| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Fester" |
| Date: |
18 Nov 2004 06:27:53 AM |
| Object: |
Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
Last year the SCOTUS decided the case of Lawrence v TX in favor of the
plaintiff. I'll assume the reader knows the gist of the case, so I won't
recap it here. The majority stated their opinion on the grounds that In a
nutshell, the majority ruled that:
<quote>
We rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify the law,
pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality
</quote>
To those who disapprovae of many of the laws on the books which are founded
on the legislative decisons of what constitutes "moral" conduct, I ask you
about an implication of denying that as a basis of law. In particular, what
rationale exists, aside from morality, for laws prohibitting cruelty to
animals? Should a person be legally allowed to perform such heinous acts as
setting fire to his cat, for example? If not, why? If so, then when does
morality constitute a legitimate state interest and when does it not?
--
"Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and
he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion"
Edmund Burke
.
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| User: "Jenny6833A" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
18 Nov 2004 10:40:30 AM |
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"Fester" says
Last year the SCOTUS decided the case of Lawrence v TX in favor of the
plaintiff. I'll assume the reader knows the gist of the case, so I won't
recap it here. The majority stated their opinion on the grounds that In a
nutshell, the majority ruled that:
<quote>
We rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify the law,
pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality
</quote>
To those who disapprovae of many of the laws on the books which are founded
on the legislative decisons of what constitutes "moral" conduct, I ask you
about an implication of denying that as a basis of law.
"Morality" (or "moral conduct") is largely subjective and constantly changing.
It's often no more than conformity to the societal taboos of the moment.
I think the Supremes are nuts to say what you claim they said, assuming they
said it without elaboration.
Some kind of harm-based analysis is needed to prevent laws that have no purpose
other than to force everyone to look and act the same.
In particular, what
rationale exists, aside from morality, for laws prohibitting cruelty to
animals?
You sure do like to line up words that have wide meanings.
I think you need to tell us what YOU mean by "moral" and by "cruel."
:-)
Jenny
Before emailing, remove Clothes
.
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| User: "Fester" |
|
| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
18 Nov 2004 02:23:25 PM |
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"Jenny6833A" <jenny6833a@aol.comClothes> wrote in message
news:20041118114030.07087.00000809@mb-m10.aol.com...
"Fester" says
Last year the SCOTUS decided the case of Lawrence v TX in favor of the
plaintiff. I'll assume the reader knows the gist of the case, so I won't
recap it here. The majority stated their opinion on the grounds that In
a
nutshell, the majority ruled that:
<quote>
We rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify the
law,
pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality
</quote>
To those who disapprovae of many of the laws on the books which are
founded
on the legislative decisons of what constitutes "moral" conduct, I ask you
about an implication of denying that as a basis of law.
"Morality" (or "moral conduct") is largely subjective and constantly
changing.
It's often no more than conformity to the societal taboos of the moment.
I think the Supremes are nuts to say what you claim they said, assuming
they
said it without elaboration.
If one looks at Scalia's dissent in this case, he agrees that he thinks it
was nuts as well, but that is how he interpretted the decision as well.
Some kind of harm-based analysis is needed to prevent laws that have no
purpose
other than to force everyone to look and act the same.
Ideally, legislatures should do so. However, except for where the Const is
violated, they are not under an obligation to do so. I am all for a
government that governs least, but I also recognize the state's interests in
public order.
In particular, what
rationale exists, aside from morality, for laws prohibitting cruelty to
animals?
You sure do like to line up words that have wide meanings.
I think you need to tell us what YOU mean by "moral" and by "cruel."
:-)
I would say that the meaning of those words are up to the legislature that
writes the law. We have laws to prevent the torture of animals, such as I
described. Is a there a basis for such laws other than the subjective
judgement of legislators that such acts should not be permissable (i.e. that
they are immoral)? Likewise, we have laws against public nudity. Can we
strike down one of these laws law because we feel that legislatures should
not be legislating morality, and allow the other to stand?
.
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| User: "Kronk" |
|
| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
18 Nov 2004 01:48:42 PM |
|
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On Thu, 18 Nov 2004 12:27:53 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:
Last year the SCOTUS decided the case of Lawrence v TX in favor of the
plaintiff. I'll assume the reader knows the gist of the case, so I won't
recap it here. The majority stated their opinion on the grounds that In a
nutshell, the majority ruled that:
<quote>
We rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify the law,
pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality
</quote>
They were talking about the Bowers decision there. The Bowers
decision was not decided on the basis of whether the government has an
interest in promoting morality (it is broadly accepted that it has),
but rather on the basis of whether the equal protection element of the
Fourteenth would apply. In Bowers, the court ruled it did not. In
Lawrence, they reversed this aspect of Bowers, and said that equal
protection does apply.
To those who disapprovae of many of the laws on the books which are founded
on the legislative decisons of what constitutes "moral" conduct, I ask you
about an implication of denying that as a basis of law.
There are good reasons not to legislate on the basis of a particular,
narrow, religious, sectarian version of morality, but those are not
arguments for divorcing law from morality utterly. Ideally, rational
morality is the model which law attempts to express, codify, promote,
and enforce.
In particular, what
rationale exists, aside from morality, for laws prohibitting cruelty to
animals? Should a person be legally allowed to perform such heinous acts as
setting fire to his cat, for example?
In a case where Joe has killed Jack, we pass judgement and impose
penalty according to our most reasonable assessment of Joe's motives.
It matters to us whether the killing was purely accidental, or if Joe
was acting in self-defense, or acting under great provocation, or
acting under coercion, or under stress or inflamed emotion, or acting
while impaired, or acting out of selfishness without remorse, or
whether Joe killed Jack for the sheer pleasure of it. In part, we do
this out of fairness, because we do not think it reasonable to punish
Joe if he killed Jack due to circumstances beyond his control. But a
major part of why we assess motive is that we want to gain some sense
of future risk. If this killing was a totally unpredictable fluke, or
self-defense, we see no grounds for concluding Joe represents any
greater risk to society than the rest of us. If it was due to
impairment which was partly under Joe's control, we deem that more
serious, but perhaps manageable. But if we decide Joe is a
remorseless psychopath, or worst of all, a thrill-killer, we judge
that Joe represents an unacceptable continuing high risk to society.
In matters of cruelty to animals, we make similar judgements on
similar grounds. If the cruelty in question was held to a reasonable
minimum and was deemed necessary for some broadly accepted reason
(food, research, animal products, religion, hunting, etc.) that does
not arouse alarm. If it was due to total indifference and neglect,
that is a more serious case. But if it was done out of a sadistic
lust for inflicting fear and pain, particularly on a helpless being
that was unable to defend itself, then we judge that to be indicative
of a personality defect which represents a threat to all feeling
beings, including ourselves.
The Lawrence case, on the other hand, involved private, adult,
consensual sex of a sort which was legal for heterosexuals. Applying
rational morality, it has to be asked how this act represents a harm,
or an alarmingly high risk of harm, to anyone else--moreso than would
apply in a case of the same acts performed heterosexually, and
sufficient to justify the known costs, burdens, and harms of allowing
state intrusion, restriction, and enforcement.
