| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"maff" |
| Date: |
19 Aug 2004 01:56:27 PM |
| Object: |
Language barriers |
Language barriers
http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3104346
Aug 19th 2004
From The Economist print edition
Can a concept exist without words to describe it?
TAKE heart, those of you who struggled with maths at school. It seems
that words for exact numbers do not exist in all languages. And if
someone has no word for a number, he may have no notion of what that
number means.
The Pirahã, a group of hunter-gatherers who live along the banks of
the Maici River in Brazil, use a system of counting called
"one-two-many". In this, the word for "one" translates to "roughly
one" (similar to "one or two" in English), the word for "two" means "a
slightly larger amount than one" (similar to "a few" in English), and
the word for "many" means "a much larger amount". In a paper just
published in Science, Peter Gordon of Columbia University uses his
study of the Pirahã and their counting system to try to answer a
tricky linguistic question.
language languages linguists linguist linguistics linguistic
http://news.google.com/news?q=%20language%20OR%20languages%20OR%20linguists%20OR%20linguist%20OR%20linguistics%20OR%20linguistic&num=100&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=gn
http://www.google.com/search?q=language+OR+languages+OR+linguists+OR+linguist+OR+linguistics+OR+linguistic&num=100&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&tab=nw&sa=N
http://www.google.com/search?q=language+OR+languages+OR+linguists+OR+linguist+OR+linguistics+OR+linguistic&num=100&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&output=search&cat=gwd/Top
http://groups.google.com/groups?q=language%20OR%20languages%20OR%20linguists%20OR%20linguist%20OR%20linguistics%20OR%20linguistic&num=100&hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=dg
http://groups.google.com/groups?as_oq=language%20languages%20linguists%20linguist%20linguistics%20linguistic&safe=images&ie=UTF-8&as_scoring=d&lr=&num=100&hl=en
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| User: "Bob Pease" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
19 Aug 2004 06:01:49 PM |
|
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"maff" <maff91@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:18510aff.0408191107.4acc6492@posting.google.com...
Language barriers
http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3104346
Aug 19th 2004
From The Economist print edition
Can a concept exist without words to describe it?
TAKE heart, those of you who struggled with maths at school. It seems
that words for exact numbers do not exist in all languages. And if
someone has no word for a number, he may have no notion of what that
number means.
The Pirahã, a group of hunter-gatherers who live along the banks of
the Maici River in Brazil, use a system of counting called
"one-two-many". In this, the word for "one" translates to "roughly
one" (similar to "one or two" in English), the word for "two" means "a
slightly larger amount than one" (similar to "a few" in English), and
the word for "many" means "a much larger amount". In a paper just
published in Science, Peter Gordon of Columbia University uses his
study of the Pirahã and their counting system to try to answer a
tricky linguistic question.
Isn't this the central question of awhole school of Philosophy called
Nominalism?
"I can't tell you, but I know its mine"
rj Pease
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
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| User: "John Wilkins" |
|
| Title: Re: Language barriers |
19 Aug 2004 07:07:11 PM |
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Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"maff" <maff91@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:18510aff.0408191107.4acc6492@posting.google.com...
Language barriers
http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3104346
Aug 19th 2004
From The Economist print edition
Can a concept exist without words to describe it?
TAKE heart, those of you who struggled with maths at school. It seems
that words for exact numbers do not exist in all languages. And if
someone has no word for a number, he may have no notion of what that
number means.
The Pirahã, a group of hunter-gatherers who live along the banks of
the Maici River in Brazil, use a system of counting called
"one-two-many". In this, the word for "one" translates to "roughly
one" (similar to "one or two" in English), the word for "two" means "a
slightly larger amount than one" (similar to "a few" in English), and
the word for "many" means "a much larger amount". In a paper just
published in Science, Peter Gordon of Columbia University uses his
study of the Pirahã and their counting system to try to answer a
tricky linguistic question.
Isn't this the central question of awhole school of Philosophy called
Nominalism?
No.
"I can't tell you, but I know its mine"
rj Pease
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.740 / Virus Database: 494 - Release Date: 8/16/04
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
.
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| User: "Bob Pease" |
|
| Title: Re: Language barriers |
19 Aug 2004 09:34:30 PM |
|
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"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"maff" <maff91@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:18510aff.0408191107.4acc6492@posting.google.com...
Language barriers
http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3104346
Aug 19th 2004
From The Economist print edition
Can a concept exist without words to describe it?
TAKE heart, those of you who struggled with maths at school. It seems
that words for exact numbers do not exist in all languages. And if
someone has no word for a number, he may have no notion of what that
number means.
The Pirahã, a group of hunter-gatherers who live along the banks of
the Maici River in Brazil, use a system of counting called
"one-two-many". In this, the word for "one" translates to "roughly
one" (similar to "one or two" in English), the word for "two" means "a
slightly larger amount than one" (similar to "a few" in English), and
the word for "many" means "a much larger amount". In a paper just
published in Science, Peter Gordon of Columbia University uses his
study of the Pirahã and their counting system to try to answer a
tricky linguistic question.
Isn't this the central question of awhole school of Philosophy called
Nominalism?
No.
OK
I read the article ,
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence of
non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
I really don't think that this as an "Angels and pinheads" type of pursuit.
RJ Pease
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.740 / Virus Database: 494 - Release Date: 8/16/04
.
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| User: "John Wilkins" |
|
| Title: Re: Language barriers |
19 Aug 2004 11:22:43 PM |
|
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Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
....
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence of
non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
Wittgestein famously said that
"Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of
the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath
it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal
the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes." Tractatus,
4.002
and
"What we cannot speak we must pass over in silence." Tractatus, 7
I really don't think that this as an "Angels and pinheads" type of
pursuit.
Nor I. Some background:
Plato held that concepts existed prior to our apprehension of them.
Hence for a Platonist, the lack of language to express a concept is a
failure of language not thought. Aristotle held, on the other hand, that
general terms (he called them "universals" but meant any general concept
that covered more than one item) existed only in their naming real
objects that shared a form. When writing a commentary on Aristotle's
logic (possibly the Prior Analytics), Porphyry said that he would not
discuss whether or not general terms existed solely in the mind or not.
This set off the medieval debate over logic.
By the end of the 12th century, this had developed into the nominalist
debate, with Roscellin famously reported to have said that universals
are just words, or "flatus vocus", the breath of the voice. Nominalism
was opposed to "realism" - the doctrine that ideas are real things in
themselves.
A nominalist view was revived by Quine in the 20thC, and developed by
David Armstrong, in his defence of universals realism, although he
rejected Platonic realism. In this account it was debated whether or not
predicates (terms that ascribe a property to objects) were nominalia or
universalia.
Now thie question you asked above is whether or not nominalism is the
view that a concept cannot exist without a word to describe it
(simplifying here).
Nominalism has no problem with inexpressible concepts - but says of
concepts we *can* express that any term that is a universal in
Aristotle's sense that the relationship between the objects represented
by a general term lies solely in the mind. Hence my answer.
