| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Scott Erb" |
| Date: |
06 Nov 2005 01:14:07 PM |
| Object: |
Re: Is Atheism a Safe Bet? |
This response didn't get seem to arrive so I'm re-sending it
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote in message news:...
"wbarwell" <wbarwell@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
news:11ms509au2k773d@corp.supernews.com...
Scott Erb wrote:
"Del" <jfacts@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:1131249862.012526.200870@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
SquareKnot wrote:
chris.holt wrote:
Scott Erb wrote:
No, I'm saying the nature of the puzzles suggest there must be
a force outside space-time that is beyond our understanding
which brought
space-time into existence (via the bi g bang). This force
could be
impersonal or have consciousness of some sort. There is no
inherent reason to privilege an impersonal force over the
possibility of a
conscious force. Ergo, logically, there is an equal
probability that there is a 'god' (not the typical religious
notion of god) that is conscious or that the force of nature is
impersonal.
You might want to rethink your idea of what constitutes an
equal probability. If you don't know, that doesn't mean
that all the alternatives you can think of are equal.
Plus the fact that arguing as Scott and friends do, that there
might be a God (Creator of the universe) because there is no proof
that hypothesis (that 'might be' conjecture) is false, is logical
fallacy, argument from ignorance, argument _ad ignorantiam_.
No, if that were the case every scientist who speculates would be
commiting a logical fallacy.
Most of modern physics, including Einstein's idea of relativity,
started with a reflection on the evidence and then, "it might be the
case..."
In any event, I'm simply noting: a) space-time is the realm of
science; b) the big bang created space-time, anything previous to or
causal of the big bang was outside our space-time universe, and thus
not in the realm of current science, and in fact beyond our
understanding;
Not true....
Why do you say that? At one point you tried to use space-time references
as
a way to deny that anything could be out of space-time, which is an error of
reasoning.
We can't know what is or can be outside space-time because we are
psychologically enslaved by it. Mathematics is perhaps the only possible
key to unlocking that, but even with things as complex as string theory,
we're still only trying to get a grip on what the nature of space-time is --
except it is our limited universe, and it is an entity (the Newtonian view
of time as the progression of events and space as the stage on which reality
is played out has long been pushed aside, of course).
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
27 Nov 2005 01:12:21 PM |
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In article <1133081158.537059.107030@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@gmail.com> wrote:
Virgil wrote:
In article <ytCdnQc4S4BiARreRVn-hw@comcast.com>,
SquareKnot <sk@nospam.net> wrote:
Virgil wrote:
Septic
Argument _ad hominem_. Got anything to say that is not logical fallacy?
That name came about because ...
... because you think you can get away with the logical fallacy of
argument _ad hominem_ if a gang of you theists join in doing it.
Simple Septic, the True Believer, is the only theist involved in this
dispute. Those he opposes are honest atheists and agnostics.
If Simple Septic, the True Believer really were the atheist he calims to
be, he would not attack those whose position he should be defending.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
27 Nov 2005 06:26:01 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
Virgil wrote:
In article <ytCdnQc4S4BiARreRVn-hw@comcast.com>,
SquareKnot <sk@nospam.net> wrote:
Virgil wrote:
Septic
Argument _ad hominem_. Got anything to say that is not logical fallacy?
That name came about because ...
... because you think
Because we think you shall not be allowed to switch identities, Septic.
Jeff
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
26 Nov 2005 08:45:57 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
What do you get out of playing these games ...
What do you mean, 'playing games'?
You're still doing it - as though you don't know what I mean. I mean (as
you know) - making arguments that you know to be fallacious; saying
things that you know to be false. Why do you do it when all that happens
is that you are loathed and despised and are called an idiot (and
worse)? What do you get out of it? I just want to understand what
possesses someone to do what you're doing.
Is there something I have said to which you have reason to take
exception?
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
23 Nov 2005 05:13:31 PM |
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In article <1132772703.486901.51790@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@gmail.com> wrote:
Scott Erb wrote:
...
The claim "It is logically possible that there is a god of some sort" is not
the same as saying "it must be true that."
Aren't you folks arguing _ad ignorantiam_ that a god of some sort is
logically possible ('might be') because there is no proof that
hypothesis (that 'might be' conjecture) is false?
No we are not.
What we are doing is not an argument but a statement of fact:
that to say something is not known to be impossible and
to say that as far as is known it is possible
are logically equivalent statements.
And we are invoking the agnostic principle to say that we will not
assent to the impossibility of gods without logically convincing
evidence of that impossibility.
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| User: "chris.holt" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
23 Nov 2005 01:27:28 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
Aren't you folks arguing _ad ignorantiam_ that a god of some sort is
logically possible ('might be') because there is no proof that
hypothesis (that 'might be' conjecture) is false?
No. People are arguing that, but it's not ad ignorantiam.
As I suggested before, you'd do well to look at modal
logics; it's much easier to see in those terms.
But you folks haven't given us any sound reason to even consider your
hypothesis, as Chris Lee points out:
http://tinylink.com/?6664ZqVskh
Since 'sound' is a technical term in logic (as is 'complete'),
I think you want to be careful of your terminology when
dealing with people who understand what they're talking
about.
--
chris.holt@ncl.ac.uk http://homepages.cs.ncl.ac.uk/chris.holt
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
23 Nov 2005 05:06:02 PM |
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In article <1132768524.686779.47940@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@gmail.com> wrote:
Goober wrote:
The puzzle is why you pretend to demonstrate that you don't.
I am not pretending anything.
Simple Septic the Secret Theist pretends not to be any of those many
nyms he has previously used. Over 100 of them I seem to recall!
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
26 Nov 2005 08:38:48 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
jientho@aol.com wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Scott Erb wrote:
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote in message
news:e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com...