Until someone comes up with a good answer to that question, the
rational presumption has to be in favor of privacy, liberty, and equal
protection.
Kronk
.
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| User: "Fester" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
18 Nov 2004 02:41:56 PM |
|
|
"Kronk" <void@isp.com> wrote in message
news:419cec47.66921838@news.gvtc.com...
On Thu, 18 Nov 2004 12:27:53 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:
Last year the SCOTUS decided the case of Lawrence v TX in favor of the
plaintiff. I'll assume the reader knows the gist of the case, so I won't
recap it here. The majority stated their opinion on the grounds that In
a
nutshell, the majority ruled that:
<quote>
We rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify the
law,
pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality
</quote>
They were talking about the Bowers decision there. The Bowers
decision was not decided on the basis of whether the government has an
interest in promoting morality (it is broadly accepted that it has),
but rather on the basis of whether the equal protection element of the
Fourteenth would apply. In Bowers, the court ruled it did not. In
Lawrence, they reversed this aspect of Bowers, and said that equal
protection does apply.
They did indeed explicitly overturn Bowers, and in so doing, they declared
that the state does not have an interest in legislating morality. If you
read the decision, it was not based upon equal protection, as they stated
that a GA law which applied equally to heterosexual couples would also be
illegal. Let's suppose, if you still disagree that the decision was
rendered on 14th Ammendment grounds, then would you say that the GA law
which is applicable to all is illegal?
To those who disapprovae of many of the laws on the books which are
founded
on the legislative decisons of what constitutes "moral" conduct, I ask you
about an implication of denying that as a basis of law.
There are good reasons not to legislate on the basis of a particular,
narrow, religious, sectarian version of morality, but those are not
arguments for divorcing law from morality utterly. Ideally, rational
morality is the model which law attempts to express, codify, promote,
and enforce.
I agree. But the line you've drawn is wide and grey. How do we know which
side of it we're on?
In particular, what
rationale exists, aside from morality, for laws prohibitting cruelty to
animals? Should a person be legally allowed to perform such heinous acts
as
setting fire to his cat, for example?
In a case where Joe has killed Jack, we pass judgement and impose
penalty according to our most reasonable assessment of Joe's motives.
It matters to us whether the killing was purely accidental, or if Joe
was acting in self-defense, or acting under great provocation, or
acting under coercion, or under stress or inflamed emotion, or acting
while impaired, or acting out of selfishness without remorse, or
whether Joe killed Jack for the sheer pleasure of it. In part, we do
this out of fairness, because we do not think it reasonable to punish
Joe if he killed Jack due to circumstances beyond his control. But a
major part of why we assess motive is that we want to gain some sense
of future risk. If this killing was a totally unpredictable fluke, or
self-defense, we see no grounds for concluding Joe represents any
greater risk to society than the rest of us. If it was due to
impairment which was partly under Joe's control, we deem that more
serious, but perhaps manageable. But if we decide Joe is a
remorseless psychopath, or worst of all, a thrill-killer, we judge
that Joe represents an unacceptable continuing high risk to society.
Ah, but when Joe attacks Jack, Joe is doing harm to Jack and we have a basis
beyond morality to judge him by. We can base Joe's punishment on the
circumstances of his attack and the likelihood of him doing it again.
In matters of cruelty to animals, we make similar judgements on
similar grounds. If the cruelty in question was held to a reasonable
minimum and was deemed necessary for some broadly accepted reason
(food, research, animal products, religion, hunting, etc.) that does
not arouse alarm. If it was due to total indifference and neglect,
that is a more serious case. But if it was done out of a sadistic
lust for inflicting fear and pain, particularly on a helpless being
that was unable to defend itself, then we judge that to be indicative
of a personality defect which represents a threat to all feeling
beings, including ourselves.
Here's where things differ greatly from your earlier example. Animals do
not have Const rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. In
fact, animals are routinely raised in atrocious "prison" conditions so that
we can enjoiy our yummy steaks, etc. I despise unnecessary cruelty, but the
question is whether a legal foundation exists for outlawing it other than
subjective morality.
The Lawrence case, on the other hand, involved private, adult,
consensual sex of a sort which was legal for heterosexuals.
The court said that a sodomy law which applied to heterosexuals would also
be disallowed.
Applying
rational morality, it has to be asked how this act represents a harm,
or an alarmingly high risk of harm, to anyone else--moreso than would
apply in a case of the same acts performed heterosexually, and
sufficient to justify the known costs, burdens, and harms of allowing
state intrusion, restriction, and enforcement.
The Lawrence decision was a case of the rights of the states to legislate
against sodomy versus the right of people to do what they wanted. The
majority opinion was very broadly stated, and declared that the state has no
interest in moral conduct. That said, are not laws against harming one's
own animals a restriction on the liberty of sadists? Are others harmed by
such sadistic acts? Do not the same issues of "intrusion, restriction, and
enforcement" apply if one does so in the privacy of one's own home?
Until someone comes up with a good answer to that question, the
rational presumption has to be in favor of privacy, liberty, and equal
protection.
I don't think that you answered my central question. On what basis can a
law against animal cruelty be upheld, if not on the basis of a state's
interest in morality?
Thank you for responding. I find this an interesting subject well worth
exploring.
.
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| User: "Mekkala" |
|
| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
18 Nov 2004 04:03:55 PM |
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|
On Thu 18 Nov 2004 02:41:56p, "Fester" <not@home.com> kicked back with a
beer, ruminated at length, fell asleep, woke up, lit up a joint, then
fell asleep again after thoughtfully blurting out:
"Kronk" <void@isp.com> wrote in message
news:419cec47.66921838@news.gvtc.com...
On Thu, 18 Nov 2004 12:27:53 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:
Last year the SCOTUS decided the case of Lawrence v TX in favor of
the plaintiff. I'll assume the reader knows the gist of the case, so
I won't recap it here. The majority stated their opinion on the
grounds that In a
nutshell, the majority ruled that:
<quote>
We rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify
the law,
pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality
</quote>
They were talking about the Bowers decision there. The Bowers
decision was not decided on the basis of whether the government has
an interest in promoting morality (it is broadly accepted that it
has), but rather on the basis of whether the equal protection element
of the Fourteenth would apply. In Bowers, the court ruled it did
not. In Lawrence, they reversed this aspect of Bowers, and said that
equal protection does apply.
They did indeed explicitly overturn Bowers, and in so doing, they
declared that the state does not have an interest in legislating
morality. If you read the decision, it was not based upon equal
protection, as they stated that a GA law which applied equally to
heterosexual couples would also be illegal. Let's suppose, if you
still disagree that the decision was rendered on 14th Ammendment
grounds, then would you say that the GA law which is applicable to all
is illegal?
To those who disapprovae of many of the laws on the books which are
founded
on the legislative decisons of what constitutes "moral" conduct, I
ask you about an implication of denying that as a basis of law.
There are good reasons not to legislate on the basis of a particular,
narrow, religious, sectarian version of morality, but those are not
arguments for divorcing law from morality utterly. Ideally, rational
morality is the model which law attempts to express, codify, promote,
and enforce.