No matter whether Platonic realism or extreme nominalism is true or not,
concepts exist in our minds. There is no problem holding that some
person or animal with the requisite capacities has concepts they can't
express (perhaps because they have had a lesion in their Broca's Area).
Do you see the difference here?
I am a bit prolix on this because I found that biologists in particular
misuse the term "nominalism" when applying it to species concepts. It
annoys me, and muddy's the water.
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
.
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| User: "Bob Pease" |
|
| Title: Re: Language barriers |
20 Aug 2004 09:53:24 AM |
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"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitl1f.1jjjwo7ncfpdrN%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
...
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence of
non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
Wittgestein famously said that
"Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of
the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath
it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal
the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes." Tractatus,
4.002
and
"What we cannot speak we must pass over in silence." Tractatus, 7
I really don't think that this as an "Angels and pinheads" type of
pursuit.
Nor I. Some background:
Plato held that concepts existed prior to our apprehension of them.
Hence for a Platonist, the lack of language to express a concept is a
failure of language not thought. Aristotle held, on the other hand, that
general terms (he called them "universals" but meant any general concept
that covered more than one item) existed only in their naming real
objects that shared a form. When writing a commentary on Aristotle's
logic (possibly the Prior Analytics), Porphyry said that he would not
discuss whether or not general terms existed solely in the mind or not.
This set off the medieval debate over logic.
By the end of the 12th century, this had developed into the nominalist
debate, with Roscellin famously reported to have said that universals
are just words, or "flatus vocus", the breath of the voice. Nominalism
was opposed to "realism" - the doctrine that ideas are real things in
themselves.
A nominalist view was revived by Quine in the 20thC, and developed by
David Armstrong, in his defence of universals realism, although he
rejected Platonic realism. In this account it was debated whether or not
predicates (terms that ascribe a property to objects) were nominalia or
universalia.
Now thie question you asked above is whether or not nominalism is the
view that a concept cannot exist without a word to describe it
(simplifying here).
Nominalism has no problem with inexpressible concepts - but says of
concepts we *can* express that any term that is a universal in
Aristotle's sense that the relationship between the objects represented
by a general term lies solely in the mind. Hence my answer.
No matter whether Platonic realism or extreme nominalism is true or not,
concepts exist in our minds. There is no problem holding that some
person or animal with the requisite capacities has concepts they can't
express (perhaps because they have had a lesion in their Broca's Area).
Do you see the difference here?
I am a bit prolix on this because I found that biologists in particular
misuse the term "nominalism" when applying it to species concepts. It
annoys me, and muddy's the water.
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
I really appreciate this!
I have saved it as a text file and will forward it to folks like myself
whose basic education in philosophy was limited to Thomas Aquinas and Doug
Hoffstadter.
In High School, it was more important to take watered-down Math and
Coach-Kellogg's-yellow-notes-copied-on-the -blackboard "History"
At Colorado Mines it was even worse.
The Masculinity of Philosophers and Musicians and Liberal Arts guys was
seriously in question.
As for women, well BOTH of them were Engineering Majors.
Nancy was the "Cute Cheerleader" type
the other girl was called "Ophelia Hagnaster" and was socially shunned.
I got saved by transferring to C.U. but I never got any formal training in
philosophy.
It wasn't until beatnik days that I even tried to get some modicum of a
background.
Bob Pease
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.740 / Virus Database: 494 - Release Date: 8/16/04
.
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| User: "Alan Jeffery" |
|
| Title: Re: Language barriers |
19 Aug 2004 11:35:10 PM |
|
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"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitl1f.1jjjwo7ncfpdrN%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
...
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence of
non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
Wittgestein famously said that
<snippage of interesting stuff - if you're a bit strange>
I am a bit prolix on this because I found that biologists in particular
misuse the term "nominalism" when applying it to species concepts. It
annoys me, and muddy's the water.
Who is this Muddy person?. And what does water look like after he/she/it
has Muddyed it?
I remember some Aussie having opinions about apostraphes. Ha!!
Alan Jeffery
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.737 / Virus Database: 491 - Release Date: 11/08/2004
.
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| User: "Bob Pease" |
|
| Title: Re: Language barriers |
20 Aug 2004 09:59:33 AM |
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"Alan Jeffery" <observa_no_spam@xtra.co.nz> wrote in message
news:2ole1hFbrufrU1@uni-berlin.de...
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitl1f.1jjjwo7ncfpdrN%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
...
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence
of
non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
Wittgestein famously said that
<snippage of interesting stuff - if you're a bit strange>
I am a bit prolix on this because I found that biologists in particular
misuse the term "nominalism" when applying it to species concepts. It
annoys me, and muddy's the water.
Who is this Muddy person?. And what does water look like after he/she/it
has Muddyed it?
I remember some Aussie having opiI remember some Aussie having opinions
about apostraphes. Ha!!
Wasnt Muddy Water's a blue's 'singer?
I remember 'some Au's'sie having opinion's about apo'str*a*phe's.
Its a 'shame to do thi's
RJ P
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.740 / Virus Database: 494 - Release Date: 8/16/04
.
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| User: "John Wilkins" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
20 Aug 2004 12:55:41 AM |
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Alan Jeffery <observa_no_spam@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitl1f.1jjjwo7ncfpdrN%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
...
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence of
non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
Wittgestein famously said that
<snippage of interesting stuff - if you're a bit strange>
I am a bit prolix on this because I found that biologists in particular
misuse the term "nominalism" when applying it to species concepts. It
annoys me, and muddy's the water.
Who is this Muddy person?. And what does water look like after he/she/it
has Muddyed it?
I'm sorry, I have a cold (flu, actually).
I remember some Aussie having opinions about apostraphes. Ha!!
And apostrophes too.
Alan Jeffery
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
---
Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free.
Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com).
Version: 6.0.737 / Virus Database: 491 - Release Date: 11/08/2004
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
.
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| User: "rich hammett" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
20 Aug 2004 11:25:54 AM |
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In talk.origins John Wilkins <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> sanoi, hitaasti kuin hämähäkki:
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
...
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence of
non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
Wittgestein famously said that
"Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of
the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath
it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal
the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes." Tractatus,
4.002
and
"What we cannot speak we must pass over in silence." Tractatus, 7
I really don't think that this as an "Angels and pinheads" type of
pursuit.
Nor I. Some background:
Plato held that concepts existed prior to our apprehension of them.
Hence for a Platonist, the lack of language to express a concept is a
failure of language not thought. Aristotle held, on the other hand, that
general terms (he called them "universals" but meant any general concept
that covered more than one item) existed only in their naming real
objects that shared a form. When writing a commentary on Aristotle's
logic (possibly the Prior Analytics), Porphyry said that he would not
discuss whether or not general terms existed solely in the mind or not.
This set off the medieval debate over logic.
