Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the *known* laws of
physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a two universes
which both followed the same *known* laws of physics, and yet in one,
a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, and in the
other it didn't?

On 4 Jun, 19:10, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

"someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1180977907.518177.127880@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

On 4 Jun, 16:07, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

"someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1180915714.304693.138900@o5g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

On 4 Jun, 00:44, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

"someone3" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1180903459.945467.317500@h2g2000hsg.googlegroups.com...

On 3 Jun, 21:38, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

"someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1180891870.230456.185600@p77g2000hsh.googlegroups.com...

On 3 Jun, 18:27, "Denis Loubet" <dlou...@io.com> wrote:

"someone2" <glenn.spig...@btinternet.com> wrote in message

news:1180875033.790773.206010@n4g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...

I was wondering how many on the atheist page can understand
the
following:

Any mechanism which simply followed the known laws of
physics,
could
have its behaviour explained with the assumption that it
wasn't
conscious (had no subjective experiences).

No. If the mechanism was conscious, then the explanation of
its
behavior
would necessarily include that consciousness.

Which means that whether it
did or didn't couldn't affect behaviour.

Which is nonsense. The explanation of its behavior would
necessarily
include
the operation of its consciousness if it was conscious.

Therefore if we were simply a
biological mechanism, we couldn't be talking about our
subjective
experiences because of their existance. It would have to be
a
coincidence that we actually experienced what our behaviour
claimed
we
did, which isn't plausible.

Well, since you obviously don't understand what you wrote,
it's
not
surprising that you've reached incorrect conclusions.

Why would I be required to assume any mechanism that simply
followed
the laws of physics was conscious,

Who said you had to?

why couldn't I explain it simply in
terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics
with
the
assumption that it wasn't?

If you fully describe the behavior of the mechanism in terms of
a
physical
mechanism following the laws of physics, then you are describing
all
the
events that contribute to that behavior. If the mechanism is
conscious,
the
consciousness will be included in the description of events in
terms
of
physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness
**is**
physical mechanisms following the laws of physics. Consciousness
is
just
our
word that labels a particular VARIETY of physical mechanisms
following
the
laws of physics.

While I you can believe that the mechanism is responsible for our
subjective experiences, you avoided explaining why I *couldn't*
explain the behaviour of the mechanism simply in terms of the
physical
mechanism following the laws of physics, with the assumption that
there were no subjective experiences, or could I?

I did not say you couldn't explain the behaviour of the mechanism
simply
in
terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics, with
the
assumption that there were no subjective experiences, and I defy
you
to
point out where I did.

What I DID say is that in explaining the behaviour of the mechanism
simply
in terms of the physical mechanism following the laws of physics,
with
the
assumption that there were no subjective experiences, you would, of
necessity, include in that explanation the physical events that
constitute
consciousness if they occurred.

Unless, of course, you arbitrarily want to avoid describing those
physical
events that constitute consciousness, and affect behavior, and
leave
your
explanation incomplete. You are free to do that.

So you admit, that the behaviour of the mechanism could be explained
with the assumption that it didn't have any subjective experiences.

Sure. But if it did have subjective experiences, those experiences
would
be
included in the explanation in terms of physical mechanisms following
the
laws of physics. In other words, you could explain the behavior with a
rote
description of physical events, unaware that you are describing
subjective
experiences and their effect on behavior, in terms of physical events.

Can you follow that this being the case, whether it did or didn't
have
any subjective experiences couldn't influence the behaviour, for if
it
did, its behaviour could not be explained without taking into
account
whether it did or didn't have any subjective experiences?

If it has subjective experiences, then they are part of its behavior,
and
any explanation that failed to include them would be incomplete, by
definition.

So only knowledge of the mechanism that you would regard as
responsible for the subjective experiences (if indeed there were
any)would be sufficient to explain the behaviour.

"Only"? I never suggested that was the only factor that effects behavior.
I'm saying that if you want a complete explanation of behavior you have
to
account for all factors.

And are you attempting to separate subjective experience form the
mechanism
responsible for it?

No knowledge of
whether there were any subjective experiences or not would be
required.

True.

So for any given mechanism, whether it were experienced or not,
wouldn't influence the behaviour.

Of course it would affect the behavior. Haven't you listened to a word
I've
said?

So if we were to be regarded as a
biological mechanism we couldn't be talking about our subjective
experiences because they actually existed.

Our subjective experiences actually exist as material patterns in brains.
These material patterns affect behavior. Is this impossible for you to
understand?

To highlight the point, though here I'm sure you would object that it
would be forbidden to even contemplate it, if there was an alternative
universe, which followed the same *known* laws of physics, but there
were no subjective experiences associated with it, it would act the
same.

No. If you disallow the material process of consciousness and subjective
experience, then you've obviously got a universe that behaves differently
from the one we're in. You're trying to violate the principle of
identity,
which pretty much hoses logic completely.

The objection that if it followed the same *known* laws of
physics, then it would automatically be subjectively experienced, if
it was in the other universe, doesn't hold, as the *known* laws of
physics don't reference subjective experiences,

We do not note any subjective experiences in the absence of physical
brains.
Thus we are justified in holding the tentative conclusion that physical
brains are required for subjective experience. Since we note that
manipulation of the physical brain produces changes in subjective
experience, we are justified in holding the tentative conclusion that
subjective experience depends on the arrangement of matter in the
physical
brain.

thus it is
conceptually possible to consider to mechanisms both following the
same laws of physics as known to us, but with one having subjective
experiences and one not, without the need for any of the *known* laws
of physics to be altered.

So this is a "Consciousness of the Gaps" argument?

Do you accept that you could conceptually due to the *known* laws of
physics not referencing subjective experiences, have a two universes
which both followed the same *known* laws of physics, and yet in one,
a given mechanism gave rise to subjective experiences, and in the
other it didn't?