Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]

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Topic:	Religions > Atheism
User:	"Dianelos Georgoudis"
Date:	02 Oct 2005 04:34:39 AM
Object:	Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]

Denis Loubet wrote:

"Dianelos" <dianelos@tecapro.com> wrote in message
news:1128062737.770563.140330@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...

Denis Loubet wrote:

"someone4" <glenn.spigel4@btinternet.com> wrote in message

[snip]

We have never detected awareness at all. There is no objective evidence
that you are aware.

That's actually a good point. You are absolutely right. I stand
corrected.

Now that we cannot justify the existence of awareness, where does that
leave
our argument about free will? Well, first off, now there's no need to
concoct a non-physical plane because awareness has been erased off the
blackboard and no longer requires an explanation.

I find this is an extremely curious statement. Awareness after all does
exist.

Does it? You said: "We have never detected awareness at all. There is no
objective evidence that you are aware."

Why then, in the face of a total lack of evidence, would I conclude that
awareness exists? Such a conclusion would not be justified. So if I am to be
intellectually honest with myself, I must abandon the claim of awareness.

Wow! I certainly admire your chutzpah.

You have no doubts you are aware, no?

Sure I have doubts. I hold nothing as 100% correct. Especially since you
made such an excellent point when you said: "We have never detected
awareness at all. There is no objective evidence that you are aware."

In what sense then has
awareness been "erased off the blackboard and no longer requires an
explanation"?

Since you said: "We have never detected awareness at all. There is no
objective evidence that you are aware."

On the contrary. Awareness is the most momentous fact we know and I can
imagine no other thing as important to explain.

Then why did you say: "We have never detected awareness at all. There is no
objective evidence that you are aware." What is a fact if not "objective
evidence"? Awareness cannot be both a fact and not a fact at the same time,
can it? You seem to be contradicting yourself.

OK. If I understand you correctly, your definition of existence is:
- Something exists only if it can be objectively detected (i.e. there
is objective evidence for it).
It's not completely clear what is meant by "objective" but I suppose
you would agree that an objective detection or evidence is something
that a scientific instrument can record.
Let's not overlook the fact that the definition above results in an
infinite regression: after all in order to know whether the objective
evidence itself exists or not, we would need to obtain objective
evidence for it too. Let's solve this problem by claiming that only a
finite depth of recurring pieces of objective evidence is needed, like:
"Something exists only if there is objective evidence for the objective
evidence for the objective evidence for it."
as
Now, you are familiar with the type of logical argument called
"reduction ad absurdum", or in other words that no true statement can
imply absurdities. I think this also applies to definitions, after all
a definition that implies absurdities is not a very useful one. So
let's see what the definition above implies.
First of all, obviously, it implies that God does not exist. But that's
ok, many people think so anyway.
Further, it implies that beauty does not exist, after all it cannot be
objectively detected. We must assume that beauty exists only as
processes in the brain of the people who experience it. Therefore
beauty in any sense will disappear when the last person dies. (Of
course, everything exists as an idea, including God, the perpetuum
mobile, and pink unicorns - but here we are interested in existents
that exist as things by themselves.)
The definition above also implies that numbers do not exist, for they
cannot be objectively detected. Again they only exist as ideas in the
brains of people, i.e. as some particular structure of synapses or
maybe some specific electrochemical processes therefore. Therefore
numbers in any sense did not exist before the first mathematical
thought ever thought.
What about the curvature of space (as Einstein's general relativity
posits)? Does it exist? At first it may seem so, but observe that
Newton thought that space is flat, and some scientist in the future may
come up with a better theory than Einstein's and claim that space is
zig-zag, or maybe a fractal. Now, what objectively exists does not
shift in or out of existence depending the latest scientific theory, so
we recognize that the curvature of space does not really exist by
itself, but represents only a model: an idea within the brains of
scientists - it too exists only as electrochemical processes in
brains, and it too will cease to exist when the last person dies.
Generalizing the above argument we immediately see that physical laws
too do not exist. I am sure you can fill in the details.
What about physical objects that are not immediately visible to our
senses, such as an electron? Do electrons exist? Now, quantum mechanics
teaches that an electron is a wave that has a non-zero amplitude in all
points of physical space, i.e. when an electron moves it passes through
every single point of space, albeit with different probabilities. Now,
no such thing has been objectively detected (and no real existent does
such magical stuff) so electrons must also be models created in the
scientists' brains for explaining what truly exists, for example the
beeps of an electron detector.
Of course, one may naively think that an electron detector detects
electrons, and that electrons do exist and only the electron properties
do not really exist except as scientific models. Only it is absurd to
claim that something exists but its properties (i.e. whatever we know
about it) do not, so the only reasonable thing to do is to only accept