I agree. But the line you've drawn is wide and grey. How do we know
which side of it we're on?
In particular, what
rationale exists, aside from morality, for laws prohibitting cruelty
to animals? Should a person be legally allowed to perform such
heinous acts as
setting fire to his cat, for example?
In a case where Joe has killed Jack, we pass judgement and impose
penalty according to our most reasonable assessment of Joe's motives.
It matters to us whether the killing was purely accidental, or if Joe
was acting in self-defense, or acting under great provocation, or
acting under coercion, or under stress or inflamed emotion, or acting
while impaired, or acting out of selfishness without remorse, or
whether Joe killed Jack for the sheer pleasure of it. In part, we do
this out of fairness, because we do not think it reasonable to punish
Joe if he killed Jack due to circumstances beyond his control. But a
major part of why we assess motive is that we want to gain some sense
of future risk. If this killing was a totally unpredictable fluke,
or self-defense, we see no grounds for concluding Joe represents any
greater risk to society than the rest of us. If it was due to
impairment which was partly under Joe's control, we deem that more
serious, but perhaps manageable. But if we decide Joe is a
remorseless psychopath, or worst of all, a thrill-killer, we judge
that Joe represents an unacceptable continuing high risk to society.
Ah, but when Joe attacks Jack, Joe is doing harm to Jack and we have a
basis beyond morality to judge him by. We can base Joe's punishment
on the circumstances of his attack and the likelihood of him doing it
again.
In matters of cruelty to animals, we make similar judgements on
similar grounds. If the cruelty in question was held to a reasonable
minimum and was deemed necessary for some broadly accepted reason
(food, research, animal products, religion, hunting, etc.) that does
not arouse alarm. If it was due to total indifference and neglect,
that is a more serious case. But if it was done out of a sadistic
lust for inflicting fear and pain, particularly on a helpless being
that was unable to defend itself, then we judge that to be indicative
of a personality defect which represents a threat to all feeling
beings, including ourselves.
Here's where things differ greatly from your earlier example. Animals
do not have Const rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. In fact, animals are routinely raised in atrocious
"prison" conditions so that we can enjoiy our yummy steaks, etc. I
despise unnecessary cruelty, but the question is whether a legal
foundation exists for outlawing it other than subjective morality.
The Lawrence case, on the other hand, involved private, adult,
consensual sex of a sort which was legal for heterosexuals.
The court said that a sodomy law which applied to heterosexuals would
also be disallowed.
Applying
rational morality, it has to be asked how this act represents a harm,
or an alarmingly high risk of harm, to anyone else--moreso than would
apply in a case of the same acts performed heterosexually, and
sufficient to justify the known costs, burdens, and harms of allowing
state intrusion, restriction, and enforcement.
The Lawrence decision was a case of the rights of the states to
legislate against sodomy versus the right of people to do what they
wanted. The majority opinion was very broadly stated, and declared
that the state has no interest in moral conduct. That said, are not
laws against harming one's own animals a restriction on the liberty of
sadists? Are others harmed by such sadistic acts? Do not the same
issues of "intrusion, restriction, and enforcement" apply if one does
so in the privacy of one's own home?
Until someone comes up with a good answer to that question, the
rational presumption has to be in favor of privacy, liberty, and
equal protection.
I don't think that you answered my central question. On what basis
can a law against animal cruelty be upheld, if not on the basis of a
state's interest in morality?
He *did* just answer. He wrote a long section of his post on precisely
that subject. We have laws against cruelty to animals because the state
cannot tolerate a person with a predisposition to cruelty, as that
person likely represents a danger to society.
Now, an individual like myself might object to cruelty to animals for a
moral or empathic reason -- but morality and empathy are not
considerations for government. Government's role is quite simple -- it
is to protect its subjects from elements of society who might harm them
in one way or another. Government, properly structured, should avoid
any moral or empathic judgement of others' actions, in my opinion.
Instead, it should judge actions based on their implications for the
health of society. Any behavior rules beyond that should be the
province of the individual and of social leaders such as teachers,
mentors, parents, clergymen, and the like.
--
Mekkala, Atheist #2148
"Atheism is ... the bed-rock of sanity in a world of madness."
--Emmett F. Fields
.
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| User: "Fester" |
|
| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
18 Nov 2004 04:34:58 PM |
|
|
"Mekkala" <joremovedathiskimtoreply@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:Xns95A5A57AFAFADMekkala@199.45.49.11...
On Thu 18 Nov 2004 02:41:56p, "Fester" <not@home.com> kicked back with a
beer, ruminated at length, fell asleep, woke up, lit up a joint, then
fell asleep again after thoughtfully blurting out:
"Kronk" <void@isp.com> wrote in message
news:419cec47.66921838@news.gvtc.com...
On Thu, 18 Nov 2004 12:27:53 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:
Last year the SCOTUS decided the case of Lawrence v TX in favor of
the plaintiff. I'll assume the reader knows the gist of the case, so
I won't recap it here. The majority stated their opinion on the
grounds that In a
nutshell, the majority ruled that:
<quote>
We rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify
the law,
pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality
</quote>
They were talking about the Bowers decision there. The Bowers
decision was not decided on the basis of whether the government has
an interest in promoting morality (it is broadly accepted that it
has), but rather on the basis of whether the equal protection element
of the Fourteenth would apply. In Bowers, the court ruled it did
not. In Lawrence, they reversed this aspect of Bowers, and said that
equal protection does apply.
They did indeed explicitly overturn Bowers, and in so doing, they
declared that the state does not have an interest in legislating
morality. If you read the decision, it was not based upon equal
protection, as they stated that a GA law which applied equally to
heterosexual couples would also be illegal. Let's suppose, if you
still disagree that the decision was rendered on 14th Ammendment
grounds, then would you say that the GA law which is applicable to all
is illegal?
To those who disapprovae of many of the laws on the books which are
founded
on the legislative decisons of what constitutes "moral" conduct, I
ask you about an implication of denying that as a basis of law.
There are good reasons not to legislate on the basis of a particular,
narrow, religious, sectarian version of morality, but those are not
arguments for divorcing law from morality utterly. Ideally, rational
morality is the model which law attempts to express, codify, promote,
and enforce.
I agree. But the line you've drawn is wide and grey. How do we know
which side of it we're on?
In particular, what
rationale exists, aside from morality, for laws prohibitting cruelty
to animals? Should a person be legally allowed to perform such
heinous acts as
setting fire to his cat, for example?
In a case where Joe has killed Jack, we pass judgement and impose
penalty according to our most reasonable assessment of Joe's motives.
It matters to us whether the killing was purely accidental, or if Joe
was acting in self-defense, or acting under great provocation, or
acting under coercion, or under stress or inflamed emotion, or acting
while impaired, or acting out of selfishness without remorse, or
whether Joe killed Jack for the sheer pleasure of it. In part, we do
this out of fairness, because we do not think it reasonable to punish
Joe if he killed Jack due to circumstances beyond his control. But a
major part of why we assess motive is that we want to gain some sense
of future risk. If this killing was a totally unpredictable fluke,
or self-defense, we see no grounds for concluding Joe represents any
greater risk to society than the rest of us. If it was due to
impairment which was partly under Joe's control, we deem that more
serious, but perhaps manageable. But if we decide Joe is a
remorseless psychopath, or worst of all, a thrill-killer, we judge
that Joe represents an unacceptable continuing high risk to society.
