"Mr.Know" <nospam@nospam.nospam> wrote:

:|So, freedom of speech only means as such, just *some* of the time.

:|the right to freedom of speech may be set aside at the personal WILL or
:|PLEASURE of the court. No wonder nobody can figure out what a law means
:|anymore: if it is Tuesday it means one thing, and if it is Wednesday,

:|means another -- at the pleasure of the courts. No strict rules or
:|precedence in force. How can such be law, if law can continually morph

:|one thing to another depending on circumstances; and may be set aside

:|once instance while at the same time be enforced with full vigor in

:|another. This is typical lawless liberal hypocrisy.
:|

Currently it is Justice Scalia, a conservative who states that precedent
means nothing to Justice Thomas, also a conservative.

The actual wording is

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances."

Note that prohibiting is used in one place and abridging in another.

At the time of the framing what did abridging mean?

We know for a fact that certain kinds of speech at that time was improper,
could be punished.

:|Federalist 78: Hamilton
:|----------------------------
:| "Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of

:|judicial to the legislative power."
:|
:| "This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between TWO
:|CONTRADICTORY LAWS, is exemplified in a familiar instance."
:|
:| "But in regard to the INTERFERING ACTS of a SUPERIOR and

:|authority, of an ORIGINAL and DERIVATIVE POWER, the nature and reason

:|thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed.

:|teach us that the PRIOR ACT OF A SUPERIOR [1st Amendment] ought to be
:|PREFERRED to the SUBSEQUENT ACT OF AN INFERIOR and subordinate

:|[local government libraries;] and that accordingly, whenever a

:|statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the *DUTY* of the

:|TRIBUNALS to *ADHERE* TO THE LATTER [Constitution] and *DISREGARD* THE
:|FORMER [local government libraries.]
:|
:| "It can be of *NO* WEIGHT to say that the courts, on the pretense

:|repugnancy, may substitute their own PLEASURE to the CONSTITUTIONAL
:|INTENTIONS of the LEGISLATURE. The courts *MUST* declare the sense of

:|law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of

:|the consequence would equally be THE SUBSTITUTION OF THEIR PLEASURE TO

:|OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY."
:|
:| "If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the

:|of a *LIMITED* CONSTITUTION against legislative encroachments, this
:|consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of
:|judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that
:|independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the

:|performance of so arduous a duty."
:|
:| "To AVOID AN *ARBITRARY* DISCRETION IN THE COURTS, it is

:|that they should be bound down by *STRICT* RULES and PRECEDENTS, which

:|to define and point out their *DUTY* in every particular case that

:|before them;"
:|

If you wish to include that above you must also put it into context.

History is written by the winners

The Federalist Papers had a mission. They were written to counter the
various writings that are now called the anti-federalist papers and they
had a function of selling ratification of the Constitution to the people

New York though they were read throughout the several states.

Also bear in mind this:

EVIDENCE THAT THE FOUNDERS, YES EVEN MADISON, DID AT TIMES SAY ONE THING
AND DO THE OPPOSITE. [read about Madison's opposite positions with

to
the national bank]

NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION, The Earliest Debates over Original Intent.

Joseph M. Lynch
Everyone--Madison, Hamilton, James Wilson, Elbridge Gerry, and many
others--engaged in opportunistic argument, invoking 'original intent' when
convenient, denouncing it (or simply changing the subject) when not.

no one felt any strong duty to be consistent is making constitutional
argument."
Reviewed By Sanford Levinson
Negotiating the Constitution can be read as a sequel to Jack Rakove's
0riginal Meanings, which closely analyzed the debates at the Philadelphia
Convention and the ensuing state ratification debates in order to

the likely "original understandings" of some basic constitutional ideas.
Rakove's final chapter discussed the attention paid these understandings

the new government got underway and actually had to confront the tasks of
governance. What was the subject of the necessarily sketchy chapter by
Rakove is fully developed in Lynch's fascinating book, as he details
constitutional argument in the Congress (and elsewhere) between 1789 and
1800.

