Religions > Atheism > "Inexcusable Failure", Cordesman report on Bush's Iraq occupation debacle
| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Bill Case" |
| Date: |
25 Sep 2004 02:31:07 PM |
| Object: |
"Inexcusable Failure", Cordesman report on Bush's Iraq occupation debacle |
For those unfamiliar, Cordesman is a heavy weight in military analysis. He
doesn't readily or happily criticize the US establishment.
Following is part of his July, 2004 paper on how Iraq is going.
Here's the URL for the entire report:
http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_inexcusablefailure.pdf
Bush has made a serious mess of this thing via his own incompetence, and he
doesn't seem to be able to learn.
This is costing the US a lot in troop deaths/wounding, money, deaths of
Iraqi innocents, and loss of respect and good will in the world,
particularly the Islamic world.
Iraq is going to continue, and the threat of terrorism is going to continue,
and it doesn't make sense to retain an incompetent as President and
Commander in chief. These are intrinsicly hard problems, and having a
stupid, dishonest, poll watching liar continue in charge isn't going to help
the US.
Read on....
Inexcusable Failure Progress in Training the Iraqi Army and Security Forces
as of Mid-July 2004
Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
Center for Strategic and International Studies
July 20, 2004
Cordesman: Iraqi Army and Security Forces 7/19/04 Page 2
Progress in Training the Iraqi Army and Security Forces as of
Mid-July 2004
Anthony H. Cordesman
The Department of Defense has provided new data on the development of Iraqi
military
and security forces as of July 13, 2004. The new data provide information on
the
equipment effort for the first time, and they break the manpower totals out
into the new
categories of Iraqi military and security forces create since April 2004,
and the end of the
CPA on June 30, 2004.
These data both confirm long standing problems in the effort to training and
equip the
Iraqi security forces, and provide details on critical problems in the
security program that
have never before been made public. They document an inexcusable level of
failure on
the part of the US, and particularly the CPA and Department of Defense, in
developing
effective Iraqi capabilities to establish security in Iraq.
One can argue the decision to disband the Iraqi military forces. The Iraqi
military had
largely disintegrated by mid-April 2003. Most of the regular forces
dependent on
conscripts had collapsed because of mass desertions; the heavier units in
the regular army
were largely ineffective and suffered from both desertions and massive
looting. The
Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units have been defeated in
the field
and were too political to preserve.
The fact remains, however, that the US-led coalition cannot be excused for
its failure to
reconstitute effective security forces and police, for trying to restrict
the development of
Iraqi armed forces to a token force to defend Iraq's borders against
external aggression,
or for ignoring the repeated warnings from US military advisory teams about
problems in
the flow of equipment and in creating the necessary facilities. The US
failed to treat the
Iraqis as partners in the counterinsurgency effort for nearly a year, and
did not attempt to
seriously train and equip Iraqi forces for proactive security and
counterinsurgency
mission until April 2004 - nearly a year after the fall of Saddam Hussein
and two-thirds
of a year after a major insurgency problem began to emerge.
The new data the Department of Defense released on July 13th do, however,
have serious
weaknesses. They omit critical details on the nature of the training Iraqis
receive for the
first time, and provide no data on the portion that actually went through
academy and
proper military training. The provide less data on the flow of US aid to the
Iraqi army and
security forces, and they use unrealistic and outdated requirements and
metrics for
measuring how the equipment effort actually meets Iraqi requirements.
Ongoing Developments
The US wasted precious time waiting for its own forces to defeat a threat
that it treated as
the product of a small number of former regime loyalists (FRLs) and foreign
volunteers,
Cordesman: Iraqi Army and Security Forces 7/19/04 Page 3
and felt it could solve without creating effective Iraqi forces. For nearly
a year, the US
acted as if the insurgency was not nationalist in character, and was small
and unpopular,
and would go away once the US and the rest of the MNF defeated it without
serious Iraqi
aid.
In many ways, the Administration's senior spokesmen still seem to live in a
fantasyland
in terms of its public announcements, talking about an insurgent force of
5,000 - when
both Iraqi intelligence and US intelligence in Iraq quote figures of from
15,000 to 35,000.
It still exaggerates the foreign threat and role of Al Qaida, in spite of
the fact only a small
fraction of detainees and those killed are foreign and Zarqawi's ties to Al
Qaida seem
limited to loose affiliation. For example, only 50 men out of the 3,800 the
82nd Airborne
apprehended in the Sunni triangle area were foreign.