By the end of the 12th century, this had developed into the nominalist
debate, with Roscellin famously reported to have said that universals
are just words, or "flatus vocus", the breath of the voice. Nominalism
was opposed to "realism" - the doctrine that ideas are real things in
themselves.
A nominalist view was revived by Quine in the 20thC, and developed by
David Armstrong, in his defence of universals realism, although he
rejected Platonic realism. In this account it was debated whether or not
predicates (terms that ascribe a property to objects) were nominalia or
universalia.
Now thie question you asked above is whether or not nominalism is the
view that a concept cannot exist without a word to describe it
(simplifying here).
Nominalism has no problem with inexpressible concepts - but says of
concepts we *can* express that any term that is a universal in
Aristotle's sense that the relationship between the objects represented
by a general term lies solely in the mind. Hence my answer.
No matter whether Platonic realism or extreme nominalism is true or not,
concepts exist in our minds. There is no problem holding that some
person or animal with the requisite capacities has concepts they can't
express (perhaps because they have had a lesion in their Broca's Area).
Do you see the difference here?
I think you may be conflating expression and storage, here.
Some fairly decent papers I've seen have said that memory is
stored as language, and that's the sole reason we don't have
infant memories--the faint impressions we had prior to
acquiring language are swamped by the later ones.
If concepts are stored and accessed as language, that still
leaves some room for processing concepts that we don't have
a word for, by weightings of other concepts that we DO have
words for. In fact, given the fluidity of meaning, I'd say
that ALL processing is done like that.
As far as the opinions and ideas of people who also thought
that the brain is solely a blood-cooling organ...or was it
blood-heating...well, they might be nice ideas for a starting
point for real research, but they don't contribute much more
than the decadent late-empire researcher/aristocrat in Asimov's
_Foundation_.
But they do play a good game of football.
rich
I am a bit prolix on this because I found that biologists in particular
misuse the term "nominalism" when applying it to species concepts. It
annoys me, and muddy's the water.
--
-to reply, it's hot not warm
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ Rich Hammett http://home.hiwaay.net/~rhammett
/ "Better the pride that resides in a citizen of the world;
\ than the pride that divides
/ when a colorful rag is unfurled."
.
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| User: "John Wilkins" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
21 Aug 2004 04:20:34 AM |
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rich hammett <bubbarichau@warmmail.com> wrote:
In talk.origins John Wilkins <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
...
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence
of non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
Wittgestein famously said that
"Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of
the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath
it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal
the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes." Tractatus,
4.002
and
"What we cannot speak we must pass over in silence." Tractatus, 7
I really don't think that this as an "Angels and pinheads" type of
pursuit.
Nor I. Some background:
Plato held that concepts existed prior to our apprehension of them.
Hence for a Platonist, the lack of language to express a concept is a
failure of language not thought. Aristotle held, on the other hand, that
general terms (he called them "universals" but meant any general concept
that covered more than one item) existed only in their naming real
objects that shared a form. When writing a commentary on Aristotle's
logic (possibly the Prior Analytics), Porphyry said that he would not
discuss whether or not general terms existed solely in the mind or not.
This set off the medieval debate over logic.
By the end of the 12th century, this had developed into the nominalist
debate, with Roscellin famously reported to have said that universals
are just words, or "flatus vocus", the breath of the voice. Nominalism
was opposed to "realism" - the doctrine that ideas are real things in
themselves.
A nominalist view was revived by Quine in the 20thC, and developed by
David Armstrong, in his defence of universals realism, although he
rejected Platonic realism. In this account it was debated whether or not
predicates (terms that ascribe a property to objects) were nominalia or
universalia.
Now thie question you asked above is whether or not nominalism is the
view that a concept cannot exist without a word to describe it
(simplifying here).
Nominalism has no problem with inexpressible concepts - but says of
concepts we *can* express that any term that is a universal in
Aristotle's sense that the relationship between the objects represented
by a general term lies solely in the mind. Hence my answer.
No matter whether Platonic realism or extreme nominalism is true or not,
concepts exist in our minds. There is no problem holding that some
person or animal with the requisite capacities has concepts they can't
express (perhaps because they have had a lesion in their Broca's Area).
Do you see the difference here?
I think you may be conflating expression and storage, here.
I don't see why. The issue is not whether we can remember things, with
or without language, but whether we can think things we cannot express.
It is my view that we can, and to demonstrate this I adduce someone who
cannot express complex concepts perhaps because of a brain lesion. Are
we to say that this person cannot think the things they used to? I
suffer from a personal foible (I hesitate to call it a condition) I call
nominal aphasia - I simply cannot recall the words I *know* I want to
use to express what I think. A strict Whorf-Sapirian would say I cannot
think those ideas unless I have access to the language. A more lenient
W-Sian might say that I can think it so long as my community can express
it. But I have no difficulty believing that my dog has concepts that she
cannot express verbally.
A much more realistic account than W-S is put forward by Margaret Boden,
a leading AI researcher, in
Boden, Margaret A. 1990. The creative mind: myths and mechanisms.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Boden proposes this view of creativity (and hence of conceptual novelty)
- the vast bulk of novelty is combinatorial novelty - it takes ideas or
idea-fragments and recombines them in novel ways. A small amount of
novelty is the invention of new ideas. This latter she calls "deep"
novelty. If we can - rarely - think new ideas, we can invent terminology
and referents to anchor them. But most of the time we are reusing prior
(culturally imputed) concepts, and the "space" of concepts is much
larger than the actualised concepts so far implemented.
W-S was possibly right only because there was a limit to the number of
concepts a culture had implemented so far. If words follow conceptual
novelty, then a culture that has had no prior need of a concept will
lack the word, but W-S inverts cause and effect. For cultural change to
be occasionally deeply novel, and it is (I trust I don't need to argue
for that), it must be able to be deeply novel, unless oyu think it was
all provided to us either in an act of creation, or that all concepts
are evolutionary a prioria, and neither account strikes me as better
than wishful thinking.
Some fairly decent papers I've seen have said that memory is
stored as language, and that's the sole reason we don't have
infant memories--the faint impressions we had prior to
acquiring language are swamped by the later ones.
If concepts are stored and accessed as language, that still
leaves some room for processing concepts that we don't have
a word for, by weightings of other concepts that we DO have
words for. In fact, given the fluidity of meaning, I'd say
that ALL processing is done like that.
As far as the opinions and ideas of people who also thought
that the brain is solely a blood-cooling organ...or was it
blood-heating...well, they might be nice ideas for a starting
point for real research, but they don't contribute much more
than the decadent late-empire researcher/aristocrat in Asimov's
_Foundation_.
I believe that Pratchett has revived the blood-cooling theory ;-)
But they do play a good game of football.
rich
I am a bit prolix on this because I found that biologists in particular
misuse the term "nominalism" when applying it to species concepts. It
annoys me, and muddy's the water.
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
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| User: "rich hammett" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
23 Aug 2004 08:58:30 AM |
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In talk.origins John Wilkins <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> sanoi, hitaasti kuin hämähäkki:
rich hammett <bubbarichau@warmmail.com> wrote:
In talk.origins John Wilkins <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
...
