| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Doug" |
| Date: |
27 Feb 2007 06:55:28 PM |
| Object: |
Is Dawkins a moral idiot or a fraud? |
The notion of god and religion is irrelevant to the argument.
What is relevant, however, is that scientific naturalism rejects moral
realism and holds that moral relativism true. But for Dawkins' moral
arguments to have any validity for you in the following video, your
philosophy must be that of a moral realist. Scientific naturalism and the
underlying moral realism of Dawkins speech cannot be true at the same time.
Scientific naturalism and moral realism refute each other. Does Dawkins not
know this or is he deliberately perpetrating a fraudulent position?
Dawkins
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xe7yf9GJUfU
His theism aside, this teacher's description of moral relativism is exactly
what's taught in ethics courses about relativism.
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-9219638402717265149
.
|
|
| User: "JTEM" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Dawkins a moral idiot or a fraud? |
28 Feb 2007 01:47:05 AM |
|
|
"Doug" <D...@somewhere.net> wrote:
What is relevant, however, is that scientific
naturalism rejects moral realism and holds
that moral relativism true.
The same is true theism.
Example #1:
Gluttony.
How many peanut butter cups can I eat before I'm
guilty of gluttony?
10? 5? None at all?
What if there is no other food available? If all
there was to eat was peanut butter cups -- or
chocolate cake -- it's a different story, now isn't
it?
Example #2:
Murder
What is murder? The definitions are as numerous
as the legal jurisdictions. Ever hear of "honor
killings"? They're not murder, and they're not
punished as murder... well, maybe in the west.
Oops. We just showed how, even amongst God
believers, there's no agreement on what
is murder. But we didn't have to leave the west,
nor even the United States, to find such
contradicitons.
California defines a "Willful disregard for human
life" as murder. In Massachusetts that's
manslaughter at best. But in Massachusetts you
can be brought up on murder charges for using
deadly force in protection of property (where
there's no threat to life & limb). In Texas though,
that's encouraged! It's not a crime, never mind
a captial offense...
Example #3:
Incest
In the biblical parable of Sodom, Lot's daughters
are heroes for getting their father drunk and
having sex with him. Why? Because they thought the
world had just about ended, that their family was
alone in the world with no men to marry, and it
was their duty to give birth to the next generation,
keep their race/tribe/whatever alive.
Where, when & why does matter to theists. To all
theists, including all Christians, morals are
"Situational," they depend on the circumstances.
.
|
|
|
| User: "quibbler" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Dawkins a moral idiot or a fraud? |
28 Feb 2007 04:53:27 PM |
|
|
In article <1172648824.991823.248200@m58g2000cwm.googlegroups.com>,
jtem01@gmail.com says...
The same is true theism.
Example #1:
Gluttony.
How many peanut butter cups can I eat before I'm
guilty of gluttony?
There's an even more obvious example of xian relativism. It's called the
Golden Rule (GR). It endorses as moral and advises one perform any act
upon another which we would like if done to us. This is radical
relativism on a person-by-person basis.
Why aren't xian pseudo-moralists wringing their hands about the moral
hazards posed by the relativism of the GR?
Also, for GR proponents out there, why not ask someone else how they
would like to be treated first, before simply doing onto them what you
think you would like in their stead?
--
Quibbler (quibbler247atyahoo.com)
"It is fashionable to wax apocalyptic about the
threat to humanity posed by the AIDS virus, 'mad cow'
disease, and many others, but I think a case can be
made that faith is one of the world's great evils,
comparable to the smallpox virus but harder to
eradicate." -- Richard Dawkins
.
|
|
|
|
|
| User: "quibbler" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Dawkins a moral idiot or a fraud? |
27 Feb 2007 10:16:32 PM |
|
|
In article <dc-dnYFyUpifTnnYnZ2dnUVZ_tadnZ2d@wcc.net>,
says...
The notion of god and religion is irrelevant to the argument.
What is relevant, however, is that scientific naturalism rejects moral
realism and holds that moral relativism true.
First off, no, you've shown no reason that this is necessarily true.