the existence of things that can be detected directly - and not only
indirectly. After all if we allow for indirect detection (e.g. that the
beep heard records an electron because of this or that scientific
argument) then we open a backdoor through which anything can be made to
exist. For example one could claim that a machine that records the
symmetry and other characteristics of a face, detects the beauty of
this face. Or that the fact that the electron detector can actually
display the number or beeps is evidence that numbers exist.
Actually, up to now we haven't detected a really absurd implication of
the above definition. Sure, it does imply that neither beauty, nor
numbers, nor curvature of space, nor physical laws, nor electrons
really exist, which does contradict the colloquial way we use the word
"exist", but you can dug in your heels and claim that these are all
indeed just ideas and exist only as physical structures in the brains
of people, and that we colloquially use the word "exist" in a
metaphorical sense.
Things really get hairy when one applies this definition on oneself.
For example your sense of redness cannot be objectively detected, so it
does not exist - even though very curiously you do see redness, which
means that in your waking hours you very often see something that does
not exist. Indeed your definition of existence implies that the whole
of your awareness does not exist (hence you denial of awareness). So
neither does your free will exist. Neither does your sense of self.
So, in what sense exactly do *you* exist? You may say that your body
exists, but how would you know that? After all, you are not aware of
your body (your awareness does not exist, remember?). But suppose you
used the curious argument that even though your awareness does not
exist you are aware of things. Even then you could not use your
awareness of your body to argue for its existence, because a) you are
also aware of redness while redness does not exist, b) it's all
subjective anyway. So, puff!, by your definition it seems you don't
exist anymore. And this is the absurd implication of your definition,
because you cannot think yourself out of existence. Descartes would be
appalled.
Incidentally there is one more argument why "I exist" and "My body
exists" cannot be equivalent statements: I am absolutely certain about
the former, but not absolutely certain about the latter (see the brain
in a vat thought experiment).
Now, let's leave that flawed definition behind, and reconsider how
matters stand. Physical existence is physical sciences' concern and
field of study. Existence in general though is one of the basic fields
of study of philosophy (called ontology). From Plato to Bertrand
Russell it was well known that physical existence does not exhaust
reality. (By reality I mean the set of all existents.) Here is what
Russell (the well known logician, philosopher, and mathematician, and
one of the brightest minds of the twentieth century) wrote when
discussing the nature of matter: "When it is said that light *is*
waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical cause of our
sensations of light. But light itself, the thing which seeing people
experience and blind people do not, is not supposed by science to form
any part of the world that is independent of us and our senses" [i.e.
the physical world]. Observe then that as he points out we use the word
"light" to denote two different things: a) light itself, i.e. our
subjective sensation (or sense-data as he put it) of light, and b) by
analogy what in the physical universe causes this sensation. Clear
thinking requires that we should not conflate the two. Russell goes on
to say that colors, sounds, and so on (i.e. all our sensations) are
absent from the scientific world of matter (see: "The Problems of
Philosophy" pag. 29 of the Oxford University Press paperback edition).
So if these parts of awareness called light, colors, sounds are absent
from the scientific world of matter, it means that the world of matter
does not exhaust everything there is. Russell, like the first modern
philosopher Descartes, taught that what we immediately know is our
subjective sense-data and that all other knowledge we discover is based
on these (as he carefully put it: "subjective things are the most
certain" - page 18 ibid). Indeed it is self-evident that we all start
with our subjective awareness and on this foundation we build the rest
of our knowledge including what we today colloquially call "objective"
knowledge. So to deny the existence of your awareness is not only
obviously impossible but also tantamount to denying your capacity for
knowing anything at all.
Now physicalism (or materialism, i.e. the ontological position that
everything is physical or that there are no kinds of things other than
physical things) is a very recent development mainly of the second half
of the twentieth century. It is so rife with paradoxes that it seems to
me that physicalism is less based on reason and more on a psychological
reaction to the great success of physics in the past century (created
by philosophers blinded by science like a deer by the headlight). The
many intents throughout the last decades to fit awareness within a
physicalist paradigm of reality has been so unsuccessful that one of
the more prominent members of that movement (David Chalmers) has
started proposing that consciousness must be considered a fundamental
principle of physical reality - which is another way to say that
consciousness does not fit in the physical universe that physics today
studies and that it is necessary to add something to our view of
physical reality in order to account for it. So it seems there is basic
agreement already and we are down to semantics: some say that
consciousness shows that reality is bigger than physical existence, and
some say that we must add something fundamental to physical existence
to account for consciousness.
So let come back to your last paragraph: I had written:

