"Brandon K. Montoya" <theintrepid@att.net> wrote in message
news:4299AEAE.22BAF606@att.net...

Fester wrote:

"Brandon K. Montoya" <theintrepid@att.net> wrote in message
news:42993A55.C6FBBD7A@att.net...

"Yang, AthD (h.c), Kicking AWOL's Cocaine Snorting *****" wrote:

On Sat, 28 May 2005 11:02:12 GMT, "Fester" <not@home.com> wrote:

Guantanamo Bay but found "no credible evidence" to confirm a
prisoner's
report that a holy book was flushed in a toilet,

NW was right about what?

That you are full of *****:

"It's you who'll have to eat crow and ***** sandwiches as all Saddam's
nasty little WMD, French deals, and Al Qaeda secrets come tumbling out
of the rubble."
-Fester, 3/18/2004

For your records.

http://groups-beta.google.com/group/alt.politics.greens/msg/962cc16fe660789c?dmode=source&hl=en

Swallow it. We don't want this war anymore than Spaniards. Or any
other
Europeans.

Swallow it? That's easy. It's you have the tough job of choking back
your tears as you watch that benevolent, beloved dictator get his balls
shot off. It's you who'll have to eat crow and ***** sandwiches as all
Saddam's nasty little WMD, French deals, and Al Qaeda secrets come
tumbling out of the rubble.

So I hope youo enjoyed the ***** sandwiches. As you Saddam did have Al
Qaeda
involvement,

Apparently Fester didn't read about the Senate 9/11 report which
explicitly stated that Saddam and Al Queda ****DID NOT*** have a working
relationship.(1)

======
CITE 1
======
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/06/18/cheney.iraq.al.qaeda/

Members of 9/11 commission found "no credible evidence" that Iraq was
involved in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks carried out by al
Qaeda hijackers, and they concluded that there was "no collaborative
relationship" between Iraq and Osama bin Laden, the network's leader,
according to details of its findings disclosed Wednesday at a public
hearing.

WMD programs

They were dead since 1991.(2)

http://www.nationalreview.com/mccarthy/mccarthy200406170840.asp

From that same report:

<quote>
Al Qaeda also forged alliances with the National Islamic Front in the Sudan
and with the government of Iran and its associated terrorist group Hezballah
for the purpose of working together against their perceived common enemies
in the West, particularly the United States. In addition, al Qaeda reached
an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work
against that government and that on particular projects, specifically
including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the
Government of Iraq.
</quote>

and Tenet's testimony:

<quote>
Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda is evolving
and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the information we
have received comes from detainees, including some of high rank. We have
solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda going
back a decade. Credible information indicates that Iraq and Al Qaeda have
discussed safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression. Since Operation Enduring
Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of Al Qaeda members,
including some that have been in Baghdad. We have credible reporting that
Al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq who could help them acquire W.M.D.
capabilities. The reporting also stated that Iraq has provided training to
Al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons and gases and making conventional
bombs. Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians coupled with
growing indications of relationship with Al Qaeda suggest that Baghdad's
links to terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action.
</quote>

======
CITE 2
======
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/06/iraq.wmd.report/

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Saddam Hussein did not possess stockpiles of illicit
weapons at the time of the U.S. invasion in March 2003 and had not begun
any program to produce them, a CIA report concludes.

In fact, the long-awaited report, authored by Charles Duelfer, who
advises the director of central intelligence on Iraqi weapons, says
Iraq's WMD program was essentially destroyed in 1991 and Saddam ended
Iraq's nuclear program after the 1991 Gulf War.
-------------------------------

and the oil for food program, heavily involving
the French is the biggest scandal of modern history.

"Biggest scandal of modern history?" That's more of a stretch than a
rack in a torture chamber.

In actuality the oil for food program heavily involved Bush's very own
sister(3) and his best friend Ken Lay (3), Cheney & Halliburton (6) and
America received about 52% of those sales. (4, 5)

I did not claim that he possessed stockpiles.

As the Deulfer report makes
clear, he did retain the capacity, illegally, to restart his production of
Chemical:

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004

<quote>
Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions
were lifted and conditions were judged favorable:

Saddam and many Iraqis regarded CW as a proven weapon against an enemy's
superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least
once already-during the Iran-Iraq war-and contributed to deterring the
Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad.