Ah, but when Joe attacks Jack, Joe is doing harm to Jack and we have a
basis beyond morality to judge him by. We can base Joe's punishment
on the circumstances of his attack and the likelihood of him doing it
again.
In matters of cruelty to animals, we make similar judgements on
similar grounds. If the cruelty in question was held to a reasonable
minimum and was deemed necessary for some broadly accepted reason
(food, research, animal products, religion, hunting, etc.) that does
not arouse alarm. If it was due to total indifference and neglect,
that is a more serious case. But if it was done out of a sadistic
lust for inflicting fear and pain, particularly on a helpless being
that was unable to defend itself, then we judge that to be indicative
of a personality defect which represents a threat to all feeling
beings, including ourselves.
Here's where things differ greatly from your earlier example. Animals
do not have Const rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness. In fact, animals are routinely raised in atrocious
"prison" conditions so that we can enjoiy our yummy steaks, etc. I
despise unnecessary cruelty, but the question is whether a legal
foundation exists for outlawing it other than subjective morality.
The Lawrence case, on the other hand, involved private, adult,
consensual sex of a sort which was legal for heterosexuals.
The court said that a sodomy law which applied to heterosexuals would
also be disallowed.
Applying
rational morality, it has to be asked how this act represents a harm,
or an alarmingly high risk of harm, to anyone else--moreso than would
apply in a case of the same acts performed heterosexually, and
sufficient to justify the known costs, burdens, and harms of allowing
state intrusion, restriction, and enforcement.
The Lawrence decision was a case of the rights of the states to
legislate against sodomy versus the right of people to do what they
wanted. The majority opinion was very broadly stated, and declared
that the state has no interest in moral conduct. That said, are not
laws against harming one's own animals a restriction on the liberty of
sadists? Are others harmed by such sadistic acts? Do not the same
issues of "intrusion, restriction, and enforcement" apply if one does
so in the privacy of one's own home?
Until someone comes up with a good answer to that question, the
rational presumption has to be in favor of privacy, liberty, and
equal protection.
I don't think that you answered my central question. On what basis
can a law against animal cruelty be upheld, if not on the basis of a
state's interest in morality?
He *did* just answer. He wrote a long section of his post on precisely
that subject. We have laws against cruelty to animals because the state
cannot tolerate a person with a predisposition to cruelty, as that
person likely represents a danger to society.
I don think that the latter part of that statement has been proven, merely
stated as a fact.
Now, an individual like myself might object to cruelty to animals for a
moral or empathic reason -- but morality and empathy are not
considerations for government. Government's role is quite simple -- it
is to protect its subjects from elements of society who might harm them
in one way or another. Government, properly structured, should avoid
any moral or empathic judgement of others' actions, in my opinion.
Instead, it should judge actions based on their implications for the
health of society. Any behavior rules beyond that should be the
province of the individual and of social leaders such as teachers,
mentors, parents, clergymen, and the like.
So, if crulety towards animals were not indicative of a threat, then you
would not object? Should it therefore be legal for one to acquire a undred
cats and not care for them? We can certainly find examples of people who
have done this, and I for believe that the law should step in, not on behalf
of people who may be harmed by it, but on the basis of "morality."
.
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| User: "Mekkala" |
|
| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
18 Nov 2004 04:06:58 PM |
|
|
On Thu 18 Nov 2004 02:41:56p, "Fester" <not@home.com> kicked back with a
beer, ruminated at length, fell asleep, woke up, lit up a joint, then
fell asleep again after thoughtfully blurting out:
Sorry, I feel I need to add a caveat: most commonly accepted moral rules
are based on not causing harm to others, so in fact a government whose
function is to protect society from harm will uphold most moral values.
The moral values it would not, and should not, uphold are those
regulating personal, private behavior that doesn't constitute a threat
to others.
--
Mekkala, Atheist #2148
"Atheism is ... the bed-rock of sanity in a world of madness."
--Emmett F. Fields
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| User: "Fester" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
18 Nov 2004 04:37:55 PM |
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"Mekkala" <joremovedathiskimtoreply@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:Xns95A5A5FF31679Mekkala@199.45.49.11...
On Thu 18 Nov 2004 02:41:56p, "Fester" <not@home.com> kicked back with a
beer, ruminated at length, fell asleep, woke up, lit up a joint, then
fell asleep again after thoughtfully blurting out:
Sorry, I feel I need to add a caveat: most commonly accepted moral rules
are based on not causing harm to others, so in fact a government whose
function is to protect society from harm will uphold most moral values.
The moral values it would not, and should not, uphold are those
regulating personal, private behavior that doesn't constitute a threat
to others.
And is the sadistic treatment of animals a personal, private behavior? For
the sake of argume nt assume that such behavior is not indicative of a
threat to others. I say assume the objection, if valid, only serves to show
the limits of this particular example, but not of the principal I am trying
to explore.
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| User: "Mekkala" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
19 Nov 2004 09:35:35 AM |
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On Thu 18 Nov 2004 04:37:55p, "Fester" <not@home.com> kicked back with a
beer, ruminated at length, fell asleep, woke up, lit up a joint, then
fell asleep again after thoughtfully blurting out:
"Mekkala" <joremovedathiskimtoreply@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:Xns95A5A5FF31679Mekkala@199.45.49.11...
On Thu 18 Nov 2004 02:41:56p, "Fester" <not@home.com> kicked back
with a beer, ruminated at length, fell asleep, woke up, lit up a
joint, then fell asleep again after thoughtfully blurting out:
Sorry, I feel I need to add a caveat: most commonly accepted moral
rules are based on not causing harm to others, so in fact a
government whose function is to protect society from harm will uphold
most moral values. The moral values it would not, and should not,
uphold are those regulating personal, private behavior that doesn't
constitute a threat to others.
And is the sadistic treatment of animals a personal, private behavior?
For the sake of argume nt assume that such behavior is not indicative
of a threat to others. I say assume the objection, if valid, only
serves to show the limits of this particular example, but not of the
principal I am trying to explore.
Remember, Fester, the definition of a "society" is not a very concrete
thing. When I say that government's role is to protect society, what do I
mean by that?
I might mean my religious peers, or my home town, or my state, or my
country, or my race or ethnic group, or all humans in the world, or even
all living things in the world. Society must be defined, and typically it
is society who defines itself. To earn the protection of government, an
organism must have been accepted as a member of society deserving rights.
It is usually the personal philosophies of society's members that pushes
society to expand its definition to include those who were once excluded
from this protection. For example, in various places the definition has
excluded, then included a number of different groups -- women, minority
races, minority faiths, other nations (allies), and so on. This was
usually because some large portion of society held a personal philosophy
that those groups were either deserving of rights, or needed for social
health.
