Jim07D5 <Jim07D5@nospam.net> wrote in
news:jp2271de9nhg2mfi4acqnbq8pfh61hvrka@4ax.com:

I take this as your acknowledgement that "maximize good/minimize evil"
stands in as much need of derivation from the theory as does
"non-malificence". But while I think your reasoning for the former
deserves to stand on its own, I don't believe that "non-malificence"
should be criticized as a sole criterion, since it is not presented as
a sole criterion. IOW, it is presented in the literature as one of
several duties, which in toto do show great similarity to the criteria
that you have proposed.

For some reason I'm just not able to make clear to you what the
difference is between the FP and the various moral duties. They not just
different in content; they are different in kind. They have different
roles in the theory. The FP is not a moral duty, nor it is it equivalent
to any duties, singly or taken together. You're using the terms
"criterion" and "duties" interchangeably there, but they are not
interchangeable.

The *criterion* is a standard against which proposed duties are tested to
determine whether or not they should be regarded as moral duties. The
criterion itself is non-moral; it is a description of a problem
situation, for which the rules (duties) are suggested as a solution.
Whether the "maximize good/minimize" (FP) criterion is the appropriate
criterion is decided empirically, not on moral grounds. It is appropriate
if it correctly describes the problem situation --- that there are a
number of agents interacting, all of whom are trying to maximize good and
mimnimize evil, as they define them.

I used the example of the traffic engineer, who tries to find traffic
rules, implemented with signage and signals, which will get all the
drivers on the road where they are going as quickly and safely as
possible. That latter --- getting them all where they want to go --- is
*his goal*. It is not a goal of any of the drivers. Their goals are
various destinations on the highway system. The engineer's goal is to
find rules which will allow them to reach *their* goals.

I don't believe that "non-malificence"
should be criticized as a sole criterion, since it is not presented as
a sole criterion.

It is not a "criterion" at all. It is a (suggested) moral rule, which
must be tested against some criterion to establish its validity or
acceptability as a moral rule.

I agree, but again, do not think that the superiority of the two-part
criteria over the one-part need be a point of contention. THe only
point of contention that I brought up was that if "non-malificence" is
one that I "need derive from the theory, not define into it" then so
is "maximize good, minimize evil." I take it that when you say that it
is chosen because it is descriptively accurate, you believe that this
is "deriving it from the theory".

No. Saying it is "descriptively accurate" does not mean it is derived or
derivable from the theory. It means it accurately describes the problem
situation the theory is intended to solve. It is a pre-moral observation
of the behavior of agents. They are busy trying to maximize good for
themselves. Our job is to find some rules for them to follow that will
allow them to do that. The FP is a statement of what *our* job is.

I would like to point out that both of these two proposed criteria,
"non-malificence" and "maximize good, minimize evil" are not quite
completely stated here in the way they are meant in the theory. The
word "universal" has to be appended, to designate that they are
intended to be applicable to the behavior of all moral beings, toward
all moral beings. THis universality does not appear to be an "aim"
that is evidenced in all agents;

Again, you are confounding the criterion with the rules. Non-malificence,
like Ross's other duties, is a rule, meant to apply to and be followed by
agents. The FP is a criterion, the goal sought by philosophers trying to
find the best rules. Universality is *not* an aim of agents. It is part
of the goal aimed for by the philosopher, and so is incorporated into the
rules, just as it is incorporated into the traffic engineer's rules. The
drivers are not interested in getting everybody where they want to go;
each of them are only interested in getting where *they* want to go. It
is the engineer who wants to get them *all* where they want to go.
Universality is part of his goal, not theirs. The traffic rules they
follow embody that universal goal. By following those rules, they promote
that goal, whether they acknowledge it or personally adopt it or not.

Well, let me know whether I've been any more successful here in
delineating the difference between moral rules and the goal of a moral
theory. :-)

"Liberator Veritatis" <liberatorveritatis@houston.rr.com> said:

Jim07D5 wrote:

"Liberator Veritatis" <liberatorveritatis@houston.rr.com> said:

...

