| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Fred Stone" |
| Date: |
08 May 2006 08:57:35 PM |
| Object: |
Insurgent Documents Captured In Iraq |
http://www.centcom.mil/sites/uscentcom1/Shared%20Documents/Extremist%
20Page/full_translation_done_may_3.aspx
A glance at the reality of Baghdad in light of the latest events
(sectarian turmoil)
1. It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in
Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of
the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with
the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation,
they will be in a better position because they represent the power of
the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the
mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up
explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a
battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable
communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite
and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and
closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone
of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to
the Shiite government. The only power the mujahidin have is what they
have already demonstrated in hunting down drifted patrols and taking
sniper shots at those patrol members who stray far from their patrols,
or planting booby traps among the citizens and hiding among them in the
hope that the explosions will injure an American or members of the
government. In other words, these activities could be understood as
hitting the scared and the hiding ones, which is an image that requires
a concerted effort to change, as well as Allah’s wisdom.
2. The strength of the brothers in Baghdad is built mainly on booby
trapped cars, and most of the mujahidin groups in Baghdad are generally
groups of assassin without any organized military capabilities.
3. There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the
brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the
brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is
very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join
operations
4. The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented
policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy
center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to
show in the media that the American and the government do not control
the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged
us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go
to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations
which follow the same direction.
This direction has large positive effects; however, being preoccupied
with it alone delays more important operations such as taking control of
some areas, preserving it and assuming power in Baghdad (for example,
taking control of a university, a hospital, or a Sunni religious site).
Page 2 of 4
At the same time, the Americans and the Government were able to absorb
our painful blows, sustain them, compensate their losses with new
replacements, and follow strategic plans which allowed them in the past
few years to take control of Baghdad as well as other areas one after
the other. That is why every year is worse than the previous year as
far as the Mujahidin’s control and influence over Baghdad.
5. The role that the Islamic party and the Islamic Scholars Committee
play in numbing the Sunni people through the media is a dangerous role.
It has been proven from the course of the events that the American
investment in the Party and the Committee were not in vain. In spite of
the gravity of the events, they were able to calm down the Sunni people,
justify the enemy deeds, and give the enemy the opportunity to do more
work without any recourse and supervision. This situation stemmed from
two matters:
n First, their media power is presented by their special radio and
TV stations as the sole Sunni information source, coupled with our weak
media which is confined mainly to the Internet, without a flyer or
newspaper to present these events.
n Second, in the course of their control of the majority of the
speakers at mosques who convert right into wrong and wrong into right,
and present Islam in a sinful manner and sins in a Muslim manner. At
the same time we did not have any positive impact or benefits from our
operations.
6. The mujahidin do not have any stored weapons and ammunition in
their possession in Baghdad, particularly rockets, such as C5K Katyosha
or bomber or mortars which we realized their importance and shortage in
Baghdad. That was due to lack of check and balance, and proper follow-
ups.
7. The National Guard status is frequently raised and whether they
belong to the Sunnis or Shiites. Too much talk is around whether we
belong to them or not, or should we strike and kill their men or not?
It is believed that this matter serves the Americans very well. I
believe that the Committee and the Party are pushing this issue because
they want to have an influence, similar to the Mujahidin’s. When and if
a Sunni units from the National Guard are formed, and begin to compete
with the mujahidin and squeeze them, we will have a problem; we either
let them go beyond the limits or fight them and risk inciting the
Sunnis against us through the Party’s and the Committee’s channels.
--
Fred Stone
aa# 1369
Master of Orion 3 lives!
Patch 1.2.5 - http://moo3.quicksilver.com/official/patch071803.html
Strawberry Mod - http://www.moo3.at/mods/link.php?id=142
*** Posted via a free Usenet account from http://www.teranews.com ***
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| User: "Scott Richter" |
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| Title: Re: Insurgent Documents Captured In Iraq |
09 May 2006 10:26:19 AM |
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Fred Stone <fstone69@earthling.com> wrote:
And what relevance does this crap have to alt.atheism?
Since you seem obsessed with political news, I suggest you find an
appropriate newsgroup to post it in, m'kay?
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