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
...
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind of god is
possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from ignorance is
logical fallacy.
No, you don't understand the logical fallacy.
I understand it,
No you don't ...
I do understand it,
The puzzle is why you pretend to demonstrate that you don't.
I am not pretending anything.
It's obvious that you are. I know it, and you know it. The puzzle is why
you play this game of yours. What role does it fufill in you life that
you should pursue it and garner such loathing?
What we are discussing here
is a very basic principle of valid argument, the principle that
arguing _ad ignorantiam_ is logical fallacy.
Arguing as you do that it must be true that some kind of god is
possible, and this hypothesis (your 'might be' theist conjecture) even
a genius like Galileo could not prove false, that kind of argument is
FAMOUS typical theist textbook logical fallacy, as Copi points out in
_Introduction to Logic_:
---
<quote>
Famous in the history of science is the argument _ad ignorantiam_ given
in criticism of Galileo, when he showed leading astronomers of his time
the mountains and valleys on the moon that could be seen through his
telescope. Some scholars of that age, absolutely convinced that the
moon was a perfect sphere, as theology and Aristotelian science had
long taught, argued against Galileo that, although we see what appear
to be mountains and valleys, the moon is in fact a perfect sphere,
because all its apparent irregularities are filled in by an invisible
crystalline substance. And this hypothesis, which saves the perfection
of the heavenly bodies, Galileo could not prove false!
</quote>
(Copi and Cohen, _Introduction to Logic_)
---
[In this case the term, 'hypothesis' means conjecture, 'might be'
imagining with no basis in fact.]
Get it now, Scooter?
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
25 Nov 2005 04:34:01 AM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
jientho@aol.com wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Scott Erb wrote:
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote in message
news:e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com...
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
...
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind of god is
possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from ignorance is
logical fallacy.
No, you don't understand the logical fallacy.
I understand it,
No you don't ...
I do understand it,
The puzzle is why you pretend to demonstrate that you don't.
I am not pretending anything.
You know that you are.
What we are discussing here
is a very basic principle of valid argument, the principle that
arguing _ad ignorantiam_ is logical fallacy.
Arguing as you do that it must be true that some kind of god is
possible, and this hypothesis (your 'might be' theist conjecture) even
a genius like Galileo could not prove false, that kind of argument is
FAMOUS typical theist textbook logical fallacy, as Copi points out in
_Introduction to Logic_:
---
<quote>
Famous in the history of science is the argument _ad ignorantiam_ given
in criticism of Galileo, when he showed leading astronomers of his time
the mountains and valleys on the moon that could be seen through his
telescope. Some scholars of that age, absolutely convinced that the
moon was a perfect sphere, as theology and Aristotelian science had
long taught, argued against Galileo that, although we see what appear
to be mountains and valleys, the moon is in fact a perfect sphere,
because all its apparent irregularities are filled in by an invisible
crystalline substance. And this hypothesis, which saves the perfection
of the heavenly bodies, Galileo could not prove false!
</quote>
(Copi and Cohen, _Introduction to Logic_)
---
[In this case the term, 'hypothesis' means conjecture, 'might be'
imagining with no basis in fact.]
Get it now, Scooter?
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
22 Nov 2005 02:35:32 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
jientho@aol.com wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Scott Erb wrote:
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote in message
news:e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com...
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind of god is
possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from ignorance is
logical fallacy.
No, you don't understand the logical fallacy.
I understand it,
No you don't ...
I do understand it
No you don't, sir. Two bags full, Septic. You _demonstrate_ that you
don't understand it every time you try to talk about it. So by all
means continue trying, Septic. Your next demonstration goes here:
Jeff
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
22 Nov 2005 03:47:03 PM |
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wrote:
OS XI wrote:
wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Scott Erb wrote:
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote in message
news:e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com...
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind of god is
possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from ignorance is
logical fallacy.
No, you don't understand the logical fallacy.
I understand it,
No you don't ...
I do understand it
No you don't ...
I do understand it, it seems to be those of you on your side who do not
have a grip on it. It is a very simple principle of valid argument.
Arguing as you do that it must be true that some kind of god is
possible, and this hypothesis (your 'might be' theist conjecture) even
a genius like Galileo could not prove false, that kind of argument is
FAMOUS typical theist textbook logical fallacy, as Copi points out in
_Introduction to Logic_:
---
<quote>
Famous in the history of science is the argument _ad ignorantiam_ given
in criticism of Galileo, when he showed leading astronomers of his time
the mountains and valleys on the moon that could be seen through his
telescope. Some scholars of that age, absolutely convinced that the
moon was a perfect sphere, as theology and Aristotelian science had
long taught, argued against Galileo that, although we see what appear
to be mountains and valleys, the moon is in fact a perfect sphere,
because all its apparent irregularities are filled in by an invisible
crystalline substance. And this hypothesis, which saves the perfection
of the heavenly bodies, Galileo could not prove false!
</quote>
(Copi and Cohen, _Introduction to Logic_)
---
[In this case the term, 'hypothesis' means conjecture, 'might be'
imagining with no basis in fact.]
Get it now, Scooter?
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
22 Nov 2005 09:08:41 PM |
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In article <1132696023.495100.118290@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@gmail.com> wrote:
I do understand it
No you don't ...
I do understand it, it seems to be those of you on your side who do
not have a grip on it. It is a very simple principle of valid argument.
Arguing as you do that it must be true that some kind of god is
possible
But that is not what we "argue" at all. What WE argue is that Simple
Septic the Secret Theist's claim that gods are known to be impossible is
a fallacy since no such thing can be known without evidence, and there
is none.
So it is Simple Septic the Secret Theist who is the only one being
fallacious.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
22 Nov 2005 09:26:17 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
jientho@aol.com wrote:
OS XI wrote:
jientho@aol.com wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Scott Erb wrote:
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote in message
news:e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com...