First of all, subjective and intersubjective are really the same

thing

from the stand point of a philosophical matter of acquiring

knowledge.

Intersubjectively agreed to "facts" are just as much as not

"true" or "false" as subjective ones. The difference between
intersubjective and subjective has more to do with the agreement
surrounding it. So, an extremem empiricist might say that logic

just intersubjectively agreed to and/or (perhaps even because it

correspondent to the universe. In saying the former, he is

that

Ockham's Razor, for instance, isn't really "true" or "false" --

is

just a widely recognized convention that many people follow in

drawing

conclusions. (I, on the other hand, would say that it is

"true", for instance.)

Could I ask a question that has nagged me, that your statement

raises?

In what sense do sentences in the prohibitive or imperative mood
express a proposition that is "actually" true, instead of

the speaker's degree of requirement of conformity to a rule? (So

more generally, use the directive modality, "a deontic modality

connotes the speaker's degree of requirement of conformity to the
proposition expressed by an utterance.")

http://www.sil.org/linguistics/GlossaryOfLinguisticTerms/WhatIsDirectiveModality.htm

One formulation of the Razor:

"Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate". (prohibitive

http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15636a.htm

One formulation of the CI:

'The first (Universal Law formulation): "Act only according to

maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become

universal law."' (imperative mood.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorical_imperative#Formulations

How can they have truth values? Can you refer me to recognized
statements of the Razor and CI that do have truth values?
Jim07D5

Sorry for the long reply. I marked sections so that you can skip to
through if you like ("Basic Response" being what its name implies):

I appreciate your thorough reply.

Background:



Or put in 6th grade grammar, an imperative sentence does not state a
proposition. We would generally use the indicative mood to do this

others such as the subjunctive could work. An informal quick

check for propositional content is to see if it even makes sense to

"<insert sentence> is either true or false." So consider a sentence
like "Does it rain a lot in Seattle?" It doesn't even make sense at
all to say that "'Does it rain a lot in Seattle' is either true or
false." This would just kind of be a grammatical mistake or

A question is not true or false -- it has to be a statement of some
kind that declares something. And the same is true with imperative
sentences such as "Don't twiddle your thumbs." "It is true or false
that 'Don't twiddle your thumbs.'" That doesn't even make sense!

And so, we see where in another post of mine to George, we can get

truly clearly articulated subjectivist interpretation of moral
sentences. We interpret "X is immoral," as *literally* meaning

do X." At that point we have to explain why it is that the sentence
was phrased in the indicative mood but we shifted to the imperative

interpretting it. (Isn't that just a technical mistake on our

The Emotivist explains that the indicative mood is used in the

to add a special kind of content to the sentence -- emotive content.
Or, it is one way to add such emotive content. Another way would be

just put an exclamation point on the end: "Don't do X!"

Or, Boo on X! (But I am not pushing emotivism and the alternative. It
seems only that "deontic modality" expresses thoughts that are not
about what is true and false.)

Or, one could
add explitives: "Don't do X, dammit!" Well, just like expletives

exclamation points as well as a great many other things that work

way in English and other languages (down to changing word order and

on), using the indicative mood in moral sentences doesn't actually

*propositional* content to the sentence. It does not add meaning to
the sentence that could be interpretted as being either "true" or
"false". So, all you are left with on this interprettation is, in
fact, an imperative sentence which does indeed lack any

content (i.e. is not objective).



Basic Response:



So finally with that said, whatever you are using as the Razor or

CI can easily be fixed up to be in the indicative mood -- just add

is wrong to...," or "It is irrational to...," or some such thing as
that. It is, in fact, really pretty easy to slip between the
indicative and imperative moods and seem like you are talking about

same thing. The purely linguistic matter of how you state things is

fairly pedantic issue. But, there is still the issue of what the

interprettation really ought to be. If it really ought to be an
imperative, then it really isn't a proposition and the subjectivist

correct in saying that they are at best intersubjectively agreed to
practices. If it is more like an assertion and the proper
interprettation is in the indicative mood, then they are

that are either true or false (and so "objective"). I will even go

step further and point out that the CI and the Razor are indeed
practices in some sense. That is one can certainly interpret them
using an imperative mood and they are indeed intersubjectively

to practices. Like George Dance says, it is an obvious fact that
people talk about and use these things (the Razor, the CI, the rule
against cross checking) -- so they are at least that much:
intersubjectively agreed to practices. So, the real question is
whether or not they *can also be* interpretted indicatively.



