Fred Stone wrote:

"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dianelos@tecapro.com> wrote in
news:1148162796.577496.39060@38g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

Fred Stone wrote:

"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dianelos@tecapro.com> wrote in
news:1148027956.597785.121960@j33g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

There is no objective evidence of consciousness. In other words
there is no objective observation for which the existence of
consciousness is the best explanation. So the consciousness
hypothesis is not required for understanding any of our
observations of the physical universe. Yet consciousness exists
- we are absolutely certain of that - which shows that the rule
"We should only believe in the existence of something when there
is objective evidence for it " is wrong, as we have just found a
counterexample.

Of course there is an objective observation for which
consciousness is the best explanation. "Other people behave in
ways similar to ways that I behave, and I know that I am
conscious.".

Yes, but the statement "I know I am conscious" is not an objective
statement you see. Actually there are some materialists who claim
that you are wrong in this belief, and that your consciousness is
nothing more than an illusion and does not really exist. To say "I
know this (because it's intuitively completely obvious to me)" is
not objective; after all some people justify their belief in God
using exactly the same language.

"I know that I am conscious" is, of course, the ultimate *subjective*
statement.

Right.

That's not a problem at all.

What do you mean? It is a problem in the sense that if you uphold
objectivity you are not allowed to use subjective statements in your
arguments. So either you relax objectivity (as I claim is reasonable)
or else you abstain from using subjective statements - you can't
have it both ways.

But, as I explained in the initial post to this thread, I find it
entirely reasonable to relax the objectivity maxim and allow for
existential claims justified on direct conscious experience: "We
should only believe in the existence of something when it is
directly perceived or when there is objective evidence for it". So,
as it really is obvious to all of us, we are justified to believe
in the existence of our own consciousness even though there is no
objective evidence for it.

So you propose the following argument (let me know if I
misrepresent it):

1. I am a conscious being (i.e. my consciousness exists).
2. My behavior is objectively observable (i.e. objective evidence).

No. *I* observe my behavior, and I know myself to be conscious.

You don't agree that your behavior is objectively observable? After
all, not only you but any other person can in principle observe it.

3. The best explanation for my behavior is that I am a conscious
being.

4. Other peoples' behavior is objectively observable.

Now we're getting somewhere. Their behavior is objectively observable
because they are not me.

Other peoples' behavior is objectively observable because you as well
as anybody else can in principle observe it.

5. Other peoples' behavior is so similar to mine that the best
explanation for it is that they too are conscious beings (i.e.
their consciousness exists).
6. Therefore other peoples' consciousness exists.

I think that's the argument we all really make - but modern science
has shown that there is a serious error in it. We know already
enough about cognition and neurophysiology that it is virtually
certain that in principle somebody who would study the physical
processes in your brain would be able to explain your conscious
behavior much better than you yourself with all your privileged
access to the content of your own conscious experience. So #3 above
is false: The best explanation for our behavior is not the presence
of our consciousness and whatever we directly know about it, but
physical processes in our brain.

But that's where you've confused the issue, since they are equating
those physical processes to consciousness. Which is exactly my point.
Those physical processes, executing on the hardware platform of the
brain *are* consciousness.

You believe that? What objective evidence do you have for this belief?

There is also a problem with #5. It's true that other peoples'
objectively observable behavior is similar, but it's not identical
to ours. Observing live bacteria in the microscope also strikes us
as somehow similar behavior to ours. Why are we then justified to
claim in the former case almost absolute certainty that other
people are conscious beings and in the later case almost absolute
certainty that microbes are not conscious beings?

Other peoples' behavior does not have to be identical to mine.
Whether or not live microbes are conscious beings is not relevant to
the argument that other humans can be observed to be conscious
beings.

But it is, because what goes for the goose goes for the gander too. If
the objective observation that X's behavior is similar to ours
justifies the belief that X is a conscious being, then the objective
observation that Y's behavior is also similar to ours should justify
the belief that Y is a conscious being. But if you are not willing to
accept that Y is a conscious being than neither can you claim that X
is - to do so would be a case of special pleading.

So, even though I agree that when thinking about this matter most
of us used your argument to justify our belief in other peoples'
consciousness, on closer inspection it does not hold water - even
when using the relaxed objectivity maxim.

No, your objections do not hold water. They still fail on the pzombie
contradiction.

I did not speak of zombies; on the contrary my argument rests on the
fact that we all believe in the existence of other peoples'
consciousness, i.e. that they are not zombies. But maybe I
misunderstand your point. What exactly do you mean?