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind of god is
possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from ignorance is
logical fallacy.
No, you don't understand the logical fallacy.
I understand it,
No you don't ...
I do understand it
No you don't ...
I do understand it,
No you don't, sir. Three bags full, Septic.
Jeff
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| User: "Richo" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
21 Nov 2005 08:17:24 PM |
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Scott Erb wrote:
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote in message
news:e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com...
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
...
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind of god is
possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from ignorance is
logical fallacy.
No, you don't understand the logical fallacy. Saying that because we don't
know something is false it must then be true is the argument from ignorance.
Science often posits wild ideas (at one point anti-matter, quarks, and even
quantized energy were considered 'maybe' ideas to explore) that we cannot
yet test or disprove, but which because they are logically possible can be
considered legitimate for speculation.
It is absolutely anti-science to argue that the argument from ignorance
means you can't accept as possible things that are unproven. The core
belief behind science, and what makes it superior to religion, is the notion
that all that is not disproven is possible, and can at some point be the
basis for an hypothesis.
Now, if such a thing renders an unfalsifiable hypothesis, as this does, it
is outside science and in the realm of philosophy. But to claim that it is
'argument from ignorance' to say that 'it is possible there is a god' is a
totally absurd claim.
-scott
Well said Scott.
I doubt very much Skeptic (AKA OS XI, DotSix etc) will change his mind
- he has had this explained to him many time before.
Mark.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
21 Nov 2005 12:48:05 AM |
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In article <e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com>,
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote:
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
...
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind of god is
possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from ignorance is
logical fallacy.
In the absence of proof of impossibility, there is no fallacy in
refusing to accept impossibility.
Just as in the absence of proof of actuality, there is no fallacy in
refusing to accept actuality.
In the matter of god(s), agnostics refuse to accept, in the absence of
logically convincing evidence, both actuality and impossibility.
.
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| User: "wbarwell" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
21 Nov 2005 02:31:42 PM |
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Virgil wrote:
In article <e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com>,
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote:
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
...
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind
of god is possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from
ignorance is logical fallacy.
In the absence of proof of impossibility, there is no fallacy in
refusing to accept impossibility.
And what are we to do with dishonest people who
are presented with proof of impossibility and ignore it?
Repeatedly as in your case.
IS THERE A GOD?
Strong Atheism's answer.
A BASIC DEFINITION OF GOD.
The general overarching definition of god as per
the major religions of the world is:
A. God is personal, God has will and consciousness.
B. God has free will.
C. God is the creator of all.
D. God is omnipotent.
E. God is omnibenevolent.
F. God is omniscient.
G. God is that which nothing more powerful
can be imagined.
These are the basic attributes that can be claimed
for the god of orthodox Judaism, Christianity,
Islam, and Hinduism.
Omnibenevolence and omniscience are actually
logically derivable from the claimed attribute of
omnipotence and so aren't not truly independent
attributes, and may be considered special aspects
of omnipotence.
There are other attributes of god, that he is the
only such god, that he is is immortal and that
god has always existed that are not important
for this discussion and for now, can be ignored.
They are secondary arguments and are for the most
part not foundational or truly necessary, except
those that can be logically derived from the
attributes listed above.
A CLASS OF GODS
It is important to note here that this is a
definition not for a particular god, but an
entire class of gods.
Sub-theories about god are not important here.
Christianity claims one may attain salvation
only through Jesus, Islam claims the Christian
dogma that Jesus was the son of god is
blasphemous.
Ideas like this though, are of little importance
to the overarching and general claims made for a
personal, creator, omni-everything god. I have
coined a term, The Grand God of Grand Theologies
for this sort of god, this sort of theological
system of expansive claims for god.
Grand theologies are those theologies that have
adopted this class of god as their basic
attributes concerning the nature of god. But it
is important to remember here that what is being
discussed here is a class of gods, not particular
gods or specific gods.
THE FOUR GREAT THEOLOGICAL TRADITIONS
Again, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism hold
to this basic Grand God and are typical Grand
Theologies holding to this basic class of god as
their basic definitions of what god is at god's
most basic level.
A big problem with this class of gods is, it
collapses rather easily into internal self-
contradiction.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
The problem of evil was first written down by
Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
Today's formulation is:
A. God is defined as omnipotent;
B. and as omnibenevolent.
C. Evil exists.
D. God therefore, is not omnipotent as claimed.
E. Or God is not omnibenevolent as claimed.
F. Or god is neither omnipotent or
omnibenevolent.
G. Or god is not existant.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
The free will defense of the problem of evil goes
back to St. Augustine who popularized it. It is
still popular, and is championed most notably
today by Alvin Plantinga, but also by other
theologians.
God gave man free will. Man freely chooses to do
evil. Ability to do evil is less evil than
lacking free will.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE DEBUNKED.
God has free will.
God is omnibenevolent, he has a good nature
incapable of doing evil.
A. If god can have free will, and a good nature,
this good nature is not allowed to count
against god's free will.
B. Nor is god's lack of ability to do evil
allowed to count against god's omnipotence.
C. Likewise, man could easily have a god like
free will and a god like good nature.
D. Inabilty then to do evil would no more count
against man's free will than it does for god's
free will.
E. If so, it also counts against god's free will
and god does not have free will as claimed.
F. If god does not have absolute and total free
will, thus free will is not a true necessity
at all.
F. If god is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, and
can give man a god like free will and a
god-like good nature incapable of moral evil,
god must do so or god is not moral, not
omnibenevolent.
G. Evil exists because he allows it to.
So free will does not exist, or it does and we can
have a god like free will and a god like good
nature. Either way, free will cannot explain away
the existence of evil. This free will defense
then, is a failed argument.