Epilogue:



The question is whether or not it really makes sense to say things
like:

"It is true or false that 'It is irrational to multiply one's
propositions.'"

"It is true or false that 'It is wrong to act such that the maxim of
one's action is not consistent with itself when considered as a
universal law.'"

My response is to take them at face value and simply say that since
they are in the indicative mood, then yes they express propositions.

This is where I find a problem. What is their face value? I have

and heard that sentences express propositions but are not identical
with propositions. What proposition, if any, is expressed by "It is
wrong to X?" I am ready to agree that the indicative sentence
expresses a meaningful proposition about X. It is possibly useful to
think about what other sentences state the same proposition. For
example, when A says "It is wrong to X" does this express the same
proposition as A's saying. "I am saying, "Do not do X." This latter

a true proposition, when said, on its face. But its truth makes "It

wrong to do X" true iff they mean exactly the same thing and
especially that the latter carries no more meaning than the former.

The subjectivist must explain why these sentences appear this way

nevertheless must be interpreted differently (truly as imperatives).

I am not sure that this is a question that splits out subjectivists
per se. It does not feel to me that "Do not do X" is a particularly
subjectivist position WRT the doing of X, especially when stated, "I
say to all, do not do X." It seems to be orthogonal to the sub/obj
axis. It seems to me that the imperative can be seen as a different
axis of reality. Deontic modality is *about* something but it is not
about what is true and what is false.

And, by the way, simply saying "But we don't really know what

means which is instrumental to the indicative formulation," is not a
satisfactory answer here. Finding out just exactly "what 'wrong'
means" is the whole point of engaging in moral philosophy.

Or, what rational thought "X is wrong" expresses.

The
subjectivist must show that not only do we not know what it means,

it is, in fact, meaningless. (And, that is again why the burden of
proof is on the subjectivist and why it is that moral statements are
said to "purport to be objective" and so on.

I always say that the BOP is on whoever wants me to change my mind or
to as though I have done so. ;-) If they have neither of these
motivations, I assign them no BOP.

To be a moral
objectivist, you simply have to take moral statements at face value

not assume that they are subjective. Of course it could end up that
way at any given point in time when someone says something that

like a moral statement -- that they actually intend it subjectively

end up having to intend it this way to remain consistent. But, an
objectivist will at least acknowledge the *possibility* that it

be otherwise and unless they can prove it subjective, assume it is

it appears to be, namely an ojectively true or false proposition.)

It is a trivial exercise to convert any statement having a deontic
modality eg the imperative ("Do not X") into a statement in the
indicative ("It is wrong [in some relevant sense] to X".) I suppose
the converse conversion is easy, as well. But it seems to me that the
person who denies that the indicative says other than the imperative,
is not, by that fact alone, a subjectivist. IOW, the tried and true
deontologist would not care about converting his imperatives into
truth statements; they would stand, completely respectable, as
imperatives that do not need conversion to truth statements.

Maybe there is something about our current philosophical paradigms
and/or language that lumps those who deny that "X is wrong" says more
than "Do not X" together with subjectivists, perhaps because duty per
se cannot stand on its own two feet, these days. Or perhaps it is
linguistic. Even the deontologist who says, "You have duty to do Y"
is speaking in the indicative.

At any rate, I do not believe that accepting Occam's Razor as "true"
is better than accepting it as an efficient starting point, and the
same goes for "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at
the same time will that it should become a universal law." So, I

agree that the burden is on whoever wants me to believe they will not
do.
Jim07D5