On the contrary. Awareness is the most momentous fact we know and I can
imagine no other thing as important to explain.

To which you responded:

It seems to me that by "fact" we denote knowledge that is completely
certain, at least for all practical purposes. By that measure
consciousness is the most factual of facts. The very existence of the
physical universe is less factual in comparison.
So, I would like to keep insisting that as consciousness is the most
momentous fact there is, intellectual honesty requires that we try to
understand it. (It's not important in the context of this post, but I
claim that the only way to understand consciousness is through the
concept of God. The fact that most religious claims are mythological,
superstitious or dogmatic is irrelevant, and should certainly not keep
us from this most momentous quest for understanding.)
Now, above I have criticized your definition of existence (at least as
I understood your thinking). It's easy enough to criticize when one is
not proposing something better. So here is the definition of existence
I would like to suggest:
- Something exists only when it explains something we experience.
I understand "explain" in the general sense of "making sense of", or of
detecting order or a pattern in the more superficial data of our
awareness. This can best be elucidated using examples from our own
experience and how we managed to make sense of it:
Let's go back to when we were newborn babies. At that time we couldn't
focus objects in front of our eyes; we were only aware of a soup of
visual stimuli. Little by little we discovered order in this visual
field, and - as we today know - we created synapses in our brain to
efficiently detect that order. For example we learned to quickly
organize the pixels of or visual field and detect the presence of, say,
an apple. So we learned to detect the "apple pattern" in our visual
field. Playing with apples, and with balls and stones and water, we
detected a deeper pattern, that of "things fall down". Later in school
we learned about gravity, which is an even deeper pattern in our
experience of the world around us (i.e. with more explanatory power)
than simply "things fall down". Gravity is not really a visible and
concrete pattern and it is therefore not really a physical object, but
is a deeper pattern that explains the how and the why of the movement
of more superficial patterns such like apples, stones, cannon balls, or
planets. Playing with the same kind of superficial patterns such as
stones and coins, we discovered (or were taught) other kind of patterns
related to counting and adding things together. The adding pattern is
indeed very conspicuous: every time we put three coins (or stones or
beans) together with two more coins (or stones or beans) and count the
elements in the resulting pile we always get five! This is a most
important pattern, deeper than the coin/stone/beans patterns because it
applies to all of them. We call this type of pattern depending on its
level of abstraction number, addition, or math.
Normally we say that all these patterns "exist", because they represent
relatively stable patterns in our field of awareness; they allow us to
make sense of the incredible variety of things we experience. Some are
superficial patterns like apples and coins, some are deeper like
gravity or numbers. Finally some patterns are so deep that they cannot
really be pointed at or taught about, but still represent levels of
organization we all manage to detect in our experience - such as
beauty. So we say that apples exist, gravity exists, numbers exist,
mathematical laws exist, and beauty exists.
The idea of "evidence" too represents a pattern, indeed a very deep
one. We empirically find that things do not exist independently of each
other, but normally interconnect and interlock with other patterns.
Therefore we expect the whole of reality to be interconnected. We get
immediately suspicious if something is claimed to exist simply hanging
in there by itself and with no apparent "connections" to other
existents. By the time we reach adulthood we have created a mental map
of reality that is a web like relation of patterns, and we expect any
further knowledge to extend that web or make it stronger. The fact that
atheists, for example, get so suspicious about the existence of God or
of beauty as things by themselves is that they don't detect the pattern
in the case of God, and they don't see how the pattern connects to
everything else that dominates their web of knowledge - the physical
universe - in the case of beauty.
Our thinking related to pattern recognition follows some patterns
itself - empirical patterns that we find help us think in a more
effective way. For example if A and B have roughly the same explanatory
power but B contradicts other existents we know, then we choose to
believe in the existence of A rather than of B. Similarly if A is
simpler than B we choose A (the Occam's razor). Also, B does not "fit"
as well with the web of the rest of existence then we choose A.
Finally, as a matter of fact, we often accept an existent on the power
of somebody else's opinion. So most people who accept that space is
curved do so because they trust scientists and not because they have
studied general relativity themselves and have directly experienced the
great explanatory power of curved space. Personally I believe that four
colors suffice to shade any flat map even though I haven't read the
relevant mathematical proof. Actually nobody really has, for it is
partly generated by computer, but I do trust the mathematicians who
worked on this, and they trust the computer. We simply know more about
existence than what we have time finding out ourselves. The web of
patterns that we find covers all reality is complemented by the web of
trust in the opinions of other people. In a way we think with more than
just our brain. That's maybe unfortunate but that's how it is.
As a final point, not all existence is equal, but depends on the myriad
factors we use to arrive at the relevant knowledge. The existence of
myself and the current state of my consciousness are absolutely
certain, but the existence of the physical universe is just a little
less then absolutely certain (we may exist as a brain in a vat). Going
very roughly from more certain to less certain existence we can point
at numbers, then beauty, then physical laws, then classical
near-experience physical objects such as apples, then galaxies, then
electrons, then curved space, then tachyons, then the ten spatial
dimensions of string theory, then the objects of dreams. The idea that
all existents can be neatly divided into two groups, objective things
whose existence is certain and subjective things whose existence is
not, is a gross oversimplification. It is also a very detrimental
belief, as often ontological discussions digress to fights about
objectivity.
Interestingly enough existential claims can be falsified even in those
cases where whether the claim is true or false would make not
difference whatsoever to what we experience. It is sufficient that
these claims make a difference to the quality of our understanding (for
example if we can apply the mental laws of non-contradiction,
simplicity and interconnectedness of reality to evaluate them).
Examples of such claims that are not experimentally falsifiable, but
can be evaluated nonetheless are:
- 1618 invisible dragons live in my garage (false)
- Only I am conscious and every other person is a zombie (false)
- The physical universe existed before anybody was around to think
about it (true)
- Everybody has the same subjective sense of redness (true, i.e. the
inverted spectrum hypothesis is wrong)
- The earth was created 6009 years ago including the much more ancient
looking fossils (false)
- We all exist within a computer simulation (false)
- We need a brain, or some comparable physical process, to be conscious
(false)
- Under general anesthesia we are fully conscious, even though several
parts of our brain are dormant and even though we cannot remember
anything afterwards (false)
- There is one absolute reality independent of our state of knowledge
of it (true)
- God exists (false or true - depending on the definition of God, see
bellow)
Now, if you think about each of these statements you'll see that it
makes absolutely no difference to what we experience right now whether
the statement is true or false. Nevertheless studying how well each of
these statements fits within our existing web of understanding we can
in principle decide whether the statement or its negation fits better.
Above I gave the truth values according to my own thinking; of course
you may disagree, but at least there is a common ground we can use to
discuss such disagreement. Also, above I simply recorded true or false,
leaving aside the important factor about how confident about each
judgment I am, i.e. how well each statement fits or does not fit within
the rest of my understanding. Fortunately most reasonable people would
agree about the basic features of this web of understanding (after all,
we assume that we experience life basically the same and that our
pattern detecting capabilities are similar), so I believe that the
above definition of existence can serve as the foundation for broad
agreement about these difficult ontological questions.
Now to the question of the existence of God. If by God we understand an
explanatory principle necessary for understanding the physical world,
then, after the recent advances of physics, we must conclude that God
does not exist. (The projected TOE - theory of everything - seems to be
completely different than the traditional descriptions of God.) If, on
the other hand, by God we understand an explanatory principle necessary
for understanding the whole of our experience (including our
consciousness, its qualities and structure) we must conclude that God
exists. A few comments: In either definition we posit that God is the
deepest pattern or the most overarching explanatory principle possible,
but the first definition is clearly inadequate because it overlooks a
huge part of reality. The second definition is the appropriate one, and
after some thinking the presence of God (the perfect being) becomes so
conspicuous that I would put my confidence in it higher than my
confidence in the existence of the physical universe. Incidentally the
advances of the physical sciences turn out to be helpful because they
teach were not to look for the God-pattern.
To finish this long post I would like to suggest a claim about
existence that is not falsifiable neither experimentally nor mentally:
- Things that exist (e.g. the physical world) would exist even if no
mind existed to know about that existence.
This statement may appear to make sense, but is in fact meaningless
because it claims knowledge about something (the existence of a thing)
while positing a context in which no knowledge is possible. That's
nonsensical. You cannot claim something where fundamentally nothing can
be known.
.

User: "someone4"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	14 Oct 2005 04:06:03 AM

someone4 wrote:

So given the definition you supplied:
"Determinism is the proposition in physics that every physical
event,
is causally determined by an unbroken chain of prior occurrences."

Bob wrote:

I never supplied any such definition.

