Religions > Atheism > OT: The US is now rediscovering the pitfalls of aspirational imperialism
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Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"maff" |
| Date: |
17 Dec 2005 07:08:35 AM |
| Object: |
OT: The US is now rediscovering the pitfalls of aspirational imperialism |
The US is now rediscovering the pitfalls of aspirational imperialism
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1669330,00.html
Bush's desire to implant western-style democracy in Iraq is profoundly
reminiscent of past British imperial practice
Linda Colley
Saturday December 17, 2005
The Guardian
The war in Iraq has had at least one redeeming feature. Along with
events in Afghanistan, it has revived serious debate into some of the
most important and long-standing issues in history and politics. Type
the four words "Iraq", "Afghanistan", "America" and "empire" into
Google, for instance, and you get around 3.5 million hits. There are
the usual mad bloggers and propaganda rants but there is also a wealth
of discussion on offer that expands every day. Is the US an empire? If
so, what sort of empire? Is imperialism good or bad, or sometimes both?
And, of course: why has it proved so hard for America, the most
formidable military and economic power the world has seen, to effect
its will? The passion behind this on-screen questioning is evident. So,
very often, is a limited understanding of what imperial ventures have
usually involved.
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| User: "stoney" |
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| Title: Re: OT: The US is now rediscovering the pitfalls of aspirational imperialism |
17 Dec 2005 02:50:28 PM |
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On 17 Dec 2005 05:08:35 -0800, "maff" <maff91@yahoo.com> wrote:
The US is now rediscovering the pitfalls of aspirational imperialism
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1669330,00.html
Bush's desire to implant western-style democracy in Iraq is profoundly
reminiscent of past British imperial practice
Linda Colley
Saturday December 17, 2005
The Guardian
The war in Iraq has had at least one redeeming feature. Along with
events in Afghanistan, it has revived serious debate into some of the
most important and long-standing issues in history and politics. Type
the four words "Iraq", "Afghanistan", "America" and "empire" into
Google, for instance, and you get around 3.5 million hits. There are
the usual mad bloggers and propaganda rants but there is also a wealth
of discussion on offer that expands every day. Is the US an empire? If
so, what sort of empire? Is imperialism good or bad, or sometimes both?
And, of course: why has it proved so hard for America, the most
formidable military and economic power the world has seen, to effect
its will? The passion behind this on-screen questioning is evident. So,
very often, is a limited understanding of what imperial ventures have
usually involved.
In part, this is understandable. Before 1939 most of the world was
still ruled by empires of some kind, as had been the case for much of
recorded history. Since the second world war and decolonisation,
however, most people have drawn their impressions of empire as a mode
of rule less from direct experience than from one of two powerful
mythologies. Some still veer towards the old, conservative mythology
of maps drenched in pink and brave pith-helmeted sahibs doing
selfless, transforming work for "native" peoples. But this view has
increasingly retreated before a rival, post-colonial mythology.
According to this, empires (especially European ones) always rested
overwhelmingly on force and invariably provoked desperate resistance
that ultimately painfully triumphed. Clearly antagonistic, these two
selective visions none the less have something in common. They both
make empires out to have been more powerful than historically was
often the case.
Some variants and examples of empire have proved powerful and durable.
China, for example, is essentially a land-based empire, forged over
the centuries by conquest and migration, which has managed to
reposition itself as a nation state. And the kind of "informal empire"
that Britain ran in parts of the world in the 19th century is also
very much with us today. The US has no conventional colonies and may
be in trouble in Iraq. But it retains military and naval bases in some
130 countries, and consequently the potential for influence over and
intervention in them; and it possesses - as every mighty empire has
done - a network of supportive and tractable client states, including,
arguably, Britain.
Direct overseas empire, however, has tended to be more uncertain and
more vulnerable. As the political scientist Stephen Walt has written,
in words that should be inscribed in gold in the Oval Office and at 10
Downing Street, it is "extremely difficult to project power across
water and on to a foreign shore". The histories of the old European
empires demonstrate this clearly enough. Even at the height of their
imperial power, there were countries - such as Afghanistan - where the
British were never able to establish themselves successfully; and
others - such as Egypt - where their rule was only tenuous. As for
India, the jewel in Victoria's Crown Imperial, the British only held
on to it for as long as they did by way of an army and police force
that were overwhelmingly made up of Indians, and by collaborating with
Indian princes who continued to rule a third of the subcontinent.
