Monkey Morality - Can Evolution Explain Ethics?
St. Jackanapes is a chimp. He's being punished by other members of
the chimpanzee band for not sharing his bananas. St. Jackanapes is
selfish. Bad St. Jackanapes. Moral rule: Chimps shouldn't be
selfish.
One of the strongest evidences for the existence of God is man's
unique moral nature. C.S. Lewis argues in Mere Christianity that
there is a persistent moral law that represents the ethical
foundation of all human cultures. This, he says, is evidence for
the God who is the author of the moral law.
Not everyone agrees. Scenarios like the one above have been offered
as evidence for rudimentary forms of morality among animals,
especially the "higher" primates like chimpanzees. This suggests
that morality in humans is not unique and can be explained by the
natural process of evolution without appeal to a divine Lawgiver.
This view of morality is one of the conclusions of the new science
of evolutionary psychology. Its adherents advance a simple premise:
The mind, just like every part of the physical body, is a product of
evolution. Everything about human personality--marital
relationships, parental love, friendships, dynamics among siblings,
social climbing, even office politics--can be explained by the
forces of neo-Darwinian evolution.
Even the moral threads that make up the fabric of society are the
product of natural selection. Morality can be reduced to chemical
relationships in the genes chosen by different evolutionary needs in
the physical environment. Love and hate; feelings of guilt and
remorse; gratitude and envy; even the virtues of kindness,
faithfulness, or self- control can all be explained mechanistically
through the cause and effect of chance genetic mutations and natural
selection.
One notable example of this challenge to the transcendent nature of
morality comes from the book The Moral Animal--Why We Are the Way We
Are: The New Science of Evolutionary Psychology, by Robert Wright.
.. How Morals Evolve
.. The Blind Moral-Maker
In his popular defense of evolution, The Blind Watchmaker, Richard
Dawkins acknowledges that the biological world looks designed, but
that this appearance is deceiving. The appearance of intelligent
order is really the result of the workings of natural selection.
Robert Wright holds the same view regarding man's psychological
features, including morality. The strongest evidence for this
analysis seems to be the explanatory power of the evolutionary
paradigm when dealing with moral conduct. The argument rests on the
nature of natural selection itself:
If within a species there is variation among individuals in their
hereditary traits, and some traits are more conducive to survival and
reproduction than others, then those traits will (obviously) become more
widespread within the population. The result (obviously) is that the
species' aggregate pool of hereditary traits changes.[1]
Wright argues from effect back to cause, asking what is the
simplest, most elegant solution adequate to explain the effects we
see. To Wright, the evolutionary explanation is "obvious." In
order to survive, animals must adapt to changing conditions. Through
the process of natural selection, naturalistic forces "choose"
certain behavior patterns that allow the species to continue to
exist. We call those patterns "morality."
.. Wired for Morality
The thesis that evolution explains all moral conduct requires that
such conduct be genetically determined. Morality rides on the
genes, as it were, and one generation passes on favorable morality
to the next. Wright sees a genetic connection with a whole range of
emotional capabilities. He talks about "genes inclining a male to
love his offspring,"[2] and romantic love that was not only invented
by evolution, but corrupted by it.[3] Consider these comments:
If a woman's "fidelity gene" (or her "infidelity gene") shapes her
behavior in a way that helps get copies of itself, into future
generations in large numbers, then that gene will by definition
flourish.[4] [emphasis in the original]
Beneath all the thoughts and feelings and temperamental differences
that marriage counselors spend their time sensitively assessing are
the stratagems of the genes--cold, hard equations composed of simple
variables.[5]
Some mothers have a genetic predisposition to love their children,
so the story goes, and this genetic predisposition to be loving is
favored by natural selection. Consequently, there are more women
who are "good" mothers.
What is the evidence, though, that moral virtues are genetic, a
random combination of molecules? Is the fundamental difference
between a Mother Teresa and a Hitler their chromosomal makeup? If
so, then how could we ever praise Mother Teresa? How could a man
like Adolph Hitler be truly guilty?
Wright offers no such empirical evidence. He seems to assume that
moral qualities are in the genes because he must; his paradigm will
not work otherwise.
.. Wright's Double-Standard
.. Morality Above Morality
In a public relations piece promoting his book, Robert Wright says,
"My hope is that people will use the knowledge [in this book] not
only to improve their lives--as a source of 'self-help'--but as
cause to treat other people more decently." [emphasis mine]
This statement captures a major flaw in Wright's analysis. His
entire thesis is that chance evolution exhausts what it means to be
moral. Morality is descriptive, a mere function of the environment
selecting patterns of behavior that assist and benefit the growth
and survival of the species. Yet he frequently lapses,
unconsciously making reference to a morality that seems to transcend
nature.