Far Too Little and Too Late in Getting the Aid Money to the Iraqis
The US Congress must accept a substantial amount of blame for failing to
ease
procedures for time critical aid expenditures, but the primary blame lies
with the
Executive Branch. The CPA and CJTF-7 failed dismally to execute their plans
in the
security sector, and these plans failed to call for treating the Iraqis as
full partners in
achieving security in Iraq, and for training and equipping them effectively
to perform
counterinsurgency missions and warfare.
The new reporting system adopted after the end of the CPA disguises serious
problems in
the security and aid efforts that were revealed in previous reporting. The
new reporting
no longer distinguishes construction and non-construction expenditures by
category, and
no longer reports the number of serious incidents occurring by day and week.
The final
reports coming out of the CPA show how misleading this can be:
.. CPA reporting as of June 29, 2004 shows that obligations for
non-construction
security procurement were about 25% of goal, and commitments were around
50%.) The figures for construction tasks were far more favorable and almost
totally misleading. They indicated that the $749 million was obligated and
$1,003
million was committed, to meet a goal for 1 July 2004 of $749 million.
.. The final CPA status report issued on July 6, 2004 shows that obligations
for nonconstruction
security procurement were about 30% of goal on June 30, 2004, and
commitments were around 60%. The figures for construction tasks were far
more
favorable, but almost totally misleading. They indicated that the $825
million was
obligated as of June 30, 2004, and $985 million was committed, to meet a
goal for
1 July 2004 of only $749 million. Yet, virtually every report on Iraqi
security
efforts indicates that facilities remain grossly inadequate.
.. The CPA went out of business just as the first battalion of the Iraq
National Task
Force division began to deploy to Baghdad, and having seen the new Iraqi
government override its plans to leave the Iraq Civil Defense Corps as a
largely
passive defense force and having the new Iraqi Prime Minister convert it to
a
National Guard. The Iraqi police are just beginning to acquire serious
Cordesman: Iraqi Army and Security Forces 7/19/04 Page 4
counterinsurgency capability in the form of nine public order battalions and
two
counterinsurgency battalions as part of an Iraqi Police Service (IPS) civil
intervention force.
.. As of 18 June 2004, US reporting showed a net average increase in the
number of
significant insurgent attacks using improvised explosive devices,
vehicle-borne
IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled grenades, and improvised rockets over the
period
since September 2003.
.. As of 26 June 2004, the US reporting summarized in the final CPA status
report
showed a net average increase in the number of significant insurgent attacks
using
improvised explosive devices, vehicle-borne IEDs, mortars, rocket propelled
grenades, and improvised rockets over the period since September 2003. They
were averaging over 40 per day and the total number of incidents of all
kinds was
far higher. The US had reported the capture or killing of many Iraqi foreign
and
domestic insurgents, but no decline in the total number of active insurgent
since
its first meaningful estimates in July 2003. It could not characterize the
leadership
or membership of either domestic or foreign insurgent groups with any
precision,
or the level of actual Al Qaida central influence and control.
As a result, it will be late 2004 at the earliest before the new Iraqi
government can take
on its share of the counterinsurgency mission, and Iraqis have seen US and
British forces
as hostile occupiers, rather than partners, in every public opinion poll
conducted since
September.
The Militia and Disarmament Issues
There is also far more talk about disarming Iraqi civilians than substance.
The militias
also continue to be a problem, and talk about disarming them is likely to
prove to be no
more than an administrative fiction, given the vast number of light arms
disbursed among
Iraq's population. In early June 2004, the CPA reached agreement with nine
parties to
disband their militias. This agreement covered about 100,000 former
resistance fighters,
and the CPA estimated that about 90% of these individuals would complete the
transition
and reintegration process by January 2005, and that all would complete the
process by
October 2005.
The CPA also estimated that about 60% of these militia members would
transition into
Iraqi security services-such as the Iraqi Armed Forces, Iraqi Police
Service, or the
Internal Security Forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government. The CPA went
out of
business without agreement on many elements of the broader transition and
reintegration
process.
No agreement was reached on which entity-whether Iraqi security forces or
the
multinational force-was responsible for taking action against illegal
militias, and many
of the programs that were supposed to provide services for militia members
participating
in the program were not operational. It was also not clear that key militias
like the
Kurdish militias and Badr forces would really be disbanded, as distinguished
from being
Cordesman: Iraqi Army and Security Forces 7/19/04 Page 5
renamed, or that smaller militias would not simply reemerge as personal
protection
forces.
