| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"maff" |
| Date: |
15 May 2004 03:51:40 AM |
| Object: |
OT: Our moral Waterloo |
Our moral Waterloo
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1217365,00.html
The claims of western values are mocked by Iraq and the rise of Asia
Martin Jacques
Saturday May 15, 2004
The Guardian
Underpinning the argument in support of the invasion of Iraq has been
the idea of the moral virtue of the west. In contrast to Saddam
Hussein's brutal dictatorship, the "coalition" espouses the values of
democracy and human rights. The invasion of Iraq represented the high
watermark of western moral virtue. In retrospect, it is clear that the
idea had been gaining momentum since two coincidental events in the
1970s: the end of the Vietnam war, which profoundly scarred the
reputation of the United States, and the beginning of the modern era
of globalisation. With Vietnam out of the way, and globalisation the
new bearer of western and, above all, American values, the latter
found an ever-expanding global audience, a process enormously boosted
by the collapse of communism.
Martin Jacques
http://groups.google.com/groups?hl=en&lr=&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&selm=18510aff.0312040126.11733e9b%40posting.google.com
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| User: "stoney" |
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| Title: Re: OT: Our moral Waterloo |
17 May 2004 09:42:19 AM |
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On 15 May 2004 01:51:40 -0700, (maff), Message ID:
<18510aff.0405150051.4beec24a@posting.google.com> wrote in alt.atheism;
Our moral Waterloo
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1217365,00.html
Comment
Our moral Waterloo
The claims of western values are mocked by Iraq and the rise of Asia
Martin Jacques
Saturday May 15, 2004
The Guardian
Underpinning the argument in support of the invasion of Iraq has been
the idea of the moral virtue of the west. In contrast to Saddam
Hussein's brutal dictatorship, the "coalition" espouses the values of
democracy and human rights. The invasion of Iraq represented the high
watermark of western moral virtue. In retrospect, it is clear that the
idea had been gaining momentum since two coincidental events in the
1970s: the end of the Vietnam war, which profoundly scarred the
reputation of the United States, and the beginning of the modern era of
globalisation. With Vietnam out of the way, and globalisation the new
bearer of western and, above all, American values, the latter found an
ever-expanding global audience, a process enormously boosted by the
collapse of communism.
Democracy and the market became the new western mantra, applicable to
every society, wherever they might be and whatever their stage of
development. Following its implosion, the former communist world, at
least in Europe, gratefully embraced the new philosophy, even though in
Russia it was to prove a disaster, as Roman Abramovich's monstrous,
ill-gotten wealth only serves to illustrate. The process of
globalisation came to be seen, during the 90s, as virtually synonymous
with westernisation. There was one model of modernity - the western
model - and globalisation was its natural vehicle. As East Asia has
modernised at breakneck speed over the past three decades, its progress
has almost invariably been interpreted as a simple process of
westernisation.
After the collapse of communism, the victorious US increasingly came to
see itself as the saviour of the world, and the arbiter - in extremis -
of each and every nation's future. If this proposition was less explicit
during the Clinton era, it became the organising principle of the Bush
regime. Where nations were not prepared to bend to the American will,
they were classified as "rogue states" and threatened with force. Barely
had the world entered the 21st century when it found itself returning to
a century earlier and the exercise of naked imperialism - all in the
name, as a century earlier, of western moral virtue.
Such was the shift in the ideological climate that the new imperialism
gained a band of adherents from the liberal wing of politics, as it had
in the late 19th century. They not only regarded the US as the only game
in town; more importantly, they saw it as the embodiment of virtue in a
failed or failing world. Michael Ignatieff, one of this new breed of
liberal imperialists, argues in his recent book, Empire: "The movements
of national liberation that swept through the African and Asian worlds
in the 1950s, seeking emancipation from colonial rule, have now run
their course and in many cases have failed to deliver on their promise
to rule more fairly than the colonial oppressors of the past." And
later: "For every nationalist struggle that succeeds in giving its
people self-determination and dignity, there are more that only deliver
their people up to a self-immolating slaughter, terror, enforced
partition and failure."
