lived in a particular way), moral
accountability, and the like. When Martin speaks of "bad making
properties,"
he simply assumes that human beings possess an intrinsic worth which
snails
and sea urchins do not. But on what naturalistic or materialistic basis
can
human dignity or human rights be affirmed? What is it within Martin's
worldview that furnishes us with such an ontology or metaphysic of
personhood as being of intrinsic value or worth? Nothing, so far as I
can
see." - P Copan
That may or may not be true of some argument he makes, but it is not
true of the segment you quoted.
I simply quoted the whole thing. It's the part of his argument on
materialism that relates to my question:
Can an atheist/materialist be moral realist? I don't see how they honestly
can be. But I do see so-called self-procalimed materialist make moral
realist statment all the time. At least CC and Les just in my reviewing
their post so far.
When you say "atheist/materialist" are you saying "an atheist who is
also a materialist?" or are you saying "a person who is either an
atheist, a materialist, or both"? It is this term that got me
interested.
The first. Even though it isn't necessarily so for the sake of economy I'm
equating the two.
A person can be an atheist and not a materialist. So an atheist can reject
materialism and not moral realism.
But a materialist is necessarily an atheist and a moral anti-realist; That
is to say, a materialist is necessarily a moral relativist. There are no
moral facts in materialism.
I don't see it either. I don't see the strawman in PC's above question.
If
a
person's metaphysic is materialism, which holds not only an atheistic
premise but also an amoral premise, on what bases does one presuppose a
moral realism, a moral fact, moral truths?
Human rights are necessarily based upon moral universalism, moral
realism
http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hum-rts.htm, but there are no moral realisms in
materialism.
I'm sorry, I was only commenting on the part I commented on. I am not
defending materialism. I think materialism comes from dualism, by
accepting mind-body dualism and then rejecting one half -- and I don't
buy that dualism. You seem to accept mind-body dualism, and reject
neither. I don't accept the dualism. THere is only one reality.
there is only one reality. The metaphysical problem is whether it is
monistic, dualistic, other. We can't prove our meta. I'm not defending or
condemning materialism. But I do base my moral epistemic argument on
materialism and then point out that I observe materialists making
statements
that are implicitly moral realistic in nature. Moral realism is not
compatible with materialism. I and Copan cannot see how it could be
compatible. Materialists/atheists simply presuppose, as Martin does, there
moral realism without a *rational* justification for their knowledge. My
pointing out the incompatibility doesn't encumber me to present an
alternative argument for moral realism.
Your "making statements that are implicitly moral realistic in nature"
bears some thought. It is really the underlying attitude and belief
set that matters. While the argument that materialism and moral
realism are incompatible may be sound, there might be very few people
actually falling under this category.
Then it would follow that very few people are factully materialist. No?
Many supposed moral realists
might be actually adherents of an exhortative, emotive ethics.
You know as well as I that emotive ethics is subjectivism. Les' "This
heaven-carrot or hell-stick morality is no morality at all" is not an
emotive statment but implicitly a truth-valued factual one.
BTW While it's on my mind. If this thread keeps going into the weekend I'll
be gone for spring break. I don't even what to see a computer next week.
Scott
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