| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"maff" |
| Date: |
28 Oct 2006 05:54:20 AM |
| Object: |
OT: War of words |
War of words
http://books.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,,1933179,00.html
Christopher Hitchens - like Tom Paine, the subject of his new book -
has made enemies by supporting American internationalism, but he will
not rest until he wins them over
Oliver Burkeman
Saturday October 28, 2006
The Guardian
In 2001, a few months before he went mad, or sold out, or finally
succumbed to the effects of alcohol, or whichever of his former allies'
theories you wish to insert here, Christopher Hitchens published a slim
work entitled Letters to a Young Contrarian. In it, he often gives the
impression of feeling patronised for his dissenting opinions -
smilingly indulged, as if he were just a rebellious teenager. Reviews
of his books, he writes with annoyance, always feature an early
paragraph that says "Hitchens, whose previous targets have even
included Mother Teresa and Princess Diana ..." It's the same
condescension he feels each morning when he picks up the New York
Times, with its front-page slogan, All The News That's Fit To Print. "I
check to make sure it still irritates me," he writes. "If I can still
exclaim, under my breath, why do they insult me and what do they take
me for and what the hell is it supposed to mean unless it's as
obviously complacent and conceited and censorious as it seems to be,
then at least I know that I still have a pulse."
"Although he advocated civil wars of national liberation against
despotic governments, he felt that it would be immoral for liberal
republics to intervene into such conflicts. While a prominent figure in
French politics, Paine usually opposed the nation's expansionist
warfare. Writing to Danton, he lamented that because France's foreign
policy paid "so little attention to moral principles" it served to
"injure the character of the Revolution and discourage the progress of
liberty all over the world." France had missed a chance to spread
liberalism through moral example. "Had this Revolution been conducted
consistently with its principles," Paine wrote Jefferson in 1793,
"there was once a good prospect of extending liberty throughout the
greatest part of Europe; but now I relinquish that hope. Should the
enemy by venturing into France put themselves again in a condition of
being captured, the hope will revive; but this is a risk that I do not
wish to see tried, lest it should fail." If the defense of liberalism
inspired the nations of invading states to overthrow their rulers and
institute liberal republics, that was to be applauded, but wars of
conquest generally were not.[13]"
Thomas Paine
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.atheism/msg/a702a408cb8a9544
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| User: "maff" |
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| Title: Re: OT: War of words |
28 Oct 2006 06:48:13 AM |
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maff wrote:
War of words
http://books.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,,1933179,00.html
Christopher Hitchens - like Tom Paine, the subject of his new book -
has made enemies by supporting American internationalism, but he will
not rest until he wins them over
Oliver Burkeman
Saturday October 28, 2006
The Guardian
In 2001, a few months before he went mad, or sold out, or finally
succumbed to the effects of alcohol, or whichever of his former allies'
theories you wish to insert here, Christopher Hitchens published a slim
work entitled Letters to a Young Contrarian. In it, he often gives the
impression of feeling patronised for his dissenting opinions -
smilingly indulged, as if he were just a rebellious teenager. Reviews
of his books, he writes with annoyance, always feature an early
paragraph that says "Hitchens, whose previous targets have even
included Mother Teresa and Princess Diana ..." It's the same
condescension he feels each morning when he picks up the New York
Times, with its front-page slogan, All The News That's Fit To Print. "I
check to make sure it still irritates me," he writes. "If I can still
exclaim, under my breath, why do they insult me and what do they take
me for and what the hell is it supposed to mean unless it's as
obviously complacent and conceited and censorious as it seems to be,
then at least I know that I still have a pulse."