OMNISCIENCE VERSUS CREATORHOOD OF GOD
God is defined as creator of all in most
religions.
And god is claimed to be omniscient, all knowing.
A. God created the Universe and all in it.
B. God is omniscient, all knowing, he knows all
in the Universe and he knows the future of the
Universe and its contents.
C. If god creates a Universe, he will know that
in 13 billion years this Universe will have a
man named John Smith in it.
D. If John Smith is good and saved, or evil and
damned, God will know that.
E. As he knows that the Universe in its present
state will have a John Smith, god may then
contemplate the future state of Smith and
decide if he will tolerate an evil Smith.
F. If yes, Smith will be evil only because of a
specific personal and will choice made solely
by god.
G. If Smith is evil, then evil exists solely
because of a choice made by god. In fact all
moral evil done by creations of god will be
evil and do evil only because of personal and
willful creations of god allowing evil acts
to be done, by direct decision of god.
H. If evil exists in a world with an omniscient
creator god, it is solely and only because
god allows evil.
I. If evil exists solely because of personal
choices of god, god then is not as defined,
omnibenevolent.
J. Man and any other sentient being in such a
Universe cannot have any free will, not even
in principle. A Universe with a god that
creates all and knows all precludes free will
for all beings god creates in the strongest
possible manner.
The Grand God of Grand
Theology is thus self destroying, it is
incoherent and contradictory as a theory.
THE SITUATION SO FAR.
1. A minimalistic class of gods is defined, this
Grand God has been defined here with as few
terms as possible.
2. The problem of evil dooms such a claimed god.
3. The attempted defense, free will is fatally
flawed. God's good nature and free will doom
claims free will makes evil necessary for man
to have free will.
4. Omniscience and creatorhood of god further
doom claims of god's omnibenevolence and
man's free will free will cannot exist for
man. All evil is the direct and knowing
creation of god contradicting claims of
omnibenevolence.
5. Since Free will for man is totally impossible,
free will cannot be a good quality, much less
necessary.
Here, the Grand God of Grand Theology has
collapsed. As has Grand
Theology. As pointed out, this destroys the claims
and viability of an entire class of possible
gods,
all secondary and tertiary claims for such a god
of
this class also fail, as do dogmas or secondary
or tertiary claims.
If a these Grand Gods cannot exist as defined,
specific gods cannot, nor can claims such as this
or that Grand God sent this or that revelation to
man or some prophet or did this or that.
God is thus disproven and is utter irrelevant
to anything real and existant.
***********
--
An Englishman who was wrecked on a strange shore and
wandering along the coast . . . came to a gallows
with a victim hanging on it, and fell down on his
knees and thanked God that he at last beheld a sign
of civilization.
--James A. Garfield (1831-1881)
(House of Representatives speech, June 15, 1870)
Cheerful Charlie
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
22 Nov 2005 04:44:10 AM |
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wbarwell wrote:
Virgil wrote:
In article <e_Sdnaq9CI490hzeRVn-sg@comcast.com>,
"Roger" <rog@nospam.org> wrote:
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote
...
There is nothing wrong with someone saying "logically some kind
of god is possible" ...
There definitely is something wrong with it: argument from
ignorance is logical fallacy.
In the absence of proof of impossibility, there is no fallacy in
refusing to accept impossibility.
And what are we to do with dishonest people who
are presented with proof of impossibility and ignore it?
Repeatedly as in your case.
IS THERE A GOD?
Strong Atheism's answer.
A BASIC DEFINITION OF GOD.
The general overarching definition of god as per
the major religions of the world is:
A. God is personal, God has will and consciousness.
B. God has free will.
C. God is the creator of all.
D. God is omnipotent.
E. God is omnibenevolent.
F. God is omniscient.
G. God is that which nothing more powerful
can be imagined.
These are the basic attributes that can be claimed
for the god of orthodox Judaism, Christianity,
Islam, and Hinduism.
Omnibenevolence and omniscience are actually
logically derivable from the claimed attribute of
omnipotence and so aren't not truly independent
attributes, and may be considered special aspects
of omnipotence.
There are other attributes of god, that he is the
only such god, that he is is immortal and that
god has always existed that are not important
for this discussion and for now, can be ignored.
They are secondary arguments and are for the most
part not foundational or truly necessary, except
those that can be logically derived from the
attributes listed above.
A CLASS OF GODS
It is important to note here that this is a
definition not for a particular god, but an
entire class of gods.
Sub-theories about god are not important here.
Christianity claims one may attain salvation
only through Jesus, Islam claims the Christian
dogma that Jesus was the son of god is
blasphemous.
Ideas like this though, are of little importance
to the overarching and general claims made for a
personal, creator, omni-everything god. I have
coined a term, The Grand God of Grand Theologies
for this sort of god, this sort of theological
system of expansive claims for god.
Grand theologies are those theologies that have
adopted this class of god as their basic
attributes concerning the nature of god. But it
is important to remember here that what is being
discussed here is a class of gods, not particular
gods or specific gods.
THE FOUR GREAT THEOLOGICAL TRADITIONS
Again, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism hold
to this basic Grand God and are typical Grand
Theologies holding to this basic class of god as
their basic definitions of what god is at god's
most basic level.
A big problem with this class of gods is, it
collapses rather easily into internal self-
contradiction.
I've seen you say this all over the place, but as I've argued before,
you've failed to provide any reason to think that the above notion of
God is internally *self-cotradictory*.
The basic point is this: if it were internally self-contradictory you
would need no other premises than those identified above (A-G) to
demonstrate that. That's what self-contradictory means - contradicts
*itself*. But what you attempt to show below and in your other posts is
that the above conception *PLUS ADDITIONAL PREMISE C (below)* is
self-contradictory.