But the most difficult form of empire by far to carry off successfully
- and this is where imperial history becomes acutely relevant - has
been the well-meaning, transformative variant. Neocon politicians and
intellectuals who are willing to admit to the existence of a US
empire, such as Dinesh D'Souza, often argue that American
interventionism is better and purer than old-style, Old World
imperialisms, because to a unique degree it strives to make the world
a better place. Yet such American idealism - which is real enough -
represents one of the ways in which present-day foreign policy closely
mirrors imperial ventures in the past. Ancient Rome, Qing China,
Napoleonic France and conspicuously imperial Britain did not simply
invade and occupy other people's lands out of economic greed. In each
case, empire was also driven at times by the desire to spread
improvement, and to export cultural and political practices that were
seen as better, fairer and more civilised.
Viewed this way, George Bush's desire to implant US-style democracy in
the Middle East, along with greater religious freedoms, women's rights
and the rule of law - by force of arms if necessary - is profoundly
reminiscent of past British imperial practices, which may be one
reason why Tony Blair and the new Tory leader have supported the
project so enthusiastically. In the 19th and early 20th centuries,
British imperialists too frequently sought to deploy their power to
export representative government, the rule of law, women's education
and the abolition of slavery, and sometimes even secured a measure of
success.
This week's elections keep open the prospect that Iraq might also
ultimately be regarded as a success. But there is an obvious
difficulty involved in this kind of aspirational imperialism. It is
hard to convince people that you mean them well if you are looking at
them down the barrel of a gun. Moreover, imperial idealism frequently
loses out to the practicalities of rule. Instead of exporting what
they perceived to be rational, modern, humane government to their
colonies, the British often found themselves propping up deeply
unattractive and corrupt princelings and client rulers because this
was the cheapest way of maintaining control. It remains to be seen how
far, and how durably, the US will achieve anything better in Iraq.
The gulf between imperial ideals and empire on the ground has
customarily proved disillusioning not only for colonial peoples but
also for some in the occupying power. In the past, anti-imperialists
in Britain, such as Richard Cobden or George Orwell, regularly argued
that overseas adventurism was detracting from the nation's decency and
liberty. British anti-imperialists also argued, exactly like the
author and journalist Chalmers Johnson is doing now in the US, that
heavy expenditure on an overseas presence and military action abroad
undermined the economic wellbeing of ordinary working people at home.
But, while current events have revived awareness that seeking to
remodel other countries can be a difficult and chancey business even
for the invaders, there is one respect in which this has come to be
true in the present to a degree that never applied in the past. Adam
Smith, who distrusted empire, argued that only when "all the different
quarters of the world" were able to inspire "mutual fear" would
nations finally begin to respect the integrity of each other's
borders. In the most horrible of ways, al-Qaida is after a fashion
testing this very premise. In the past, the imperialism of the west,
like that of the rest, was often difficult - for the doers as well as
for their victims; but western states were none the less usually able
to dispatch forces overseas against non-western peoples without any
fear of being attacked themselves. That kind of immunity is probably
now a thing of the past.
· Linda Colley is the author of Captives: Britain, Empire and the
World and professor of history at Princeton University
l.colley@princeton.edu
© Guardian Newspapers Limited 2005
--
Contempt of Congress meter reading-offscale.
Hello, theocracy with a fundamentalist US Supreme
Court who will ensure church and state are joined
at the hip like clergy and altar boys.
America 1776-Jan 2001 RIP
"As democracy is perfected, the office of president
represents, more and more closely, the inner soul
of the people. On some great and glorious day the
plain folks of the land will reach their heart's
desire at last and the White House will be adorned
by a downright moron." --- H.L. Mencken (1880 - 1956)
Religion is the original war crime.
-Michelle Malkin (Feb 26, 2005)
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