"Although he advocated civil wars of national liberation against
despotic governments, he felt that it would be immoral for liberal
republics to intervene into such conflicts. While a prominent figure in
French politics, Paine usually opposed the nation's expansionist
warfare. Writing to Danton, he lamented that because France's foreign
policy paid "so little attention to moral principles" it served to
"injure the character of the Revolution and discourage the progress of
liberty all over the world." France had missed a chance to spread
liberalism through moral example. "Had this Revolution been conducted
consistently with its principles," Paine wrote Jefferson in 1793,
"there was once a good prospect of extending liberty throughout the
greatest part of Europe; but now I relinquish that hope. Should the
enemy by venturing into France put themselves again in a condition of
being captured, the hope will revive; but this is a risk that I do not
wish to see tried, lest it should fail." If the defense of liberalism
inspired the nations of invading states to overthrow their rulers and
institute liberal republics, that was to be applauded, but wars of
conquest generally were not.[13]"
War, Peace, and Commerce in the Ideology of Tom Paine
http://www.independent.org/students/garvey/essay.asp?id=1455
May 1, 2000
David Fitzsimons
First Prize ($2,500)
No person figures more prominently in the ideology of early American
foreign relations than Tom Paine.[1] According to Felix Gilbert, "For
a long time" after the publication of Common Sense in January 1776,
"every utterance on foreign policy starts with Paine's words and
echoes his thoughts." Michael Howard asserts that, after the
publication of Rights of Man in 1791-92, "virtually every liberal or
socialist who has written about foreign policy since then has been able
to provide little more than an echo" to Paine's philippic on
revolutionary internationalism and the domestic sources of foreign
policy and war. Paine shaped not only the elite ideology that
diplomatic historians have traditionally examined; he wrote The Crisis,
Common Sense, and Rights of Man-the latter two arguably the most
momentous publications of the age-primarily to influence the way
ordinary people thought about international relations and war.[2]
Considering his significance, it is surprising that Paine's views on
international relations have not been more thoroughly explored by his
biographers and historians concerned with early American ideology.[3]
Isaac Kramnick describes Paine as a "vintage liberal," what we
might more commonly call a classical liberal. Paine envisioned a
self-ordering, commercial society consisting of largely self-interested
individuals. Government's role was to merely preside over these
clashing interests; it held little positive role in promoting virtue.
Paine attributes social order not primarily to government but to the
"mutual and reciprocal interest" of individuals in society.
Government was the enemy of order, not its guarantor; "riots and
tumults" did not proceed from the want of a government. Instead,
"government itself was the generating cause; instead of consolidating
society, it divided it; it deprived it of its natural cohesion, and
engendered discontents and disorders, which otherwise would not have
existed."[4] He claimed that during the American Revolution "there
were no established forms of government. The old governments had been
abolished, and the country was too much occupied in defense, to employ
its attention to establishing new governments; yet during this
interval, order and harmony were preserved as inviolate as in any
country in Europe." In this spontaneous order, virtue was highly
desirable, but not necessary for civil peace. The danger to order came
not from individuals bereft of virtue, but from excessive governmental
power. Because liberal governments would have minimal coercive power,
it was not crucial that their politicians be virtuous.[5]
Paine's enthusiasm for international trade surfaces in his first
significant essay, Common Sense, where he asserts that "because it is
in the interest of all Europe to have America a free port," a foreign
policy based on commerce would secure her "the peace and
friendship" of the continent. Independence would allow America to
break free from mercantilistic restrictions and "shake hands with the
world-live at peace with the world-and trade to any market" that
would have her. Paine saw little contradiction between virtue and
commerce; each supported the other. Commerce itself was virtuous
because it was mutually beneficial and contributed to the wealth of
nations. Increased wealth in a liberal republic would help protect it
from internal counterrevolution and strengthen its defenses against the
predations of despotic powers.[6]
Commerce would not only strengthen liberal republics internally, it
would also serve their interests by transforming the international
milieu. International trade would "temper the human mind," help
peoples "to know and understand each other," and have a
"civilizing effect" on all who participated in it. Commerce would
encourage peace by drawing the world together into mutual dependency;
the greater the amount of international trade, the lesser the
likelihood of war. Because consumer goods "cannot be procured by war
so cheaply or so commodiously as by commerce," liberal republics
would avoid war because "war never can be in the interest of a
trading nation." Commerce was a "pacific system, operating to unite