While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been
discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared
chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.

There are no credible indications that
Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG
attributes to Baghdad's desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered
ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered.

The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other
factors, precluded an examination of the entire stockpile; however, ISG
inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or
deployment of chemical weapons.

Iraq'sCW program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical
industry, which suffered under sanctions, only began to recover in the
mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civilian
organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provided Iraq
with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base.

Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial
Commission (MIC) financially unsound and in a state of almost complete
disarray.

Saddam implemented a number of changes to the Regime's organizational and
programmatic structures after the departure of Husayn Kamil.

Iraq's acceptance of the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program was the foundation of
Iraq's economic recovery and sparked a flow of illicitly diverted funds that
could be applied to projects for Iraq's chemical industry.

The way Iraq organized its chemical industry after the mid-1990s allowed it
to conserve the knowledge-base needed to restart a CW program, conduct a
modest amount of dual-use research, and partially recover from the decline
of its production capability caused by the effects of the Gulf war and
UN-sponsored destruction and sanctions. Iraq implemented a rigorous and
formalized system of nationwide research and production of chemicals, but
ISG will not be able to resolve whether Iraq intended the system to underpin
any CW-related efforts.

The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers,
production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program.

Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production projects
in 1995 and 1996. Many of these projects, while not weapons-related, were
designed to improve Iraq's infrastructure, which would have enhanced Iraq's
ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up production processes were
implemented.

Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq was not
allowed to acquire due to sanctions. ISG found no evidence that this system
was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however documents indicate
that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were acquired through this
system.

Iraq constructed a number of new plants starting in the mid-1990s that
enhanced its chemical infrastructure, although its overall industry had not
fully recovered from the effects of sanctions, and had not regained pre-1991
technical sophistication or production capabilities prior to Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF).

ISG did not discover chemical process or production units configured to
produce key precursors or CW agents. However, site visits and debriefs
revealed that Iraq maintained its ability for reconfiguring and 'making-do'
with available equipment as substitutes for sanctioned items.

ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist
debriefings, that Iraq at OIF probably had a capability to produce large
quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months.

A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to
produce nerve agent in significant quantities within two years, given the
import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible
indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of
these chemicals through its existing procurement networks for sanctioned
items.

In addition to new investment in its industry, Iraq was able to monitor the
location and use of all existing dual-use process equipment. This provided
Iraq the ability to rapidly reallocate key equipment for proscribed
activities, if required by the Regime.

One effect of UN monitoring was to implement a national level control system
for important dual-use process plants.

Iraq's historical ability to implement simple solutions to weaponization
challenges allowed Iraq to retain the capability to weaponize CW agent when
the need arose. Because of the risk of discovery and consequences for ending
UN sanctions, Iraq would have significantly jeopardized its chances of
having sanctions lifted or no longer enforced if the UN or foreign entity
had discovered that Iraq had undertaken any weaponization activities.

ISG has uncovered hardware at a few military depots, which suggests that
Iraq may have prototyped experimental CW rounds. The available evidence is
insufficient to determine the nature of the effort or the timeframe of
activities.

Iraq could indigenously produce a range of conventional munitions,
throughout the 1990s, many of which had previously been adapted for filling
with CW agent. However, ISG has found ambiguous evidence of weaponization
activities.

Saddam's Leadership Defense Plan consisted of a tactical doctrine taught to
all Iraqi officers and included the concept of a "red-line" or last line of
defense. However, ISG has no information that the plan ever included a
trigger for CW use.

Despite reported high-level discussions about the use of chemical weapons in
the defense of Iraq, information acquired after OIF does not confirm the
inclusion of CW in Iraq's tactical planning for OIF. We believe these were
mostly theoretical discussions and do not imply the existence of
undiscovered CW munitions.

Discussions concerning WMD, particularly leading up to OIF, would have been
highly compartmentalized within the Regime. ISG found no credible evidence
that any field elements knew about plans for CW use during Operation Iraqi
Freedom.

Uday-head of the Fedayeen Saddam-attempted to obtain chemical weapons for
use during OIF, according to reporting, but ISG found no evidence that Iraq
ever came into possession of any CW weapons.

ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)
maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert laboratories
to research and test various chemicals and poisons, primarily for
intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could have provided an
ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW agent R&D or
small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications this was planned.
(See Annex A.)

ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16) scientists
were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories. However, sources
indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW agents including sulfur
mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.

Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites revealed
no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many of these
sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to OIF. Interviews
with key IIS officials within and outside of M16 yielded very little
information about the IIS' activities in this area.

The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never declared
to the UN.

The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing purposes.

ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving the possible
movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11 major depots
assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of documents, interviews,
available reporting, and site exploitations revealed alternate, plausible
explanations for activities noted prior to OIF which, at the time, were
believed to be CW-related.

ISG investigated pre-OIF activities at Musayyib Ammunition Storage Depot-the
storage site that was judged to have the strongest link to CW. An extensive
investigation of the facility revealed that there was no CW activity, unlike
previously assessed.

</quote>

And Bio Weapons:

<quote>
In 1991, Saddam Husayn regarded BW as an integral element of his arsenal of
WMD weapons, and would have used it if the need arose.

At a meeting of the Iraqi leadership immediately prior to the Gulf war in
1991, Saddam Husayn personally authorized the use of BW weapons against
Israel, Saudi Arabia and US forces. Although the exact nature of the
circumstances that would trigger use was not spelled out, they would appear
to be a threat to the leadership itself or the US resorting to
"unconventional harmful types of weapons."

Saddam envisaged all-out use. For example, all Israeli cities were to be
struck and all the BW weapons at his disposal were to be used. Saddam
specified that the "many years" agents, presumably anthrax spores, were to
be employed against his foes.

ISG judges that Iraq's actions between 1991 and 1996 demonstrate that the
state intended to preserve its BW capability and return to a steady,
methodical progress toward a mature BW program when and if the opportunity
arose.

ISG assesses that in 1991, Iraq clung to the objective of gaining
war-winning weapons with the strategic intention of achieving the ability to
project its power over much of the Middle East and beyond. Biological
weapons were part of that plan. With an eye to the future and aiming to
preserve some measure of its BW capability, Baghdad in the years immediately
after Desert Storm sought to save what it could of its BW infrastructure and
covertly continue BW research, hide evidence of that and earlier efforts,
and dispose of its existing weapons stocks.

From 1992 to 1994, Iraq greatly expanded the capability of its Al Hakam
facility. Indigenously produced 5 cubic meter fermentors were installed,
electrical and water utilities were expanded, and massive new construction
to house its desired 50 cubic meter fermentors were completed.

With the economy at rock bottom in late 1995, ISG judges that Baghdad
abandoned its existing BW program in the belief that it constituted a
potential embarrassment, whose discovery would undercut Baghdad's ability to
reach its overarching goal of obtaining relief from UN sanctions.

In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility,

Iraq
abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no
direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was
conducting BW-specific work for military purposes. Indeed, from the
mid-1990s, despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical
weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of discussion or even
interest in BW at the Presidential level.

Iraq would have faced great difficulty in re-establishing an effective BW
agent production capability. Nevertheless, after 1996 Iraq still had a
significant dual-use capability-some declared-readily useful for BW if the
Regime chose to use it to pursue a BW program. Moreover, Iraq still
possessed its most important BW asset, the scientific know-how of its BW
cadre.

Any attempt to create a new BW program after 1996 would have encountered a
range of major hurdles. The years following Desert Storm wrought a steady
degradation of Iraq's industrial base: new equipment and spare parts for
existing machinery became difficult and expensive to obtain, standards of
maintenance declined, staff could not receive training abroad, and foreign
technical assistance was almost impossible to get. Additionally, Iraq's
infrastructure and public utilities were crumbling. New large projects,
particularly if they required special foreign equipment and expertise, would
attract international attention. UN monitoring of dual-use facilities up to
the end of 1998, made their use for clandestine purpose complicated and risk
laden.

Depending on its scale, Iraq could have re-established an elementary BW
program within a few weeks to a few months of a decision to do so, but ISG
discovered no indications that the Regime was pursuing such a course.