Do you know the name of any school of thought for which the existence
of non- languageable concepts IS a central issue?
Wittgestein famously said that
"Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of
the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath
it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal
the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes." Tractatus,
4.002
and
"What we cannot speak we must pass over in silence." Tractatus, 7
I really don't think that this as an "Angels and pinheads" type of
pursuit.
Nor I. Some background:
Plato held that concepts existed prior to our apprehension of them.
Hence for a Platonist, the lack of language to express a concept is a
failure of language not thought. Aristotle held, on the other hand, that
general terms (he called them "universals" but meant any general concept
that covered more than one item) existed only in their naming real
objects that shared a form. When writing a commentary on Aristotle's
logic (possibly the Prior Analytics), Porphyry said that he would not
discuss whether or not general terms existed solely in the mind or not.
This set off the medieval debate over logic.
By the end of the 12th century, this had developed into the nominalist
debate, with Roscellin famously reported to have said that universals
are just words, or "flatus vocus", the breath of the voice. Nominalism
was opposed to "realism" - the doctrine that ideas are real things in
themselves.
A nominalist view was revived by Quine in the 20thC, and developed by
David Armstrong, in his defence of universals realism, although he
rejected Platonic realism. In this account it was debated whether or not
predicates (terms that ascribe a property to objects) were nominalia or
universalia.
Now thie question you asked above is whether or not nominalism is the
view that a concept cannot exist without a word to describe it
(simplifying here).
Nominalism has no problem with inexpressible concepts - but says of
concepts we *can* express that any term that is a universal in
Aristotle's sense that the relationship between the objects represented
by a general term lies solely in the mind. Hence my answer.
No matter whether Platonic realism or extreme nominalism is true or not,
concepts exist in our minds. There is no problem holding that some
person or animal with the requisite capacities has concepts they can't
express (perhaps because they have had a lesion in their Broca's Area).
Do you see the difference here?
I think you may be conflating expression and storage, here.
I don't see why. The issue is not whether we can remember things, with
or without language, but whether we can think things we cannot express.
I am arguing from the other side, from hardware or wetware. And I
am saying that, perhaps, this rich inner life that you describe might
be an illusion.
It is my view that we can, and to demonstrate this I adduce someone who
cannot express complex concepts perhaps because of a brain lesion. Are
we to say that this person cannot think the things they used to? I
suffer from a personal foible (I hesitate to call it a condition) I call
nominal aphasia - I simply cannot recall the words I *know* I want to
use to express what I think.
Your brain still has to store and access the concept in some way--I'm
suggesting it's a weighted sum of other concepts and words that you
do have immediate access to.
A strict Whorf-Sapirian would say I cannot
think those ideas unless I have access to the language. A more lenient
W-Sian might say that I can think it so long as my community can express
it. But I have no difficulty believing that my dog has concepts that she
cannot express verbally.
I thought of non-human animals as a weakness in my argument when I
first posed it. I'll continue to ignore them for a while.
A much more realistic account than W-S is put forward by Margaret Boden,
a leading AI researcher, in
Boden, Margaret A. 1990. The creative mind: myths and mechanisms.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Boden proposes this view of creativity (and hence of conceptual novelty)
- the vast bulk of novelty is combinatorial novelty - it takes ideas or
idea-fragments and recombines them in novel ways.
That's what I'm saying.
A small amount of
novelty is the invention of new ideas. This latter she calls "deep"
novelty. If we can - rarely - think new ideas, we can invent terminology
and referents to anchor them. But most of the time we are reusing prior
(culturally imputed) concepts, and the "space" of concepts is much
larger than the actualised concepts so far implemented.
Does she give any examples of these new ideas? My first thought is
that they are nonexistent.
W-S was possibly right only because there was a limit to the number of
concepts a culture had implemented so far. If words follow conceptual
novelty, then a culture that has had no prior need of a concept will
lack the word, but W-S inverts cause and effect. For cultural change to
be occasionally deeply novel, and it is (I trust I don't need to argue
for that), it must be able to be deeply novel, unless oyu think it was
all provided to us either in an act of creation, or that all concepts
are evolutionary a prioria, and neither account strikes me as better
than wishful thinking.
Sorry, I'm not sure that cultural change is ever deeply novel, although
one good example might serve to convince me. I would argue that
all concepts are evolutionary, but, as I say, I'm open to argument.
rich
Some fairly decent papers I've seen have said that memory is
stored as language, and that's the sole reason we don't have
infant memories--the faint impressions we had prior to
acquiring language are swamped by the later ones.
If concepts are stored and accessed as language, that still
leaves some room for processing concepts that we don't have
a word for, by weightings of other concepts that we DO have
words for. In fact, given the fluidity of meaning, I'd say
that ALL processing is done like that.
As far as the opinions and ideas of people who also thought
that the brain is solely a blood-cooling organ...or was it
blood-heating...well, they might be nice ideas for a starting
point for real research, but they don't contribute much more
than the decadent late-empire researcher/aristocrat in Asimov's
_Foundation_.
I believe that Pratchett has revived the blood-cooling theory ;-)
But they do play a good game of football.
rich
I am a bit prolix on this because I found that biologists in particular
misuse the term "nominalism" when applying it to species concepts. It
annoys me, and muddy's the water.
--
-to reply, it's hot not warm
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
\ Rich Hammett http://home.hiwaay.net/~rhammett
/ "Better the pride that resides in a citizen of the world;
\ than the pride that divides
/ when a colorful rag is unfurled."
.
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| User: "John Wilkins" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
23 Aug 2004 06:02:30 PM |
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rich hammett <bubbarichau@warmmail.com> wrote:
ohn Wilkins <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> sanoi, hitaasti kuin hämähäkki:
rich hammett <bubbarichau@warmmail.com> wrote:
In talk.origins John Wilkins <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote:
Bob Pease <robertjp@dropthospartrobertjp.cnc.net> wrote:
"John Wilkins" <johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au> wrote in message
news:1gitazw.1s9ecwuwurp57N%johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au...
....
No matter whether Platonic realism or extreme nominalism is true or not,
concepts exist in our minds. There is no problem holding that some
person or animal with the requisite capacities has concepts they can't
express (perhaps because they have had a lesion in their Broca's Area).
Do you see the difference here?
I think you may be conflating expression and storage, here.
I don't see why. The issue is not whether we can remember things, with
or without language, but whether we can think things we cannot express.
I am arguing from the other side, from hardware or wetware. And I
am saying that, perhaps, this rich inner life that you describe might
be an illusion.
The ability to think is an illusion without language? I think we might
have to define some terms here. I am not arguing for inner qualia but
the ability to reason, problem solve, develop concepts and use them. We
have sufficient evidence that thinking occurs in humans prior to
language and it can be later expressed once language is learned (Helen
Keller being a paradigm case).