Defining "Necessary and Proper"

A central focus of Lynch is the "Necessary and Proper" Clause that
concludes the listing of congressional powers in Article 1, Section 8 of
the Constitution. Did this enhance congressional power, as feared by many
opponents of the Constitution who wrote that this "sweeping clause" would
in fact allow Congress to legislate in areas reaching well beyond the
subject matters assigned to it in earlier clauses of Section 8? Or did it,
at most, simply authorize Congress to pass legislation "incidental" to the
assigned powers, as suggested, quite likely for strategic reasons, by many
proponents of the Constitution, including Madison and Hamilton in The
Federalist, who were worried about gaining the votes necessary for
ratification?

As Washington's secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton reversed direction,
brilliantly defending a broad reading of the clause that gave Congress the
power to charter the Bank of the United States; his erstwhile colleague
Madison, now a member of the House of Representatives, responded that
Congress lacked such a power. Congress agreed with Hamilton, and

signed legislation establishing the Bank. John Marshall, an avid
Hamiltonian, would in 1819 give the clause an expansive reading in
McCulloch v. Maryland, upholding the Second Bank of the United States.)
The first American party system was significantly defined by such
issues of constitutional interpretation and, concomitantly, the extent of
national power. The Necessary and Proper Clause was only one

issue dividing the parties, and Lynch well tells the story of many debates
that shaped the nation (and with whose consequences in some cases we still
live). One central theme of his book is captured in the concluding
paragraph:
"Madison, diligent advocate of strict construction, has been called Father
of the Constitution. After constitutions are written, however, they must

interpreted and made to work. It is Hamilton who deserves the title of
Father of Constitutional Law."

Opportunistic readings, and "strict constructions"

As noted earlier, Lynch is interested whether any of the founding
generation felt duties to remain faithful to the presumptive "original
intent" of those who framed the 1787 Constitution. His answer is,
basically, no. Everyone-Madison, Hamilton, James Wilson, Elbridge Gerry,
and many others--engaged in opportunistic argument, invoking "original
intent" when convenient, denouncing it (or simply changing the subject)
when not. Almost no one felt any strong duty to be consistent in making
constitutional argument. Lynch refers to the "extremities of

argumentation and political positioning that both sides would embrace in
pursuit of ambition, partisan triumph, and national and sectional

Although this book concludes with the election of 1800 and the triumph of
the Jeffersonian view of ostensibly "strict construction" of national
powers, Lynch notes that Jefferson spectacularly violated all of his
strictures in welcoming the Louisiana Purchase. The felt imperatives of
American expansionism took easy precedence over any doubts about the
constitutional legitimacy of the purchase.

Lynch concludes his acknowledgments by thanking his wife, Irene, for her
insistence that he lay out the complex materials that are the subject of
his book in "understandable American usage." All of us are in Irene

debt, for Negotiating the Constitution is indeed an extraordinarily
accessible book. Every scholar even remotely interested in American
constitutional development must read this book; every general reader
sharing similar interests will be able to enjoy and profit from it.
ABOUT THE Author: JOSEPH M. LYNCH is Professor of Law Emeritus at Seton
Hall University School of Law.
HISTORY BOOK CLUB MAY 1999

-------------------------------------------------

FROM THE FLYLEAF:

No concept sparks more controversy in Constitutional debate than

Intent." Offering a Legal Historians's approach to the subject, this book
demonstrates that the framers deliberately obscured one of their most
important decisions.

Joseph Mr. Lynch argues that the Constitution was a product of political
struggles involving regional interests, economic concerns, and ideology.
The framers, he maintains settled on enigmatic wording of the Necessary

Proper Clause and of the General Welfare provision in the Spending Clause
leaving the extent of federal power to be determined by the political
process. During ratification, however, attempts by dissident framers to
undo the compromise were repelled in were repelled in The Federalist:
charges of overly broad congressional powers were met with protestations
that in fact these powers were limited. This exchange set the stage for
later battles between Federalists and Republicans.

