| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"George Dance" |
| Date: |
06 Apr 2004 11:48:23 AM |
| Object: |
Re: a "first cause" argument: was "The burden of proof" |
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
On 3/29/04 2:09 PM, in article
Ce> >> "The argument that there MUST be a first cause is one that
cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Where does Russell say "The argument that there MIGHT be a first cause
is one that cannot have any validity"?
NEVER!
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
2. Whatever has a beginning has a cause.
4. The cause of a physical object is either (a) solely physical or (b)
at least partly non-physical.
5. If 4a, then: there has been an infinite series of physical objects.
(by 1 and 2, recursively)
6. If 4b, then: there is at least one non-physical object capable of
causing physical events.
7. Either: there has been an infinite series of physical objects, or
there is at least one non-physical object capable of causing physical
events. (4,5,6 CD)
8. There might not have been an infinite series of physical objects.
9. There might be a non-physical object capable of causing physical
events.
QED
Now, it's up to you to demonstrate either logical inconsistency or
special pleading in the argument.
.
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: a "first cause" argument: was "The burden of proof" |
06 Apr 2004 01:42:56 PM |
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On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
On 3/29/04 2:09 PM, in article
Ce> >> "The argument that there MUST be a first cause is one that
cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Where does Russell say "The argument that there MIGHT be a first cause
is one that cannot have any validity"?
NEVER!
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
2. Whatever has a beginning has a cause.
4. The cause of a physical object is either (a) solely physical or (b)
at least partly non-physical.
5. If 4a, then: there has been an infinite series of physical objects.
(by 1 and 2, recursively)
6. If 4b, then: there is at least one non-physical object capable of
causing physical events.
7. Either: there has been an infinite series of physical objects, or
there is at least one non-physical object capable of causing physical
events. (4,5,6 CD)
8. There might not have been an infinite series of physical objects.
9. There might be a non-physical object capable of causing physical
events.
You are still running into that fatal problem Russell points out, a
logically inconsistent special pleading for one thing, in this case your
hypothetical 'non-physical object' (call it God).
There is no possibility that there might be such a thing due to this fatal
problem (special pleading) inherent in the very idea of it.
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
If you still believe there might be such a thing, then try to craft an
argument for it that overcomes this fatal problem Russell points out is
inherent in the very idea of it.
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
|
| Title: Re: a "first cause" argument: was "The burden of proof" |
08 Apr 2004 12:12:44 PM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
On 3/29/04 2:09 PM, in article
Ce> >> "The argument that there MUST be a first cause is one that
cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Where does Russell say "The argument that there MIGHT be a first cause
is one that cannot have any validity"?
NEVER!
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
2. Whatever has a beginning has a cause.
4. The cause of a physical object is either (a) solely physical or (b)
at least partly non-physical.
5. If 4a, then: there has been an infinite series of physical objects.
(by 1 and 2, recursively)
6. If 4b, then: there is at least one non-physical object capable of
causing physical events.
7. Either: there has been an infinite series of physical objects, or
there is at least one non-physical object capable of causing physical
events. (4,5,6 CD)
8. There might not have been an infinite series of physical objects.
9. There might be a non-physical object capable of causing physical
events.
<unsnip>
Now, it's up to you to demonstrate either logical inconsistency or
special pleading in the argument. </us>
You are still running into that fatal problem Russell points out, a
logically inconsistent special pleading for one thing, in this case your
hypothetical 'non-physical object' (call it God).
I don't see any 'logically inconsistent special pleading' in the
argument, which is why I asked you to demonstrate either
inconsistency, pleading, or both. Please do.
There is no possibility that there might be such a thing due to this fatal
problem (special pleading) inherent in the very idea of it.
Which is why it's important that you demonstrate this fatal problem,
if there is any.
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
Completely irrelevant. There's no assumption, in the above argument,
that everything must have a cause (or that non-physical objects do not
have causes, either).
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God."
No, as the world apparently did have a beginning, and therefore a
cause.
-- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
If you still believe there might be such a thing, then try to craft an
argument for it that overcomes this fatal problem Russell points out is
inherent in the very idea of it.
In order to remove 'this fatal problem' from the argument, I'll first
have to see where and how 'this fatal problem' appears in the
argument. Which I'm still waiting for you to show.
.
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| User: "Sniper" |
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| Title: Re: a "first cause" argument: was "The burden of proof" |
08 Apr 2004 04:01:23 PM |
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George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
On 3/29/04 2:09 PM, in article
Ce> >> "The argument that there MUST be a first cause is one that
cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Where does Russell say "The argument that there MIGHT be a first cause
is one that cannot have any validity"?
NEVER!
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
2. Whatever has a beginning has a cause.
4. The cause of a physical object is either (a) solely physical or (b)
at least partly non-physical.
5. If 4a, then: there has been an infinite series of physical objects.
(by 1 and 2, recursively)
6. If 4b, then: there is at least one non-physical object capable of
causing physical events.
7. Either: there has been an infinite series of physical objects, or
there is at least one non-physical object capable of causing physical
events. (4,5,6 CD)
8. There might not have been an infinite series of physical objects.
9. There might be a non-physical object capable of causing physical
events.
<unsnip>
Now, it's up to you to demonstrate either logical inconsistency or
special pleading in the argument. </us>
You are still running into that fatal problem Russell points out, a
logically inconsistent special pleading for one thing, in this case your
hypothetical 'non-physical object' (call it God).
I don't see any 'logically inconsistent special pleading' in the
argument, which is why I asked you to demonstrate either
inconsistency, pleading, or both. Please do.
There is no possibility that there might be such a thing due to this fatal
problem (special pleading) inherent in the very idea of it.
Which is why it's important that you demonstrate this fatal problem,
if there is any.