Again sorry about the repeated posts, seem to be having trouble
supplying the correct link, hopefully this time it will work.
Yes you did, see
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/c3d868c4b9f87f15
Under where I gave the definition from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Determinism .
You said it was the definition according to QM. You now claim that
though QM doesn't actually fit the definition, that the definition is
wrong, and deny supplying it.
[snip rest of justification of why even though it doesn't fit the
definition of determinism that you supplied, but now deny, that QM is
determinisitic]
.

User: "Bob"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	14 Oct 2005 07:03:02 AM

On 14 Oct 2005 01:54:52 -0700, "someone4"
<glenn.spigel4@btinternet.com> wrote:

I never supplied any such definition.

Yes you did, see
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/browse_frm/thread/06649abc17bc9b2e/54eafdd01d8b0525#54eafdd01d8b0525

That link is not pointing to the post you want.
Please repost the entire context of my statement.
Because of the confusion surrounding the use of vague terms like
determinism, I will concede that even I sometimes make a statement
that is not as clear as I want. I would rather we avoid using these
terms and concentrate on the real issue, which is casuality.
Ultimately what it comes down to is the justification of acasuality in
QM because of intrinsically unknown quantities. Notice I did not have
to use either the word "determinism" or "random".
By now you should know precisely what I mean by "intrinsically
unknowable", having spent the past week discussing just about every
aspect there is to discuss on this and other threads. Suffice it to
say that a quantity that is intrinsically unknowable is also correctly
described as being "truly random". But most importantly, it means
"uncomputable" in the Church-Turing sense and in the Chaitin sense
that no algorithm exists that is substantially smaller than the number
itself. IOW, these intrinsically unknowable quantities are that way
because there is no way to compute them. That means they are
irrelevent to the process under consideration, because they can't and
they don't contribute to the evolution of the wave function.
The real question revolves around causality. Forget about vague terms
like determinism, which has a different meaning in classical physics
than it does in quantum physics. Leave out the equally vague term
"random". Those terms only confuses things.
Does the existence of intrinsically unknowable quantities mean that
the process which is being considered acausal. I maintain that it does
not, that regardless of the existence of intrinsically unknowable
quantities, causality is fully operational. The process evolves
according to the wave function which is calculated using the
Schrodinger Equation which employs Unitary operators. The use of
Unitary operators guaranteed that causality is preserved in the wave
function.
In classical physics we can, in principle, calculate the cause and
effect behavior of every participant. But in QM we find that such
details are intrinsically unknowable as well as being irrelevant. It
makes no difference as far as the wave function is concerned which
particles are involved at the detailed level, as long as some
particles are involved. The fact that some particles are involved in
causal behavior is what preserves causality even when QM does not
provide the kinds of details we expect from classical processes.
If you have such a large number of Vacuum fluctuations that it appears
infinite compared to the Universe, then what possible difference does
it make which fluctuations are the cause of a particular instance of
radioactive decay? We know there must be some fluctuations
responsible, and since any one of those in the Vaccum qualify as
candidates for that role (as long as they obey the Schrodinger
Equation), it makes no difference which ones it is.
It makes no difference if Joe or Harry dipped Suzie's pigtails in the
ink well. Her hair is full of ink because some boy did it, and that
fact of reality makes no difference who the specific culprit is.
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	14 Oct 2005 08:09:41 AM

(Bob) wrote in
news:434f9a0e.628531@news-server.houston.rr.com:

Because of the confusion surrounding the use of vague terms like
determinism, I will concede that even I sometimes make a statement
that is not as clear as I want. I would rather we avoid using these
terms and concentrate on the real issue, which is casuality.
Ultimately what it comes down to is the justification of acasuality in
QM because of intrinsically unknown quantities. Notice I did not have
to use either the word "determinism" or "random".

Way back near the beginning of this thread I suggested a terminology for
resolving this confusion. I.e., a system is:
1. *Strongly deterministic* if it is fully causal (all states of the system
are functions of previous states) AND those future states are predictable
in principle (future states could be predicted without exceeding the
resources available in the system). This is the "classical" (LaPlacian)
position;
2. *Weakly deterministic* if is is fully causal, but not predictable in
principle. This is the position adopted by most modern physicists;
3. *Very weakly deterministic* if it largely causal, but admits of some
uncaused events.
Now the problem is, if the system is not predictable (not strongly
deterministic), then unless the causes of all detected events are known
empirically, it is not possible to distinguish system #2 from system #3.
.

User: "Bob"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	14 Oct 2005 09:33:51 AM

On Fri, 14 Oct 2005 08:09:41 -0500, Publius
<m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

Way back near the beginning of this thread I suggested a terminology for
resolving this confusion. I.e., a system is:

The problem is that for everyone else these ad hoc terms are more
confusing than the original. The best thing is not to use vague terms,
because they are not useful. Their use shows sloppy thinking.
.

User: "Dianelos Georgoudis"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	17 Oct 2005 04:47:02 AM

Publius wrote:

spam@uce.gov (Bob) wrote in
news:434f9a0e.628531@news-server.houston.rr.com:

Way back near the beginning of this thread I suggested a terminology for
resolving this confusion. I.e., a system is:

1. *Strongly deterministic* if it is fully causal (all states of the system
are functions of previous states) AND those future states are predictable
in principle (future states could be predicted without exceeding the
resources available in the system). This is the "classical" (LaPlacian)
position;

2. *Weakly deterministic* if is is fully causal, but not predictable in
principle. This is the position adopted by most modern physicists;

3. *Very weakly deterministic* if it largely causal, but admits of some
uncaused events.

Now the problem is, if the system is not predictable (not strongly
deterministic), then unless the causes of all detected events are known
empirically, it is not possible to distinguish system #2 from system #3.