Examining debates in the first six Congresses, Lynch describes how early
lawmakers applied the Constitution to such issues as executive power and
privilege, the creation of the national bank, the deportation of aliens,
and the prohibition of seditious speech. He follows the disputes over
interpretation of this document--focusing on James Madison's changing
views--and the new government took shape and political parties were

Lynch points out that the first six Congresses and President George
Washington disregarded the framers intentions when they were deemed
impractical to follow.
=========================================================


***************************************************************
You are invited to check out the following:

The Rise of the Theocratic States of America
http://members.tripod.com/~candst/theocracy.htm

American Theocrats - Past and Present
http://members.tripod.com/~candst/theocrats.htm

The Constitutional Principle: Separation of Church and State
http://members.tripod.com/~candst/index.html

[and to join the discussion group for the above site and/or Separation of
Church and State in general, listed below]

HRSepCnS · Hampton Roads [Virginia] SepChurch&State
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/HRSepCnS/

[Its not just Hampton Roads folks who are members, there are members from
all over the US and a couple from overseas as well]

***************************************************************
. . . You can't understand a phrase such as "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion" by syllogistic reasoning. Words
take their meaning from social as well as textual contexts, which is why

page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v.

256 U.S. 345, 349, 41 S.Ct. 506, 507, 65 L.Ed. 963 (1921) (Holmes, J.).
Sherman v. Community Consol. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992)
. . .
****************************************************************
USAF LT. COL (Ret) Buffman (Glen P. Goffin) wrote

"You pilot always into an unknown future;
facts are your only clue. Get the facts!"

That philosophy 'snipit' helped to get me, and my crew, through a good
many combat missions and far too many scary, inflight, emergencies.

It has also played a significant role in helping me to expose the
plethora of radical Christian propaganda and lies that we find at
almost every media turn.

*****************************************************************
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE:
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

http://members.tripod.com/~candst/index.html
****************************************************************

"Mr.Know" <nospam@nospam.nospam> wrote:

"Prohibiting Faith Center's religious worship services from the Antioch
meeting room is a permissible exclusion of a category of speech," Judge
Richard Paez ruled.

So, freedom of speech only means as such, just *some* of the time. Hence,
the right to freedom of speech may be set aside at the personal WILL or
PLEASURE of the court.

No right is absolute, because it can come in conflict with other
rights, in this case with the right not to have government aiding
religion.

You also don't have the right to shout "Fire" in a crowded theater, or
to cuss out the judge in a court proceeding because you don't like the
way he looks at you.

No strict rules or precedence in force.

Actually, it is precisely because there are rules and precedence that
such conflicts are identified. You are quick to make reference to the
Federalist Papers, which are only minimally relevant as a precedent,
since they were informal opinions of individuals, albeit much
respected individuals who were knowledgeable about the intent of those
who wrote the Constitution (or course they were written before the
Bill of Rights and thus cannot speak authoritatively as to the intent
of any particular clause.

But you have NOT made reference to the court decision itself, which
states the rules of laws and the precedents which were relevant to the
case. Your argument is thus an argument from ignorance.

might remedy that, since the court decision, as well as the dissents,
make extensive reference to rules of law and precedents.

How can such be law, if law can continually morph from
one thing to another depending on circumstances;

The law doesn't morph. How SEVERAL laws of overlapping relevance are
applied can depend on circumstances.

and may be set aside in
once instance while at the same time be enforced with full vigor in still
another. This is typical lawless liberal hypocrisy.

It is neither "lawless", "liberal", nor "hypocritical".

Federalist 78: Hamilton
----------------------------
"Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power."

"This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between TWO
CONTRADICTORY LAWS, is exemplified in a familiar instance."

"But in regard to the INTERFERING ACTS of a SUPERIOR and SUBORDINATE
authority, of an ORIGINAL and DERIVATIVE POWER, the nature and reason of

thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed. They
teach us that the PRIOR ACT OF A SUPERIOR [1st Amendment] ought to be
PREFERRED to the SUBSEQUENT ACT OF AN INFERIOR and subordinate authority
[local government libraries;]

The conflict is not between the 1st amendment and the local government
libraries. It is between the first amendment (free speech) and the
first amendment (no establishment of religion).