The point is that premise C - "evil exists" is a substantive claim that
can be consistently denied by the theist, and hence preserve the logical
possibility of such a being existing and the consistency of of such a
belief.
When I've pointed this out to you before I believe you failed to provide
an argument to the contrary, so I'll give you another chance here.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
The problem of evil was first written down by
Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
Today's formulation is:
A. God is defined as omnipotent;
B. and as omnibenevolent.
C. Evil exists.
D. God therefore, is not omnipotent as claimed.
E. Or God is not omnibenevolent as claimed.
F. Or god is neither omnipotent or
omnibenevolent.
G. Or god is not existant.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
The free will defense of the problem of evil goes
back to St. Augustine who popularized it. It is
still popular, and is championed most notably
today by Alvin Plantinga, but also by other
theologians.
God gave man free will. Man freely chooses to do
evil. Ability to do evil is less evil than
lacking free will.
I'd really like you to tell me precisely what you means by "free will".
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE DEBUNKED.
God has free will.
God is omnibenevolent, he has a good nature
incapable of doing evil.
A. If god can have free will, and a good nature,
this good nature is not allowed to count
against god's free will.
We have here a conditional claim. If P (then) Q.
P= "god can have both free will and a good nature"
= "it is possible that both god has free will and a good nature"
I'm not sure what else you might mean by "is not allowed to count
against" other than "is consistent with". In which case:
Q= "it is possible that both god has a good nature and has free will"
But that's a completely uninformative tautology:
"If it is possible that both god has free will and a good nature
then
it is possible that both god has a good nature and has free will"
B. Nor is god's lack of ability to do evil
allowed to count against god's omnipotence.
And here we appear to have an inference that you seem to suppose follows
from the same antecedent, P (the use of "nor" suggest that to me). Hence:
If "it is possible that both god has free will and has a good nature"
then
"it is logically possible that god be unable to do evil and be omnipotent".
C. Likewise, man could easily have a god like
free will and a god like good nature.
What would it be to have a *god-like* free will or a *god-like* good
nature? Is this any different from plain old "free will" and plain old
"good nature"? If it means something more than plain old free-will and
good nature, then I'd like to know the basis for saying that man could
easily have such things.
In any case, this too seems to be following from some implicit
antecedent ('likewise'). Hence:
"If god can have both free will and a good nature
then
it is (easily) possible that man have god-like free will and god-like
good nature"
D. Inabilty then to do evil would no more count
against man's free will than it does for god's
free will.
Presumably:
"If it is (easily) possible that man have god-like free will and
god-like good nature
then
it is possible that man both have free will and be unable to do evil"
E. If so, it also counts against god's free will
and god does not have free will as claimed.
I don't follow this inference at all. Is this supposed to follow
directly from D, or from D in combination with some other claim, or just
a part of D? What is the "it" in E? Is it the truth of D, or the
consequent of D [my best guess]? But how does a counterfactual claim
about what is possible for man entail a non-counterfactual claim about
what is not possible for god? I just don't yet see it. You seem to move
from a claim about consistency to a claim about inconsistency:
As best I can tell:
"If it is possible that man both have free will and be unable to do evil
then
it is not possible for god to have free will"
hence
god does not have free will"
F. If god does not have absolute and total free
will, thus free will is not a true necessity
at all.
What does "absolute and total" free will mean? In the previous claim you
seem to say that god does not have free will,
Shouldn't "thus" be "then"? Or are you simply assuming "god does not
have absolute and total free will"?
F. If god is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, and
can give man a god like free will and a
god-like good nature incapable of moral evil,
god must do so or god is not moral, not
omnibenevolent.
This may be the key move. Why *must* a god give man those powers?
Apparently you think it would be immoral for god to do otherwise, but
why? Because (in your view) a world with the less evil than the evil
that (in your view) it contains, would be a world that a benovolent and
powerful god with free will *must* choose. But still - *why* must such a
god choose that?
Here's you suppose two things - both of which are consistently deniable,
and the denial of either of which removes the problem for the theist:
1) That there is evil
2) (given 1) That a world with less evil would be better. (I.e., that
this is not the best of all possible worlds)
G. Evil exists because he allows it to.
So free will does not exist, or it does and we can
have a god like free will and a god like good
nature. Either way, free will cannot explain away
the existence of evil. This free will defense
then, is a failed argument.
OMNISCIENCE VERSUS CREATORHOOD OF GOD
God is defined as creator of all in most
religions.
And god is claimed to be omniscient, all knowing.
A. God created the Universe and all in it.
B. God is omniscient, all knowing, he knows all
in the Universe and he knows the future of the
Universe and its contents.
Here's a dubious inference. Omniscience of god is that god knows all
that can *logically* be known. Just as omnipotence does not entail god
can do the logically impossible, omniscience does not entail that god
can know what it is logically impossible to know.
Now, it is at least arguable that if the universe is indeterministic
then god *cannot* know how things will turn out regarding Smith.
Moreover, on certain views, only an indeterministic universe is
compatible with the existence of free will. So if god has free will,
then the universe *must* be indeterminsitic, hence there are some things
that god *cannot* know.
So you need to explain why you think the universe is not
indetmerministic, and how god could have free will in a deterministic
universe.
Lastly, it is anathema on many views of god to talk of god "deciding" -
god would be outside of time.
C. If god creates a Universe, he will know that
in 13 billion years this Universe will have a
man named John Smith in it.
D. If John Smith is good and saved, or evil and
damned, God will know that.
E. As he knows that the Universe in its present
state will have a John Smith, god may then
contemplate the future state of Smith and
decide if he will tolerate an evil Smith.