My personal philosophy is that all human life has equal and inherent value,
and that all non-human life has value second only to human life. As such,
I personally would like to see "society" defined as the population of all
humans (that is, a world society where all humans receive equal protection
under the law), with "secondary" rights extended to non-human life.
So why am I arguing that the protection of animals doesn't fall under the
province of government, when my personal philosophy says it ought to?
Simply because animals have *not* been given status as secondary members of
society. Animals do not have legal rights. Humans are not allowed to
unnecessarily mistreat animals, but that is a regulation on human behavior
that does not qualify as an animal right -- an animal in just as much pain
and suffering receives no succor from the government if the source of the
suffering is not human.
Since animals have no legal rights in our society, one must assume that the
government has an interest in morality to make laws regulating human
behavior towards animals, unless that behavior can be reasonably assumed to
represent a danger to those who *do* have legal rights. The government
should under no circumstances show an interest in morality, and thus such
laws are (or should be) invalid.
Now, I personally believe that animals should be given certain rights under
the law that are limited only by the need for human survival and health.
If they are given such rights, then laws to protect them are as much the
province of the government as laws to protect humans.
Unfortunately, since this is not the case, I believe that the laws we
currently have to protect animals (with the exception of those behaviors
that might represent a danger to society) can be defended only on moral
grounds. In my opinion, legislating morality is a useless and dangerous
endeavor, and using it as a basis for one law allows the argument for other
laws that have only personal moral beliefs as a basis. Therefore, as much
as it pains me, I have to say that until and unless we choose as a society
to accept animals as members, laws to protect them alone have no rational
basis and should not be passed.
--
Mekkala, Atheist #2148
"Atheism is ... the bed-rock of sanity in a world of madness."
--Emmett F. Fields
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| User: "Fester" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
19 Nov 2004 11:44:04 AM |
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"Mekkala" <joremovedathiskimtoreply@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:Xns95A663A5318DAMekkala@199.45.49.11...
On Thu 18 Nov 2004 04:37:55p, "Fester" <not@home.com> kicked back with a
beer, ruminated at length, fell asleep, woke up, lit up a joint, then
fell asleep again after thoughtfully blurting out:
"Mekkala" <joremovedathiskimtoreply@attbi.com> wrote in message
news:Xns95A5A5FF31679Mekkala@199.45.49.11...
On Thu 18 Nov 2004 02:41:56p, "Fester" <not@home.com> kicked back
with a beer, ruminated at length, fell asleep, woke up, lit up a
joint, then fell asleep again after thoughtfully blurting out:
Sorry, I feel I need to add a caveat: most commonly accepted moral
rules are based on not causing harm to others, so in fact a
government whose function is to protect society from harm will uphold
most moral values. The moral values it would not, and should not,
uphold are those regulating personal, private behavior that doesn't
constitute a threat to others.
And is the sadistic treatment of animals a personal, private behavior?
For the sake of argume nt assume that such behavior is not indicative
of a threat to others. I say assume the objection, if valid, only
serves to show the limits of this particular example, but not of the
principal I am trying to explore.
Remember, Fester, the definition of a "society" is not a very concrete
thing. When I say that government's role is to protect society, what do I
mean by that?
I might mean my religious peers, or my home town, or my state, or my
country, or my race or ethnic group, or all humans in the world, or even
all living things in the world. Society must be defined, and typically it
is society who defines itself. To earn the protection of government, an
organism must have been accepted as a member of society deserving rights.
I would suggest that in this context, society refers to the constituency of
a particual legislature. For example the people of NC in the case of laws
made by the NC state legislature.
It is usually the personal philosophies of society's members that pushes
society to expand its definition to include those who were once excluded
from this protection. For example, in various places the definition has
excluded, then included a number of different groups -- women, minority
races, minority faiths, other nations (allies), and so on. This was
usually because some large portion of society held a personal philosophy
that those groups were either deserving of rights, or needed for social
health.
In those cases, equal protection comes in to play. Even before the langauge
was added to our Const, equal protection *was* the law, although it was not
obeyed. By that I mean that our nation was founded on the premise that all
men are created equal. While in the DOI and not the Const, it forms a large
part of the context of our basis of law and so does have force.
My personal philosophy is that all human life has equal and inherent
value,
and that all non-human life has value second only to human life. As such,
I personally would like to see "society" defined as the population of all
humans (that is, a world society where all humans receive equal protection
under the law), with "secondary" rights extended to non-human life.
I share your desire to see that.
So why am I arguing that the protection of animals doesn't fall under the
province of government, when my personal philosophy says it ought to?
Simply because animals have *not* been given status as secondary members
of
society. Animals do not have legal rights. Humans are not allowed to
unnecessarily mistreat animals, but that is a regulation on human behavior
that does not qualify as an animal right -- an animal in just as much pain
and suffering receives no succor from the government if the source of the
suffering is not human.
Since animals have no legal rights in our society, one must assume that
the
government has an interest in morality to make laws regulating human
behavior towards animals, unless that behavior can be reasonably assumed
to
represent a danger to those who *do* have legal rights. The government
should under no circumstances show an interest in morality, and thus such
laws are (or should be) invalid.
Here's the nub of our difference (or at least of the position I am
advocating in this thread. In fact, I am not sure just where I stand).
Now, I personally believe that animals should be given certain rights
under
the law that are limited only by the need for human survival and health.
If they are given such rights, then laws to protect them are as much the
province of the government as laws to protect humans.
Unfortunately, since this is not the case, I believe that the laws we
currently have to protect animals (with the exception of those behaviors
that might represent a danger to society) can be defended only on moral
grounds. In my opinion, legislating morality is a useless and dangerous
endeavor, and using it as a basis for one law allows the argument for
other
laws that have only personal moral beliefs as a basis. Therefore, as much
as it pains me, I have to say that until and unless we choose as a society
to accept animals as members, laws to protect them alone have no rational
basis and should not be passed.
This is the difficulty of the question. I am not aware of legal basis for
excluding morality as a basis for law (aside from the Lawrence decision,
whcih come have argued does not do that anyway).
As you noted, if the door is opened, where does it end? The Bill of Rights
and later ammendments certainly defines the outer bounds of legislative
authority. What if we apply your standard more generally? I would suggest
there are numerous laws which are based solely on morality. Examples among
these are public indecency, adult incest, drug use, prostitution, and many
others. While I think that some of the items on this list ought to be
legal, I wouldn't want to live in a society that allowed all of them (in
addition to animal abuse). I'm certain that most people would not. In a
Democracy should the people not be allowed to make laws to define which?
.
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| User: "Kronk" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
19 Nov 2004 01:22:35 AM |
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On Thu, 18 Nov 2004 20:41:56 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:
"Kronk" <void@isp.com> wrote in message
news:419cec47.66921838@news.gvtc.com...