Take this comment as an example: "Human beings are a species
splendid in their array of moral equipment, tragic in their
propensity to misuse it, and pathetic in their constitutional
ignorance of the misuse."[6] [emphasis mine] Wright reflects on the
moral equipment randomly given to us by nature, and then bemoans our
immoral use of it with words like "tragic," "pathetic," and
"misuse."
He writes, "Go above and beyond the call of a smoothly functioning
conscience; help those who aren't likely to help you in return, and
do so when nobody's watching. This is one way to be a truly moral
animal."[7]
It's almost as if there are two categories of morality, nature's
morality and a transcendent standard used to judge nature's
morality. But where did this transcendent standard come from? It's
precisely this higher moral law that needs explaining. If
transcendent morality judges the "morality" that evolution is
responsible for, then it can't itself be accounted for by evolution.
Social Darwinism
Like many evolutionists, Wright recoils from social Darwinism. "To
say that something is 'natural' is not to say that it is good. There
is no reason to adopt natural selection's 'values' as our own."[8]
Just because nature exploits the weak, he argues, doesn't mean we
are morally obliged to do so.
Natural selection's indifference to the suffering of the weak is not
something we need to emulate. Nor should we care whether murder, robbery,
and rape are in some sense "natural." It is for us to decide how
abhorrent we find such things and how hard we want to fight them.[9]
Wright argues that the reductio ad absurdum argument from social
Darwinism is flawed. Though life is an unregulated state of nature
is, as 17th century English philosophy Thomas Hobbes described it,
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,"[10] we're not required
to take the "survival of the fittest" as a moral guideline.
Evolutionists may be right when they argue that we're not compelled
to adopt the morality of evolution. The danger of social Darwinism,
though, is not that society is required to adopt the law of the
jungle, but that it is allowed to. The exploitation of the weak by
the strong is morally benign according to this view.
What Darwinists cannot do is give us a reason why we ought not
simply copy nature and destroy those who are weak, unpleasant,
costly, or just plain boring. If all moral options are legitimate,
then it's legitimate for the strong to rule the weak. No moral
restraints protect the weak, because moral restraints simply
wouldn't exist.
Monkey Morality
Recent studies have attempted to show that animals exhibit
rudimentary moral behavior. In one case, a group of chimpanzees
"punished" one "selfish" member of their band by withholding food
from it. Apparently, the moral rule was this: Chimps shouldn't be
selfish.
Conduct, Motive, and Intent
There are some problems with this assessment. First of all, drawing
conclusions about animal morality simply from external behavior
reduces morality to conduct. Why should we accept that morality is
exhaustively described by behavior? True morality entails
non-behavioral elements, too, like intent and motive.
One can't infer actual moral obligations from the mere fact of a
chimp's conduct. One might talk descriptively about a chimp's
behavior, but no conclusion about morality follows from this. One
can observe that chimps in community share food, and when they do
they survive better. But you can't conclude from this that St.
Jackanapes, the chimp, ought to share his bananas, and if he
doesn't, then he's immoral because he hasn't contributed to the
survival of his community.
Further, in fixing blame, we distinguish between an act done by
accident and the very same act done on purpose. The behavior is the
same, but the intent is different. We don't usually blame people
for accidents: The boy didn't intend to trip the old lady.
We also give attention to the issue of motive. We withhold blame
even if the youngster tripped the old lady on purpose if the motive
is acceptable: He tripped her to keep her from running in front of
a train.
Motive and intent cannot be determined simply by looking at
behavior. In fact, some "good" behavior--giving to the poor, for
example--might turn out to be tainted if the motive and intent are
wrong: being thought well of with no concern for the recipient.
Indeed, it seems one can be immoral without any behavior at all,
e.g. plotting an evil deed that one never has the opportunity to
carry out.
Morality informs behavior, judging it either good or bad, but it's
not identical to behavior. Morality is something deeper than
habitual patterns of physical interaction. Therefore, one can't
draw conclusions about animal morality simply based on what he
observes in their conduct.
Morality: Explained or Denied?