mankind by rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful to each
other." Contrary to mercantilist doctrine, Paine insisted that any
lessening of commerce through war harms every nation involved
regardless of where the reduction occurs, for when governments make
war, "the attack is made upon the common stock of commerce, and the
consequence is the same as if each had attacked his own." Its
salutary effects were potentially tremendous, because "if commerce
were permitted to act to the universal extent it is capable of, it
would extirpate the system of war, and produce a revolution in the
uncivilized state of governments."[7]
The foundation of Paine's thinking on international relations was his
belief that humankind could be grouped into two distinct classes. The
first entity, which Paine labeled "society," consisted of the
"productive classes," which included laborers, farmers, artisans,
small merchants, and manufacturers not holding government-chartered
monopolies. The second entity, which he labeled "the state,"
consisted of what he referred to as the "plundering classes," those
who used state power to live off the productive classes through high
taxation. This minority included government officials, standing armies,
blue-water navies, aristocrats, established clergy, and holders of
government-chartered monopolies. The dynamic of history was the
conflict between these "two classes of men in the nation, those who
pay taxes, and those who receive and live upon them": the struggle
for supremacy between society and state.[8]
In Paine's view, most warfare was essentially this conflict writ
large. In part, war was an attempt by the plundering classes to
increase revenue through the conquest of territories containing
exploitable productive classes. In addition, it was an attempt by the
plundering classes to distract their own productive classes from the
abuses of government, for war served to "prevent people from looking
into the defects and abuses of government." Government encouraged
national chauvinism because "it will have no excuse for its enormous
revenue and taxation, except it can prove that, somewhere or another,
it has enemies." Most importantly, war was an attempt by the
plundering classes to increase taxation in the territories already
under their control by creating a crisis in which national humiliation
or annihilation might result from resistance to tax increases. Paine
asserted that "war is the common harvest of all those who participate
in the division and expenditure of public money, in all countries. It
is the art of conquering at home: the object of it is an increase of
revenue; and as revenue cannot be increased without taxes, a pretense
must be made for expenditures." In other words, "Taxes were not
raised to carry on wars, wars were raised to carry on taxes": The
plundering classes who live on taxation promote war to raise
revenue.[9]
In contrast to the plundering classes, war harms the productive classes
because they "must all pay towards the expense" and gain none of
the benefits. Successful wars of conquest do not lessen taxes; on the
contrary, society is "taxed to pay for the charge of making them, and
has not the same been the case in every war?" The plundering classes
may "fatten on the folly of one country and the spoils of another;
and, between their plunder and their prey, may go home rich. But the
case is very different with the laboring farmer, the working tradesman,
and the necessitous poor in England, the sweat of whose brow goes day
after day to feed, in prodigality and sloth," the army that
"plunders" the productive classes on all sides of international
conflicts.[10]
Paine, therefore, saw war as a system of exploitation. The "predatory
classes" used state power to live off the "productive classes,"
the multitudes who labor at the base of the social pyramid. States were
wedded to "a continual system of war and extortion."[11] The
plundering classes' thirst for taxation meant that perpetual war was
the fate of societies dominated by the state.
Though he opposed warfare calculated to benefit the interests of
states, Paine sanctioned warfare intended to liberate societies from
the domination of states he considered oppressive. It was necessary,
for instance, for society to protect itself from the predations of
invading states or invasive colonial restrictions. Also acceptable were
civil wars in which societies attempt to free themselves from
oppressive rulers; that is why Rights of Man was directed toward the
British masses, and that is why that manifesto occasioned the British
government to successfully try and convict Paine in absentia for
treason.[12]
Although he advocated civil wars of national liberation against
despotic governments, he felt that it would be immoral for liberal
republics to intervene into such conflicts. While a prominent figure in
French politics, Paine usually opposed the nation's expansionist
warfare. Writing to Danton, he lamented that because France's foreign
policy paid "so little attention to moral principles" it served to
"injure the character of the Revolution and discourage the progress
of liberty all over the world." France had missed a chance to spread
liberalism through moral example. "Had this Revolution been conducted
consistently with its principles," Paine wrote Jefferson in 1793,
"there was once a good prospect of extending liberty throughout the
greatest part of Europe; but now I relinquish that hope. Should the
enemy by venturing into France put themselves again in a condition of