Secondly, while every first semester philosophy student hears charges of
"moral relativism" being thrown out willy-nilly, it is not clear that
this distinction is as meaningful as so-called "moral absolutists" tout
it to be. First of all, nobody has ever furnished even a single example
of a convincing "moral absolute" ever. No, the ten commandments are not
absolutes (even jebus broke them). Of course, we can make anything sound
absolute saying something like, "No eating pickle...EVER!". But it is no
more justifiable or ontologically "real" because of this absolutism
attached. Secondly, it's not clear that the "relativism" label is
actually a distinction that matters. The notion that "moral truths"
exist in some neo-platonic or idealist sense smacks of confusion as to
what the concept of an abstraction is to begin with. But the bottom line
is it often doesn't practically matter whether we do something because we
believe it is "morally true" or because we just decided to make the rule
up arbitrarily, especially if we cannot actually furnish justification
for why something is a "moral truth". However, the fact remains that it
still regulates behavior, whether the rule is man-made, or somehow
floating out there in a spooky spirit realm. It's really somewhat like
people debating about whether mathematical objects are "real" or just the
consequences of made up systems. BTW, the correct answer is the latter,
but either way, it would have no functional impact upon mathematics.
But for Dawkins' moral
arguments to have any validity
Ummmm....no, you apparently don't understand what deductive validity is.
As in the above example, your argument would be like saying that
mathematics had no "validity" if it turned out that we actually made up
our axioms, as opposed to the axioms just kind of existing in some realm
of pure truth. In actual fact, it makes no difference mathematically or
logically because we assume them anyway. And they are valid so long as
it's not possible for our set of premises to be asserted to be true and
for this to lead to a false conclusion.
Scientific naturalism and the
underlying moral realism of Dawkins speech cannot be true at the same time.
Are you ever in the habit of actually justifying your claim with argument
or evidence. Why do you claim this.
Scientific naturalism and moral realism refute each other.
How? Simply claiming it is not enough, nor is stating that it is
"obvious", since that will likely be your next maneuver. I suspect that
you will claim some combination of equating naturalism to purposely,
blind chance and amply saltings of the naturalistic fallacy, if you
attempt to answer this at all.
Does Dawkins not
know this
Just to be clear. Dawkins is not my pope or my hero, nor am I under any
illusion that he always gets things right. His knowledge of ethical
theory, as in your case, is probably rather meager. Many people,
including Dawkins, and probably yourself, often assume that they know far
more about the subject than they actually do. But, having watched the
video, I find nothing in his casual comments which is irreconcilable with
naturalism or ethical theory.
His theism aside, this teacher's description of moral relativism is exactly
what's taught in ethics courses about relativism.
I suspect that you really just wanted to try to get us to watch this
preachy video. It's really rather quite feeble and you need to learn a
lot more about ethics if that is the extent of your knowledge.
--
Quibbler (quibbler247atyahoo.com)
"It is fashionable to wax apocalyptic about the
threat to humanity posed by the AIDS virus, 'mad cow'
disease, and many others, but I think a case can be
made that faith is one of the world's great evils,
comparable to the smallpox virus but harder to
eradicate." -- Richard Dawkins
.
|
|
|
|
| User: "Richo" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Dawkins a moral idiot or a fraud? |
27 Feb 2007 08:57:29 PM |
|
|
On Feb 28, 11:55 am, "Doug" <D...@somewhere.net> wrote:
The notion of god and religion is irrelevant to the argument.
OK.
What is relevant, however, is that scientific naturalism rejects moral
realism and holds that moral relativism true.
I think this is an oversimplification - I would say that scientific
naturalism *allows* moral relativism.
Which is different to saying it necessitates it.
But for Dawkins' moral
arguments to have any validity for you in the following video, your
philosophy must be that of a moral realist. Scientific naturalism and the
underlying moral realism of Dawkins speech cannot be true at the same time.
Scientific naturalism and moral realism refute each other. Does Dawkins not
know this or is he deliberately perpetrating a fraudulent position?
I choose (c) None of the above.
Ethics is a complex subject - and ussualy these "either/ or" or
choices are presented by people with an axe to grind.
When presented with an alledged dichotomy the first thing is to
question "Is this a real dichotomy?"
Here is one take on the issue:
http://www.stpt.usf.edu/hhl/papers/relative.htm
Cheers, Mark.
.
|
|
|
| User: "Doug" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Dawkins a moral idiot or a fraud? |
27 Feb 2007 09:50:57 PM |
|
|
"Richo" <m.richardson@utas.edu.au> wrote in message
news:1172631449.207519.127990@s48g2000cws.googlegroups.com...
On Feb 28, 11:55 am, "Doug" <D...@somewhere.net> wrote:
The notion of god and religion is irrelevant to the argument.
OK.
What is relevant, however, is that scientific naturalism rejects moral
realism and holds that moral relativism true.