Historically speaking, this is nonsense. Asia is home to 60% of the
world's population and has few failing states: in East Asia, where
one-third live, there are almost none, and many extremely successful
ones. But let that pass. Ignatieff perfectly illustrates the belief in
western moral virtue: the newly-independent world (viz, the societies of
other races and cultures) has largely failed, consequently it is the
US's moral duty, and historic mission, to save these nations from
themselves. For half a century, following the second world war and the
rise of the anti-colonial movement, only diehard colonialists would have
voiced such sentiments - such has the ideological wheel turned.
But for how long? Iraq has proved a rude awakening. Already the west has
been reminded by growing Iraqi resistance of the forgotten lesson of the
anti-colonial period, that people of different races and cultures do not
want to be ruled by an alien power from the other side of the world.
Meanwhile, the revelations of widespread criminal behaviour by American
and British troops are a poignant illustration of the fact that "western
moral virtue" is only one element of the western story.
President Bush claimed last week: "People seeing those pictures didn't
understand the true nature and heart of America." On the contrary, they
are an integral part of its "true nature and heart": a society that was
built on the destruction of the indigenous peoples; that practised
racial segregation until 40 years ago; that still incarcerates many of
its young black people; that killed hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese;
that has a messianic belief in the applicability of its own values to
the rest of the world; that is willing to impose its model by force;
that believes itself to be above international law. These too are
American values. In this light, the behaviour of the US forces,
nurturing a deep sense of racial superiority combined with a disdain for
international law, is entirely predictable.
The growing sense of crisis that now pervades the Anglo-American
occupation of Iraq could well herald a global shift in perceptions about
the "moral virtue of the west". The idea that the coalition was a force
for liberation rather than occupation is already a distant memory and is
becoming more absurd by the day. There is, though, another and different
reason that may lie behind such a growing shift in perceptions. The
emergence of the US as the world's sole superpower, which has commanded
such worldwide attention, represents only one aspect of a much more
complex global picture.
The sudden collapse of European communism, together with US military
might and the emergence of the Bush doctrine, has served to highlight
the extraordinary power of the US. But another trend over the past
quarter-century, which is at least as important - and, in the longer
run, is likely to be more important - is the economic rise of East Asia,
above all China, and also India, which between them constitute almost
40% of the world's population. The power and influence of western values
was a consequence of, and has ultimately always depended upon, the
economic strength of the west. The rise of China as a key global player,
and probably the next superpower, will be the prelude to the growing
global influence of Chinese values. Further down the road, the same can
be said of India.
Western hubris hitherto has seen the economic growth of these countries
as simply an affirmation of growing western influence. Countless BBC
news items coo about how western the Chinese are becoming. Well, yes, in
some respects, but in others not at all. Modernity is not just composed
of technology and markets, it is embedded in and shaped by culture. We
will slowly wake up to the fact that the west no longer has a monopoly
of modernity - that there are other modernities, not just ours. The
story of the next quarter-century will not simply be about American
hyper-power, but the rise of Asian power and values.
The invasion of Iraq may well come to be seen as the apogee of the idea
of the "moral virtue of the west". One year of occupation has already
profoundly eroded that claim. If 9/11 and its aftermath - not to mention
Ignatieff and kindred spirits - suggest that we have entered a simple
world of American power and moral virtue, a more balanced view of global
development suggests that we stand on the eve of a very different world,
in which western values will be contested far more vigorously than at
any time since the rise of Europe five centuries ago. It is true, of
course, that communism, especially in its heyday, represented a profound
challenge to western values, but the nature of this threat was always
political rather than cultural: and culture is far more powerful than
politics.
· Martin Jacques is a visiting fellow at the London School of Economics
Asian Research Centre
martinjacques1@aol.com
(c) 2004 Guardian Newspapers
Stoney
"Designated Rascal and Rapscallion
and
SCAMPERMEISTER!"
When in doubt, SCAMPER about!
When things are fair, SCAMPER everywhere!
When things are rough, can't SCAMPER enough!
/end humour alert
alt.atheism military veteran #11
{so much for the 'no atheists in foxholes' rubbish}
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