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
Completely irrelevant. There's no assumption, in the above argument,
that everything must have a cause (or that non-physical objects do not
have causes, either).
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God."
No, as the world apparently did have a beginning, and therefore a
cause.
-- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
If you still believe there might be such a thing, then try to craft an
argument for it that overcomes this fatal problem Russell points out is
inherent in the very idea of it.
In order to remove 'this fatal problem' from the argument, I'll first
have to see where and how 'this fatal problem' appears in the
argument. Which I'm still waiting for you to show.
Don't hold your breath. Septic decides that something
holds a certain meaning, but despite his inability to
successfully argue it does indeed contain the meaning
he says it does, he'll repost it over and over again,
thinking that somehow, it'll magically reveal itself.
It's like walking to an empty refrigerator, & opening
it again & again thinking food will magically appear.
(In Septic's case, thinking Schlitz beer will appear)
.
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
09 Apr 2004 05:32:27 AM |
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<piggyback to "Dance">
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
On 3/29/04 2:09 PM, in article
Ce> >> "The argument that there MUST be a first cause is one that
cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Where does Russell say "The argument that there MIGHT be a first cause
is one that cannot have any validity"?
NEVER!
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
2. Whatever has a beginning has a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause it might as well be the
universe, right?
4. The cause of a physical object is either (a) solely physical or (b)
at least partly non-physical.
Define 'non-physical' and give three examples please.
5. If 4a, then: there has been an infinite series of physical objects.
(by 1 and 2, recursively)
Maybe just a big cloud of a huge number of particles of matter/energy
that has always existed, coming together in one way in one event, and
different ways in another events, based on natural movements and
chemical reactions due to the differences in properties of the different
elements.
6. If 4b, then: there is at least one non-physical object capable of
causing physical events.
What cause the non-physical object? If anything and everything must have
a cause, then your hypothetical non-physical imagining (call it God,
since that is easier to write) must have a cause, to be logically
consistent.
7. Either: there has been an infinite series of physical objects, or
there is at least one non-physical object capable of causing physical
events. (4,5,6 CD)
Unwarranted assumption. You haven't explained how a non-physical
imagining can have any effect on the physical matter comprising the
univeerse.
8. There might not have been an infinite series of physical objects.
Maybe there is only a big cloud of matter composed of a huge number of
paricles, some helium, som hydrogen, etc. that is eternal.
Maybe it's all just fluctuations in the quantum substrate?
9. There might be a non-physical object capable of causing physical
events.
Only if you can demonstrate how it is that you know that your
proposition, "There might be a non-physical object capable of causing
physical events" is true (in accord with the facts of the matter), so
that anyone can check your observations. Otherwise, it is just wild
metaphysical speculation with no basis in fact.
<unsnip>
Now, it's up to you to demonstrate either logical inconsistency or
special pleading in the argument. </us>
You are still running into that fatal problem Russell points out, a
logically inconsistent special pleading for one thing, in this case your
hypothetical 'non-physical object' (call it God).
I don't see any 'logically inconsistent special pleading' in the
argument ...
Argument from personal incredulity? Tsk tsk.
Aren't you arguing that your hypothetical "non-physical object" (a
contradiction in terms, by the way) is special, in that it is eternal
and therefore can exist without a cause, whereas the universe
(everything else) cannot be eternal, therefore must have a cause, the
first cause, your hypothetical "non-physical entity" (read God)?
That's still the inherently fatal problem with the idea (special
pleading for one thing, creating a double standard) which Russell points
out in his unassailable rebuttal of the theist argument that there must
be a first cause.
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
|
| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
09 Apr 2004 01:01:21 PM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<%Yudc.106536$JO3.75761@attbi_s04>...
<piggyback to "Dance">
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
I wouldn't say it was either one. It does, though, contain physical
objects.
2. Whatever has a beginning has a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause it might as well be the
universe, right?
But not any of the physical objects in the universe. If the two
premises are true, it's also true that
3. Every physical object has a cause. (1,2 HS)
4. The cause of a physical object is either (a) solely physical or (b)
at least partly non-physical.
Define 'non-physical' and give three examples please.
'Physical' would be made up of particles - protons, electrons, etc. -
in space-time. Non-physical would be not made up of particles in
space-time. 3 commonly given examples are numbers like 2, geometric
shapes like triangles, propositions like "All dragons are red".
5. If 4a, then: there has been an infinite series of physical objects.
(by 1 and 2, recursively)
Maybe just a big cloud of a huge number of particles of matter/energy
that has always existed, coming together in one way in one event, and
different ways in another events, based on natural movements and
chemical reactions due to the differences in properties of the different
elements.
Maybe; maybe not. There might be an Eternal Cloud.
6. If 4b, then: there is at least one non-physical object capable of
causing physical events.
What cause the non-physical object?
Dunno. Maybe it's eternal, like your hypothetical Eternal Cloud.
If anything and everything must have
a cause, then your hypothetical non-physical imagining (call it God,
since that is easier to write) must have a cause, to be logically
consistent.
Well, yes; but the idea that 'everything must have a cause' is your
premise, not mine.
7. Either: there has been an infinite series of physical objects, or
there is at least one non-physical object capable of causing physical
events. (4,5,6 CD)
Unwarranted assumption. You haven't explained how a non-physical
imagining can have any effect on the physical matter comprising the
univeerse.
Nor have I explained where and how the Eternal Cloud could have
existed before the Big Bang. I haven't argued for either option, but
just show that it has to be one or the other.
8. There might not have been an infinite series of physical objects.
Maybe there is only a big cloud of matter composed of a huge number of
paricles, some helium, som hydrogen, etc. that is eternal.
Maybe; maybe not.
Maybe it's all just fluctuations in the quantum substrate?
Maybe; maybe not.
9. There might be a non-physical object capable of causing physical
events.