First you must establish that god can *decide* to tolerate an evil
Smith. The theist might consistently object that god *cannot* decide to
do any such thing - why? because (they might suggest) allowing the evil
that smith does may be better (more moral) than disallowing it. Hence to
disallow Smith's evil would be contrary to gods essence - contrary to
his benevolence. God cannot do the logically or metaphysically impossible.
I've given you enough to chew on - will go to bed now.
Goober.
F. If yes, Smith will be evil only because of a
specific personal and will choice made solely
by god.
G. If Smith is evil, then evil exists solely
because of a choice made by god. In fact all
moral evil done by creations of god will be
evil and do evil only because of personal and
willful creations of god allowing evil acts
to be done, by direct decision of god.
H. If evil exists in a world with an omniscient
creator god, it is solely and only because
god allows evil.
I. If evil exists solely because of personal
choices of god, god then is not as defined,
omnibenevolent.
J. Man and any other sentient being in such a
Universe cannot have any free will, not even
in principle. A Universe with a god that
creates all and knows all precludes free will
for all beings god creates in the strongest
possible manner.
The Grand God of Grand
Theology is thus self destroying, it is
incoherent and contradictory as a theory.
THE SITUATION SO FAR.
1. A minimalistic class of gods is defined, this
Grand God has been defined here with as few
terms as possible.
2. The problem of evil dooms such a claimed god.
3. The attempted defense, free will is fatally
flawed. God's good nature and free will doom
claims free will makes evil necessary for man
to have free will.
4. Omniscience and creatorhood of god further
doom claims of god's omnibenevolence and
man's free will free will cannot exist for
man. All evil is the direct and knowing
creation of god contradicting claims of
omnibenevolence.
5. Since Free will for man is totally impossible,
free will cannot be a good quality, much less
necessary.
Here, the Grand God of Grand Theology has
collapsed. As has Grand
Theology. As pointed out, this destroys the claims
and viability of an entire class of possible
gods,
all secondary and tertiary claims for such a god
of
this class also fail, as do dogmas or secondary
or tertiary claims.
If a these Grand Gods cannot exist as defined,
specific gods cannot, nor can claims such as this
or that Grand God sent this or that revelation to
man or some prophet or did this or that.
God is thus disproven and is utter irrelevant
to anything real and existant.
***********
.
|
|
|
| User: "Richo" |
|
| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
22 Nov 2005 06:25:22 AM |
|
|
Goober wrote:
wbarwell wrote:
A BASIC DEFINITION OF GOD.
The general overarching definition of god as per
the major religions of the world is:
A. God is personal, God has will and consciousness.
B. God has free will.
C. God is the creator of all.
D. God is omnipotent.
E. God is omnibenevolent.
F. God is omniscient.
G. God is that which nothing more powerful
can be imagined.
These are the basic attributes that can be claimed
for the god of orthodox Judaism, Christianity,
Islam, and Hinduism.
Omnibenevolence and omniscience are actually
logically derivable from the claimed attribute of
omnipotence and so aren't not truly independent
attributes, and may be considered special aspects
of omnipotence.
I have a problem with this - how is omnibenevolence derivable from
omnipotence?
Why couldn't God be both omnipotent and omnimalevolent?
I dont see why not.
All Gods traditionally specified atributes seem to me ad-hoc.
There are other attributes of god, that he is the
only such god, that he is is immortal and that
god has always existed that are not important
for this discussion and for now, can be ignored.
They are secondary arguments and are for the most
part not foundational or truly necessary, except
those that can be logically derived from the
attributes listed above.
A CLASS OF GODS
It is important to note here that this is a
definition not for a particular god, but an
entire class of gods.
<small snip>
A big problem with this class of gods is, it
collapses rather easily into internal self-
contradiction.
I've seen you say this all over the place, but as I've argued before,
you've failed to provide any reason to think that the above notion of
God is internally *self-cotradictory*.
The basic point is this: if it were internally self-contradictory you
would need no other premises than those identified above (A-G) to
demonstrate that. That's what self-contradictory means - contradicts
*itself*.
Agreed.
But what you attempt to show below and in your other posts is
that the above conception *PLUS ADDITIONAL PREMISE C (below)* is
self-contradictory.
The point is that premise C - "evil exists" is a substantive claim that
can be consistently denied by the theist, and hence preserve the logical
possibility of such a being existing and the consistency of of such a
belief.
Theologians themselves have great difficulty believing that - for
example the extermination of Jews in the Nazi death camps or the
Rawandan genocide are wholly good things.
So I dont think the additional assumption "evil exists" is much of a
problem.
When I've pointed this out to you before I believe you failed to provide
an argument to the contrary, so I'll give you another chance here.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
The problem of evil was first written down by
Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
Today's formulation is:
A. God is defined as omnipotent;
B. and as omnibenevolent.
C. Evil exists.
D. God therefore, is not omnipotent as claimed.
E. Or God is not omnibenevolent as claimed.
F. Or god is neither omnipotent or
omnibenevolent.
G. Or god is not existant.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
The free will defense of the problem of evil goes
back to St. Augustine who popularized it. It is
still popular, and is championed most notably
today by Alvin Plantinga, but also by other
theologians.
God gave man free will. Man freely chooses to do
evil. Ability to do evil is less evil than
lacking free will.
I'd really like you to tell me precisely what you means by "free will".
You wouldnt be alone.
In Bills defence I would point out "free will" isnt his invention - he
is just using a standard formula.
Loosely it is that God can choose to do or allow whatever it is
possible for him to choose or allow that doesnt conflict with any
essential part of his own nature.
(Being omnipotent the scope of possibilities for God is greater than
for any other being.)
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE DEBUNKED.
God has free will.
God is omnibenevolent, he has a good nature
incapable of doing evil.
A. If god can have free will, and a good nature,
this good nature is not allowed to count
against god's free will.