I think this is an oversimplification - I would say that scientific
naturalism *allows* moral relativism.
Which is different to saying it necessitates it.
But for Dawkins' moral
arguments to have any validity for you in the following video, your
philosophy must be that of a moral realist. Scientific naturalism and the
underlying moral realism of Dawkins speech cannot be true at the same
time.
Scientific naturalism and moral realism refute each other. Does Dawkins
not
know this or is he deliberately perpetrating a fraudulent position?
I choose (c) None of the above.
Ethics is a complex subject - and ussualy these "either/ or" or
choices are presented by people with an axe to grind.
When presented with an alledged dichotomy the first thing is to
question "Is this a real dichotomy?"
Here is one take on the issue:
http://www.stpt.usf.edu/hhl/papers/relative.htm
This quote from you link is not a description of moral relativism no matter
what the author says. It is, however, a description of objective morality -
not to be confused with moral absolutism - aka moral realism.
"Situation Sensitivity
Most if not all ethicists recognize that ethical principles are relative in
one sense, namely that they are situation-sensitive. Proffered moral rules
like "Don't lie" are objectionable in undiluted form, we are told, since
allegiance to them invites morally horrendous consequences. Textbook wisdom
has it that these rules are not absolute prescriptions to be unwaveringly
followed. Instead they are rules of thumb, abridgements of unexpurgated
moral principles with specific qualifications or ceteris paribus clauses.
Thus "Don't lie" is short for "Don't lie unless one must do so to avert
great moral harm," or even more vaguely, "Don't lie, other things being
equal." These "complete" principles are presumably general (i.e., relatively
context-free) and exceptionless (applicable to all cases).[1]Thus, although
the principles are absolute, what they prescribe varies, depending on the
relevant features of the case.
Most philosophers recognize it is difficult, if not impossible, to delineate
all and only such principles. We are too limited intellectually. Nonetheless
we must assume there are such principles, and strive to formulate (rough
approximations) of them. Without this regulative assumption, they argue, we
must conclude there are conflicting ethical opinions that are equally valid.
That, Brandt says, is the deleterious essence of relativism."
And again: "There are limits to what is (was) morally worthy, though I am
often uncomfortable with attempts to strictly delimit those boundaries. In
particular, although I find some of the mentioned options defective by my
lights, when I step back and observe the historical movement, I am impressed
by the necessity of these different styles. Without them the movement would
not have made the progress it has (which, as it turns out, is altogether
inadequate.)
" He assumes moral progress is possible. But for moral progress to be REAL
the nature of ethics must be moral realism and not moral anti-real, as is
moral relativism. Moral progress like scientific progress must be objective.
The person you quoted is confusing moral relativism with moral realism. He
is equating moral realism to moral absolutism. Moral relativism is the
denial of moral truths and principles.
Consider an argument grounded in naturalism/materialism:
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_vitzthum/materialism.html
"[14] An evolutionary account of the origin of moral judgment in human
beings does not tell us what (if anything) makes a specific action moral. On
a materialist view, all codes of conduct must ultimately be man-made or
socially constructed; there are no objective moral laws existing
independently of sentient beings in the way that laws of nature do. Thus
there are no objective criteria for determining if human actions are right
or wrong. The objectivity of laws of nature is clear--our approximations to
them (laws of physics) are publicly falsifiable and can be corroborated by
empirical evidence. Moreover, unlike natural laws, moral laws can be
violated. But if what we call moral laws are really man-made inventions, our
ethical rules are arbitrary and thus individuals are not obligated to follow
them. Nothing makes an action objectively moral or immoral; individual and
social codes vary because ethics, like beauty, is in the eye of the
beholder. But then there are no compelling grounds for arguing that Aztec
human sacrifice, Nazi or Serbian genocide, or infanticide is really wrong.
Core ethical rules are no doubt determined by intersubjective consensus
across cultures--for example, incest and murder are universally prohibited.
But such consensus does not demonstrate the objectivity of ethics; it merely
demonstrates that human beings or societies are largely 'built' the same way
and react similarly to certain types of behavior. Suppose we have inherited
an aversion to committing murder. That such a genetic disposition would be
widespread makes evolutionary sense. A known murderer's neighbors will fear
that the murderer might kill them. Out of mutual self-interest they would be
wise to band together and eliminate the murderer before he could eliminate
them. Since murderers would tend to be eliminated before they could
reproduce, individuals with a genetic inclination to commit murder would
tend to dwindle. But this is merely an accident of natural selection, and
trying to base morality on the fact that adhering to certain ethical norms
will make you more "fit" to stay alive and reproduce is insufficient. The
origin of behavior is irrelevant to whether a behavior is right or wrong;
what makes an individual evolutionarily 'fit' (e.g. infidelity) is not
necessarily moral. There will no doubt still be some individuals who are
genetically inclined to commit murder; but we do not conclude that the are
exempt from moral prohibitions on murder because of this. Furthermore, the
fitness of certain evolutionary traits changes when the environment changes.