Only if you can demonstrate how it is that you know that your
proposition, "There might be a non-physical object capable of causing
physical events" is true (in accord with the facts of the matter), so
that anyone can check your observations. Otherwise, it is just wild
metaphysical speculation with no basis in fact.
As is your suggested Eternal Cloud.
<unsnip>
Now, it's up to you to demonstrate either logical inconsistency or
special pleading in the argument. </us>
You are still running into that fatal problem Russell points out, a
logically inconsistent special pleading for one thing, in this case your
hypothetical 'non-physical object' (call it God).
I don't see any 'logically inconsistent special pleading' in the
argument ...
Argument from personal incredulity? Tsk tsk.
That's not a demonstration of any, BTW.
Aren't you arguing that your hypothetical "non-physical object" (a
contradiction in terms, by the way) is special, in that it is eternal
and therefore can exist without a cause,
No. The only uncaused object being postulated here is your Eternal
Cloud.
whereas the universe
(everything else) cannot be eternal, therefore must have a cause,
No; just physical objects.
first cause, your hypothetical "non-physical entity" (read God)?
Possibly a non-physical entity; possibly your Eternal Cloud.
That's still the inherently fatal problem with the idea (special
pleading for one thing, creating a double standard) which Russell points
out in his unassailable rebuttal of the theist argument that there must
be a first cause.
Your speculation that the Eternal Cloud, which was uncaused, caused
everything else in the universe, suffers from that problem. However,
the alternative speculation does not, as it depends on no assumption
that the non-physical cause(s) was/were uncaused.
.
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
09 Apr 2004 01:50:30 PM |
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On 4/9/04 11:01 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404091001.2a7f88a8@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<%Yudc.106536$JO3.75761@attbi_s04>...
<piggyback to "Dance">
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause
without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by
Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
I wouldn't say it was either one. It does, though, contain physical
objects.
The universe is a container, like my tea cup? How did you arrive at that
conclusion? It would have to be an object made of pottery or some other
material to serve as a container like my tea cup, wouldn't it? Where is
there any evidence of that?
Let me ask the question in a slightly different way. Would you say that the
universe is itself a physical object like a tea cup that contains things, or
would you say that the universe is just everything that exists considered as
a whole, including the spaces and times between all the particles and events
involving those particles, and the relationships (physical, chemical, time
whatever) between the parts?
In other words, wouldn't you say that everything that exists does so as part
of a web of relationships (chemical, physical, time, whatever - you know
what I mean?) with everything else that exists?
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
09 Apr 2004 08:09:59 PM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9C3E86.35CE%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/9/04 11:01 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404091001.2a7f88a8@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<%Yudc.106536$JO3.75761@attbi_s04>...
<piggyback to "Dance">
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause
without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by
Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
I wouldn't say it was either one. It does, though, contain physical
objects.
The universe is a container, like my tea cup?
More precisely, it's a coordinate system or a continuum; but you can
imagine it as something like a teacup if you find that helpful.
How did you arrive at that
conclusion?
Which conclusion; that there are physical objects, or that they're in
the universe?
It would have to be an object made of pottery or some other
material to serve as a container like my tea cup, wouldn't it?
No; the earth is in the solar system, even though the solar system
isn't made of pottery.
Where is
there any evidence of that?
Evidence of what: evidence of physical objects, or evidence that they
are contained in the space-time continuum?
Let me ask the question in a slightly different way. Would you say that the
universe is itself a physical object like a tea cup that contains things,
No.
or
would you say that the universe is just everything that exists considered as
a whole,
No.
[...] the spaces and times between all the particles and events
involving those particles,
Yes; but not just the space between the particles and the time between
the events.
In other words, wouldn't you say that everything that exists does so as part
of a web of relationships (chemical, physical, time, whatever - you know
what I mean?) with everything else that exists?
No, I wouldn't say that. I'm not aware of any webs connecting my
computer keyboard and the moons of Jupiter, for instance.
BTW, what do any of your questions have to do with your promised
demonstration of 'special pleading' in the argument that, I note,
you've once again completely snipped? I'd be interested in seeing
your point, if any.
.
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
11 Apr 2004 04:06:01 PM |
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George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9C3E86.35CE%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/9/04 11:01 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404091001.2a7f88a8@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<%Yudc.106536$JO3.75761@attbi_s04>...
<piggyback to "Dance">
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause
without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by
Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
I wouldn't say it was either one. It does, though, contain physical
objects.
The universe is a container, like my tea cup?
More precisely, it's a coordinate system or a continuum ...
That is the space time continuum, which is not everything that exists.
The universe is everything that exists.
How did you arrive at that
conclusion?
Which conclusion; that there are physical objects, or that they're in
the universe?
Your conclusion hat the universe is a physical object, a container, like
my tea cup, or a stew pot containing things?
It would have to be an object made of pottery or some other
material to serve as a container like my tea cup, wouldn't it?
No; the earth is in the solar system, even though the solar system
isn't made of pottery.
Is "the solar system" a container, a physical object like a stew pot, or
is it just the collection of things that exist in this neck of the
woods, including the web of relationships between these things, that
comprises the solar system (or the whole universe, if we get back on
topic, for that matter)?
See, you say, "Every physical object has a beginning" but you have not
established that the universe is a physical object like a stew ot or a
tea cup, for example.
Where is
there any evidence of that?
Evidence of what: evidence of physical objects, or evidence that they
are contained in the space-time continuum?
Where is there any evidence that the universe is anything other than
everything that exists including the web of relationships between these
things? Where is there any evidence that the universe is a stew pot?
Let me ask the question in a slightly different way. Would you say that the
universe is itself a physical object like a tea cup that contains things,
No.
You didn't let me finish my whole question. How rude of you.