It is my view that we can, and to demonstrate this I adduce someone who
cannot express complex concepts perhaps because of a brain lesion. Are
we to say that this person cannot think the things they used to? I
suffer from a personal foible (I hesitate to call it a condition) I call
nominal aphasia - I simply cannot recall the words I *know* I want to
use to express what I think.
Your brain still has to store and access the concept in some way--I'm
suggesting it's a weighted sum of other concepts and words that you
do have immediate access to.
I think you are begging the question (all right! Committing a petitio!
Sheesh) here. In any case it is not immediately apparent to me that we
store memories in terms of words. In fact from what I have read,
memories are stored non-linguistically and indeed non visually/aurally,
etc.
A strict Whorf-Sapirian would say I cannot
think those ideas unless I have access to the language. A more lenient
W-Sian might say that I can think it so long as my community can express
it. But I have no difficulty believing that my dog has concepts that she
cannot express verbally.
I thought of non-human animals as a weakness in my argument when I
first posed it. I'll continue to ignore them for a while.
Why? Consider here that we are thinking about it from an evolutionary
perspective, and that we must assume that we humans have nothing novel
in our neurophysiology apart from complexity of size and combination of
neural connections. It is pretty well ascertained that, for example,
Corvus and other avian clades reason symbolically. They certainly lack
the signs (verbal or otherwise) for that symbolic reasoning. This is a
counterexample to your claim. I leave the primates to one side as being
too close to humans to be illuminating.
A much more realistic account than W-S is put forward by Margaret Boden,
a leading AI researcher, in
Boden, Margaret A. 1990. The creative mind: myths and mechanisms.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Boden proposes this view of creativity (and hence of conceptual novelty)
- the vast bulk of novelty is combinatorial novelty - it takes ideas or
idea-fragments and recombines them in novel ways.
That's what I'm saying.
A small amount of
novelty is the invention of new ideas. This latter she calls "deep"
novelty. If we can - rarely - think new ideas, we can invent terminology
and referents to anchor them. But most of the time we are reusing prior
(culturally imputed) concepts, and the "space" of concepts is much
larger than the actualised concepts so far implemented.
Does she give any examples of these new ideas? My first thought is
that they are nonexistent.
Atoms. Democritus came up with a totally novel and fruitful hypothesis
that was, in my opinion, a quantum leap conceptually. It affected
Epicurean philosophy, the Stoics, and of course was rediscovered by the
moderns 2000 years later (actually, only about 500 years later, or else
we would not have Lucretius' poem or Cicero's counterarguments in De
Finibus).
W-S was possibly right only because there was a limit to the number of
concepts a culture had implemented so far. If words follow conceptual
novelty, then a culture that has had no prior need of a concept will
lack the word, but W-S inverts cause and effect. For cultural change to
be occasionally deeply novel, and it is (I trust I don't need to argue
for that), it must be able to be deeply novel, unless oyu think it was
all provided to us either in an act of creation, or that all concepts
are evolutionary a prioria, and neither account strikes me as better
than wishful thinking.
Sorry, I'm not sure that cultural change is ever deeply novel, although
one good example might serve to convince me. I would argue that
all concepts are evolutionary, but, as I say, I'm open to argument.
....
I'm open to giving it...
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
God cheats
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
22 Aug 2004 09:16:40 AM |
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My version of W-S says that language strongly affects thought. It is
easier to think in the words I currently have, it is obviously easier
to communicate in those words, and so my thoughts will tend to "walk"
well trod paths. It is not that I can't perceive a color for which I
have no word, it is that I am more likely to paint my house with a
color with a familiar name. I am more likely to remember things in
terms of familiar words. I also suspect that the structure of the
language affects this, but I am not as clear on that and don't have
clear examples.
--
Matt Silberstein
Do in order to understand.
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| User: "Lieutenant Kizhe Katson" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
23 Aug 2004 03:28:42 PM |
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Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message news:<r3bhi0ta1t467bbpedus8f49165ckju4cg@4ax.com>...
My version of W-S says that language strongly affects thought. It is
easier to think in the words I currently have, it is obviously easier
to communicate in those words, and so my thoughts will tend to "walk"
well trod paths. It is not that I can't perceive a color for which I
have no word, it is that I am more likely to paint my house with a
color with a familiar name. I am more likely to remember things in
When I was growing up, my parents had a couch upholstered in a shade
that was absolutely indescribable. I know it was indescribable,
because I actually tried to describe it to my Shop teacher (don't ask)
one day, and after I muddled about with terms like "beige" and "light
purple" for a few minutes, he gave me the Teacher's Look Of Death and
I shut up. This is perhaps relevant to the current discussion,
because to this day I can still visualize that couch, but for the life
of me still cannot not name its colour (and still less would I ever
allow any piece of furniture of that colour in my house. Bleh.)
(No, it wasn't taupe either -- ref _Thief of Time_, I think?)
terms of familiar words. I also suspect that the structure of the
language affects this, but I am not as clear on that and don't have
clear examples.
-- Kizhe
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| User: "John Wilkins" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
22 Aug 2004 05:44:18 PM |
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Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
My version of W-S says that language strongly affects thought. It is
easier to think in the words I currently have, it is obviously easier
to communicate in those words, and so my thoughts will tend to "walk"
well trod paths. It is not that I can't perceive a color for which I
have no word, it is that I am more likely to paint my house with a
color with a familiar name. I am more likely to remember things in
terms of familiar words. I also suspect that the structure of the
language affects this, but I am not as clear on that and don't have
clear examples.
This is cultural selection for a practice that is more "fit" in virtue
of being expressible. A similar example might be that we are more likely
to communicate about things that already have words for them (or to bend
and stretch the denotation of a referring word that exists to cover the
new case).
But I think that is true of most cultural things - we don't usually
invent new ideas but recombine the existing ones, or fragments of
existing ones, to form novel combinations.
There is a cart and horse thing happening here. Do we express things
because the language is able to express them, or is it able to express
them because we do express (or wanted at one point to express) them.
Think of medical language - as we discover new things we name them. We
have the Islets of Langerhans, the pancreas, the thymus, the Krebs
cycle, etc. Having a name for them we can discuss them. We can
investigate their properties (and use the newly invented language of
chemistry to do so) and so on. As the need arose, so too did the
terminology.
The W-S hypothesis was, if I recall correctly, a claim that
*fundamental* properties of language affect what we think - that because
a language is tenseless, for instance, its speakers do not think in
terms of time. But I think *that* claim is pretty well dead in the
water. I am sure, though, that having a particular grammar affects the
*way* in which speakers think. For example, Germans must be methodical
and patient because you have to wait so long for the verb ;-)
--
John S. Wilkins
web: www.wilkins.id.au blog: evolvethought.blogspot.com
Cheats, does God
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
22 Aug 2004 06:20:59 PM |
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On Sun, 22 Aug 2004 22:44:18 +0000 (UTC), (John
Wilkins) wrote:
Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
My version of W-S says that language strongly affects thought. It is
easier to think in the words I currently have, it is obviously easier
to communicate in those words, and so my thoughts will tend to "walk"
well trod paths. It is not that I can't perceive a color for which I
have no word, it is that I am more likely to paint my house with a
color with a familiar name. I am more likely to remember things in
terms of familiar words. I also suspect that the structure of the
language affects this, but I am not as clear on that and don't have
clear examples.