being captured, the hope will revive; but this is a risk that I do not
wish to see tried, lest it should fail." If the defense of liberalism
inspired the nations of invading states to overthrow their rulers and
institute liberal republics, that was to be applauded, but wars of
conquest generally were not.[13]
Such warfare was also ultimately unnecessary, for the productive
classes would eventually recognize their interests and become
courageous enough (in part by reading Rights of Man, which Paine, with
his usual modesty, thought "could take the place of all the books in
the world") to overthrow despotic states and institute liberal
republics. America's revolution was not merely a separation from
England; it was a "new era for politics," a "new method of
thinking." America had "made a stand, not for herself only, but for
the world, and looked beyond the advantages she herself could
receive." The cause of America was "in great measure the cause of
all mankind," and its significance would affect "the principles of
all lovers of mankind" and posterity until "the end of time." It
was the beginning of the end for the old regimes, for the American
Revolution began a new world order that by 1789 had extended to France
and would travel from there to England and then outward from this North
Atlantic core. Once liberal republics had been introduced to the world,
"all attempts to oppose their progress will in the end be
fruitless."[14]
Accordingly, Paine envisioned his new world order as arising not
through aggressive warfare on the part of liberal republics, but rather
from the attraction that he believed liberalism held for ordinary
people. The liberal idea was supposedly more powerful than arms, for an
idea "will penetrate where an army of soldiers cannot; it will
succeed where diplomatic management would fail; it is neither the
Rhine, the Channel, nor the ocean that can arrest its progress: it will
march on the horizon of the world, and it will conquer." Having
conquered, liberal societies would trade freely, lower taxes, negotiate
arms-control, and organize a European congress to resolve international
conflicts. Relations between the Great Powers would transform from
"war and mercantilism" into "peace and commerce." It would be a
kind of secular millennium.[15]
Despite his general hostility to state power, in his later career Paine
grew impatient with the gradual, idealistic approach toward bringing
about his millennial visions. Beginning with France's invasion of
Belgium and the Dutch alliance of 1795 and continuing until 1802, Paine
argued for a "descent on England" from the Dutch coastline. He
proposed an invasion force of one thousand gunboats, each armed with
one hundred men and a single cannon. True to his hatred of taxation, he
claimed that the force could be equipped solely through voluntary
donations. The hope was that such an invasion would spark a popular
uprising against what Paine believed to be a despotic government. His
plan, of course, was never attempted. He was also rather impatient
regarding his hopes for the rest of the world. Assuming that his
writings would lead to the establishment of a liberal republic in
England, he proposed that a redeemed England could combine with France,
Holland, and the United States into a irresistible confederation. They
could "propose" a limitation of all fleets in Europe to one-tenth
their present size, thus assuring a reduction in taxes. They could then
"propose" to Spain that its possessions be opened to free trade and
"command the Algernine piracy to cease." All of this was advanced
as a nonviolent expedient until the triumph of liberal ideas, but it
does contain more than a whiff of grape.[16]
John Adams famously described the late eighteenth-century as the "Age
of Paine." Does that label apply to the current age? Paine certainly
would have embraced the incredible growth of international trade and
communication since his time, and the way that capitalism has made
international travel and countless other one-time luxuries available to
hundreds of millions of ordinary people. He would have celebrated the
fall of communism and the Soviet empire, which he would have seen as an
opportunity for the United States to more drastically cut military
spending, re-orient its military to a non-interventionist posture of
primarily continental defense, and commit its foreign affairs to a
policy of peace and free trade. Considering current misadventures in
Iraq and Yugoslavia, not to mention the stationing of American
garrisons all over the world, if we are indeed in an age of Paine, it
is alas closer to the Paine of the "descent on England" than the
Paine of peace and free trade.
Footnotes:
1. In this essay the term "foreign policy ideology" refers to, as
Michael Hunt puts it, "sets of beliefs and values, sometimes only
poorly and partially articulated, that make international relations
intelligible and decision making possible." Michael H. Hunt,
"Ideology," in Explaining the History of American Foreign
Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York,
1991), 194. Broader but similar is Akira Iriye's definition of the
"cultural approach to diplomatic history" as being the examination
of international affairs in terms of "dreams, aspirations, and other
manifestations of human consciousness." Akira Iriye, "Culture and
International History," in ibid., 214. See also Bradford Perkins's
discussion of the "prism of cultural values" in Perkins, The
Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865 (New York, 1993), 9-16.