Let me ask the question in a slightly different way. Would you say that
the universe is itself a physical object like a tea cup that contains
things, or would you say that the universe is just everything that
exists considered as a whole, including the spaces and times between all
the particles and events involving those particles, and the
relationships (physical, chemical, time whatever) between the parts?
In other words, wouldn't you say that everything that exists does so as
part of a web of relationships (chemical, physical, time, whatever - you
know what I mean?) with everything else that exists?
Not 'web' as in a web of sticky thread as a spider web, but just the web
of relationships between things, understand?
Now please explain how you reached the conclusion that the universe
must have had a beginning. If it is everythng that exists, including the
relationships between them, then it must be eternal, and could not
possibly have had a beginning, right?
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
13 Apr 2004 12:55:33 PM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<Zqiec.16008$rg5.38391@attbi_s52>...
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BC9C3E86.35CE%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/9/04 11:01 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404091001.2a7f88a8@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<%Yudc.106536$JO3.75761@attbi_s04>...
<piggyback to "Dance">
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause
without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by
Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
I wouldn't say it was either one. It does, though, contain physical
objects.
The universe is a container, like my tea cup?
More precisely, it's a coordinate system or a continuum ...
That is the space time continuum, which is not everything that exists.
The universe is everything that exists.
Ho, hum; if you insist on that definition, we'll accept it for the
argument, as long as that's the one used consistently.
How did you arrive at that
conclusion?
Which conclusion; that there are physical objects, or that they're in
the universe?
Your conclusion hat the universe is a physical object, a container, like
my tea cup, or a stew pot containing things?
I didn't conclude that the universe is a 'physical object' - I said
nothing about the universe until you asked me how I defined it, and
then gave you that definition: the space/time continuum and and the
matter/energy in the continuum. (Which we're not using, anyway.)
It would have to be an object made of pottery or some other
material to serve as a container like my tea cup, wouldn't it?
No; the earth is in the solar system, even though the solar system
isn't made of pottery.
Is "the solar system" a container, a physical object like a stew pot, or
is it just the collection of things that exist in this neck of the
woods, including the web of relationships between these things, that
comprises the solar system (or the whole universe, if we get back on
topic, for that matter)?
I don't see that it matters; either way, the earth is in the solar
system.
See, you say, "Every physical object has a beginning" but you have not
established that the universe is a physical object like a stew ot or a
tea cup, for example.
I don't see that I have to; as long as you accept that 'the collection
of things' includes physical objects, all of which did apparently have
a beginning, you've got the same problem of what caused them. Which
leads you to either: (a) postulate an infinite series of causes (which
by your own criterion is 'meaningless,' as there's no way to prove or
disprove such a thing) or (b) postulate some eternally existing
physical object (like your hypothetical 'eternally existing cloud of
matter and energy,' which *is* false by all the evidence).
Where is
there any evidence of that?
Evidence of what: evidence of physical objects, or evidence that they
are contained in the space-time continuum?
Where is there any evidence that the universe is anything other than
everything that exists including the web of relationships between these
things? Where is there any evidence that the universe is a stew pot?
First of all, no one said that 'the universe is a stew pot'. Second,
even if we say that the univese is 'everything that exists', that
doesn't get rid of (or even hide) the question of where those things
came from.
Let me ask the question in a slightly different way. Would you say that the
universe is itself a physical object like a tea cup that contains things,
No.
You didn't let me finish my whole question. How rude of you.
Let me ask the question in a slightly different way. Would you say that
the universe is itself a physical object like a tea cup that contains
things, or would you say that the universe is just everything that
exists considered as a whole, including the spaces and times between all
the particles and events involving those particles, and the
relationships (physical, chemical, time whatever) between the parts?
No.
In other words, wouldn't you say that everything that exists does so as
part of a web of relationships (chemical, physical, time, whatever - you
know what I mean?) with everything else that exists?
No.
Not 'web' as in a web of sticky thread as a spider web, but just the web
of relationships between things, understand?
Now please explain how you reached the conclusion that the universe
must have had a beginning. If it is everythng that exists, including the
relationships between them, then it must be eternal, and could not
possibly have had a beginning, right?
Sure; by your definition of 'universe,' there would still be a
universe even if nothing at all existed; an 'empty set universe' or
'null universe.' So what? As you know, my argument dealt with
physical objects, and (as you've agreed) your definition of universe
means that it is not a physical object. So how is your definition of
'universe' even relevant to the argument I gave you?
Is it anything more than wordplay meant to mask your continued failure
to find any 'logical inconsistency' or 'special pleading' in that
argument? Remember, this all began with your claim that there could
be no first cause argument free of either; and my demonstration that
your claim was false, which (so far) you have not answered.
.
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
19 Apr 2004 01:31:34 PM |
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George Dance wrote:
I didn't conclude that the universe is a 'physical object'
You are definitely taking it for granted (begging the question) as your
first premise in your argument that there must be a first cause of the
universe, taking it for granted that the universe is an object like a
crockery pot that requires a creator:
"1. Every physical object has a beginning." -- Dance
The term, 'universe' ('world', as Russell puts it, which was more common
a hundred years ago) means simply the whole collection of everything
that exists, including the web of relationships (time, space, physical
attraction, repulsion, chemical reactions, or whatever - you know what
'relationship' mean) between things.
Your idea that there is an object like a crockery pot that is the
container of everything that exists, an object that requires a creator,
is simply an absurd idea, Mr. Dunce.
There cannot be any possibility of the hypothetical Magic Invisible God,
the hypothetical first cause here, since the very idea of such a thing
is doomed from the start by the absolutely fatal problem inherent in the
very idea of such a thing (special pleading for that one thing), which
Russell hightlights with a bright red marker:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
It's a very simple problem for anybody who still believes there might be one
anyway. All they have to do is come up with an argument for God, the
hypothetical first cause/creator of the universe, that does not run into
this fatal problem inherent in the very idea of it, which Russell points
out.
