http://pajamasmedia.com/2007/12/what_happens_after_the_surge.php
With important moves like cracking down on the al-Qaeda sympathetic
Association of Muslim Scholars, the Iraqi government is exploiting the
achievements of the surge strategy by the step-by-step establishment of
the rule of law, writes Omar Fadhil of Iraq the Model.
by Omar Fadhil
How to eat an elephant?
Most people would say it’s impossible. No one could eat an elephant.
Others would argue that one actually could eat an elephant—with patience,
one bite at a time.
The government cracked down on the Association of Muslim Scholars, an
organization of Sunni clerics sympathetic to al-Qaeda and believed to
have even been involved in leading, funding and hosting insurgent groups
that have been responsible for countless attacks against Iraqis and
Americans alike.
Unlike previous operations, this one is different in that the troops were
sent following a request submitted to the government by the department of
Sunni endowment, an entity in charge of overseeing Sunni mosques and
other religious activities. The chief of the Sunni endowment, Sheikh
Ahmed Abdul Ghafour Samarraie, is a moderate Sunni cleric who has
renounced the insurgency and explicitly accused the association of
assisting al-Qaeda by justifying their murderous attacks against Iraqis.
For four years now we’ve been waiting for this to happen. This al-Qaeda
apologist, so-called association of Muslim scholars had to be dealt with
and honestly it was frustrating to see them operate freely when the
damage they caused was widely known, in nature if not in extent.
This incident, I believe, is not to be seen as abstract and it’s no
coincidence that the raid on their office came amid efforts to prosecute
corrupt officials from Sadr’s movement and the Fadheela Party. The list
includes the former deputy minister of health, a Sadr follower who’s been
accused of running sectarian death squads and the chief of the integrity
committee in the parliament; a member of the Fadheela Party which is
believed to be involved in massive oil smuggling operations in the south.
He is now about to lose parliamentary immunity over corruption charges.
The interesting thing indeed is that the officials who are leading this
campaign and rose to challenge the Sadrists and the association are from
their respective sects and regions.
In Karbala, as a most recent example, the police chief finally declared
the Mahdi Army an outlaw group. He accused them of murdering over 700
Iraqi civilians, 70 police officers, kidnapping over 130 civilians as
well as conducting some 50 attacks with roadside bombs over the last
three years in Karbala province alone.
In my opinion, what we’re seeing right now is an exploitation of the
achievements of the surge strategy in the direction to establish rule of
law-step by step.
I think, and it would be a practical approach if that was the case, that
the campaign will involve multiple steps and will deal with targets one
at a time according to a certain pattern; that is from the most
aggressive, least reconcilable and less politically powerful to the less
aggressive, more reconcilable and more politically powerful.
Yes, I consider Sadr now to fit in the less powerful politically category
because a) PM Maliki became less dependent on him after withdrew his
followers from the cabinet and from the UIA as well and b) his political
weight comes from his ability to create chaos and fear; this ability is
not as great as it used to be.
Of course such a pattern would require different means and tactics to
deal with each target. For example with al-Qaeda it is simply a great
military and intelligence effort to exterminate them. With Sunni
insurgents it was a combination of coercion and persuasion. Those who
agree to cooperate are welcome in the new Iraq-those contributed to the
effort against al-Qaeda — while those who don’t suffer the consequences.
Now it’s Sadr’s and Dhari’s (the head of the association of Muslim
scholars) turn. The two have been more or less defanged in many parts of
the country as Dhari can’t find reliable bargaining power in al-Qaeda
anymore and as Sadr is being squeezed with pressure from his former
allies in the UIA and determined Iraqi military commanders in the south.
In my assessment of the situation, I think this phase of the campaign
will focus on these two threats while momentarily purposely overlooking
the smaller ones (small in the ability to create chaos, greater in
political weight though). This can make a lot of sense. What stopped the
US military from taking decisive action against Dhari or Sadr and his
followers were the concerns that doing so might cause more harm than
good. Now it seems that those two have lost the capacity to cause enough
chaos. In other words they no longer can deter a decisive action by the
US troops and Iraqi government. This is truer since the decisive action
is coming in the form of legal processes and charges pushed by Iraqi
officials supported by evidence, meaning the defendants are denied the
use of the occupation /sectarian partiality cliché.
When this phase is completed, and it might take a while, the judicial and
security institutions of the state will have gained confidence, popular
support and will be galvanized by the experience. That would prepare the
atmosphere for the launch of the next phase—cleaning the “house of
moderates”. Those moderates (represented by parties such as the SIIC,
Islamic Party, Kurdish parties, etc) have enjoyed a fairly long “grace
period” since they have been indispensable in establishing the political
process after the fall of the former regime. But when state institutions
become stronger, terror and other threats and manipulation by extremists
would be neutralized to a great extent; those parties will become more
vulnerable to scrutiny and to the rule of law.
Our moderate politicians-I prefer to call them “less radical” politicians
— might not like this in the future but I doubt they would be able to
stop the moving wheel of evolution. The beautiful nature of democracy and
power-sharing is that concessions will always be made in order to
preserve both; the system for the state and the best possible position
for the groups within.
Omar Fadil has served as Pajamas Media’s Baghdad editor; currently based
in New York, he blogs at Iraq the Model
--
Fred Stone
aa# 1369
Liberal: a power worshipper without power. - George Orwell
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