This leads us to the second problem, which runs much deeper. When
morality is reduced to patterns of behavior chosen by natural
selection for its survival value, then morality is not explained;
it's denied. Wright admits as much. Regarding the conscience he
says:
The conscience doesn't make us feel bad the way hunger feels bad, or good
the way sex feels good. It makes us feel as if we have done something
that's wrong or something that's right. Guilty or not guilty. It is
amazing that a process as amoral and crassly pragmatic as natural
selection could design a mental organ that makes us feel as if we're in
touch with higher truth. Truly a shameless ploy.[11] [emphasis mine]
Evolutionists like Wright are ultimately forced to admit that what
we think is a "higher truth" of morality turns out to be a
"shameless ploy" of nature, a description of animal behavior
conditioned by the environment for survival. We've given that
conduct a label, they argue. We call it morality. But there is no
real right and wrong.
Does St. Jackanapes, the chimp, actually exhibit genuine moral
behavior? Does he understand the difference between right and wrong?
Does he make principled choices to do what's right? Is he worthy of
blame and punishment for doing wrong? Of course not, Wright says.
St. Jackanapes merely does in a primitive way what humans do in a
more sophisticated way. We respond according to our genetic
conditioning, a program "designed" by millions of years of
evolution.
The evolutionary approach is not an explanation of morality; it's a
denial of morality. It explains why we think moral truths exist
when, in fact, they don't.
.. Why Be a Good Boy Tomorrow?
This observation uncovers the most serious objection to the idea
that evolution is adequate to explain morality. There is one
question that can never be answered by any evolutionary assessment
of ethics. The question is this: Why ought I be moral tomorrow?
One of the distinctives of morality is its "oughtness," its moral
incumbency. Assessments of mere behavior, however, are descriptive
only. Since morality is essentially prescriptive--telling what
should be the case, as opposed to what is the case--and since all
evolutionary assessments of moral behavior are descriptive, then
evolution cannot account for the most important thing that needs to
be explained: morality's "oughtness."
The question that really needs to be answered is: "Why shouldn't
the chimp (or a human, for that matter) be selfish?" The
evolutionary answer might be that when we're selfish, we hurt the
group. That answer, though, presumes another moral value: We ought
to be concerned about the welfare of the group. Why should that
concern us? Answer: If the group doesn't survive, then the species
doesn't survive. But why should I care about the survival of the
species?
Here's the problem. All of these responses meant to explain
morality ultimately depend on some prior moral notion to hold them
together. It's going to be hard to explain, on an evolutionary view
of things why I should not be selfish, or steal, or rape, or even
kill tomorrow without smuggling morality into the answer.
The evolutionary explanation disembowels morality, reducing it to
mere descriptions of conduct. The best the Darwinist explanation
can do--if it succeeds at all--is explain past behavior. It cannot
inform future behavior. The essence of morality, though, is not
description, but prescription.
Evolution may be an explanation for the existence of conduct we
choose to call moral, but it gives no explanation why I should obey
any moral rules in the future. If one countered that we have a
moral obligation to evolve, then the game would be up, because if we
have moral obligations prior to evolution, then evolution itself
can't be their source.
Evolutionists Are Wrong about Ethics
Darwinists opt for an evolutionary explanation for morality without
sufficient justification. In order to make their naturalistic
explanation work, "morality" must reside in the genes. "Good,"
beneficial tendencies can then be chosen by natural selection.
Nature, through the mechanics of genetic chemistry, cultivates
behaviors we call morality.
This creates two problems. First, evolution doesn't explain what
it's meant to explain. It can only account for preprogrammed
behavior, which doesn't qualify as morality. Moral choices, by
their nature, are made by free agents, not dictated by internal
mechanics.
Secondly, the Darwinist explanation reduces morality to mere
descriptions of behavior. The morality that evolution needs to
account for, however, entails much more than conduct. Minimally, it
involves motive and intent as well. Both are non-physical elements
which can't, even in principle, evolve in a Darwinian sense.
Further, this assessment of morality, being descriptive only,
ignores the most fundamental moral question of all: Why should I be
moral tomorrow? Evolution cannot answer that question. It can only
attempt to describe why humans acted in a certain way in the past.
Morality dictates what future behavior ought to be.
Evolution does not explain morality. St. Jackanapes is not a bad
chimp, he's just a chimp. No moral rules apply to him. Eat the
banana, St. Jackanapes.
by Greg Koukl
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[1]Robert Wright, The Moral Animal--Why We Are the Way We Are: The New
Science of Evolutionary Psychology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994), p.
23.
[2]Ibid., p. 58
[3]Ibid., p. 59.
[4]Ibid., p. 56.
[5]Ibid., p. 88.
[6]Ibid., p. 13.
[7]Ibid., p. 377.
[8]Ibid., p. 31.
[9]Ibid., p. 102.
[10]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651.
[11]Wright, p. 212.
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