<cue the chirping crickets>
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
20 Apr 2004 12:54:23 PM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<aWUgc.28966$yD1.72066@attbi_s54>...
George Dance wrote:
I didn't conclude that the universe is a 'physical object'
You are definitely taking it for granted (begging the question) as your
first premise in your argument that there must be a first cause of the
universe, taking it for granted that the universe is an object like a
crockery pot that requires a creator:
"1. Every physical object has a beginning." -- Dance
All I've 'taken for granted' is that the universe contains physical
objects, as per the two definitions of universe that you insisted on
and we're therefore using:
(1)
"universe: a set that contains all elements relevant to a particular
discussion or problem" m-w.com
and
(2)
The term, 'universe' ... means simply the whole collection of everything
that exists, including the web of relationships (time, space, physical
attraction, repulsion, chemical reactions, or whatever - you know what
'relationship' mean) between things.
Since (by your second definition) the universe is the collection (set)
of 'everything that exists', then (by your first definition) it
contains everything that exists. And since some of the things that
exist are physical objects, the universe contains physical objects.
QED
[My strawman] that there is an object like a crockery pot that is the
container of everything that exists, an object that requires a creator,
is simply an absurd idea, Mr. Dunce.
Yes; but it's your absurd idea, Mr. Lickshit, not mine.
There cannot be any possibility of the hypothetical Magic Invisible God,
the hypothetical first cause here, since the very idea of such a thing
is doomed from the start by the absolutely fatal problem inherent in the
very idea of such a thing (special pleading for that one thing), which
Russell hightlights with a bright red marker:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Russell's argument (which is a Constructive Dilemma, by the way)
fails, for the reasons I already told you. "If everything must have a
cause, then God must have a cause" is true but not relevant (as
there's no assumption in my argument that 'everything must have a
cause'). "If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as
well be the world as God" is relevant but not true, as
as the world did have a beginning and therefore a cause.
It's a very simple problem for anybody who still believes there might be one
anyway. All they have to do is come up with an argument for God, the
hypothetical first cause/creator of the universe, that does not run into
this fatal problem inherent in the very idea of it, which Russell points
out.
So far you haven't pointed out any 'special pleading'. I'm still
waiting.
<cue the chirping crickets>
They've been chirping for over a month now, and you still haven't
shown any 'special pleading'.
.
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
20 Apr 2004 02:51:53 PM |
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George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<aWUgc.28966$yD1.72066@attbi_s54>...
There cannot be any possibility of the hypothetical Magic Invisible God,
the hypothetical first cause here, since the very idea of such a thing
is doomed from the start by the absolutely fatal problem inherent in the
very idea of such a thing (special pleading for that one thing), which
Russell hightlights with a bright red marker:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Russell's argument ...
Straw man. Russell is not making an argment, he is simply pointing out
why the argument of you theists, that there must be a first cause (God,
the hypothetical first cause of everything), is an argument that cannot
have any validity. See above.
"If everything [anything] must have a
cause, then God must have a cause" is true but not relevant (as
there's no assumption in my argument that 'everything must have a
cause').
Yes, I know. You are not arguing that everything must have a cause, you
are making a special pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first
cause. That is the fatal problem inherent in the very idea of God, the
hypothetical causeless first cause.
It's a very simple problem for anybody who still believes there might be one
anyway. All they have to do is come up with an argument for God, the
hypothetical first cause/creator of the universe, that does not run into
this fatal problem inherent in the very idea of it, which Russell points
out.
So far you haven't pointed out any 'special pleading'. I'm still
waiting.
See just above here, the part just above, "Yes I know. You are not
arguing that everything must have a cause, you are making a special
pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first cause."
<cue the chirping crickets>
They've been chirping for over a month now, and you still haven't
shown any 'special pleading'.
Special pleading is the problem fatal to the very idea of God, the
hypothetical causeless first cause, which Russell has highlighted with a
bright red marker. See above.
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
21 Apr 2004 11:09:30 AM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<tbfhc.25474$hw5.40248@attbi_s53>...
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<aWUgc.28966$yD1.72066@attbi_s54>...
There cannot be any possibility of the hypothetical Magic Invisible God,
the hypothetical first cause here, since the very idea of such a thing
is doomed from the start by the absolutely fatal problem inherent in the
very idea of such a thing (special pleading for that one thing), which
Russell hightlights with a bright red marker:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Russell's argument <unsnip> (which is a Constructive Dilemma, by
the way) fails, for the reasons I already told you. "If
everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause" is
true but not relevant (as there's no assumption in my argument
that 'everything must have a cause'). "If there can be anything
without a cause, it may just as well be the world as God" is
relevant but not true, as the world did have a beginning and
therefore a cause. </unsnip>
Straw man. [...] You are not arguing that everything must have a cause, you
are making a special pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first
cause.
Yes, that is a straw man; thanks for the warning.
.
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
22 Apr 2004 08:04:55 AM |
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George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<tbfhc.25474$hw5.40248@attbi_s53>...
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<aWUgc.28966$yD1.72066@attbi_s54>...
There cannot be any possibility of the hypothetical Magic Invisible God,
the hypothetical first cause here, since the very idea of such a thing
is doomed from the start by the absolutely fatal problem inherent in the
very idea of such a thing (special pleading for that one thing), which
Russell hightlights with a bright red marker:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Russell's argument ...
Russell is not making an argment, he is simply pointing out why the
argument of you theists, that there must be a first cause (God, the
hypothetical first cause of everything), is an argument that cannot have
any validity. See above.
"If everything [anything] must have a
cause, then God must have a cause" is true but not relevant (as
there's no assumption in my argument that 'everything must have a
cause').