Would murder suddenly become morally acceptable--even obligatory--if it
provided us a selective advantage? On a materialist account, the only
foundations for behavioral codes are preserving self-interest and satisfying
one's conscience--there are no additional 'moral facts' which motivate
behavior."
I could easily insert Dawkins' examples into the above quote along with
Aztec human sacrifice. Joshua's genocide was moral for him.
On moral progress:
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/moral2.html
"In his concluding remarks, Schick challenges his readers to find a
counterexample to the 'moral truth' that "unnecessary suffering is wrong."
But the challenge is misguided because the lack of a counterexample does not
establish the objectivity of moral values. Consider analogous challenges:
Would a continuous tone be considered music by anyone, or would anyone
consider a blank canvass to be a beautiful work of art? Using Schick's
reasoning I could similarly argue that, unless you can find a counterexample
where a blank canvass is a beautiful work of art, or a monotonous tone
constitutes music, the burden of proof is upon you to show that there are no
objective aesthetic values. Schick also argues that our _moral progress_ is
evidence for objective moral standards; but this simply begs the question.
To assume that there has been, or could be, moral progress is simply to
assume that such standards exist.<<
The point is that just because there are criteria that all ethical systems
will hold as basic assumptions--such as the immorality of producing
unnecessary harm--this does not establish that these kinds of criteria,
whether invoked by art critics or ethicists, are somehow inherent in nature,
existing independently of human opinion. What we have in ethics (as in
aesthetics) are basic criteria that we invent. In the absence of objective
moral values we can have basic intersubjective moral standards--but
intersubjective is still subjective. Instead of morality being based on a
single individual's opinions it can be based on the common elements of
several individuals' opinions--but opinions they still are. They are not
moral 'laws' existing independently of human opinion inherently in
nature--indeed, it would be quite odd to say that objective moral standards
would exist if sentience never arose in the universe or all sentient beings
were extinct."
http://theaetetus.tamu.edu/phil-111/victor/moral/Relativism_handout.pdf
"4. No moral progress: the notion of moral progress would not make sense
according to relativism. A society's views cannot improve because whatever
the society thinks is right at the time is right. Hence society could not
progress from a worse to a better position; the most we could say is that
the society's view had changed. This would mean that we didn't make progress
by ending slavery or giving women their rights."
And that also undermines Dawkins' moral position. You simply cannot
rationally hold to both scientific naturalism and his inherent moral realism
at the same time. As atheists are a-theistic so goes nature. Nature is both
a-theistic and a-moral. To say that Dawkins' moral philosophy is rationally
better than Osama's is to beg a question as to how it could be without an
independent standard by which to judge such an opinion. You might say you
prefer one to the other but that doesn't make opinion rational.
.
|
|
|
| User: "quibbler" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Dawkins a moral idiot or a fraud? |
28 Feb 2007 10:30:32 AM |
|
|
In article <y6udnRuBWK--YXnYnZ2dnUVZ_vShnZ2d@wcc.net>,
says...
Most philosophers recognize it is difficult, if not impossible,
If it's impossible to delineate such principles then what good are they.
Indeed, the author is correct that these asserted principles are
impossible because there is a combinatorial explosion of possible nuances
that could affect any one particular action and we cannot even come close
to expressing all of these possibilities. Instead, we settle for a
reasonable approximation, based on evidence, arguments and consideration
of the consequences, among other factors. That's your cue to flip out
about consequentialism.
to delineate
all and only such principles.
We are too limited intellectually. Nonetheless
we must assume there are such principles,
No, we must not. What we must do is make reasonable arguments based upon
evidence in order to support our views. That is all that we can do
because, even if moral truths did exist, in some sense, we would still
have no clear method for determining them other than argument and
evidence.
and strive to formulate (rough
approximations) of them. Without this regulative assumption, they argue, we
must conclude there are conflicting ethical opinions that are equally valid.
