On Thu, 02 Feb 2006 23:45:30 -0800, "Yang, AthD (h.c), Kicking AWOL's
Cocaine Snorting *****" <eacmole@/*AWOLBUSH*/mail.com> wrote in
alt.atheism

Another Downing Street memo

Shrub made the statement; "It doesn't matter what Saddam does, we're
going to invade anyway" at the Azores summit on the radio.

http://thinkprogress.org/2006/02/02/another-british-memo/

Another Damaging British Memo: Bush Made Up His Mind On Iraq Two Months
Before Invasion

The Guardian reports a newly-disclosed British memo[1] provides evidence
that Bush had made up his mind to attack Iraq almost two months prior to
the war:

A memo of a two-hour meeting between the two leaders at the White
House on January 31 2003 - nearly two months before the invasion -
reveals that Mr Bush made it clear the US intended to invade whether or
not there was a second resolution and even if UN inspectors found no
evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons programme.

The new revelations demonstrate that Bush was deceiving the American
public about his intentions in the lead-up to the war. On numerous
occasions, Bush claimed he had not made up his mind to attack Iraq:

I’ve not made up our mind about military action. Hopefully, this can
be done peacefully. [3/6/03]

We are doing everything we can to avoid war in Iraq. But if Saddam
Hussein does not disarm peacefully, he will be disarmed by force.
[3/8/03]

Should Saddam Hussein choose confrontation, the American people can
know that every measure has been taken to avoid war, and every measure
will be taken to win it. [3/17/03]

This is just further proof that you can’t take literally what comes out
of Bush’s mouth.
/end

[1]
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,,1700881,00.html
Blair-Bush deal before Iraq war revealed in secret memo

PM promised to be 'solidly behind' US invasion with or without UN
backing

Richard Norton-Taylor
Friday February 3, 2006

Tony Blair told President George Bush that he was "solidly" behind US
plans to invade Iraq before he sought advice about the invasion's
legality and despite the absence of a second UN resolution, according to
a new account of the build-up to the war published today.

A memo of a two-hour meeting between the two leaders at the White House
on January 31 2003 - nearly two months before the invasion - reveals
that Mr Bush made it clear the US intended to invade whether or not
there was a second UN resolution and even if UN inspectors found no
evidence of a banned Iraqi weapons programme.

"The diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military
planning", the president told Mr Blair. The prime minister is said to
have raised no objection. He is quoted as saying he was "solidly with
the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam".

The disclosures come in a new edition of Lawless World, by Phillipe
Sands, a QC and professor of international law at University College,
London. Professor Sands last year exposed the doubts shared by Foreign
Office lawyers about the legality of the invasion in disclosures which
eventually forced the prime minister to publish the full legal advice
given to him by the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith.

The memo seen by Prof Sands reveals:

· Mr Bush told Mr Blair that the US was so worried about the failure to
find hard evidence against Saddam that it thought of "flying U2
reconnaissance aircraft planes with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in
UN colours". Mr Bush added: "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in
breach [of UN resolutions]".

· Mr Bush even expressed the hope that a defector would be extracted
from Iraq and give a "public presentation about Saddam's WMD". He is
also said to have referred Mr Blair to a "small possibility" that Saddam
would be "assassinated".

· Mr Blair told the US president that a second UN resolution would be an
"insurance policy", providing "international cover, including with the
Arabs" if anything went wrong with the military campaign, or if Saddam
increased the stakes by burning oil wells, killing children, or
fomenting internal divisions within Iraq.

· Mr Bush told the prime minister that he "thought it unlikely that
there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and
ethnic groups". Mr Blair did not demur, according to the book.

The revelation that Mr Blair had supported the US president's plans to
go to war with Iraq even in the absence of a second UN resolution
contrasts with the assurances the prime minister gave parliament shortly
after. On February 25 2003 - three weeks after his trip to Washington -
Mr Blair told the Commons that the government was giving "Saddam one
further, final chance to disarm voluntarily".

He added: "Even now, today, we are offering Saddam the prospect of
voluntary disarmament through the UN. I detest his regime - I hope most
people do - but even now, he could save it by complying with the UN's
demand. Even now, we are prepared to go the extra step to achieve
disarmament peacefully."

On March 18, before the crucial vote on the war, he told MPs: "The UN
should be the focus both of diplomacy and of action... [and that not to
take military action] would do more damage in the long term to the UN
than any other single course that we could pursue."

The meeting between Mr Bush and Mr Blair, attended by six close aides,
came at a time of growing concern about the failure of any hard
intelligence to back up claims that Saddam was producing weapons of mass
destruction in breach of UN disarmament obligations. It took place a few
days before the then US secretary Colin Powell made claims - since
discredited - in a dramatic presentation at the UN about Iraq's weapons
programme.

Earlier in January 2003, Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, expressed
his private concerns about the absence of a smoking gun in a private
note to Mr Blair, according to the book. He said he hoped that the UN's
chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, would come up with enough evidence
to report a breach by Iraq of is its UN obligations.

Downing Street did not deny the existence of the memo last night, but
said: "The prime minister only committed UK forces to Iraq after
securing the approval of the House of Commons in a vote on March 18,
2003." It added the decision to resort to military action to ensure Iraq
fulfilled its obligations imposed by successive security council
resolutions was taken only after attempts to disarm Iraq had failed. "Of
course during this time there were frequent discussions between the UK
and US governments about Iraq. We do not comment on the prime minister's
conversations with other leaders."

Sir Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat acting leader, said last
night: "The fact that consideration was apparently given to using
American military aircraft in UN colours in the hope of provoking Saddam
Hussein is a graphic illustration of the rush to war. It would also
appear to be the case that the diplomatic efforts in New York after the
meeting of January 31 were simply going through the motions.

"The prime minister's offer of February 25 to Saddam Hussein was about
as empty as it could get. He has a lot of explaining to do."

Prof Sands says Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's UN ambassador at the
time, told a foreign colleague he was "clearly uncomfortable" about the
failure to get a second resolution. Foreign Office lawyers consistently
warned that an invasion would be regarded as unlawful. The book reveals
that Elizabeth Wilmshurst, the FO's deputy chief legal adviser who
resigned over the war, told the Butler inquiry into the use of
intelligence during the run-up to the war, of her belief that Lord
Goldsmith, the attorney general, shared the FO view. According to
private evidence to the Butler inquiry, Lord Goldsmith told FO lawyers
in early 2003: "The prime minister has told me that I cannot give
advice, but you know what my views are".

On March 7 2003 he advised the prime minister that the Bush
administration believed that a case could be made for an invasion
without a second UN resolution. But he warned that Britain could be
challenged in the international criminal court. Ten days later, he said
a second resolution was not necessary.

/end