Yes, I know. You are not arguing that everything must have a cause, you
are making a special pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first
cause. That is the fatal problem inherent in the very idea of God, the
hypothetical causeless first cause. The fact remains that, to be
logically consistent, if anything must have a cause, then God must have
a cause.
It's a very simple problem for anybody who still believes there
might be one
anyway. All they have to do is come up with an argument for God, the
hypothetical first cause/creator of the universe, that does not run into
this fatal problem inherent in the very idea of it, which Russell points
out.
So far you haven't pointed out any 'special pleading'. I'm still
waiting.
See just above here, the part just above, "Yes I know. You are not
arguing that everything must have a cause, you are making a special
pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first cause."
<cue the chirping crickets>
They've been chirping for over a month now, and you still haven't
shown any 'special pleading'.
Special pleading is the problem fatal to the very idea of God, the
hypothetical causeless first cause, which Russell has highlighted with a
bright red marker. See above.
.
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| User: "Courageous" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
22 Apr 2004 08:30:41 AM |
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Yes, I know. You are not arguing that everything must have a cause, you
are making a special pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first
cause. That is the fatal problem inherent in the very idea of God,...
Arguments of the form "A implies B, A is false, therefore B is false"
are known as "denial of the antecedent" a fallacy. You continue to
treat the "A implies B" argument as if it were constructed of the
form "A implies B, IFF A is true," without having established any
basis for such a position.
C//
.
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
27 Apr 2004 11:56:10 AM |
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Courageous wrote:
Yes, I know. You are not arguing that everything must have a cause, you
are making a special pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first
cause. That is the fatal problem inherent in the very idea of God,...
Arguments of the form "A implies B, A is false, therefore B is false"
are known as "denial of the antecedent" a fallacy.
Where do you see any argument at all, A, B, or otherwise, from me or
from Russell?
Can't you recognize the difference between an argument from theists
("There must be a first cause') and the denial and deconstruction of
that argument by Russell?
Snap out of it.
I have presented no argument, and neither has Russell. All I have done
is show you where Russell points out the fact that the theist argument
that there must be a first cause is one which cannot have any validity.
How about dealing with what is actually written here, instead of
building a straw man?
Here again is what was actually written:
The very idea of God, the hypothetical first cause/creator depends upon
the argument that there must be a first cause, and, as Russell points
out, that argument is one that cannot have any validity.
There is no possibility that there might actually be such a thing as
God, the theists' hypothetical first cause/creator of everything, due to
the fatal problem (special pleading) inherent in the very idea of God,
which Russell points out:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
It's a very simple problem for anybody who still believes there might be
one anyway. All they have to do is come up with an argument for God, the
hypothetical first cause/creator of the universe, that does not run into
this fatal problem inherent in the very idea of it, which Russell points
out.
<cue the chirping crickets>
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
28 Apr 2004 12:06:06 AM |
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In article <Kgwjc.51454$_L6.4114012@attbi_s53>, Dixit <dix@nospam.com>
wrote:
Courageous wrote:
Yes, I know. You are not arguing that everything must have a cause, you
are making a special pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first
cause. That is the fatal problem inherent in the very idea of God,...
Arguments of the form "A implies B, A is false, therefore B is false"
are known as "denial of the antecedent" a fallacy.
Where do you see any argument at all, A, B, or otherwise, from me or
from Russell?
That question, by implying that there are no arguments, is itself an
argument.
Everything Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, posts is argument. One of
Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple's standard lies is to deny that his
arguments are arguments.
Can't you recognize the difference between an argument from theists
("There must be a first cause') and the denial and deconstruction of
that argument by Russell?
To declare any argument false is itself an argument.
I have presented no argument, and neither has Russell.
Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, has presented no valid argument.
Whether Russell's argument is valid or not, it is certainly an argument.
All I have done
is show you where Russell points out
"Pointing out" is arguing. Any assertion of the validity or invalidity
of any statement is an argumemnt about that statement.
How about dealing with what is actually written here, instead of
building a straw man?
That is exactly what Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, does not do.
Here again is what was actually written:
The very idea of God, the hypothetical first cause/creator depends upon
the argument that there must be a first cause, and, as Russell points
out, that argument is one that cannot have any validity.
So Russell questions the necessity of a first cause but does not
question the possibility of one. And Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple,
lied about what Russell "pointed out".
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
22 Apr 2004 03:43:28 PM |
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In article <XpPhc.2328$_L6.403144@attbi_s53>, Dixit <dix@nospam.com>
wrote:
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<tbfhc.25474$hw5.40248@attbi_s53>...
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<aWUgc.28966$yD1.72066@attbi_s54>...
There cannot be any possibility of the hypothetical Magic Invisible God,
the hypothetical first cause here, since the very idea of such a thing
is doomed from the start by the absolutely fatal problem inherent in the
very idea of such a thing (special pleading for that one thing), which
Russell hightlights with a bright red marker:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a
cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Russell's argument ...
Russell is not making an argment, he is simply pointing out
If Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, thinks that Russell is not making an
argument, then Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, doesn't know much about
Russell, or about what constitutes an argument.
why the argument of you theists,
What theists are those? All the theists I have ever met, acknowledge
their theism with some sort of creed stating their belief that a god
actually exists. You are arguing with people who merely claim that we do
no know that a god cannot exist.
that there must be a first cause
And we merely say that there might be a first cause, at least as far as
we can know, because it has not been satisfactorily proved or
demonstrated that there cannot be one.
"If everything must have a
cause, then God must have a cause" is true but not relevant (as
there's no assumption in my argument that 'everything must have a
cause').
Yes, I know. You are not arguing that everything must have a cause, you
are making a special pleading for God,
On the contrary, it is Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, who is making a
special pleading against any god, by demanding that we accept his plea
without evidence. A clearly anti agnostic stance.
The fact remains that, to be
logically consistent, if anything must have a cause, then God must have
a cause.