Political scientists are increasingly incorporating such concerns into
their work on international relations. See, for instance, Ideas and
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith
Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, 1993).
2. Felix Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American
Foreign Policy (Princeton, 1961), 43; Michael Howard, War and the
Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, 1977), 29. Published on 10 January
1776, Common Sense sold one hundred thousand copies in America by
March. In a population of only three million, total sales were roughly
four hundred thousand copies, the equivalent of over thirty million
copies today. Because its style was conducive to public readings in
taverns, churches, and other meeting places, surely a larger number
heard its message. Its French translation was an immediate sensation in
Paris. See Neil Postman, Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse
in the Age of Show Business (New York, 1985), 35; and Michael Foot and
Isaac Kramnick, eds., Thomas Paine Reader (New York, 1987), 10.
3. Aspects of Paine's thought on international relations are
discussed in Darrel Abel, "The Significance of the Letter to the Abbe
Raynal in the Progress of Thomas Paine's Thought," Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography 66 (April 1942): 176-90; A. Owen
Aldridge, Thomas Paine's American Ideology (Newark, 1984), 269-85;
Gregory Claeys, Thomas Paine: Social and Political Thought (Boston,
1989); Gilbert, Farewell Address; David A. Wilson, Paine and Cobbett:
The Transatlantic Connection (Kingston, Ontario, 1988); and Arnold
Wolfers and Laurence W. Martin, The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign
Affairs (New Haven, 1956), 126-38. On Paine in general see Claeys,
Social and Political Thought; Aldridge, American Ideology; idem, Man of
Reason: The Life of Thomas Paine (New York, 1959); John Keane, Tom
Paine: A Political Life (Boston, 1995); A. J. Ayer, Thomas Paine
(Chicago, 1988); Moncure Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine (1892;
reprint, New York, 1969); Eric Foner, Thomas Paine and Revolutionary
America (New York, 1967); Jack Fruchtman, Jr., Thomas Paine and the
Religion of Nature (Baltimore, 1993); idem, Thomas Paine: Apostle of
Freedom (New York, 1994); Isaac Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois
Radicalism (Ithaca, 1990), 133-60; and Audrey Williamson, Thomas Paine:
His Life, Work, and Times (London, 1973).
4. Kramnick, Republicanism, 154; idem, Thomas Paine Reader, 26. Thomas
Paine, Rights of Man, in Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, 2 vols.,
ed. Philip S. Foner (New York, 1945), 1:359. Foner's edition is
imperfect, yet still the best available. Annotated bibliographies on
Paine studies are provided by A. Owen Aldridge, "Thomas Paine: A
Survey of Research and Criticism since 1945," British Studies Monitor
5 (Winter 1975): 3-31; and Jerome Douglas Wilson, "Thomas Paine in
America: An Annotated Bibliography 1900-1973," Bulletin of
Bibliography 31 (October - December 1974): 133-51, 180. Eric Foner
notes that "from 1776 to the end of his life, the hallmarks of
Paine's political and social outlook remained remarkably constant."
Foner, Revolutionary America, 87.
5. Paine, Rights of Man, in Writings, 1:358; Kramnick, Republicanism,
151-60. "Society in every state is a blessing, but government, even
in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an
intolerable one." Some government was necessary for security because
of the "failure of moral virtue to govern the world." Paine, Common
Sense, in Writings, 1:4-6. Welfare programs were needed temporarily in
Europe, not America, to correct past abuses by powerful states. Elkins
and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 327; Foner, Revolutionary America,
93-94. On the role of the idea of "spontaneous order" in the
Scottish Enlightenment see Ronald Hamowy, The Scottish Enlightenment
and the Theory of Spontaneous Order (Carbondale, IL, 1987).
6. Paine, Common Sense, in Writings, 1:20; The American Crisis #3
(1777), ibid., 80; Aldridge, American Ideology, 152; Foner,
Revolutionary America, 153, 190; Fruchtman, Religion of Nature, 117.
7. Fruchtman, Religion of Nature, 118; Paine, "Letter to the Abbe
Raynal" (1782), in Writings, 2:241; American Crisis #7 (1778), ibid.,
1:145; Rights of Man, ibid., 400-410, 449.