We have here a conditional claim. If P (then) Q.
P= "god can have both free will and a good nature"
= "it is possible that both god has free will and a good nature"
I'm not sure what else you might mean by "is not allowed to count
against" other than "is consistent with". In which case:
Q= "it is possible that both god has a good nature and has free will"
But that's a completely uninformative tautology:
"If it is possible that both god has free will and a good nature
then
it is possible that both god has a good nature and has free will"
Yes A is "It is possible to have both a good nature and free will"
The "If - Then" is totally unecessary.
B. Nor is god's lack of ability to do evil
allowed to count against god's omnipotence.
And here we appear to have an inference that you seem to suppose follows
from the same antecedent, P (the use of "nor" suggest that to me). Hence:
If "it is possible that both god has free will and has a good nature"
then
"it is logically possible that god be unable to do evil and be omnipotent".
I see this as a corrolary of A.
C. Likewise, man could easily have a god like
free will and a god like good nature.
What would it be to have a *god-like* free will or a *god-like* good
nature? Is this any different from plain old "free will" and plain old
"good nature"? If it means something more than plain old free-will and
good nature, then I'd like to know the basis for saying that man could
easily have such things.
Good point. I think that C should be restated somehow.
In any case, this too seems to be following from some implicit
antecedent ('likewise'). Hence:
"If god can have both free will and a good nature
then
it is (easily) possible that man have god-like free will and god-like
good nature"
That is a clearer statement.
D. Inabilty then to do evil would no more count
against man's free will than it does for god's
free will.
Presumably:
"If it is (easily) possible that man have god-like free will and
god-like good nature
then
it is possible that man both have free will and be unable to do evil"
E. If so, it also counts against god's free will
and god does not have free will as claimed.
I don't follow this inference at all. Is this supposed to follow
directly from D, or from D in combination with some other claim, or just
a part of D? What is the "it" in E? Is it the truth of D, or the
consequent of D [my best guess]? But how does a counterfactual claim
about what is possible for man entail a non-counterfactual claim about
what is not possible for god? I just don't yet see it. You seem to move
from a claim about consistency to a claim about inconsistency:
As best I can tell:
"If it is possible that man both have free will and be unable to do evil
then
it is not possible for god to have free will"
hence
god does not have free will"
If the inablillity to do evil counts against free will then it counts
against *any* beings free will.
Or at least no one has ever explained why not.
8-)
F. If god does not have absolute and total free
will, thus free will is not a true necessity
at all.
What does "absolute and total" free will mean? In the previous claim you
seem to say that god does not have free will,
Shouldn't "thus" be "then"? Or are you simply assuming "god does not
have absolute and total free will"?
F. If god is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, and
can give man a god like free will and a
god-like good nature incapable of moral evil,
god must do so or god is not moral, not
omnibenevolent.
This may be the key move. Why *must* a god give man those powers?
To be omnibenevolent - to prevent evil.
IF God has the POWER to create free beings that are wholly good THEN
the Holocaust and the Rawandan genocides would not have occurred.
So Either:
God isnt omnipotent (and so isnt God)
OR
God isnt omnibenevolent (and so isnt God)
OR
God isnt.
OR
It is IMPOSSIBLE for God to create man to be both free and wholly good.
This last choice is the "free will defence" - but the people who assert
it (theologians - not William Barwell) also assert that God can be both
free and wholly good - so it is certainly a possibility for God- so it
is certainly a possibility *fullstop*.
The power of omnipotence is the power to be able to do anything that is
POSSIBLE to do.
And we have the example of God and so KNOW it is possible - at least
for God.
So where is the proof that it is IMPOSSIBLE for God (an infinite,
eternal, all knowing being, that is as powerfull as is logically
possible to be) to make man with free will and wholly good?
There is no such a proof.
Apparently you think it would be immoral for god to do otherwise, but
why? Because (in your view) a world with the less evil than the evil
that (in your view) it contains, would be a world that a benovolent and
powerful god with free will *must* choose.
Yes - that is the logical consequence of Omnipotence combined with
Omnibenevolence.
If it were POSSIBLE for God to create a world with less suffering than
this one then we would be living in it.
But still - *why* must such a
god choose that?
Because he must follow his nature - he can do anything EXCEPT that it
contradicts his nature.
Here's you suppose two things - both of which are consistently deniable,
and the denial of either of which removes the problem for the theist:
1) That there is evil
It is possible to deny this - that the aparently pointless sufferering
of inocents serves a greater good.
Most humans (believers and non) find this repugnant.
2) (given 1) That a world with less evil would be better. (I.e., that
this is not the best of all possible worlds)
Ditto - most human beings have an instinctual revulsion to this idea.
That a World without WW1 or the Killing fields of Cambodia would not be
better that this actual world seems obviously false.
I think William should rewrite his argument in light of your
criticisms.
I think the underlying argument is a striong one - even if the
presentation needs work.
Mark.
.
|
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| User: "Goober" |
|
| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
23 Nov 2005 05:07:41 AM |
|
|
Richo wrote:
Goober wrote:
wbarwell wrote:
A BASIC DEFINITION OF GOD.
The general overarching definition of god as per
the major religions of the world is:
A. God is personal, God has will and consciousness.
B. God has free will.
C. God is the creator of all.
D. God is omnipotent.
E. God is omnibenevolent.
F. God is omniscient.
G. God is that which nothing more powerful
can be imagined.
These are the basic attributes that can be claimed
for the god of orthodox Judaism, Christianity,
Islam, and Hinduism.
Omnibenevolence and omniscience are actually
logically derivable from the claimed attribute of
omnipotence and so aren't not truly independent
attributes, and may be considered special aspects
of omnipotence.
I have a problem with this - how is omnibenevolence derivable from
omnipotence?