On Thu, 18 Nov 2004 12:27:53 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:
Last year the SCOTUS decided the case of Lawrence v TX in favor of the
plaintiff. I'll assume the reader knows the gist of the case, so I won't
recap it here. The majority stated their opinion on the grounds that In
a
nutshell, the majority ruled that:
<quote>
We rejected the argument that no rational basis existed to justify the
law,
pointing to the government's interest in promoting morality
</quote>
They were talking about the Bowers decision there. The Bowers
decision was not decided on the basis of whether the government has an
interest in promoting morality (it is broadly accepted that it has),
but rather on the basis of whether the equal protection element of the
Fourteenth would apply. In Bowers, the court ruled it did not. In
Lawrence, they reversed this aspect of Bowers, and said that equal
protection does apply.
They did indeed explicitly overturn Bowers, and in so doing, they declared
that the state does not have an interest in legislating morality.
The specific basis for overturning Bowers was that they decided the
Texas law violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of
the 14th. That overturns Bowers by reversing their stand on whether
the 14th applies, but that does not mean that they are therefore
allowing every *other* argument which they rejected when they allowed
Bowers.
If you read the decision, it was not based upon equal protection,
More precisely, it was not based exclusively on equal protection. It
was based on equal protection *and* due process--the part of the 14th
which establishes protection of vital interests in liberty and
privacy.
as they stated
that a GA law which applied equally to heterosexual couples would also be
illegal.
Because that one violated due process, even if it didn't violate equal
protection.
Let's suppose, if you still disagree that the decision was
rendered on 14th Ammendment grounds, then would you say that the GA law
which is applicable to all is illegal?
Yes. It violates vital interests in liberty and privacy.
And the Texas law does the same *and* it violates equal protection.
To those who disapprovae of many of the laws on the books which are
founded
on the legislative decisons of what constitutes "moral" conduct, I ask you
about an implication of denying that as a basis of law.
There are good reasons not to legislate on the basis of a particular,
narrow, religious, sectarian version of morality, but those are not
arguments for divorcing law from morality utterly. Ideally, rational
morality is the model which law attempts to express, codify, promote,
and enforce.
I agree. But the line you've drawn is wide and grey. How do we know which
side of it we're on?
We argue.
In particular, what
rationale exists, aside from morality, for laws prohibitting cruelty to
animals? Should a person be legally allowed to perform such heinous acts
as
setting fire to his cat, for example?
In a case where Joe has killed Jack, we pass judgement and impose
penalty according to our most reasonable assessment of Joe's motives.
It matters to us whether the killing was purely accidental, or if Joe
was acting in self-defense, or acting under great provocation, or
acting under coercion, or under stress or inflamed emotion, or acting
while impaired, or acting out of selfishness without remorse, or
whether Joe killed Jack for the sheer pleasure of it. In part, we do
this out of fairness, because we do not think it reasonable to punish
Joe if he killed Jack due to circumstances beyond his control. But a
major part of why we assess motive is that we want to gain some sense
of future risk. If this killing was a totally unpredictable fluke, or
self-defense, we see no grounds for concluding Joe represents any
greater risk to society than the rest of us. If it was due to
impairment which was partly under Joe's control, we deem that more
serious, but perhaps manageable. But if we decide Joe is a
remorseless psychopath, or worst of all, a thrill-killer, we judge
that Joe represents an unacceptable continuing high risk to society.
Ah, but when Joe attacks Jack, Joe is doing harm to Jack and we have a basis
beyond morality to judge him by. We can base Joe's punishment on the
circumstances of his attack and the likelihood of him doing it again.
That is not going beyond morality (even if it may be going beyond a
particular sort of morality). Considerations of harms are the very
foundation of rational morality.
In matters of cruelty to animals, we make similar judgements on
similar grounds. If the cruelty in question was held to a reasonable
minimum and was deemed necessary for some broadly accepted reason
(food, research, animal products, religion, hunting, etc.) that does
not arouse alarm. If it was due to total indifference and neglect,
that is a more serious case. But if it was done out of a sadistic
lust for inflicting fear and pain, particularly on a helpless being
that was unable to defend itself, then we judge that to be indicative
of a personality defect which represents a threat to all feeling
beings, including ourselves.
Here's where things differ greatly from your earlier example. Animals do
not have Const rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
We do not regard those as Constitutional rights. We regard those as
human rights. If Joe was an active duty American Soldier on foreign
soil, and Jack was a foreign national not under our control, we would
still hold Joe accountable if we deemed the killing of Jack to be
wanton murder, even though our Constitutional protections would not
apply to Jack.
In fact, animals are routinely raised in atrocious "prison" conditions so that
we can enjoiy our yummy steaks, etc. I despise unnecessary cruelty, but the
question is whether a legal foundation exists for outlawing it other than
subjective morality.
I have the impression that your sense of morality is something
different from rational morality.
Our criminal laws are, in theory, a patch for when our innate moral
restraints fails. We do have some legacy laws which date from a time
when morality was defined by religious code and dogma, but such laws
are in decline as we make slow, but general progress toward laws based
on reason. There used to be laws against masturbation, but now there
are only laws against public displays of it (thought to harm others by
their offensiveness) and private displays for profit (argued to cause
harm to a community by the deterioration supposedly associated with
prostitution and sex enterprises). I don't think there is a remaining
rationale for outlawing masturbation for private self-gratification on
the basis of the moral condemnation of it which certain religions
have.
The Lawrence case, on the other hand, involved private, adult,
consensual sex of a sort which was legal for heterosexuals.
The court said that a sodomy law which applied to heterosexuals would also
be disallowed.
On due process grounds.
Applying
rational morality, it has to be asked how this act represents a harm,
or an alarmingly high risk of harm, to anyone else--moreso than would
apply in a case of the same acts performed heterosexually, and
sufficient to justify the known costs, burdens, and harms of allowing
state intrusion, restriction, and enforcement.
If you want to get away from the equal protection reason the Texas law
was struck down, I can amend the above to address only the due process
violation like this:
"Applying rational morality, it has to be asked how this act
represents a harm, or an alarmingly high risk of harm, to anyone else,
sufficient to justify the known costs, burdens, and harms of allowing
state intrusion, restriction, and enforcement."
The Lawrence decision was a case of the rights of the states to legislate
against sodomy versus the right of people to do what they wanted.
It is very commonly the case that considerations of law weigh the
interests of the collective against the interests of the individual.
In Lawrence, there was insufficient demonstration of a legitimate
state interest.
The majority opinion was very broadly stated, and declared that the state has no
interest in moral conduct.
I don't think the majority opinion declared that. I think it was the
minority opinion which declared that the majority opinion would have
that effect. Scalia, in particular, claimed: "State laws against
bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise
sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral
choices."
But Scalia routinely indulges in inflammatory rhetoric, not because he
actually believes it, but because he means for it to have an effect
(ie. energize the Right). Here, he is trying to up the ante, and
paint a picture which is alarming enough that he hopes it will
ultimately lead to a reversal of Lawrence. But despite claiming all
such laws are now bankrupt and without foundation because of Lawrence,
it is generally assumed that Scalia would have no trouble finding
plenty of other foundation if any of those other laws were actually
challenged because of Lawrence.
Now, I say all this only because I disagree that it is the
sincerely-held view of the Supreme Court that the state has no
legitimate interest in promoting moral conduct. I would personally
agree that the state has no legitimate interest in legislating to
promote the specific brand of morality that Scalia has in mind when he
speaks of morality, so in that, I disagree with at least three SC
justices.