8. Paine, Common Sense, in Writings, 1:4-5; "Letter Addressed to the
Addressers on the Late Proclamation" (1792), ibid., 2:478.
9. Rights of Man, ibid., 1:449, 248, 283-84 (emphasis in original).
10. American Crisis #7, ibid., 151; American Crisis #12 (1782), ibid.,
225; Rights of Man, ibid., 362.
11. Rights of Man, ibid., 361-62.
12. American Crisis #7, ibid., 145; "Epistle to Quakers" (1776),
ibid., 2:56-57; Common Sense, ibid., 1:45; American Crisis #5 (1778),
ibid., 120. On his trial see Williamson, Thomas Paine, 186-91; and
Fruchtman, Apostle of Freedom, 288-91.
13. Paine to Danton, Paris, 6 May 1793, Writings, 2:1337. Paine's
emphasis on morality contrasts sharply with the amoral basis of power
politics. For a perceptive discussion of the relationship between power
politics and morality in the context of Gilbert and Hutson see Jonathan
Dull, "Benjamin Franklin and the Nature of Early American
Diplomacy," International History Review 5 (August 1983): 346-63.
Paine to Jefferson, Paris, 20 April 1793, Writings, 2:1331. Robert W.
Tucker and David C. Hendrickson have noted the close similarities
between the thinking of Jefferson and Paine on international affairs.
Tucker and Hendrickson, Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas
Jefferson (New York, 1990) 13, 43-44. See also Michael Durey, "Thomas
Paine's Apostles: Radical Emigres and the Triumph of Jeffersonian
Republicanism," William and Mary Quarterly 44 (October 1987): 661-88.
Over time Paine became more enthusiastic about wars of conquest. See
Paine to General Brune, Dieppe, November 1799, Writings, 2:1403-5.
14. David Powell, Tom Paine: The Greatest Exile (London, 1985), 197;
Paine, Common Sense, in Writings, 1:45, 17, 3; Rights of Man, ibid.,
398, 354-55. On Paine and "progress" see V. E. Gibbens, "Tom
Paine and the Idea of Progress," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and
Biography 66 (April 1942): 191-204. See also Robert Nisbet's analysis
of Paine's close friend Condorcet in History of the Idea of Progress
(New York, 1980), 122-36.
15. Paine, Agrarian Justice (1795-96), in Writings, 1:622; Rights of
Man, ibid., 344, 448, 419; "Letter to the Abbe Raynal," ibid.,
2:262; Paine to Jefferson, New Rochelle, NY, 30 January 1806, ibid.,
1477. On Paine and millennialism see J. F. C. Harrison, "Thomas Paine
and Millenarian Radicalism," in Citizen of the World: Essays on
Thomas Paine, ed. Ian Dyck (London 1987), 73-85; Fruchtman, "The
Revolutionary Millennialism of Thomas Paine," in Studies in
Eighteenth-Century Culture, vol. 13, ed. O. M. Brack, Jr. (Madison,
1984), 65-77; and Stephen Newman, "A Note on Common Sense and
Christian Eschatology," Political Theory 6 (February 1978): 101-8.
16. Paine, Rights of Man, in Writings, 1:419, 448-51; Aldridge,
"Thomas Paine's Plan for a Descent on England," William and Mary
Quarterly 14 (January 1957): 74-84. Looking back from 1804, Paine wrote
in the Philadelphia Aurora on the plan submitted to the Directory in
1798 that "Bonaparte was appointed to the command, and by an
agreement between him and me, I was to accompany him, as the intention
of the expedition was to give the people of England an opportunity of
forming a government for themselves, and thereby bring about peace."
"To the People of England on the Invasion of England," Writings,
2:680. For a guide to the literature on Paine's reception in England,
France, Germany, Austria, Bohemia, Cuba, Hungary, India, and Latin
America see Aldridge, "Thomas Paine: A Survey of Research and
Criticism since 1945," 22-25. "
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David Fitzsimons is with the Department of History at the University of
Michigan.
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Thomas Paine
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.atheism/msg/a702a408cb8a9544
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