It is also clear that Sadr is now rebuilding his militia in Najaf and
possibly in Sadr City.
The HUMINT Problem
Furthermore, the US has tried to carry out the impossible mission of
developing effective
human intelligence (HUMINT) on its own, rather than it full partnership with
the Iraqis.
One of the critical lessons of Vietnam was ignored. Rather than see the need
for effective
Iraqi intelligence collection and analysis -- and to rely on Iraqis for the
lack of area and
language skills and understanding of local political and tactical
conditions - the US tried
to create a network of informers and local contacts and carry out analysis
on its own. The
US simply does not have the capability in terms of expertise and access to
suddenly
improvise a largely autonomous HUMINT effort as a substitute for partnership
with an
intelligence organization run by local allies.
Progress Could Be Real if Adequate Aid Were (Had Been) Provided
Serious training in urban warfare, and efforts to provide proper equipment-
including
reconnaissance assets and other special equipment- seems to be currently
underway. For
example, the CPA reported as it went out of business that it had decided to
give the new
Iraqi air force two Seeker reconnaissance aircraft to conduct surveillance
of the borders
and oil facilities and was rushing procurement of 14 more.
There also is enough progress to show how productive the aid effort could
still be if it
was rushed forward, and the US treated the Iraqis as partners in reality and
not simply in
name:
.. Iraqi government announced a new law allowing it to impose emergency
security
measures to combat terrorism
.. The initial battalion of the Iraq Intervention Force (IIF) deployed into
Baghdad at
the end of Jun
- The IIF is being established, trained and equipped for urban
counterinsurgency
operations
- All three battalions of the first IIF brigade will be ready by end of
July.
.. At the end of June, 41 of 45 battalions of the Iraqi National Guard
(formerly the
Iraqi Civil Defense Corp) were manned above 75 percent strength
- Currently conducting joint patrols throughout Iraq with Coalition and
Iraqi
Police forces
- Focus on equipping, training, and reconstituting the force
.. Efforts are underway to recruit six additional 400-man public order
battalions as
part of the Iraqi Police Service civil intervention force
Cordesman: Iraqi Army and Security Forces 7/19/04 Page 6
.. With these additions, the Iraqi Police Service civil intervention force
will total nine
public order battalions and two counterinsurgency battalions
.. A total of 5,502 new IPS recruits have completed the eight week training
course
- Five classes, or over 3,411 students, have graduated from the Jordan
Academy
- Four classes, or 2,091 students, have graduated from the Baghdad Public
Safety Academy
.. Approximately 25,000 IPS personnel who served as police under the former
regime
have completed a three-week Transitional and Integration Program taught by
Coalition
.. IPS officers are also being taught basic criminal investigation, criminal
intelligence,
and dignitary protection by Coalition advisors
Unfortunately, the reporting issued by the Depart pf Defense confirms the
fact that the
actual flow of US aid to the Iraqi security effort remains slow and
inadequate. As of July
13, the US had only actually spent $220 million out of the $2,976 million
apportioned
under the FY2004 aid program of $18.4 billion.
xx clipped
.
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| User: "Ray Fischer" |
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| Title: Re: "Inexcusable Failure", Cordesman report on Bush's Iraq occupation debacle |
25 Sep 2004 05:34:52 PM |
|
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Bill Case <Billd548@Hotmail.com> wrote:
For those unfamiliar, Cordesman is a heavy weight in military analysis. He
doesn't readily or happily criticize the US establishment.
Following is part of his July, 2004 paper on how Iraq is going.
Here's the URL for the entire report:
http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_inexcusablefailure.pdf
Bush has made a serious mess of this thing via his own incompetence, and he
doesn't seem to be able to learn.
This is costing the US a lot in troop deaths/wounding, money, deaths of
Iraqi innocents, and loss of respect and good will in the world,
particularly the Islamic world.
And then the idiot Rumsfeld comes along and tries to claim that
elections don't need to be held in the _whole_ country. It's okay
if only the people the US likes have an election.
Rumsfeld is too stupid to realize that that's a good way to end
up with a civil war.
