| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Scott Erb" |
| Date: |
06 Nov 2005 01:14:07 PM |
| Object: |
Re: Is Atheism a Safe Bet? |
This response didn't get seem to arrive so I'm re-sending it
"Scott Erb" <scotterb@att.net> wrote in message news:...
"wbarwell" <wbarwell@mylinuxisp.com> wrote in message
news:11ms509au2k773d@corp.supernews.com...
Scott Erb wrote:
"Del" <jfacts@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:1131249862.012526.200870@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
SquareKnot wrote:
chris.holt wrote:
Scott Erb wrote:
No, I'm saying the nature of the puzzles suggest there must be
a force outside space-time that is beyond our understanding
which brought
space-time into existence (via the bi g bang). This force
could be
impersonal or have consciousness of some sort. There is no
inherent reason to privilege an impersonal force over the
possibility of a
conscious force. Ergo, logically, there is an equal
probability that there is a 'god' (not the typical religious
notion of god) that is conscious or that the force of nature is
impersonal.
You might want to rethink your idea of what constitutes an
equal probability. If you don't know, that doesn't mean
that all the alternatives you can think of are equal.
Plus the fact that arguing as Scott and friends do, that there
might be a God (Creator of the universe) because there is no proof
that hypothesis (that 'might be' conjecture) is false, is logical
fallacy, argument from ignorance, argument _ad ignorantiam_.
No, if that were the case every scientist who speculates would be
commiting a logical fallacy.
Most of modern physics, including Einstein's idea of relativity,
started with a reflection on the evidence and then, "it might be the
case..."
In any event, I'm simply noting: a) space-time is the realm of
science; b) the big bang created space-time, anything previous to or
causal of the big bang was outside our space-time universe, and thus
not in the realm of current science, and in fact beyond our
understanding;
Not true....
Why do you say that? At one point you tried to use space-time references
as
a way to deny that anything could be out of space-time, which is an error of
reasoning.
We can't know what is or can be outside space-time because we are
psychologically enslaved by it. Mathematics is perhaps the only possible
key to unlocking that, but even with things as complex as string theory,
we're still only trying to get a grip on what the nature of space-time is --
except it is our limited universe, and it is an entity (the Newtonian view
of time as the progression of events and space as the stage on which reality
is played out has long been pushed aside, of course).
.
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
03 Dec 2005 10:01:05 PM |
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Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
[snip]
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
It appears that Goober is inclined to want to assume his desired
conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain function), which
is the fallacy of begging the question.
If you'd like to try to justify that accusation, be my guest.
You justified it by clearly showing your inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above), which is the fallacy of
begging the question. You would never get away with it even in a
freshman lab class. Try it on some experimental psychologists at your
nearest university. Let us know how you make out.
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
04 Dec 2005 12:18:22 AM |
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In article <1133668865.786872.19460@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@gmail.com> wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
[snip]
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
It appears that Goober is inclined to want to assume his desired
conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain function), which
is the fallacy of begging the question.
If you'd like to try to justify that accusation, be my guest.
You justified it by clearly showing your inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above)
Septic still cannot distinguish between the meaning of "must" and
"might".
To say something MIGHT exist asserts no more than that it has not been
proved impossible, which does not beg any questions unless it actually
has been proved impossible.
Well, has it punk?
.
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
04 Dec 2005 11:11:02 AM |
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Virgil wrote:
To say something MIGHT exist asserts no more than that it has not been
proved impossible
You are still arguing that there might be a God because there is no
proof that hypothesis ('might be' theist conjecture) is false?
That is typical textbook theist argument _ad ingorantiam_ for which you
theists are FAMOUS, as Copi points out:
---
<quote>
Famous in the history of science is the argument _ad ignorantiam_ given
in criticism of Galileo, when he showed leading astronomers of his time
the mountains and valleys on the moon that could be seen through his
telescope. Some scholars of that age, absolutely convinced that the
moon was a perfect sphere, as theology and Aristotelian science had
long taught, argued against Galileo that, although we see what appear
to be mountains and valleys, the moon is in fact a perfect sphere,
because all its apparent irregularities are filled in by an invisible
crystalline substance. And this hypothesis, which saves the perfection
of the heavenly bodies, Galileo could not prove false!
</quote>
(Copi and Cohen, _Introduction to Logic_)
---
[In this case the term, 'hypothesis' means conjecture, 'might be'
imagining with no basis in fact.]