Those conflicts are settled by evidence, reasonable arguments and
considerations of consequences. We do not need to assume that there is
one moral truth. At any given time, we must be convinced that something
is moral, not merely have it asserted to us without evidence. Effective
moral reasoning has been done in the past and this helps us avoid
reinventing the wheel every time. But the fact remains that thinking and
argumentation, at least in principle, still needs to be done in every
moral situation.
That, Brandt says, is the deleterious essence of relativism."
And I've just shown that this "deleterious essence" is imaginary. The
big deal is supposedly that we might disagree on something, perhaps based
upon the same evidence. Well, a complex system can have more than one
solution set. It should come as no surprise that different assumptions
can lead to different conclusions. Sometimes there are no solutions at
all, given certain constraints. For so called "moral realism" to work,
we would have to know which premises were the "right" ones. But
premises, by definition, are not something we attempt to justify and
still call them premises.
" He assumes moral progress is possible.
Yes, according to a pre-defined subset of premises. You aren't bothering
to find one which ones those might be. You're just assuming that he's
talking about the same nonsense you are.
But for moral progress to be REAL
the nature of ethics must be moral realism
All you seem able to do is repeat this claim, not defend it. I know you
read that in a book somewhere, or something, but surely you can supply a
better reason than that.
and not moral anti-real, as is
moral relativism.
Not necessarily. Like skepticism in any other area of knowledge, the
skeptic of ethical claims is not necessarily saying there is no
moral truth of any kind, but looking for justifications for these alleged
truths. Deep skepticism is often untenable, but that still doesn't mean
that we have answered the skeptics objections. It's simply that there
are practical limits into how far we can inquire into a given matter.
That doesn't mean that you can just make ***** up and assert absolutism.
Practicalism is a better standard.
Moral progress like scientific progress must be objective.
Perhaps with respect to a set of premises it can be. Why do you assume
that these premises can't merely be defined and have to exist out in
space somewhere. I will grant that the way we define our premises will
never be free of ambiguity either, but neither is anything else that we
do.
The person you quoted is confusing moral relativism with moral realism.
Whereas you're simply confused in general.
He is equating moral realism to moral absolutism. Moral relativism is the
denial of moral truths and principles.
That's what you want it to be. But like I said, a skeptic does not have
to deny the truth of the issue with which he or she takes exception. A
reasonable skeptic is merely saying, the evidence I've seem so far
doesn't seem decisive for reason x, y or z. What more can you give me
that might help me decide the matter further.
Consider an argument grounded in naturalism/materialism:
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_vitzthum/materialism.html
"[14] An evolutionary account of the origin of moral judgment in human
beings does not tell us what (if anything) makes a specific action moral.
That's because evolution can provide a methaethical basis for the way are
needs and attitudes currently are, but things could have been different.
On
a materialist view, all codes of conduct must ultimately be man-made or
socially constructed; there are no objective moral laws
Well, they're making that assumption, but infidels.org is hardly an
infallible authority. They assume that, because people could come up
with different proposed standards that this automatically makes morals
non-objective. But it could well be that the people recognize many of
the proposed standards are inadequate and reach better consensus on at
least some moral principles. Indeed, there is a fair amount of moral
agreement and this is because we evolved with certain biological and
social needs, inhabit a world where many of the same problems and
environmental conditions exist, etc.
existing
independently of sentient beings in the way that laws of nature do. Thus
there are no objective criteria for determining if human actions are right
or wrong.
They are probably right. But we haven't established that and certainly
scientific naturalism tells us nothing definitive on that score.
I could easily insert Dawkins' examples into the above quote along with
Aztec human sacrifice. Joshua's genocide was moral for him.
Or perhaps not so easily. Clearly the issue of how gravity affects a
ball is categorically different than the issue of how a human "ought" to
behave in a given situation. Because gravity can be objectively
investigated, your simple mind makes the demand that morals must
necessarily be investigatable in the same way. The best we can say of
that endeavor so far, is that we have yet to find a way to do so.
On moral progress:
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/keith_augustine/moral2.html
"In his concluding remarks, Schick challenges his readers to find a
counterexample to the 'moral truth' that "unnecessary suffering is wrong."
But morality is about behavior and "unnecessary suffering" may not be the
result of behavior. It may be the result of nerves firing randomly. Are
we going to say that the nerve is morally wrong for inducing a pain
impulse in a sentient organism? Of course, it's pretty clear that what
Shick's game is, is to take any counter-example and suggest that it is
"necessary" in some sense. Like, I could point out that unnecessary
suffering might help a person mature more quickly. Then Shick would come
back and say, "aha, that means it was necessary for quicker maturity".