In this particular case, it is also a question of whether the library
meeting room is a public forum (like a street-corner, where free
speech has greatest extent), a non-public forum (like a courtroom,
where free speech is quite constrained) or a semi-public forum, where
shades of grey exist. The essence of the ruling seems to be that the
purpose of a library is not especially compatible with worship
services, and thus a broad exclusion of that category of activity is
permissible especially since there is no obvious viewpoint
discrimination against a particular kind of worship. The organization
was not restricted against using the library for public activities
that included religious content, but only for using the library for
its worship services.

The case also was apparently over an injunction, which was vacated
because it wasn't likely to be upheld; it thus may not be the final
determination of the matter.

lojbab

"Mr.Know" <nospam@nospam.nospam> wrote:

"Prohibiting Faith Center's religious worship services from the Antioch
meeting room is a permissible exclusion of a category of speech," Judge
Richard Paez ruled.

So, freedom of speech only means as such, just *some* of the time. Hence,
the right to freedom of speech may be set aside at the personal WILL or
PLEASURE of the court.

No right is absolute, because it can come in conflict with other
rights, in this case with the right not to have government aiding
religion.

No strict rules or precedence in force.

Actually, it is precisely because there are rules and precedence that
such conflicts are identified. You are quick to make reference to the
Federalist Papers, which are only minimally relevant as a precedent,

Mr.Know wrote:

<buckeye-elo@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:4ma8h2tch35uve2t7mjgk13s4uskkmf032@4ax.com...

http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/news/15571328.htm
[excerpt]

Posted on Thu, Sep. 21, 2006
Court bars prayer in public libraries
By David Kravets
ASSOCIATED PRESS

Government libraries can block religious groups from worshipping in pub=

lic

meeting rooms, a federal appeals court ruled Wednesday.

The decision overturns a lower court order allowing a Christian group to
pray in a Contra Costa County library.

The Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries, which initially was
rejected from holding prayer services at the library's Antioch branch, =

had

won a court order allowing them to pray in meeting rooms open to other
groups. A federal judge said it had a First Amendment right of religion=

to

use the public's facilities.

But a three-judge panel of the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San
Francisco overturned that ruling Wednesday in a 2-1 decision.

"Prohibiting Faith Center's religious worship services from the Antioch
meeting room is a permissible exclusion of a category of speech," Judge
Richard Paez ruled.

So, freedom of speech only means as such, just *some* of the time. Hence,
the right to freedom of speech may be set aside at the personal WILL or
PLEASURE of the court. No wonder nobody can figure out what a law means
anymore: if it is Tuesday it means one thing, and if it is Wednesday, it
means another -- at the pleasure of the courts. No strict rules or
precedence in force. How can such be law, if law can continually morph fr=

om

one thing to another depending on circumstances; and may be set aside in
once instance while at the same time be enforced with full vigor in still
another. This is typical lawless liberal hypocrisy.

The clock is ticking on judicial tyranny where the unconstitutional
stifling of our religious freedoms are concerned. This is because it
can be shown that Justice Black twisted the reasonable interpretation
of the establishment clause to stifle Roman Catholic influence in the
state governments. Justice Black used Jefferson's "wall of separation"
words to help justify his treasonous, 10th Amendment ignoring
interpretation of the establishment clause in the Everson opinion.
Note Jefferson's words in the last sentence of the following paragraph
from Everson where Black wrote his scandalous interpretation of the
establishment clause.

"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertain- [330 U.S. 1, 16] ing or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and
vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
Church and State.' Reynolds v. United States, supra, 98 U.S. at page
164." --Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing TP. 1947.
http://tinyurl.com/8q3d8

But Justice Black shouldn't have been so hasty to borrow Jefferson's
words.

"Jenny6833A" <Jenny6833A@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1159115375.309017.214460@h48g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...

buckeye-elo@nospam.net wrote:

http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/news/15571328.htm
[excerpt]

Posted on Thu, Sep. 21, 2006
Court bars prayer in public libraries
By David Kravets
ASSOCIATED PRESS

<snip>

The library policy that was upheld prohibited use of its meeting rooms
for "religious services."

Atheist groups commonly meet in libraries.

The obvious questions is ...

:-)

Jenny

The answer is that atheism is not a religion. It is lack of belief in
imaginary gods.