That said, are not laws against harming one's
own animals a restriction on the liberty of sadists?
Virtually all criminal laws represent restrictions on some sort of
liberty.
Are others harmed by such sadistic acts?
It all depends on whether animals and sentient beings other than
humans do, or should, count as "others".
Do not the same issues of "intrusion, restriction, and
enforcement" apply if one does so in the privacy of one's own home?
If a couple living in a backwoods cabin conceived and had a baby, and
then killed and ate it for the enjoyment of an exotic meal, most of us
would not say that interests of liberty or privacy should protect that
act, even if no other human was involved. We collectively have
decided that the baby is automatically deserving of our protection by
virtue of its similarity to us. The protection we decide to extend to
other mammals is also largely contingent on the degree of similarity
to us--thus we are inclined to afford greater protection to a
chimpanzee than we are to a rat. The protections we feel we should
extend to animals who are not human are muddled by old traditions and
competing interests, as was the case when we had muddled laws
regarding the treatment of humans who were not white, but the impulse
to protect animals is derived from the same empathic aversion to
causing hurt which is the basis of the rational morality we apply to
governance of behavior between humans.
Until someone comes up with a good answer to that question, the
rational presumption has to be in favor of privacy, liberty, and equal
protection.
I don't think that you answered my central question. On what basis can a
law against animal cruelty be upheld, if not on the basis of a state's
interest in morality?
Your central question uses terms for which it is not clear what you
mean, which complicates answering your question. When the state
outlaws sadistic treatment of animals, then the people who violate
such laws despite the punishments are presumed to be people who cannot
constrain their sadistic impulses even despite the extra motivation of
criminal sanction. Society has an interest in identifying and
exerting control over such people because we deem such compulsive
sadists a risk to society at large. I can't tell whether you would
call that self-protection a "moral" basis or not. If morality extends
to govern all cases of harm, then I would say the answer to your
question is that there is no other rational basis on which such a law
against cruelty could be established.
Thank you for responding. I find this an interesting subject well worth
exploring.
I am, of course, only describing one school of thought regarding the
basis for law. At least three of our Supreme Court justices would be
far more inclined towards a canonical basis for our laws. Theirs is a
competing view which is still popular in some quarters, but I think
religious pluralism will ultimately have to result in a general
progress away from their way of thinking.
Kronk
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| User: "Fester" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
19 Nov 2004 03:59:13 AM |
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<snip for brevity, not for the excellence of the response>
Your central question uses terms for which it is not clear what you
mean, which complicates answering your question. When the state
outlaws sadistic treatment of animals, then the people who violate
such laws despite the punishments are presumed to be people who cannot
constrain their sadistic impulses even despite the extra motivation of
criminal sanction. Society has an interest in identifying and
exerting control over such people because we deem such compulsive
sadists a risk to society at large. I can't tell whether you would
call that self-protection a "moral" basis or not. If morality extends
to govern all cases of harm, then I would say the answer to your
question is that there is no other rational basis on which such a law
against cruelty could be established.
I don' think that I could support this justification. The link between a
danger to others seems too tenuous to me. What other behaviors which are
"indicative" of a criminal nature should be outlawed? If it can be shown
that sodomy correlates highly with child molestation, and if a causal
rationale can be defined to support it, Would society then have an interest
in outlawing sodomy?
Thank you for responding. I find this an interesting subject well worth
exploring.
I am, of course, only describing one school of thought regarding the
basis for law. At least three of our Supreme Court justices would be
far more inclined towards a canonical basis for our laws. Theirs is a
competing view which is still popular in some quarters, but I think
religious pluralism will ultimately have to result in a general
progress away from their way of thinking.
What you describe as "rational morality" sounds very close to my way of
thinking for my personal decision-making, although I doubt I could express
it as well. If it seemed otherwise to you earlier, it was probably because
I am trying to represent a view that I am not in full agreement with, but
would like to be able to reject or consign myself to accepting depending on
what I learn.
My remaining question for you is where, in our basis of law can we find
justification for constraining laws to rational morality? Religious people
define morality quite differently, for example. In most cases they are the
ones who frame the laws and sit on benches. Does the 1st Ammendment prevent
them from using their own "moral compass" to create/interpret law? If not,
on what basis can they be legitimately be constrained to it?
.
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| User: "Kronk" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
19 Nov 2004 01:36:32 PM |
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On Fri, 19 Nov 2004 09:59:13 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:
Your central question uses terms for which it is not clear what you
mean, which complicates answering your question. When the state
outlaws sadistic treatment of animals, then the people who violate
such laws despite the punishments are presumed to be people who cannot
constrain their sadistic impulses even despite the extra motivation of
criminal sanction. Society has an interest in identifying and
exerting control over such people because we deem such compulsive
sadists a risk to society at large. I can't tell whether you would
call that self-protection a "moral" basis or not. If morality extends
to govern all cases of harm, then I would say the answer to your
question is that there is no other rational basis on which such a law
against cruelty could be established.
I don't think that I could support this justification. The link between a
danger to others seems too tenuous to me.
This is, of course, a judgement call we have to make
collectively--which is always particularly difficult when dealing with
abnormal psychology, because what seems intuitively obvious to us
might not apply to a different sort of mind.
What other behaviors which are
"indicative" of a criminal nature should be outlawed? If it can be shown
that sodomy correlates highly with child molestation, and if a causal
rationale can be defined to support it, Would society then have an interest
in outlawing sodomy?
The more obvious real-world example concerns synthetic child
pornography--that which is created without any involvement of a legal
minor at any point of production. The data is shaky, but people who
molest children appear to have been consumers of child pornography at
a greater rate than in the population at large, so there seems to be a
correlation. But it could easily be that being sexually attracted to
children caused both the pornography consumption and the molesting
offense, rather than the former causing the latter--particularly since
there appear to be some people who molest children without consuming
the pornography, and there appear to be a large number of people who
consume child pornography without committing molestation. There is
even the very real possibility that consuming child pornography might
act as a surrogate outlet for some people, so for them, it might
actually decrease the likelihood of their molesting anyone.
(Likewise with animal cruelty. The self-protection rationale for
prohibiting animal cruelty would not work in any case where a
compulsively sadistic individual was successfully using animal cruelty
as a surrogate for cruelty to humans.)
What you describe as "rational morality" sounds very close to my way of
thinking for my personal decision-making, although I doubt I could express
it as well. If it seemed otherwise to you earlier, it was probably because
I am trying to represent a view that I am not in full agreement with, but
would like to be able to reject or consign myself to accepting depending on
what I learn.
I was aware this was a hypothetical discussion. And my describing a
given theory doesn't constitute my endorsement of it either. My
personal view regarding animal cruelty, for example, is that the
proper basis for extending protection to other sentient beings is not
to identify risk cases for our own protection, but because sentient
beings are deserving of moral consideration by virtue of their
sentience. I see nothing magical about human DNA, and I would easily
extend the same consideration to a similarly sentient being even if it
came from a different planet--or was one we engineered ourselves.