This is cultural selection for a practice that is more "fit" in virtue
of being expressible. A similar example might be that we are more likely
to communicate about things that already have words for them (or to bend
and stretch the denotation of a referring word that exists to cover the
new case).
But I think that is true of most cultural things - we don't usually
invent new ideas but recombine the existing ones, or fragments of
existing ones, to form novel combinations.
Yes, I think it is just a bit more important for language than for,
say, cars or baked goods. We do lots of our thinking and lots of our
communicating in language. (I think a big portion of thinking is
internal communication, btw.) There are many more opportunities for
the language restrictions to affect the thinking than for baking
restrictions to do so.
There is a cart and horse thing happening here.
Think of it as a wagon train. I don't much care if there is a cart or
a horse in front.
Do we express things
because the language is able to express them, or is it able to express
them because we do express (or wanted at one point to express) them.
Think of medical language - as we discover new things we name them. We
have the Islets of Langerhans, the pancreas, the thymus, the Krebs
cycle, etc. Having a name for them we can discuss them. We can
investigate their properties (and use the newly invented language of
chemistry to do so) and so on. As the need arose, so too did the
terminology.
Sure. But think of how the term "organ" then restricts our thinking.
Some piece of flesh must belong to an organ. My use of words affects
how I think about things.
I just realized that my argument here is a bit more basic than I had
originally thought. Words are namings, but the very act of naming is a
separating out of some stuff from other stuff. Naming tends to freeze
things in time and space, it implies sharp edges where no such edges
exist. I call that organ a heart and that thing there a vein, but the
body does not actually have a clear separation between the two.
The W-S hypothesis was, if I recall correctly, a claim that
*fundamental* properties of language affect what we think - that because
a language is tenseless, for instance, its speakers do not think in
terms of time. But I think *that* claim is pretty well dead in the
water. I am sure, though, that having a particular grammar affects the
*way* in which speakers think. For example, Germans must be methodical
and patient because you have to wait so long for the verb ;-)
I came to W-S via Korzybski, an interesting writer though, apparently
a kook. (Ok, I came to Korzybski via Van Vogt who wrote interesting
paranoiac science fiction and like to follow kooks.) I do agree that
the original W-S is wrong. It is the kind of idea where there was,
IMVHO, an interesting insight taken way too far beyond the evidence.
--
Matt Silberstein
Do in order to understand.
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| User: "Elroy Willis" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
25 Aug 2004 10:02:56 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au (John Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
Do we express things because the language is able to express them,
or is it able to express them because we do express (or wanted at one
point to express) them. Think of medical language - as we discover new
things we name them. We have the Islets of Langerhans, the pancreas,
the thymus, the Krebs cycle, etc. Having a name for them we can discuss
them. We can investigate their properties (and use the newly invented
language of chemistry to do so) and so on. As the need arose, so too
did the terminology.
Sure. But think of how the term "organ" then restricts our thinking.
Some piece of flesh must belong to an organ.
Or an organism...
My use of words affects how I think about things.
Of course, and since the word "organ" has so many different meanings,
I don't think it's all that restrictive, is it?
I just realized that my argument here is a bit more basic than I had
originally thought. Words are namings, but the very act of naming is a
separating out of some stuff from other stuff.
Naming tends to freeze things in time and space,
Not if you're willing or open to adding multiple meanings to some
particular word. Last time I looked in a thesaurus, there were over
8 definitions for the word "spirit."
it implies sharp edges where no such edges exist. I call that organ
a heart and that thing there a vein, but the body does not actually
have a clear separation between the two.
I think the heart is a pump, and the blood vessels are the
conduits or tubes to carry the blood to the different organs. A
pretty clear separation of the two, at least in my mind.
Then there are the church "organs" which I assume are related
to our lung organs, and previously related to horns which people blew
their breath or "spirit" into?
--
Elroy Willis
EAP Chief Editor and Newshound
http://www.eapnews.com
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| User: "Jenny6833A" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
25 Aug 2004 11:11:06 AM |
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Do we express things because the language is able to express them,
or is it able to express them because we do express (or wanted at one
point to express) them.
Both.
But concepts don't need labels and objects don't either, although labels are
often a convenient (and usually misleading) shorthand. One can always express
the idea in terms of other words or just call it a neat-***** idea, a gizmo, or
whatever.
Way back when, in the days when hardware engineers all talked dirty and
programmers all wore Jesus beads, I came up with a neat-***** trick to do
{whatever} on a new computer. I just did it, and forgot about it.
Months later, my !*@*% boss asked me to explain to him how it worked. Next
thing I knew I had a patent attorney bugging me for an explanation followed by
all sorts of incredibly silly questions. He ended up writing reams of legalese
on long, narrow pieces of paper that I had to red-mark again and again until he
got it more or less @&%## right.
And he wanted a name for the concept. I told him it was just "A neat-*****
trick to do {whatever}" and that I was busy doing useful things. Like, "Go
away!" I never did find out what he called it.
Somewhere along the line, marketing heard about "The neat-***** trick to do
{whatever}" and gave it some name of their own invention but, of course, didn't
tell me.
At least a year later, I'm sitting in some *^#*(*&%#* meeting where some dorks
from the ^%$*&$ ad agency was telling us how they were going to publicize this
new computer.
And this huckster type who didn't know diddly was throwing all these glitzy
pseudo-technical terms around.
One of them really grated, so I interrupted to ask, "What the ***** is that?"
And everyone in the room laughed at me.
They thought I, of all people, ought to know.
I didn't, and don't remember the term to this day.
To me, and to all the people I worked with, the people who actually understood
it, it was just a neat ***** trick to get the *&$*&($ job done in a smaller,
cheaper, faster way.
It didn't need a %@&*%@#* name!
:-)
Jenny
Before emailing, remove Clothes
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
25 Aug 2004 10:27:58 AM |
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On Wed, 25 Aug 2004 15:02:56 +0000 (UTC), Elroy Willis
<elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au (John Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
Do we express things because the language is able to express them,
or is it able to express them because we do express (or wanted at one
point to express) them. Think of medical language - as we discover new
things we name them. We have the Islets of Langerhans, the pancreas,
the thymus, the Krebs cycle, etc. Having a name for them we can discuss
them. We can investigate their properties (and use the newly invented
language of chemistry to do so) and so on. As the need arose, so too
did the terminology.
Sure. But think of how the term "organ" then restricts our thinking.
Some piece of flesh must belong to an organ.
Or an organism...
Not how people tend to think about it. They don't see a piece of skin
as an organ, they see the whole skin as the organ.