Why couldn't God be both omnipotent and omnimalevolent?
I dont see why not.
All Gods traditionally specified atributes seem to me ad-hoc.
There are other attributes of god, that he is the
only such god, that he is is immortal and that
god has always existed that are not important
for this discussion and for now, can be ignored.
They are secondary arguments and are for the most
part not foundational or truly necessary, except
those that can be logically derived from the
attributes listed above.
A CLASS OF GODS
It is important to note here that this is a
definition not for a particular god, but an
entire class of gods.
<small snip>
A big problem with this class of gods is, it
collapses rather easily into internal self-
contradiction.
I've seen you say this all over the place, but as I've argued before,
you've failed to provide any reason to think that the above notion of
God is internally *self-cotradictory*.
The basic point is this: if it were internally self-contradictory you
would need no other premises than those identified above (A-G) to
demonstrate that. That's what self-contradictory means - contradicts
*itself*.
Agreed.
But what you attempt to show below and in your other posts is
that the above conception *PLUS ADDITIONAL PREMISE C (below)* is
self-contradictory.
The point is that premise C - "evil exists" is a substantive claim that
can be consistently denied by the theist, and hence preserve the logical
possibility of such a being existing and the consistency of of such a
belief.
Theologians themselves have great difficulty believing that - for
example the extermination of Jews in the Nazi death camps or the
Rawandan genocide are wholly good things.
Agreed. Once stripped of theological overtones of the notion of 'evil',
I too would balk at such a suggestion. But my point was simply to
indicate a route to consistency for the theist, not a route to
plausibility.
So I dont think the additional assumption "evil exists" is much of a
problem.
I wasn't sugessting that the assumption is false or implausible, just
that one could consistently deny its existence.
When I've pointed this out to you before I believe you failed to provide
an argument to the contrary, so I'll give you another chance here.
THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
The problem of evil was first written down by
Epicurus in about the third century BCE.
Today's formulation is:
A. God is defined as omnipotent;
B. and as omnibenevolent.
C. Evil exists.
D. God therefore, is not omnipotent as claimed.
E. Or God is not omnibenevolent as claimed.
F. Or god is neither omnipotent or
omnibenevolent.
G. Or god is not existant.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE
The free will defense of the problem of evil goes
back to St. Augustine who popularized it. It is
still popular, and is championed most notably
today by Alvin Plantinga, but also by other
theologians.
God gave man free will. Man freely chooses to do
evil. Ability to do evil is less evil than
lacking free will.
I'd really like you to tell me precisely what you means by "free will".
You wouldnt be alone.
In Bills defence I would point out "free will" isnt his invention - he
is just using a standard formula.
Of course. But there are different views on free will that might make a
difference to understanding or assessing his argument.
Loosely it is that God can choose to do or allow whatever it is
possible for him to choose or allow that doesnt conflict with any
essential part of his own nature.
And that is a loose way of putting it, as you say, but also vaguely
circular, because 'choose' or 'allow' are already imbued with the notion
of free action.
Suppose (unknown to me) someone has locked the door of the room I am in.
Am I in this room (which is where I wish to be) of my own free will?
Mutatis mutandis it seems to fit the above: I can choose to do what it
is possible for me to choose to do that doesn't conflict with my nature.
I can't leave the room, so doing that is not possible for me, but
staying here is possible, and that is what I do, as a direct effect of
my will.
(Being omnipotent the scope of possibilities for God is greater than
for any other being.)
I'd agree. I take it that the limitations for god are those of logical
or metaphysical necessity; those of man, also include nomological and
circumstantial necessity. That could be a significant difference that
undermines the supposedly parallel reasoning employed in the argument.
I'm not sure.
THE FREE WILL DEFENSE DEBUNKED.
God has free will.
God is omnibenevolent, he has a good nature
incapable of doing evil.
A. If god can have free will, and a good nature,
this good nature is not allowed to count
against god's free will.
We have here a conditional claim. If P (then) Q.
P= "god can have both free will and a good nature"
= "it is possible that both god has free will and a good nature"
I'm not sure what else you might mean by "is not allowed to count
against" other than "is consistent with". In which case:
Q= "it is possible that both god has a good nature and has free will"
But that's a completely uninformative tautology:
"If it is possible that both god has free will and a good nature
then
it is possible that both god has a good nature and has free will"
Yes A is "It is possible to have both a good nature and free will"
The "If - Then" is totally unecessary.
Just to be clearer, my main intent was to try to get clearer precisely
what Bill's argument is, so that it might be easier to assess it. I have
some problems with some of the claims as well, but some of those may be
due to me not understanding him.
B. Nor is god's lack of ability to do evil
allowed to count against god's omnipotence.
And here we appear to have an inference that you seem to suppose follows
from the same antecedent, P (the use of "nor" suggest that to me). Hence:
If "it is possible that both god has free will and has a good nature"
then
"it is logically possible that god be unable to do evil and be omnipotent".
I see this as a corrolary of A.
C. Likewise, man could easily have a god like
free will and a god like good nature.
What would it be to have a *god-like* free will or a *god-like* good
nature? Is this any different from plain old "free will" and plain old
"good nature"? If it means something more than plain old free-will and
good nature, then I'd like to know the basis for saying that man could
easily have such things.
Good point. I think that C should be restated somehow.
In any case, this too seems to be following from some implicit
antecedent ('likewise'). Hence:
"If god can have both free will and a good nature
then
it is (easily) possible that man have god-like free will and god-like
good nature"
That is a clearer statement.
D. Inabilty then to do evil would no more count
against man's free will than it does for god's
free will.
Presumably:
"If it is (easily) possible that man have god-like free will and
god-like good nature
then
it is possible that man both have free will and be unable to do evil"
E. If so, it also counts against god's free will
and god does not have free will as claimed.
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