My remaining question for you is where, in our basis of law can we find
justification for constraining laws to rational morality? Religious people
define morality quite differently, for example. In most cases they are the
ones who frame the laws and sit on benches. Does the 1st Ammendment prevent
them from using their own "moral compass" to create/interpret law? If not,
on what basis can they be legitimately be constrained to it?
Imagine a theologically homogeneous society where virtually everyone
was in agreement regarding the moral code espoused by their one
religion. Say, for example, that it was an extremely offensive
blasphemy to make any reference at all to God's nipples, and doing so
caused great fear, consternation, and emotional distress to anyone
hearing such a blasphemy. In such a society, would a law which
reflects the religious prohibition on such a blasphemy be violating
rational morality? No, because the perception of harm from such a
blasphemy is sufficient to make it actual harm. Rational morality in
this society with only one flavor of religion would still exist. But
it would be indistinguishable from the dominant religious morality
most everyone accepted.
To establish rational morality that is distinct from any one
particular religious morality, the easiest and simplest way to
accomplish that is to have a plurality of religions. For the sake of
order, the diverse adherents will quickly establish laws where they
are in agreement, and then they will haggle, lobby, fight and
negotiate on the others. The more heterogeneous the society, the less
the rational morality of that society will be specific to any one
culture, religion or creed, and the more it will be grounded in
generalities of the human condition.
Kronk
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| User: "Fester" |
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| Title: Re: Morality Laws and "Animal Rights" |
19 Nov 2004 03:00:30 PM |
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"Kronk" <void@isp.com> wrote in message
news:419e3ba0.152771213@news.gvtc.com...
On Fri, 19 Nov 2004 09:59:13 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:
Your central question uses terms for which it is not clear what you
mean, which complicates answering your question. When the state
outlaws sadistic treatment of animals, then the people who violate
such laws despite the punishments are presumed to be people who cannot
constrain their sadistic impulses even despite the extra motivation of
criminal sanction. Society has an interest in identifying and
exerting control over such people because we deem such compulsive
sadists a risk to society at large. I can't tell whether you would
call that self-protection a "moral" basis or not. If morality extends
to govern all cases of harm, then I would say the answer to your
question is that there is no other rational basis on which such a law
against cruelty could be established.
I don't think that I could support this justification. The link between a
danger to others seems too tenuous to me.
This is, of course, a judgement call we have to make
collectively--which is always particularly difficult when dealing with
abnormal psychology, because what seems intuitively obvious to us
might not apply to a different sort of mind.
What other behaviors which are
"indicative" of a criminal nature should be outlawed? If it can be shown
that sodomy correlates highly with child molestation, and if a causal
rationale can be defined to support it, Would society then have an
interest
in outlawing sodomy?
The more obvious real-world example concerns synthetic child
pornography--that which is created without any involvement of a legal
minor at any point of production. The data is shaky, but people who
molest children appear to have been consumers of child pornography at
a greater rate than in the population at large, so there seems to be a
correlation. But it could easily be that being sexually attracted to
children caused both the pornography consumption and the molesting
offense, rather than the former causing the latter--particularly since
there appear to be some people who molest children without consuming
the pornography, and there appear to be a large number of people who
consume child pornography without committing molestation. There is
even the very real possibility that consuming child pornography might
act as a surrogate outlet for some people, so for them, it might
actually decrease the likelihood of their molesting anyone.
(Likewise with animal cruelty. The self-protection rationale for
prohibiting animal cruelty would not work in any case where a
compulsively sadistic individual was successfully using animal cruelty
as a surrogate for cruelty to humans.)
What you describe as "rational morality" sounds very close to my way of
thinking for my personal decision-making, although I doubt I could express
it as well. If it seemed otherwise to you earlier, it was probably
because
I am trying to represent a view that I am not in full agreement with, but
would like to be able to reject or consign myself to accepting depending
on
what I learn.
I was aware this was a hypothetical discussion. And my describing a
given theory doesn't constitute my endorsement of it either. My
personal view regarding animal cruelty, for example, is that the
proper basis for extending protection to other sentient beings is not
to identify risk cases for our own protection, but because sentient
beings are deserving of moral consideration by virtue of their
sentience. I see nothing magical about human DNA, and I would easily
extend the same consideration to a similarly sentient being even if it
came from a different planet--or was one we engineered ourselves.
My remaining question for you is where, in our basis of law can we find
justification for constraining laws to rational morality? Religious
people
define morality quite differently, for example. In most cases they are
the
ones who frame the laws and sit on benches. Does the 1st Ammendment
prevent
them from using their own "moral compass" to create/interpret law? If
not,
on what basis can they be legitimately be constrained to it?
Imagine a theologically homogeneous society where virtually everyone
was in agreement regarding the moral code espoused by their one
religion. Say, for example, that it was an extremely offensive
blasphemy to make any reference at all to God's nipples, and doing so
caused great fear, consternation, and emotional distress to anyone
hearing such a blasphemy. In such a society, would a law which
reflects the religious prohibition on such a blasphemy be violating
rational morality?
It would based upon my understanding of what you meant by rational morality
prior to reading this paragraph. If this is what you mean by the term,
though, then I can see a lot of daylight between it and my own sense of
morality. In the specific case of blasphemy that you cited, I would
consider it moral to apply the group consensus. However, I would be
reluctant to extend this theory very far. I will grant you that many aspect
of morality are to a large extent arbitrary and defined by group opinion.
However, if there is no law, for example, that outlawed wife-beating and if
the society I was in condoned it, I would still not consider it "moral." I
don't approve of it in our society and I don't approve of it in homogeneous
muslim cultures where it is accepted and even encouraged. I think that it
is just wrong!
No, because the perception of harm from such a
blasphemy is sufficient to make it actual harm. Rational morality in
this society with only one flavor of religion would still exist. But
it would be indistinguishable from the dominant religious morality
most everyone accepted.
You've addeed a wrinkle to your remarks on rational morality here that
distinguishes it from my own philosophical basis. While I am certainly
influenced by societal opinion, I cannot say that I base all my inclinations
of morality based upon it. I would say, for example, that if society did
not conclude that torturing cats was wrong I would like to think that I felt
it was. Furthermore, I'm not sure where one could find "rationality" in a
morality that didn't, but that may just be semantic.
To establish rational morality that is distinct from any one
particular religious morality, the easiest and simplest way to
accomplish that is to have a plurality of religions. For the sake of
order, the diverse adherents will quickly establish laws where they
are in agreement, and then they will haggle, lobby, fight and
negotiate on the others. The more heterogeneous the society, the less
the rational morality of that society will be specific to any one
culture, religion or creed, and the more it will be grounded in
generalities of the human condition.
Is this not what we have today? A heterogenous society where laws come
about based upon negotiated consensus? Perhaps you and I would prefer that
the mix were different, but your theory does seem to exist in practice in
the US. If I haven't read you wrong, then wouldn' that imply that laws
based upon the consensus of public opinon should be upheld, even if their
own justification is that most people object (i.e. think it is wrong) to do?
If most people in a state thought that sodomy was morally wrong, should laws
against sodomy be upheld?
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