Which is rather strange, especially to a person who believes in
objectivity and rationalism. In fact, there isn't any objective
evidence for consciousness: there is no observation that anybody
can independently validate and for which consciousness is the best
explanation. And even relaxing objectivity and accepting the
obvious truth of direct conscious experience we still cannot
justify the belief in other peoples' consciousness. That's why
there is the so-called Hard Problem of consciousness. And that's
why some of the most stringent materialists bite the bullet and
conclude that there must be something deeply wrong with our
intuitive beliefs about consciousness, and therefore propose,
rather ludicrously, that consciousness is an illusion (whatever
that means in this context) or even that it does not exist at all.
Others have resorted to rather odd ideas (often accompanied by the
coining of new words) such as that consciousness is an
epiphenomenon, an emergent property, that it is a irreducible
physical phenomenon, or that it is identical to the physical
processes happening in our brains. Every one of these positions is
a case of special pleading: all other phenomena are mere phenomena
and only consciousness is an "epiphenomenon"; all other emergent
properties are objectively observable and only consciousness is
not; all other existents are physically reducible and only
consciousness is not; in all other cases if A is claimed to be
identical to B then knowledge of A implies at least some knowledge
about B and only with consciousness that isn't the case. The only
viable position is I think to propose, as Chalmers does, that
consciousness must be a fundamental principle of physical reality,
in which case we should start speaking of "spirituphysical
reality".

All your attempts to get around that simple example fall on self-
contradiction based on the pzombie fallacy that "conscious
behavior" can be performed by a non-conscious entity. Occam's
razor will eliminate any alternative explanations.

No such claims are needed for my argument. My argument here is that
there simply isn't any objective evidence for the existence of
consciousness and that therefore a consistent use of objectivity
implies solipsism, i.e. the denial of the existence of other
peoples' consciousness - or at the extreme the even more absurd
notion that personal consciousness does not exist. The fact that
virtually all people affirm the existence of theirs and other
peoples' consciousness shows that they do not in fact consistently
use objectivity. Which is quite ok, as the example of consciousness
shows that to consistently use objectivity is not an intellectually
viable option and that in some cases subjective evidence must be
accepted as valid evidence for rational thought.

You haven't proved your case.

My case is simple. It is logically impossible for all three
propositions to be true:

1. I do not believe in something unless there is objective evidence
for it.

2. I believe in the existence of other peoples' consciousness.

3. There is no objective evidence for the existence of other peoples'
consciousness.

I assume we agree so far as this is a matter of simple propositional
logic. So, in your personal case, which one of these three
propositions is false?

If one should relax this rule and say "We should only believe in
the existence of something when it is directly perceived or when
there is objective evidence for it" then one can justify the
existence of consciousness by pointing out that one's own
consciousness is directly perceived, therefore it exists, and
therefore consciousness in general exists also. But how about
the existence of other peoples' consciousness? We don't perceive
it directly and neither is there objective evidence of it. Yet
we know other peoples' consciousness exists also - we are
practically certain about that. So this form of the rule doesn't
work either.

It is not necessary to be able to observe "consciousness"
directly. Their behavior is the objective evidence of their
consciousness.

Behavior is indeed objective evidence, but the best explanation for
that objective evidence is the presence of physical processes in
the brains that produce that behavior. The behavior of a cockroach
also is best explained by the presence of physical processes in its
brain (yes, they have brains) - and incidentally we have no idea
whether cockroaches are conscious beings or not.

Whether cockroaches are conscious or not is irrelevant to the
argument that other humans than myself are observably conscious
beings.

Actually it is. If you claim that there are objective means (i.e.
means that do not include any subjective criteria at all) to ascertain
that other people are conscious then the same criteria apply to
cockroaches too. To suggest otherwise is a clear case of special
pleading.

How about: "We should only believe in the existence of something
when it is directly perceived or when there is evidence for
it."? That's I think the rule that rational thought should
follow. But it's not objective anymore. (And it makes you think
what subjective evidence there is for the existence of other
peoples' consciousness.)

In short what I am claiming here is that objectivity directly
leads to the solipsistic view that one is the only conscious
being there is. Objectivity and non-solipsism are logically
exclusive.

You may now once again stack piles upon piles of meaningless
sophistry in your attempts to disprove observable reality.

On the contrary, my personal view is that only observable reality
is truly real. That's why I consider that consciousness is the
fundamental aspect of reality.

Vast swathes of physical reality are not objectively observable and
yet can be deduced to exist by indirect means.

Correct, but the existence of every single item barred none in this
vast swatch of physical reality is justified by objective evidence,
i.e. there exists objective evidence for which the existence of this
item is the best explanation.

Thus consciousness cannot be
fundamental to existence.

Tell that to those materialist philosophers (the well known David
Chalmers comes to mind) who have spend many years of their lives
thinking about the problem of consciousness and who have concluded
that we must regard consciousness as a fundamental principle of
reality: something that is unprovable, does not connect to anything
else, and yet clearly exists.