Not quite!
If EVERYTHING must have a cause, then any god must have a cause, too.
But first Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, must show that everything
DOES have a cause, Absent this proof, something might be without a cause
, and it might as well be a god as anything else.
It's a very simple problem for anybody who still believes there
might be one
anyway. All they have to do is come up with an argument for God, the
hypothetical first cause/creator of the universe, that does not run into
this fatal problem inherent in the very idea of it, which Russell points
out.
Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, misses the point, as usual. Those who
say only "might" are under no obligation to prove "must".
But those who say "cannot" are obliged to prove it, or have their claim
roundfiled with all the other unproven claims.
So far you haven't pointed out any 'special pleading'. I'm still
waiting.
See just above here, the part just above, "Yes I know. You are not
arguing that everything must have a cause, you are making a special
pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first cause."
As a claim made without evidence, this goes right into the round file,
as it deserves. Repeating a claim, however often, is not evidence for
its validity, it is merely the fallacy of argumentum ad nauseam.
<cue the chirping crickets>
They've been chirping for over a month now, and you still haven't
shown any 'special pleading'.
Special pleading is the problem fatal to the very idea of God, the
hypothetical causeless first cause, which Russell has highlighted with a
bright red marker. See above.
I see no red, except about Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple's continual
lying.
Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, merely repeats once more the same
claim still without any evidence of its validity. Repeating a claim,
however often, is not evidence for its validity, it is merely the
fallacy of argumentum ad nauseam.
And the round file is handy.
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
20 Apr 2004 09:26:48 PM |
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In article <tbfhc.25474$hw5.40248@attbi_s53>, Dixit <dix@nospam.com>
wrote:
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<aWUgc.28966$yD1.72066@attbi_s54>...
There cannot be any possibility of the hypothetical Magic Invisible God,
the hypothetical first cause here, since the very idea of such a thing
is doomed from the start by the absolutely fatal problem inherent in the
very idea of such a thing (special pleading for that one thing), which
Russell hightlights with a bright red marker:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If everything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
Russell's argument ...
Straw man. Russell is not making an argment, he is simply pointing out
"Simply pointing out" is arguing.
"If everything must have a
cause, then God must have a cause" is true but not relevant (as
there's no assumption in my argument that 'everything must have a
cause').
Yes, I know. You are not arguing that everything must have a cause,
It's a very simple problem for anybody who still believes
that Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, gets his knowledge by divine
inspiration.
But most of us don't, so we see Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple's
posturing for what it is.
So far you haven't pointed out any 'special pleading'. I'm still
waiting.
See just above here, the part just above, "Yes I know. You are not
arguing that everything must have a cause, you are making a special
pleading for God, the hypothetical causeless first cause."
<cue the chirping crickets>
They've been chirping for over a month now, and you still haven't
shown any 'special pleading'.
Special pleading is the problem fatal to the very idea of God, the
hypothetical causeless first cause, which Russell has highlighted with a
bright red marker. See above.
The circularity of Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple's arguments is as
astounding as Giotto's O.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
19 Apr 2004 03:14:20 PM |
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In article <aWUgc.28966$yD1.72066@attbi_s54>, Dixit <dix@nospam.com>
wrote:
George Dance wrote:
I didn't conclude that the universe is a 'physical object'
You are definitely taking it for granted (begging the question) as your
first premise in your argument that there must be a first cause of the
universe, taking it for granted that the universe is an object like a
crockery pot that requires a creator:
"1. Every physical object has a beginning." -- Dance
If this is Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple's best evidence that George
says we live in a crock pot, it is Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, who
is crocked, and George falsely accused.
The term, 'universe' ('world', as Russell puts it, which was more common
a hundred years ago) means simply the whole collection of everything
that exists, including the web of relationships (time, space, physical
attraction, repulsion, chemical reactions, or whatever - you know what
'relationship' mean) between things.
That is exactly what George was talking about
Your idea that there is an object like a crockery pot
Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, is getting crocked again. He is again
trying to push his own ideas into other mouths.
that is the
container of everything that exists, an object that requires a creator,
is simply an absurd idea, Mr. Dunce.
There cannot be any possibility of the hypothetical Magic Invisible God,
the hypothetical first cause here, since the very idea of such a thing
is doomed from the start by the absolutely fatal problem inherent in the
very idea of such a thing (special pleading for that one thing), which
Russell hightlights with a bright red marker:
"The argument that there must be a first cause is one that cannot have
any validity. If anything must have a cause, then God must have a cause.
If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world [universe, everything that exists] as God." -- Lord Bertrand
Russell (1872 - 1970)
I see no bright red marker. I see nothing but Russell's argument that
there need not be (though he does not say there cannot be) a first
cause. Perhaps Septic Capon, the Simple Pimple, is delusional again
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
13 Apr 2004 01:51:09 PM |
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On 4/13/04 10:55 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404130955.74edc25@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<Zqiec.16008$rg5.38391@attbi_s52>...
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC9C3E86.35CE%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/9/04 11:01 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404091001.2a7f88a8@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<%Yudc.106536$JO3.75761@attbi_s04>...
<piggyback to "Dance">
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause
without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by
Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
I wouldn't say it was either one. It does, though, contain physical
objects.
The universe is a container, like my tea cup?
More precisely, it's a coordinate system or a continuum ...
That is the space time continuum, which is not everything that exists.
The universe is everything that exists.
Ho, hum; if you insist on that definition, we'll accept it for the
argument, as long as that's the one used consistently.
How did you arrive at that
conclusion?
Which conclusion; that there are physical objects, or that they're in
the universe?
Your conclusion hat the universe is a physical object, a container, like
my tea cup, or a stew pot containing things?
I didn't conclude that the universe is a 'physical object' - I said
nothing about the universe until you asked me how I defined it ...