My use of words affects how I think about things.
Of course, and since the word "organ" has so many different meanings,
I don't think it's all that restrictive, is it?
I don't think it has that many reasons. In the context of biology it
implies a fairly specific model.
I just realized that my argument here is a bit more basic than I had
originally thought. Words are namings, but the very act of naming is a
separating out of some stuff from other stuff.
Naming tends to freeze things in time and space,
Not if you're willing or open to adding multiple meanings to some
particular word. Last time I looked in a thesaurus, there were over
8 definitions for the word "spirit."
So? 8 is not all that many. And each definition is a specific thing.
it implies sharp edges where no such edges exist. I call that organ
a heart and that thing there a vein, but the body does not actually
have a clear separation between the two.
I think the heart is a pump, and the blood vessels are the
conduits or tubes to carry the blood to the different organs. A
pretty clear separation of the two, at least in my mind.
Yes, I can understand that. Thanks for supporting my point. There is
no actual dividing line in the body between heart and blood vessels.
The differentiation in reality is not as clear as the differentiation
in terminology.
Then there are the church "organs" which I assume are related
to our lung organs, and previously related to horns which people blew
their breath or "spirit" into?
So?
--
Matt Silberstein
Do in order to understand.
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| User: "Elroy Willis" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
26 Aug 2004 07:07:16 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au (John Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
I just realized that my argument here is a bit more basic than I had
originally thought. Words are namings, but the very act of naming is a
separating out of some stuff from other stuff.
Naming tends to freeze things in time and space,
Not if you're willing or open to adding multiple meanings to some
particular word. Last time I looked in a thesaurus, there were over
8 definitions for the word "spirit."
So? 8 is not all that many. And each definition is a specific thing.
After re-reading this post, I realize I agree with you after all.
By naming something, you create a specific definition for it and
separate it from something else, just like you said up above.
So, where does that leave us? With all the compilers and scribes and
editors and publishers of the latest dictionary or thesaurus or
encyclopedia left with plenty to keep them busy and in work for
the rest of their lives, don't you think?
It can however, create ambiguity at the same time, if a person doesn't
know all the definitions of some specific thing, or even the cultural
background of some particular definition.
"I was overtaken by the spirit of DionIsis," might mean one thing to
one person who said it 2000 years ago, and another thing to some
modern day person, and nothing at all to someone else, who knows
nothing of the words or etymology of "spirit" and "DionIsis."
--
Elroy Willis
EAP Chief Editor and Newshound
http://www.eapnews.com
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
26 Aug 2004 08:11:01 AM |
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On Thu, 26 Aug 2004 12:07:16 +0000 (UTC), Elroy Willis
<elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au (John Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
I just realized that my argument here is a bit more basic than I had
originally thought. Words are namings, but the very act of naming is a
separating out of some stuff from other stuff.
Naming tends to freeze things in time and space,
Not if you're willing or open to adding multiple meanings to some
particular word. Last time I looked in a thesaurus, there were over
8 definitions for the word "spirit."
So? 8 is not all that many. And each definition is a specific thing.
After re-reading this post, I realize I agree with you after all.
By naming something, you create a specific definition for it and
separate it from something else, just like you said up above.
So, where does that leave us? With all the compilers and scribes and
editors and publishers of the latest dictionary or thesaurus or
encyclopedia left with plenty to keep them busy and in work for
the rest of their lives, don't you think?
I think it means we need to be actively engaged in remembering that
distinctions in words are not necessarily distinctions in things.
It can however, create ambiguity at the same time, if a person doesn't
know all the definitions of some specific thing, or even the cultural
background of some particular definition.
Of course.
"I was overtaken by the spirit of DionIsis," might mean one thing to
one person who said it 2000 years ago, and another thing to some
modern day person, and nothing at all to someone else, who knows
nothing of the words or etymology of "spirit" and "DionIsis."
I think this is yet another problem. We think we know the culture
because we know the word and a meaning for the word. I find it
difficult sometimes to understand issues and ideas from 150 year ago,
and I have plenty of material to work from. Understanding the role of
the Greek gods in Greek culture pretty much bewilders me.
--
Matt Silberstein
Do in order to understand.
.
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| User: "Elroy Willis" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
26 Aug 2004 09:35:07 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au (John Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
I just realized that my argument here is a bit more basic than I had
originally thought. Words are namings, but the very act of naming is a
separating out of some stuff from other stuff.
Naming tends to freeze things in time and space,
Not if you're willing or open to adding multiple meanings to some
particular word. Last time I looked in a thesaurus, there were over
8 definitions for the word "spirit."
So? 8 is not all that many. And each definition is a specific thing.
After re-reading this post, I realize I agree with you after all.
By naming something, you create a specific definition for it and
separate it from something else, just like you said up above.
So, where does that leave us? With all the compilers and scribes and
editors and publishers of the latest dictionary or thesaurus or
encyclopedia left with plenty to keep them busy and in work for
the rest of their lives, don't you think?
I think it means we need to be actively engaged in remembering that
distinctions in words are not necessarily distinctions in things.
Are you actually a supporter of getting rid of ambiguous words instead
of just adding more definitions to some particular word?
It can however, create ambiguity at the same time, if a person doesn't
know all the definitions of some specific thing, or even the cultural
background of some particular definition.
Of course.
"I was overtaken by the spirit of DionIsis," might mean one thing to
one person who said it 2000 years ago, and another thing to some
modern day person, and nothing at all to someone else, who knows
nothing of the words or etymology of "spirit" and "DionIsis."
I think this is yet another problem. We think we know the culture
because we know the word and a meaning for the word. I find it
difficult sometimes to understand issues and ideas from 150 year ago,
and I have plenty of material to work from. Understanding the role of
the Greek gods in Greek culture pretty much bewilders me.
Which parts in particular bewilder you?
I've never made much distinction between one god or many
gods, and don't think that one is better than two or three or a
hundred...
--
Elroy Willis
EAP Chief Editor and Newshound
http://www.eapnews.com
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
26 Aug 2004 03:59:25 PM |
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On Thu, 26 Aug 2004 14:35:07 +0000 (UTC), Elroy Willis
<elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au (John Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
I just realized that my argument here is a bit more basic than I had
originally thought. Words are namings, but the very act of naming is a
separating out of some stuff from other stuff.
Naming tends to freeze things in time and space,
Not if you're willing or open to adding multiple meanings to some
particular word. Last time I looked in a thesaurus, there were over
8 definitions for the word "spirit."
So? 8 is not all that many. And each definition is a specific thing.
After re-reading this post, I realize I agree with you after all.
By naming something, you create a specific definition for it and
separate it from something else, just like you said up above.
So, where does that leave us? With all the compilers and scribes and
editors and publishers of the latest dictionary or thesaurus or
encyclopedia left with plenty to keep them busy and in work for
the rest of their lives, don't you think?
I think it means we need to be actively engaged in remembering that
distinctions in words are not necessarily distinctions in things.