For me determinism is a simple concept expressing the idea that the
future of a system is fixed, i.e. that there can be only one future for
there is only one possibility open for the system's evolution. For
example, some people (including Einstein) find reason to believe that
the physical universe is deterministic - our sense of free will and
what QM on its face says notwithstanding.
Causality seems to me to be a more synthetic notion, and therefore I
think it's a bad idea to define determinism in function of causality.
For example, one often reads that causality means that every event has
a previous cause. But a photon passing through the left slit in the two
slits experiment does have a previous cause, namely the shooting of the
photon. Nevertheless there are two possible futures: the photon passing
through the left or through the right slit. So a universe can be both
causal and non deterministic (according to the above definitions).
Therefore we must distinguish between two types of causality. The above
definition is about "necessary causality". It seems to me that
determinism is equivalent only to "sufficient causality", defined as
that every event has a previous cause that is sufficient (for bringing
about this event).
Taking all this into account I would like to suggest the following
definitions, in relation to any system (and observe that they do not
depend on the notion of causality):
1. Determinism means that the system can evolve only through one
future; i.e. the future of the system is fixed.
1a. Practically predictable determinism means that the system's future
is fixed and can be predicted in praxis.
1b. Theoretically predictable determinism means that the system's
future is fixed, but can only be predictable in principle, and not in
praxis. ("In principle" can mean "absolutely or logically impossible"
or merely "impossibly according to the resources and laws of physical
reality", so we could specify some sub-classes here.)
1c. Weakly predictable determinism means that the system's future is
fixed, but it is praxis possible to make some predictions about its
future (e.g. probabilistic predictions).
1d. Null predictable determinism means that the system's future is
fixed, but it is impossible, even in principle, to make any kind of
predictions.
2. Indeterminism means that the system can evolve through different
futures; i.e. the future of the system is not fixed.
2a. Null predictable indeterminism means that the system can evolve
through different futures and we can't predict anything about how it
will evolve even in principle.
2b. Theoretically predictable indeterminism means that the system can
evolve through different futures and that we can only in principle but
not in praxis predict some things about how it will evolve.
2c. Weakly predictable indeterminism means that even though the system
can evolve through different futures we can in praxis predict some
things about how it will evolve.
Examples I can think of:
Practically predictive determinism is found in counting, the decimal
expansion of pi up to a point, and in most systems of Newtonian
mechanics.
Theoretically predictable determinism is found in some mathematical
"undecidable" problems such as the halting problem.
Weakly predictable determinism is found in chaotic systems and in some
the interpretations of quantum mechanics.
I cannot find a good example of null predictable determinism. Maybe it
exists in some theological ideas of predetermination.
Absolute indeterminism is found in a fully random mathematical
variable, e.g. whether the tossing of a coin will come heads or tails.
I cannot find any example of theoretically predictable indeterminism.
Weakly predictable indeterminism is found in most mathematical models
of randomness (e.g. the tossing of a thousand coins), in statistical
models of physical reality, and in some interpretations of quantum
mechanics.
Now in the context of the physical universe, and depending on one's
ontological position about physical reality, modern science teaches
that that it is either a case of weakly predictable determinism or of
weakly predictable indeterminism. As far as calculations are concerned
the distinction is irrelevant.
Personally, and thinking from within the physicalist paradigm of
reality, I embrace the view of an indeterministic universe because:
a) It removes some problems related to free will. Consciousness is
already hard enough for physicalism to burden it with one more
problematic aspect.
b) It removes the requirement to assume that information was almost
infinitely compressed at the big bang.
c) It removes a contradiction I see with the second law of
thermodynamics.
d) It is more consistent with what at least superficially quantum
experiments tell us.
e) Does not avoid paradoxes in QM - nothing apparently does within
physicalism - but at least simplifies (for my taste) the understanding
of quantum mechanics.
f) Gives me a very elegant view of the physical universe: everything at
quantum sizes is random and acausal, and even so almost everything at
my size seems to be orderly and causal. Apparent physical order and
causality become emergent phenomena of a random and acausal reality. So
the world we observe ourselves seems highly orderly and even so in
principle everything remains possible, and everything can be broken
albeit at low probability. So there is a non-zero probability of the
statue of Liberty suddenly materializing in Tiananmen Square, and of
the moon suddenly turning into cheese. But if no physical facts are
absolutely certain, can physical laws be far behind? Now physics has
not yet been unified, but I speculate that no physical law is absolute,
so E=mc2 holds only probabilistically too. Not only is this fun, it
also resonates well with my sense of how a complex universe should be.
I wonder if some time down the road we might not find that a
deterministic universe following absolute laws cannot exceed some
particular measure of complexity.
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	17 Oct 2005 04:43:09 PM

"Dianelos Georgoudis" <dianelos@tecapro.com> wrote in
news:1129542422.199208.274590@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com:

That system would be "fully causal."

Causality seems to me to be a more synthetic notion, and therefore I
think it's a bad idea to define determinism in function of causality.
For example, one often reads that causality means that every event has
a previous cause. But a photon passing through the left slit in the
two slits experiment does have a previous cause, namely the shooting
of the photon. Nevertheless there are two possible futures: the photon
passing through the left or through the right slit. So a universe can
be both causal and non deterministic (according to the above
definitions).

I think we are agreeing so far, in substance. But causality and determinism
are interdefined; one is not more "synthetic" than the other. There are
only two senses (as far as I know) in which the evolution of a system can
be said to be "fixed:" 1) if all events are caused by prior ones, or 2) all
events are scripted in advance. In the latter case state A is not the cause
of state B; A and B have nothing essential to do with each other. Rather,
both A and B are called for by the script. In the next run C could follow
A. None of the states are caused by any prior state. They are all
determined by the (external) script. So if you adopt predestination, you
can dispense with the notion of causality, except for the causal relation
between the script and the system ("God is the cause of all things").
If you don't like predestination, then you need causes operating inside the
system (events causing other events) for its evolution to be "fixed."
The system you describe above would be "very weakly deterministic" per the
def. I suggested. The system is causal, but not fully causal. Emitting the
photon is only a partial cause of the appearance of the photon at the left
slit. The remaining causal factors (if any) are unknown.