Of course, it was not necessary that maturity take place quicker. It was
simply a silver-lining. Clearly Shick tries to smuggle a moral
evaluation into his standard and then acts surprised that it biases the
results.
But the challenge is misguided because the lack of a counterexample does not
establish the objectivity of moral values. Consider analogous challenges:
Would a continuous tone be considered music by anyone, or would anyone
consider a blank canvass to be a beautiful work of art? Using Schick's
reasoning I could similarly argue that, unless you can find a counterexample
where a blank canvass is a beautiful work of art, or a monotonous tone
constitutes music, the burden of proof is upon you to show that there are no
objective aesthetic values. Schick also argues that our _moral progress_ is
evidence for objective moral standards; but this simply begs the question.
To assume that there has been, or could be, moral progress is simply to
assume that such standards exist.<<
The point is that just because there are criteria that all ethical systems
will hold as basic assumptions--such as the immorality of producing
unnecessary harm--this does not establish that these kinds of criteria,
whether invoked by art critics or ethicists, are somehow inherent in nature,
existing independently of human opinion.
So what. Why do they have exist independently of human opinion, so long
as that opinion is well defined and appeals to strong justifications?
What we have in ethics (as in
aesthetics) are basic criteria that we invent. In the absence of objective
moral values we can have basic intersubjective moral standards--but
intersubjective is still subjective. Instead of morality being based on a
single individual's opinions it can be based on the common elements of
several individuals' opinions--but opinions they still are. They are not
moral 'laws' existing independently of human opinion inherently in
nature--indeed, it would be quite odd to say that objective moral standards
would exist if sentience never arose in the universe or all sentient beings
were extinct."
http://theaetetus.tamu.edu/phil-111/victor/moral/Relativism_handout.pdf
"4. No moral progress: the notion of moral progress would not make sense
according to relativism. A society's views cannot improve because whatever
the society thinks is right at the time is right.
No, that's cultural relativism. If we wish to measure progress relative
to any arbitrary benchmark, we simply start with that benchmark. That is
quite different from saying that the benchmark is necessary "true" or the
"one correct benchmark" justifiable by the laws of the universe.
And that also undermines Dawkins' moral position. You simply cannot
rationally hold to both scientific naturalism and his inherent moral realism
Well, again, scientific naturalism has nothing to do with it, as it is
measuring different classes of things which are not obviously reducible.
However, moral realism, regardless of one's view of naturalism, seems to
be in unnecessary and implausible assertion, at least in all cases. It
migth be true, but only evidence and argument will justify accepting it.
at the same time. As atheists are a-theistic so goes nature. Nature is both
a-theistic and a-moral.
Nature doesn't manifest sentience, so it is a category error to expect
that nature behaves morally.
To say that Dawkins' moral philosophy is rationally
better than Osama's is to beg a question as to how it could be without an
independent standard
There are independent standards based upon evidence and reasoning. The
evidence suggests that radical islam, like radical christinsanity,
fosters all kinds of consequences which most people find unacceptable on
their own. However, deference to religion still causes so many to
continue to tolerate it. All we have to do is change the biasing details
of which tribe and which religion did what to whom, as Dawkins cites in
his latest book, and people shift from saying that Joshua's massacre was
right to saying that it was wrong.
by which to judge such an opinion. You might say you
prefer one to the other but that doesn't make opinion rational.
And your alternative is to propose your opinion about the existence of
objective moral truths, despite not having a scrap of evidence for them,
on the grounds that, otherwise, you might be even more confused than you
are right now.
--
Quibbler (quibbler247atyahoo.com)
"It is fashionable to wax apocalyptic about the
threat to humanity posed by the AIDS virus, 'mad cow'
disease, and many others, but I think a case can be
made that faith is one of the world's great evils,
comparable to the smallpox virus but harder to
eradicate." -- Richard Dawkins
.
|
|
|
|
|
|
| User: "Michael Gray" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Dawkins a moral idiot or a fraud? |
28 Feb 2007 12:51:51 AM |
|
|
On Tue, 27 Feb 2007 18:55:28 -0600, "Doug" <Doug@somewhere.net> wrote:
- Refer: <dc-dnYFyUpifTnnYnZ2dnUVZ_tadnZ2d@wcc.net>
The notion of god and religion is irrelevant to the argument.
What "argument"?
You present a bogus false dichotomy, and that is supposed to be an
argument?
--
.
|
|
|
|
|
Related Articles |
|
|