Are you actually a supporter of getting rid of ambiguous words instead
of just adding more definitions to some particular word?
Neither. Words will always have some ambiguity. "Overloading" a term
with more meanings will not help at all. I am in favor of make the it
clear which is the appropriate definition in the discussion. Even so,
we have two choices: we can make our definitions clear and precise
with sharp edges, but then they won't apply all that well to the
world. Or we can have more ambiguous fuzzy definitions, but those can
apply to real world objects.
[snip]
I think this is yet another problem. We think we know the culture
because we know the word and a meaning for the word. I find it
difficult sometimes to understand issues and ideas from 150 year ago,
and I have plenty of material to work from. Understanding the role of
the Greek gods in Greek culture pretty much bewilders me.
Which parts in particular bewilder you?
It is not at all clear what they thought the God did or whether they
thought they really existed.
I've never made much distinction between one god or many
gods, and don't think that one is better than two or three or a
hundred...
This is because you attempt to make all ideas fit into a small number
of predetermined boxes.
--
Matt Silberstein
Do in order to understand.
.
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| User: "Fred Stone" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
26 Aug 2004 04:37:10 PM |
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Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> wrote in
news:29ksi09mi8h8ejqh0c203ur5k856ve7nk2@4ax.com:
On Thu, 26 Aug 2004 14:35:07 +0000 (UTC), Elroy Willis
<elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
johnSPAM@wilkins.id.au (John Wilkins) wrote:
<snip>
I just realized that my argument here is a bit more basic than I
had originally thought. Words are namings, but the very act of
naming is a separating out of some stuff from other stuff.
Naming tends to freeze things in time and space,
Not if you're willing or open to adding multiple meanings to some
particular word. Last time I looked in a thesaurus, there were
over 8 definitions for the word "spirit."
So? 8 is not all that many. And each definition is a specific
thing.
After re-reading this post, I realize I agree with you after all.
By naming something, you create a specific definition for it and
separate it from something else, just like you said up above.
So, where does that leave us? With all the compilers and scribes
and editors and publishers of the latest dictionary or thesaurus or
encyclopedia left with plenty to keep them busy and in work for
the rest of their lives, don't you think?
I think it means we need to be actively engaged in remembering that
distinctions in words are not necessarily distinctions in things.
Are you actually a supporter of getting rid of ambiguous words instead
of just adding more definitions to some particular word?
Neither. Words will always have some ambiguity. "Overloading" a term
with more meanings will not help at all. I am in favor of make the it
clear which is the appropriate definition in the discussion. Even so,
we have two choices: we can make our definitions clear and precise
with sharp edges, but then they won't apply all that well to the
world. Or we can have more ambiguous fuzzy definitions, but those can
apply to real world objects.
[snip]
I think this is yet another problem. We think we know the culture
because we know the word and a meaning for the word. I find it
difficult sometimes to understand issues and ideas from 150 year
ago, and I have plenty of material to work from. Understanding the
role of the Greek gods in Greek culture pretty much bewilders me.
Which parts in particular bewilder you?
It is not at all clear what they thought the God did or whether they
thought they really existed.
Is that because we have the views of so many different Greeks? Plato vs
those of Aeschylus or Euripides vs Homer-a and -b?
I've never made much distinction between one god or many
gods, and don't think that one is better than two or three or a
hundred...
This is because you attempt to make all ideas fit into a small number
of predetermined boxes.
--
Fred Stone
aa# 1369
Cthulhu for President! Why vote for a lesser evil?
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| User: "Elroy Willis" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
27 Aug 2004 06:33:39 AM |
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Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> wrote:
<snip>
I think this is yet another problem. We think we know the culture
because we know the word and a meaning for the word. I find it
difficult sometimes to understand issues and ideas from 150 year ago,
and I have plenty of material to work from. Understanding the role of
the Greek gods in Greek culture pretty much bewilders me.
Which parts in particular bewilder you?
It is not at all clear what they thought the God did or whether they
thought they really existed.
They certainly thought their gods and goddesses existed and did
certain things, otherwise they wouldn't have named them and worshipped
them and prayed to them, would they?
In the example I gave which has been snipped by now, with regards
to Dionysus, it seems to me that certain people believed that wine or
alcohol held some kind of spirit in it, and when people drink it, the
spirit overtakes them and they become "drunk in the spirit of
Dionysus," or the god of wine or alcohol. We still call alcoholic
beverages "spirits" as a remnant of that particular belief, as I'm
sure you already know.
If there is some god out there who doesn't like people getting
drunk, why doesn't that god change the laws of nature to get rid of
fermentation, or make it so that people don't get drunk when they
drink alcohol? Would it actually involve killing the god Dionysus,
once and for all? So it would seem, and that power seems to be
beyond some one almighty make-believe omni-powerful god.
I've never made much distinction between one god or many
gods, and don't think that one is better than two or three or a
hundred...
This is because you attempt to make all ideas fit into a small number
of predetermined boxes.
Lumping them all together into one single box and calling it God or
Gott or YHWH or Jehovah or HaShem doesn't really help all that
much, does it? It adds the dreaded "mysterious plan" of some omni-god
which nobody can understand, doesn't it?
If one single god has to do everything, and be responsible for
everything, then it creates more problems than it solves, don't you
think?
--
Elroy Willis
EAP Chief Editor and Newshound
http://www.eapnews.com
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| User: "rich hammett" |
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| Title: Re: Language barriers |
27 Aug 2004 12:32:18 PM |
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In talk.origins Elroy Willis <elo@airmail.net> sanoi, hitaasti kuin hämähäkki:
Matt Silberstein wrote in alt.atheism
[in discussing Greek Gods]
It is not at all clear what they thought the God did or whether they
thought they really existed.
They certainly thought their gods and goddesses existed and did
certain things, otherwise they wouldn't have named them and worshipped
them and prayed to them, would they?
In the example I gave which has been snipped by now, with regards
to Dionysus, it seems to me that certain people believed that wine or
alcohol held some kind of spirit in it, and when people drink it, the
spirit overtakes them and they become "drunk in the spirit of
Dionysus," or the god of wine or alcohol. We still call alcoholic
beverages "spirits" as a remnant of that particular belief, as I'm
sure you already know.
Anthropomorphic personifications aren't necessarily believed
in in the way you seem to think. Sometimes you just name a
thing to get some form of psychological control over it.
If there is some god out there who doesn't like people getting
drunk, why doesn't that god change the laws of nature to get rid of
fermentation, or make it so that people don't get drunk when they
drink alcohol? Would it actually involve killing the god Dionysus,
once and for all? So it would seem, and that power seems to be
beyond some one almighty make-believe omni-powerful god.
What a bizarre rant. You don't seem to have much difficulty creating
strawmen.
I've never made much distinction between one god or many
gods, and don't think that one is better than two or three or a
hundred...
This is because you attempt to make all ideas fit into a small number
of predetermined boxes.
Lumping them all together into one si | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