Therefore we must distinguish between two types of
causality. The above definition is about "necessary causality". It
seems to me that determinism is equivalent only to "sufficient
causality", defined as that every event has a previous cause that is
sufficient (for bringing about this event).

"Sufficient causality" is the same thing I've been calling "fully causal"
(I think).

Taking all this into account I would like to suggest the following
definitions, in relation to any system (and observe that they do not
depend on the notion of causality):

1. Determinism means that the system can evolve only through one
future; i.e. the future of the system is fixed.

1a. Practically predictable determinism means that the system's future
is fixed and can be predicted in praxis.

1b. Theoretically predictable determinism means that the system's
future is fixed, but can only be predictable in principle, and not in
praxis. ("In principle" can mean "absolutely or logically impossible"
or merely "impossibly according to the resources and laws of physical
reality", so we could specify some sub-classes here.)

1c. Weakly predictable determinism means that the system's future is
fixed, but it is praxis possible to make some predictions about its
future (e.g. probabilistic predictions).

1d. Null predictable determinism means that the system's future is
fixed, but it is impossible, even in principle, to make any kind of
predictions.

2. Indeterminism means that the system can evolve through different
futures; i.e. the future of the system is not fixed.

2a. Null predictable indeterminism means that the system can evolve
through different futures and we can't predict anything about how it
will evolve even in principle.

2b. Theoretically predictable indeterminism means that the system can
evolve through different futures and that we can only in principle but
not in praxis predict some things about how it will evolve.

2c. Weakly predictable indeterminism means that even though the system
can evolve through different futures we can in praxis predict some
things about how it will evolve.

I think your defs do depend upon the notion of causality, but that it is
left implicit. If the evolution of the system is fixed, partly or
completely, something must fix it. What your defs do, though, is leave
predestination in the picture, while mine did not.
It is interesting, though, that all your defs depend upon predictability. I
think that (accurately) reflects the fact the without predictability, the
only way we can make sense of the concept of determinism is via
predestination. Bob, and physicists generally, wish to separate causality
from predictability.

I cannot find a good example of null predictable determinism. Maybe it
exists in some theological ideas of predetermination.

Ha! :-)

I cannot find any example of theoretically predictable indeterminism.

Of course not. Indeterminism and unpredictability are related
biconditionally.

Now in the context of the physical universe, and depending on one's
ontological position about physical reality, modern science teaches
that that it is either a case of weakly predictable determinism or of
weakly predictable indeterminism. As far as calculations are concerned
the distinction is irrelevant.

Yes. What matters is the degree of predictability. One can sensibly claim a
system is determined (fixed, fully causal) only to the extent that it is
predictable.

Apparent physical order and
causality become emergent phenomena of a random and acausal reality.

That is Zurek's view. Classical phenomena are emergent structures in a
random or chaotic substrate.
http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0405161

So the world we observe ourselves seems highly orderly and even so in
principle everything remains possible, and everything can be broken
albeit at low probability. So there is a non-zero probability of the
statue of Liberty suddenly materializing in Tiananmen Square, and of
the moon suddenly turning into cheese. But if no physical facts are
absolutely certain, can physical laws be far behind? Now physics has
not yet been unified, but I speculate that no physical law is
absolute, so E=mc2 holds only probabilistically too. Not only is this
fun, it also resonates well with my sense of how a complex universe
should be. I wonder if some time down the road we might not find that
a deterministic universe following absolute laws cannot exceed some
particular measure of complexity.

The N-body problem should provide a clue.
.

User: "Bob"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	18 Oct 2005 08:24:41 AM

On Mon, 17 Oct 2005 16:43:09 -0500, Publius
<m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

There are
only two senses (as far as I know) in which the evolution of a system can
be said to be "fixed:" 1) if all events are caused by prior ones, or 2) all
events are scripted in advance. In the latter case state A is not the cause
of state B; A and B have nothing essential to do with each other. Rather,
both A and B are called for by the script.

That's called "correlation" and is a phenomenon of QM.
Pauli's Exclusion Principle prevents any two Fermions from occupying
the same quantum state at the same time. A Fermion can be identified
from its half-integer spin, such as an electron. Those particles with
full-integer spin, such as a photon, are called Bosons and can occupy
the same quantum state.
This property of Fermions leads to some extremely important physical
effects. One of them is the periodic table of the elements. Another is
"correlation" which, for example, alters the behavior of electrons in
metals and semiconductors. Correlation is a collective phenomenon - so
there is no way to identify which particle is responsible for the
behavior of any other particle.
This is why using the classical definition of determinism is confusing
in QM. That is why Quantum Determinism falls back on the wave function
for its meaning. As long as the wave function is well-defined for each
point in time, the system is deemed to be Quantum Deterministic.
That's because the wave function contains all the information about
the system that is knowable.
The fact that QM yields intrinsically unknowable quantities and
therefore makes classical determinism meaningless does not mean that
causality is not operative. In QM the notion of causality takes on a
different meaning than in classical physics. In QM causality generally
means that the wave function obeys the conservation laws. It does not
mean that we can know if particle A is directly responsible for the
behavior of particle B, because that is not how the wave function
describes the behavior of the system.
If want to know how a particular electron in a conductor or
semiconductor behaves, the best you can do is accept the results of QM
regarding the effects of correlation, among other things. The best you
can say is that the electron system comprised of all the electrons
behaved collectively in a particular manner which is called
correlation. It is not possible to require a classical description -
and it is wrong to conclude that because you can't that causality is
not operative.
Causality is fully operative but it is not the kind you are used to in
classical physics. Imagine that drum full of BBs hitting one another
as the drum rotates. When one of the BBs comes out of the drum thru
that small hole in the side, all you can really say is that the entire
collection of BBs inside caused that to happen. You know that there
was, however, a precise causal chain, but you cannot compute it
because there is no computer big enough to do the calculation.
In the case of QM, you cannot discover the causal chain because there
is no causal chain per se. What there is that is different from
classical physics is a cooperative effect of participants to cause the
effect. It is literally true that any particular radioactive atom
decays because of the cooperative effect of all the fluctuations in
the Vacuum. There is no A -> B -> C causal chain. There is only
{A,B,C...Z ad infinitum} acting collectively to cause the decay.
The fact that the discrete picture of classical physics is replaced by
the collective picture of QM is one of the fundamental reasons why QM
is to radically different from classical physics. But that's what
happens when you rely on a "wave" function to describe the behavior of
the system. These "waves" are collective, not discrete. The interact
with one another to all orders, whereas discrete particles are usually
restricted to nearest neighbors and perhaps a small distance beyond.
In a very real sense, when you witness something like the decay of a
radioactive atom, you can say that the reason that happened is because
of the collective behavior of the entire Universe. No longer is
causality confined to local settings. All the fluctuations in the
entire Vacuum are described by the wave function and therefore all you
can say is that all the fluctuations in the Vacuum CAUSED the decay to
happen.
You are never going to understand any of this if you continue to
insist that physical reality behave classically. Your classical
notions of determinism and causality are not going to work for QM. So
give it up and learn some real QM - then you will see that causality
is fully operative on a grand scale, namely the entire Universe
participates collectively thru the wave function to cause every single
event that happens.
There is another Universe-wide phenomenon in Relativity - inertia.
According to Mach's Principle, inertia is caused by the mass of the
entire Universe, and most of that inertia is caused by mass at the
outer extent of the Universe. The inertia due to our Galaxy alone is
extremely small.
So modern physics paints an entirely different picture of how the
Universe behaves, one which defies classical descriptions including
those of determinism and causality.
In the next run C could follow