You said nothing about the universe? How do you figure that? Isn't that what
we are discussing?
Let's review:
We were discussing the idea that there must be a first cause in order for
the universe to exist, and I asked, "Can you produce a valid argument that
there might be a first cause without running into the fatal problem of
special pleading pointed out by Russell? Please post one."
And then you replied, "Child's play: 1. Every physical object has a
beginning."
So, you are taking it for granted in your first premise that the universe is
a physical object, a container, like a tea cup or a stew pot, right?
Now all I am asking is, "What warrants that assumption? Any evidence
supporting it, or inductive reasoning, or some such?"
Is there something you don't understand about my question?
.
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| User: "Jeff Young" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
13 Apr 2004 05:53:17 PM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<BCA184AD.7C7%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/13/04 10:55 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404130955.74edc25@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<Zqiec.16008$rg5.38391@attbi_s52>...
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC9C3E86.35CE%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/9/04 11:01 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404091001.2a7f88a8@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<%Yudc.106536$JO3.75761@attbi_s04>...
<piggyback to "Dance">
George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC984840.28DB%dix@nospam.com>...
On 4/6/04 9:48 AM, in article
6312c50b.0404060848.64d24b14@posting.google.com, "George Dance"
<georgedance@hotmail.com> wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:<BC9059D1.203B%dix@nospam.com>...
Can you produce a valid argument that there might be a first cause
without
running into the fatal problem of special pleading pointed out by
Russell?
Please post one.
Child's play:
1. Every physical object has a beginning.
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
I wouldn't say it was either one. It does, though, contain physical
objects.
The universe is a container, like my tea cup?
More precisely, it's a coordinate system or a continuum ...
That is the space time continuum, which is not everything that exists.
The universe is everything that exists.
Ho, hum; if you insist on that definition, we'll accept it for the
argument, as long as that's the one used consistently.
How did you arrive at that
conclusion?
Which conclusion; that there are physical objects, or that they're in
the universe?
Your conclusion hat the universe is a physical object, a container, like
my tea cup, or a stew pot containing things?
I didn't conclude that the universe is a 'physical object'
You said nothing about the universe?
Can't you read? He said the universe is a non-physical container.
Let's review:
We were discussing the idea that there must be a first cause in order for
the universe to exist, and I asked, "Can you produce a valid argument that
there might be a first cause without running into the fatal problem of
special pleading pointed out by Russell? Please post one."
And then you replied, "Child's play: 1. Every physical object has a
beginning."
So, you are taking it for granted in your first premise that the universe is
a physical object,
Incorrect. Complete Strawman Fallacy from Septic; again.
Septic Donny AllFried remains the completely fallacious, mendacious,
and discredited old idiot fool lying loser of alt.atheism and
Bellingham, Washington, as always.
Jeff
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
18 Apr 2004 10:37:30 AM |
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Jeff Young wrote:
... He said the universe is a non-physical container.
No he didn't, all he said was 'container'.
Please define your term 'non-physical container' and give three
examples, so that everybody can check your observations.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
20 Apr 2004 01:15:39 PM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<_gxgc.20536$yD1.47211@attbi_s54>...
Jeff Young wrote:
... He said the universe is a non-physical container.
No he didn't, all he said was 'container'.
Please define your term 'non-physical container' and give three
examples, so that everybody can check your observations.
We can define it ostensively (which means, by pointing to an example):
in this case, to one of the definitions of 'universe' that you
insisted on using:
universe: a set that contains all elements relevant to a particular
discussion or problem <m-w.com>
Sets are not physical, but do contain elements. Therefore they are
non-physical containers. QED
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| User: "Dixit" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
20 Apr 2004 03:26:29 PM |
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George Dance wrote:
Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<_gxgc.20536$yD1.47211@attbi_s54>...
Jeff Young wrote:
... He said the universe is a non-physical container.
No he didn't, all he said was 'container'.
Please define your term 'non-physical container' and give three
examples, so that everybody can check your observations.
We can define it ostensively (which means, by pointing to an example):
in this case, to one of the definitions of 'universe' that you
insisted on using:
universe: a set that contains all elements relevant to a particular
discussion or problem <m-w.com>
Sets are not physical, but do contain elements. Therefore they are
non-physical containers. QED
Sets are not containers (like stew pots), sets are simply groups of
things, and you know it. The universe is just such a set, the set of
everything that exists, including the web of relationships between them.
There is nothing like a container (a stew pot) about it.
Now how about getting off this diversion?
"The Fallacies of Diversion. The fallacies in this family share the
characteristic that they distract attention away from the issue that is
genuinely under discussion."
http://www.cuyamaca.net/bruce.thompson/Fallacies/diversion.asp
When are you going to get around to producing an argument for God that
does not run into that fatal problem (special pleading) with the very
idea of God, the hypothetical uncaused first cause, which Russell
highlights?
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| User: "Jeff Young" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
18 Apr 2004 08:23:23 PM |
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Dixit <dix@nospam.com> wrote in message news:<_gxgc.20536$yD1.47211@attbi_s54>...
Jeff Young wrote:
... He said the universe is a non-physical container.
No he didn't, all he said was 'container'.
Bzzzzzzt! Wrong again, Septic.
<begin excerpt>
Is the universe a physical object, or is it just everything that exists?
I wouldn't say it was either one. It does, though, contain physical
objects.
<end excerpt>
Dance _clearly_ says here that he wouldn't say the universe is a
physical object, and he also _clearly_ says here that the universe
_contains_ physical objects. Can't you read, Septic??
Septic Donny AllFried remains the completely illiterate, fallacious,
mendacious, and discredited old idiot fool lying loser of alt.atheism
and Bellingham, Washington, as always.
Jeff
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: problems fatal to the very idea of God |
20 Apr 2004 11:42:17 AM |
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