In spite of the difficulties noted above, a BW capability is technically the
easiest WMD to attain. Although equipment and facilities were destroyed
under UN supervision in 1996, Iraq retained technical BW know-how through
the scientists that were involved in the former program. ISG has also
identified civilian facilities and equipment in Iraq that have dual-use
application that could be used for the production of agent.

ISG judges that in 1991 and 1992, Iraq appears to have destroyed its
undeclared stocks of BW weapons and probably destroyed remaining holdings of
bulk BW agent. However ISG lacks evidence to document complete destruction.
Iraq retained some BW-related seed stocks until their discovery after
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

After the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 in April
1991, Iraqi leaders decided not to declare the offensive BW program and in
consequence ordered all evidence of the program erased. Iraq declared that
BW program personnel sanitized the facilities and destroyed the weapons and
their contents.

Iraq declared the possession of 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads
containing BW agent. ISG assesses that the evidence for the original number
of bombs is uncertain. ISG judges that Iraq clandestinely destroyed at least
132 bombs and 25 missiles. ISG continued the efforts of the UN at the
destruction site but found no remnants of further weapons. This leaves the
possibility that the fragments of up to 25 bombs may remain undiscovered. Of
these, any that escaped destruction would probably now only contain degraded
agent.

ISG does not have a clear account of bulk agent destruction. Official Iraqi
sources and BW personnel, state that Al Hakam staff destroyed stocks of bulk
agent in mid 1991. However, the same personnel admit concealing details of
the movement and destruction of bulk BW agent in the first half of 1991.
Iraq continued to present information known to be untrue to the UN up to
OIF. Those involved did not reveal this until several months after the
conflict.

Dr. Rihab Rashid Taha Al 'Azzawi, head of the bacterial program claims she
retained BW seed stocks until early 1992 when she destroyed them. ISG has
not found a means of verifying this. Some seed stocks were retained by
another Iraqi official until 2003 when they were recovered by ISG.

ISG is aware of BW-applicable research since 1996, but ISG judges it was not
conducted in connection with a BW program.

ISG has uncovered no evidence of illicit research conducted into BW agents
by universities or
research organizations.

The work conducted on a biopesticide (Bacillus thuringiensis) at Al Hakam
until 1995 would serve to maintain the basic skills required by scientists
to produce and dry anthrax spores (Bacillus anthracis) but ISG has not
discovered evidence suggesting this was the Regime's intention. However in
1991, research and production on biopesticide and single cell protein (SCP)
was selected by Iraq to provide cover for Al Hakam's role in Iraq's BW
program. Similar work conducted at the Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological
Research Center (TABRC) up to OIF also maintained skills that were
applicable to BW, but again, ISG found no evidence to suggest that this was
the intention.

Similarly, ISG found no information to indicate that the work carried out by
TABRC into Single Cell Protein (SCP) was a cover story for continuing
research into the production of BW agents, such as C. botulinum and B.
anthracis, after the destruction of Al Hakam through to OIF.

TABRC conducted research and development (R&D) programs to enable indigenous
manufacture of bacterial growth media. Although these media are suitable for
the bulk production of BW agents, ISG has found no evidence to indicate that
their development and testing were specifically for this purpose.

Although Iraq had the basic capability to work with variola major
(smallpox), ISG found no evidence that it retained any stocks of smallpox or
actively conducted research into this agent for BW intentions.

The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work
including research into BW agents for assassination purposes until the
mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of the
work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was related
to military development of BW agent.

The security services operated a series of laboratories in the Baghdad area.
Iraq should have declared these facilities and their equipment to the UN,
but they did not. Neither the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) nor the UN
Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were aware of
their existence or inspected them.

Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting research
into BW agents for military purposes, but ISG does not know whether this
occurred although there is no evidence of it. The laboratories were probably
the successors of the Al Salman facility, located three kilometers south of
Salman Pak, which was destroyed in 1991, and they carried on many of the
same activities, including forensic work.

Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team developed
assassination instruments using poisons or toxins for the Iraqi state. A
small group of scientists, doctors and technicians conducted secret
experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths. The aim was probably
the development of poisons, including ricin and aflatoxin to eliminate or
debilitate the Regime's opponents. It appears that testing on humans
continued until the mid 1990s. There is no evidence to link these tests with
the development of BW agents for military use.