A. None of the states are caused by any prior state. They are all
determined by the (external) script. So if you adopt predestination, you
can dispense with the notion of causality, except for the causal relation
between the script and the system ("God is the cause of all things").

If you don't like predestination, then you need causes operating inside the
system (events causing other events) for its evolution to be "fixed."

The system you describe above would be "very weakly deterministic" per the
def. I suggested. The system is causal, but not fully causal. Emitting the
photon is only a partial cause of the appearance of the photon at the left
slit. The remaining causal factors (if any) are unknown.

"Sufficient causality" is the same thing I've been calling "fully causal"
(I think).

I think your defs do depend upon the notion of causality, but that it is
left implicit. If the evolution of the system is fixed, partly or
completely, something must fix it. What your defs do, though, is leave
predestination in the picture, while mine did not.

It is interesting, though, that all your defs depend upon predictability. I
think that (accurately) reflects the fact the without predictability, the
only way we can make sense of the concept of determinism is via
predestination. Bob, and physicists generally, wish to separate causality
from predictability.

I cannot find a good example of null predictable determinism. Maybe it
exists in some theological ideas of predetermination.

Ha! :-)

I cannot find any example of theoretically predictable indeterminism.

Of course not. Indeterminism and unpredictability are related
biconditionally.

Yes. What matters is the degree of predictability. One can sensibly claim a
system is determined (fixed, fully causal) only to the extent that it is
predictable.

Apparent physical order and
causality become emergent phenomena of a random and acausal reality.

That is Zurek's view. Classical phenomena are emergent structures in a
random or chaotic substrate.

http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0405161

The N-body problem should provide a clue.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	19 Oct 2005 03:54:50 AM

(Bob) wrote in
news:4354f184.71816265@news-server.houston.rr.com:

If want to know how a particular electron in a conductor or
semiconductor behaves, the best you can do is accept the results of QM
regarding the effects of correlation, among other things. The best you
can say is that the electron system comprised of all the electrons
behaved collectively in a particular manner which is called
correlation. It is not possible to require a classical description -
and it is wrong to conclude that because you can't that causality is
not operative.

Causality is fully operative but it is not the kind you are used to in
classical physics.

I have snipped much of the QM stuff because I have no quarrel with it.
The problem here is that both causality and determinism are classical
concepts. The concept of causality holds that a distinct, discriminable
event may have a distinct, discriminable cause. For two events related in
that way, the causal event, when fully specified, is *sufficient* to
produce the effect --- it will yield the effect each and every time. It
is not *necessary* to produce the effect, since a given effect may have
more than one cause.
We have fully specified a cause when we can produce the desired effect
with it on each and every trial. Once we are able to do that, any further
specification of the causal event would be superfluous.
Determinism, classically understood, is the thesis that *every*
determinate, discriminable event has a cause, as defined above. Hence for
every event E we are able to discriminate (distinguish from another
event), we should be able to find a corresponding distinct, discriminable
causal event C, and we should be able to specify that causal event
precisely enough to reliably generate E. It is not enough to specify C
with only enough precision that we can reliably generate some one of a
set of events, say, E1 through E10. As long as we can distinguish among
E1, E2, and the other members of that set, until we can select exactly
which one will be produced, we have not fully specified C for those E's.
Causality does not imply determinism. Determinism is a metaphysical or
scientific thesis about causality. Denying determinism does not entail
denying causality; denying determinism is only to deny what the
determinist thesis specifically states: that each and every discriminable
event has distinct, discriminable cause.
What distinguishes metaphysical from scientific determinism (classically
understood) is predictability. Being able to predict an event given a
prior event is a substitute for actually observing the relationship
between the two events. If we have a method for predicting events, and we
validate that method by observing that events occur as predicted (all
that we try), then we have grounds for believing other events within the
scope of the method are determinate as well. In other words, we have a
theory that passes every test we give it.
If we can neither observe the causal antecedent of an event, nor reliably
predict those events with a validated theory, then continuing to claim
they have causes (that they are determined) ceases to be a scientific
thesis. It is only a metaphysical one.
The problem (from the point of view of classical determinism) with QM is
that it does not specify causal events precisely enough. We can specify a
cause for a set of events. But we cannot select which member of that set
the cause will yield. Yet, we can discriminate among those members; we
can tell them apart. So from a classical point of view, that cause has
not been fully specified.
I understand (as does DG, I'm sure) what "quantum determinism" states and
implies. But the method underdetermines outcomes. It does not permit us
to predict which slit the photon will pass through on each and every
trial, for each and every photon. It can predict a great deal, but until
it can predict each and every discriminable event, we are not entitled to
conclude that the system is (classically) deterministic.
Now I'm sure you'll agree that the system is not classically
deterministic; you'll say that it is quantum deterministic. And so it is.
But quantum determinism is a rather less bold and thus less interesting
thesis.
There is a way, however, to preserve for quantum determinism all the
"boldness" of classical determinism. That would happen if it could never
make any difference which slit the photon passes through --- that all
events "downline" from the passage through the slit must be the same,
regardless of which slit is traversed. (That was the point of my cat
example, not superimposed states ala Copenhagen). Would you argue that is
the case?