--
Ray Fischer
rfischer@sonic.net
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| User: "Al Dykes" |
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| Title: Re: "Inexcusable Failure", Cordesman report on Bush's Iraq occupation debacle |
25 Sep 2004 05:45:03 PM |
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Good article. I'll add that Col. Hackworth
(http://www.hackworth.com/),
Gen. Zinni
http://makeashorterlink.com/?X54342168
and a group of 2 dozen retired Generals and Diplomats
http://makeashorterlink.com/?J33432069
have all come against Bush. Some of these people said they voted for
Bush in 2000. This, by itself is not unusual, what is unusual is that
there is no similar list of retired brass _for_ Bush. Not that I've
heard of.
In article <cj4rqb$rum$1@bolt.sonic.net>,
Ray Fischer <rfischer@bolt.sonic.net> wrote:
Bill Case <Billd548@Hotmail.com> wrote:
For those unfamiliar, Cordesman is a heavy weight in military analysis. He
doesn't readily or happily criticize the US establishment.
Following is part of his July, 2004 paper on how Iraq is going.
Here's the URL for the entire report:
http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_inexcusablefailure.pdf
Bush has made a serious mess of this thing via his own incompetence, and he
doesn't seem to be able to learn.
This is costing the US a lot in troop deaths/wounding, money, deaths of
Iraqi innocents, and loss of respect and good will in the world,
particularly the Islamic world.
And then the idiot Rumsfeld comes along and tries to claim that
elections don't need to be held in the _whole_ country. It's okay
if only the people the US likes have an election.
Rumsfeld is too stupid to realize that that's a good way to end
up with a civil war.
--
Ray Fischer
rfischer@sonic.net
--
Al Dykes
-----------
adykes at p a n i x . c o m
.
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| User: "Michael Gray" |
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| Title: Re: "Inexcusable Failure", Cordesman report on Bush's Iraq occupation debacle |
25 Sep 2004 08:05:23 PM |
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On Sat, 25 Sep 2004 22:34:52 GMT, (Ray
Fischer) wrote:
Bill Case <Billd548@Hotmail.com> wrote:
For those unfamiliar, Cordesman is a heavy weight in military analysis. He
doesn't readily or happily criticize the US establishment.
Following is part of his July, 2004 paper on how Iraq is going.
Here's the URL for the entire report:
http://www.csis.org/features/iraq_inexcusablefailure.pdf
Bush has made a serious mess of this thing via his own incompetence, and he
doesn't seem to be able to learn.
This is costing the US a lot in troop deaths/wounding, money, deaths of
Iraqi innocents, and loss of respect and good will in the world,
particularly the Islamic world.
And then the idiot Rumsfeld comes along and tries to claim that
elections don't need to be held in the _whole_ country. It's okay
if only the people the US likes have an election.
Rumsfeld is too stupid to realize that that's a good way to end
up with a civil war.
I don't agree that Rumsfeld is an idiot.
A crazy megalomaniac yes, but dumb, no.
Of course Rummy realizes that his suggested course will result in a
civil war.
That's exactly what he and his fellow puppet masters hope for!
.
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| User: "Paolo Pizzi" |
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| Title: Re: "Inexcusable Failure", Cordesman report on Bush's Iraq occupation debacle |
25 Sep 2004 08:41:24 PM |
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"Michael Gray" <fleetg@newsguy.spam.com> wrote in message
news:4b5cl0d60qfvt5of4lgkkk2vjnis6u7efm@4ax.com...
Of course Rummy realizes that his suggested course will result in a
civil war. That's exactly what he and his fellow puppet masters
hope for!
I wonder who they'll blame it on...
.
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| User: "Michael Gray" |
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| Title: Re: "Inexcusable Failure", Cordesman report on Bush's Iraq occupation debacle |
25 Sep 2004 11:07:33 PM |
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On Sun, 26 Sep 2004 01:41:24 GMT, "Paolo Pizzi"
<paolopizziDONOTSPAM@sbcglobal.net> wrote:
"Michael Gray" <fleetg@newsguy.spam.com> wrote in message
news:4b5cl0d60qfvt5of4lgkkk2vjnis6u7efm@4ax.com...
Of course Rummy realizes that his suggested course will result in a
civil war. That's exactly what he and his fellow puppet masters
hope for!
I wonder who they'll blame it on...
It looks like they've even given up caring about fabricating a
pretext.
They don't need to; with CNN and FOX doing the job voluntarily for
them.
.
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