</quote>

======
CITE 3
======
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/MAD505B.html

At the same time Enron Chairman Kenneth ("Kenny Boy") Lay was involved
in Vice President ***** Cheney's Energy Task Force secret dealings and
when he was stuffing hundreds of thousands of dollars into the pockets
of George W. Bush and Cheney's political campaign, he also managed to
illegally stick $206, 757 into the pockets of Saddam Hussein and his
cohorts.

The Iraqi Oil-for-Food scandal also involves one of the Bush
children-Dorothy "Doro" Bush Koch, sister of George W. Bush and married
to Bobby Koch, reportedly a cousin in the oil industry Koch family, the
owner of Koch Industries, which is also one of Bush's largest political
donors. The minority committee report indicates that Koch Industries was
also a major recipient of illegal Iraqi oil and a huge source of
kickbacks to Saddam Hussein:

Trying to deflect attention away from Jacques,

I see, with this canard.
Here's what we know:

http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20050511-115405-2031r.htm

<quote>
A longtime ally of French President Jacques Chirac and a leading British
critic of the Iraq war received huge contracts to resell Iraqi oil from
Saddam Hussein under the U.N. oil-for-food program, Senate investigators
have found.
In findings being released today, the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs permanent subcommittee on investigations charges that
former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua and British Member of
Parliament George Galloway

each received the right to market more than 10
million barrels of cut-rate oil from dictator Saddam's Oil Ministry between
1999 and 2003.
</quote>

======
CITE 4
======
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1485546,00.html

US 'backed illegal Iraqi oil deals'

Report claims blind eye was turned to sanctions busting by American
firms

Julian Borger and Jamie Wilson in Washington
Tuesday May 17, 2005
The Guardian

The United States administration turned a blind eye to extensive
sanctions-busting in the prewar sale of Iraqi oil, according to a new
Senate investigation.

A report released last night by Democratic staff on a Senate
investigations committee presents documentary evidence that the Bush
administration was made aware of illegal oil sales and kickbacks paid to
the Saddam Hussein regime but did nothing to stop them.

The scale of the shipments involved dwarfs those previously alleged by
the Senate committee against UN staff and European politicians like the
British MP, George Galloway, and the former French minister, Charles
Pasqua.

Which does nothing to refute me.

======
CITE 5
======
Of the $228 million in surcharged oil, the Democratic report found the
United States imported 525 million barrels, or 52 percent of it. Among
the biggest end users of this oil were Valero, Premcor, Alon USA, and
Exxon, according to the report.

CNN's Phil Hirschkorn contributed to this report.

Find this article at:
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITI­CS/05/17/oil.food/index.html

Another red herring. None of ths refutes what I said about Saddam.

======
CITE 6
======
From Scoop, 10/12/04:
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/s­tories/HL0410/S00132.htm

Cheney's Halliburton Helped Saddam Siphon UN $Bns

Tuesday, 12 October 2004, 11:36 am

Under Cheney, Halliburton Helped Saddam Hussein Siphon Billions from UN
Oil-for-Food Program

By Jason Leopold

One company that helped Saddam exploit the oil-for-food program in the
mid-1990s that wasn't identified in Duelfer's report was Halliburton,
and the person at the helm of Halliburton at the time of the scheme was
Vice President ***** Cheney.

Halliburton and its subsidiaries were one of several American and
foreign oil supply companies that helped Iraq increase its crude exports
from $4 billion in 1997 to nearly $18 billion in 2000 by skirting U.S.
laws and selling Iraq spare parts so it could repair its oil fields and
pump more oil.

Since the oil-for-food program began, Iraq has sold $40 billion worth of
oil.

U.S. and European officials have long argued that the increase in Iraq's
oil production also expanded Saddam's ability to use some of that money
for weapons, luxury goods and palaces.

Security Council diplomats estimate that Iraq was skimming off as much
as 10 percent of the proceeds from the oil-for-food program thanks to
companies like Halliburton and former executives such as Cheney.

Blah, blah. More irrelevant crap that does nothing to refute my remarks.