You are never going to understand any of this if you continue to
insist that physical reality behave classically.

No! The universe, to all appearances, does NOT behave classically. That
is a given. We do not disagree about that. The only thing we are
disagreeing about is whether we can properly describe it using such
classical terms as "deterministic" and even "causality." Rather than try
to redefine those terms, as some QM theorists wish to do, better to admit
(it seems to me) that the universe is indeterminsitic and that some
events may not have causes. And then accept it for what it is.

So modern physics paints an entirely different picture of how the
Universe behaves, one which defies classical descriptions including
those of determinism and causality.

Agreed. :-)
.

User: "Bob"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	19 Oct 2005 08:24:07 AM

On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 03:54:50 -0500, Publius
<m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

The concept of causality holds that a distinct, discriminable
event may have a distinct, discriminable cause.

That's the classical meaning - it is not the quantum meaning.
In QM there are no "distinct, discriminable" anything. That's because
the evolution of the system is determined by the wave function, which
takes all possible contributing factors into account at the same time.

The problem (from the point of view of classical determinism) with QM is
that it does not specify causal events precisely enough.

You have stated that backwards. The correct statement is that QM
specifies all that can be known about a system. If QM does not specify
a quantity, then it is because that quantity cannot be specified.
QM tell us that there are intrinsically unknowable quantities, but we
don't accept it because we insist on hanging on to the old classical
picture of the Universe where in principle we are able to know
everything we want to know about a process. QM says that for certain
processes, called "quantum mechanical processes" that is not possible.
That is not just an epistemological statement but an ontological
statement as well. The intrinsic unknowability is not a flaw of QM, it
is an ontological fact of the real objective world. The reason for
intrinsically unknowable quantities is because there is no algorithm
for doing the computation. Reality does not yield information about
intrinsically unknowable quantities because there is no information
possible.
The process involved is such that the intrinsically unknowable
quantity is irrelevant. For example, it makes no difference to the
process of radioactive decay which particular atoms decay, only that
some atoms decay. That is not true for classical processes where the
exact details of A -> B -> C are crucial to the process. QM says that
some quantities are not important in detail.
We can specify a

cause for a set of events. But we cannot select which member of that set
the cause will yield. Yet, we can discriminate among those members; we
can tell them apart. So from a classical point of view, that cause has
not been fully specified.

You are thinking backwards. Instead of attempting to focus on what you
claim is a single cause and then track it to the single event is
causes, in QM you must accept that the entire set of all causes is
responsible for the event. All the fluctuations of the Vacuum
participate in the decay process. The wave function is the sum of all
causes.

But quantum determinism is a rather less bold and thus less interesting
thesis.

That's only because you do not understand QM.
Try calculating the energy lineshape for photons emitted in
radioactive decay using classical methods. You can't do it. Yet QM
rather easily provides the answer, a Lorentzian lineshape with a width
parameter related to the reciprocal half-life of the isotope.
Quantum determinism is far more interesting than classical
determinism.
--
If you build a man a fire and he will be warm for a day. If you
set a man on fire, he will be warm for the rest of his life.
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	19 Oct 2005 04:29:05 PM

(Bob) wrote in news:4356443c.64229078@news-
server.houston.rr.com:

Try calculating the energy lineshape for photons emitted in
radioactive decay using classical methods. You can't do it. Yet QM
rather easily provides the answer, a Lorentzian lineshape with a width
parameter related to the reciprocal half-life of the isotope.

I agree. So abandom the classical terms instead of re-defining them.
.

User: "Bob"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	19 Oct 2005 08:03:54 AM

On Wed, 19 Oct 2005 03:54:50 -0500, Publius
<m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:

Causality is fully operative but it is not the kind you are used to in
classical physics.

The problem here is that both causality and determinism are classical
concepts.

The problem is you insist on claiming that causality and determinism
are only classical concepts. You won't accept the fact that quantum
causality and quantum determinism are perfectly well defined.
Once you overcome this problem, you will begin understanding what
causality and determinism in QM are all about. Until then, you will
continue to thrash about like a fish out of water.
--
If you build a man a fire and he will be warm for a day. If you
set a man on fire, he will be warm for the rest of his life.
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	19 Oct 2005 04:22:19 PM

(Bob) wrote in news:43564389.64049843@news-
server.houston.rr.com:

The problem here is that both causality and determinism are classical
concepts.

The problem is you insist on claiming that causality and determinism
are only classical concepts. You won't accept the fact that quantum
causality and quantum determinism are perfectly well defined.

Aaaargh! Of course they are well-defined. That is not the problem. The
problem is that, as defined, they underspecify a system. You're trying to
re-define a couple of classical concepts in such a way as to sweep that
underspecification under the rug. What is the point? Why not just give them
up?
We already agree that "reality" (per the best theories we have) is not
classical. So why insist on applying classical terms to it, and then re-
define them to make them fit?
.

User: "Bob"
Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]	17 Oct 2005 07:51:07 AM

On 17 Oct 2005 02:47:02 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dianelos@tecapro.com> wrote:

That's the classical definition of determinism, which applies to
classical systems in principle. But it is not the quantum definition.
In QM the wave function is claimed to be the repositiory of all
information about the system that can be known. It is