"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dianelos@tecapro.com> wrote in
news:1148271975.704617.138660@38g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:

Fred Stone wrote:

"I know that I am conscious" is, of course, the ultimate *subjective*
statement.

Right.

That's not a problem at all.

What do you mean? It is a problem in the sense that if you uphold
objectivity you are not allowed to use subjective statements in your
arguments. So either you relax objectivity (as I claim is reasonable)
or else you abstain from using subjective statements - you can't
have it both ways.

Of course I can have it both ways. *I* am doing the observing, so a
subjective observation about *myself* is acceptable to an objectivist.
That's the basis of introspection.

Now, if I were to accept one of *YOUR* subjective observations, *THAT*
would be a problem.

I think that's the argument we all really make - but modern science
has shown that there is a serious error in it. We know already
enough about cognition and neurophysiology that it is virtually
certain that in principle somebody who would study the physical
processes in your brain would be able to explain your conscious
behavior much better than you yourself with all your privileged
access to the content of your own conscious experience. So #3 above
is false: The best explanation for our behavior is not the presence
of our consciousness and whatever we directly know about it, but
physical processes in our brain.

But that's where you've confused the issue, since they are equating
those physical processes to consciousness. Which is exactly my point.
Those physical processes, executing on the hardware platform of the
brain *are* consciousness.

You believe that? What objective evidence do you have for this belief?

The current state of neurophysiology and cognitive science, among
others.

There is also a problem with #5. It's true that other peoples'
objectively observable behavior is similar, but it's not identical
to ours. Observing live bacteria in the microscope also strikes us
as somehow similar behavior to ours. Why are we then justified to
claim in the former case almost absolute certainty that other
people are conscious beings and in the later case almost absolute
certainty that microbes are not conscious beings?

Other peoples' behavior does not have to be identical to mine.
Whether or not live microbes are conscious beings is not relevant to
the argument that other humans can be observed to be conscious
beings.

But it is, because what goes for the goose goes for the gander too. If
the objective observation that X's behavior is similar to ours
justifies the belief that X is a conscious being, then the objective
observation that Y's behavior is also similar to ours should justify
the belief that Y is a conscious being. But if you are not willing to
accept that Y is a conscious being than neither can you claim that X
is - to do so would be a case of special pleading.

Now don't go putting abstract X's and Y's in where you had nice specific
Humans and Microbes before, DG, that's more bafflegabbian distraction
and I'm going to call you on it when you do it. Now explain why
Microbial behavior is so similar to Human behavior that no Human could
possibly make a distinction between Microbial behavior and that of
Humans.

So, even though I agree that when thinking about this matter most
of us used your argument to justify our belief in other peoples'
consciousness, on closer inspection it does not hold water - even
when using the relaxed objectivity maxim.

No, your objections do not hold water. They still fail on the pzombie
contradiction.

I did not speak of zombies; on the contrary my argument rests on the
fact that we all believe in the existence of other peoples'
consciousness, i.e. that they are not zombies. But maybe I
misunderstand your point. What exactly do you mean?

The zombie argument is that a non-conscious zombie could,
hypothetically, produce the same behavior as a conscious human. But that
runs into the contradiction of "conscious behavior" being produced by a
non-conscious actor.

You haven't proved your case.

My case is simple. It is logically impossible for all three
propositions to be true:

1. I do not believe in something unless there is objective evidence
for it.

2. I believe in the existence of other peoples' consciousness.

3. There is no objective evidence for the existence of other peoples'
consciousness.

I assume we agree so far as this is a matter of simple propositional
logic. So, in your personal case, which one of these three
propositions is false?

Number 3 is the problem here. That's what I've been trying to get past
all your bafflegab diversions.

You may now once again stack piles upon piles of meaningless
sophistry in your attempts to disprove observable reality.

On the contrary, my personal view is that only observable reality
is truly real. That's why I consider that consciousness is the
fundamental aspect of reality.

Vast swathes of physical reality are not objectively observable and
yet can be deduced to exist by indirect means.

Correct, but the existence of every single item barred none in this
vast swatch of physical reality is justified by objective evidence,
i.e. there exists objective evidence for which the existence of this
item is the best explanation.

But "justified by objective evidence" is not the same as "objectively
observable". The latter is repeatably observable phenomena; the former
is logic and reasoning based on those observations.

Thus consciousness cannot be
fundamental to existence.

Tell that to those materialist philosophers (the well known David
Chalmers comes to mind) who have spend many years of their lives
thinking about the problem of consciousness and who have concluded
that we must regard consciousness as a fundamental principle of
reality: something that is unprovable, does not connect to anything
else, and yet clearly exists.

Since there is an obvious contradiction in "something that is unprovable
yet clearly exists" I'd say that there isn't much point in talking to
"the well known David Chalmers" about anything. He sounds like another
practitioner of bafflegab like yourself.