As Chris Lee points out, there is no reason to even consider the
hypothesis there might be a god:
http://tinylink.com/?6664ZqVskh
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
04 Dec 2005 01:45:57 PM |
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In article <1133716262.199991.138610@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@gmail.com> wrote:
Virgil wrote:
To say something MIGHT exist asserts no more than that it has not been
proved impossible
You are still arguing that there might be a God because there is no
proof that hypothesis ('might be' theist conjecture) is false?
Not quite. I am merely pointing out the fact that that, as an honest
agnostic, I cannot reject that possibility without proof of its
impossibity.
Septic seems quite unable to understand that the agnostic principle
prohibits unfounded rejection of possibility of gods as much as it does
unfounded acceptance of actuallity of gods.
Thomas Huxley's agnosticism only objects to unfounded claims.
.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
06 Dec 2005 05:23:46 AM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
[snip]
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
It appears that Goober is inclined to want to assume his desired
conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain function), which
is the fallacy of begging the question.
If you'd like to try to justify that accusation, be my guest.
You justified it by clearly showing your inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above)
Begs the question. I renew my inivitation.
Goober.
, which is the fallacy of
begging the question. You would never get away with it even in a
freshman lab class. Try it on some experimental psychologists at your
nearest university. Let us know how you make out.
.
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
06 Dec 2005 09:13:01 AM |
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Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
[snip]
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
It appears that Goober is inclined to want to assume his desired
conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain function), which
is the fallacy of begging the question.
If you'd like to try to justify that accusation, be my guest.
You justified it by clearly showing your inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above
Begs the question.
Yes, your BS argument above is begging the question (assuming the
deessired conclusion as a premise), that is what I am telling you.
You have an inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above), which is the fallacy of begging
the question. You would never get away with it even in a freshman lab
class. Try it on some experimental psychologists at your nearest
university. Let us know how you make out.
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
06 Dec 2005 08:27:43 PM |
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In article <1133881981.117090.143570@z14g2000cwz.googlegroups.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@gmail.com> wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
You justified it by clearly showing your inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above
Begs the question.
Yes, your BS argument above is begging the question (assuming the
deessired conclusion as a premise), that is what I am telling you.
You can tell it til your cows come home, but the telling does not make
ity true.
You have an inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function
Actually, the absence of any proof of "must not" is the logical
equivalent of "might be" (though not of "must be"), so that Septics
argument is a fallacy. The same one he so often makes, conflating "must
be" with "might be".
.
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
07 Dec 2005 01:53:22 AM |
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"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-3020CD.19274306122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com...
Actually, the absence of any proof of "must not" is the logical
equivalent of "might be"
That was still argument _ad ignorantiam_ last time I checked, logical
fallacy for which you theists have been famous for hundreds of years!
<quote>
Famous in the history of science is the argument _ad ignorantiam_ given
in criticism of Galileo, when he showed leading astronomers of his time
the mountains and valleys on the moon that could be seen through his
telescope. Some scholars of that age, absolutely convinced that the moon
was a perfect sphere, as theology and Aristotelian science had long
taught, argued against Galileo that, although we see what appear to be
mountains and valleys, the moon is in fact a perfect sphere, because all
its apparent irregularities are filled in by an invisible crystalline
substance. And this hypothesis, which saves the perfection of the
heavenly bodies, Galileo could not prove false!
Galileo, to expose the argument _ad ignorantium_, offered another of the
same kind as a caricature. Unable to prove the nonexistence of the
transparent crystal supposedly filling the valleys, he put forward the
equally probable hypothesis that there were, rearing up from the
invisible crystalline envelope on the moon, even greater mountain
peaks -- but made of crystal and thus invisible! And this hypothesis his
critics could not prove false.
</quote>
(Copi and Cohen, _Introduction to Logic_, p. 117)
[In this case the term, 'hypothesis' means conjecture, a speculative,
'might be' imagining with no basis in fact.]
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
07 Dec 2005 02:34:46 PM |
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In article <dtudncn1lPpsCQveRVn-ug@comcast.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@nospam.net> wrote:
"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-3020CD.19274306122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com...
Actually, the absence of any proof of "must not" is the logical
equivalent of "might be"
That was still argument _ad ignorantiam_ last time I checked
As usual, Septic did not check carefully enough. In order to have an
Argumentum ad Ignorantiam, one would needs to insist that "MUST BE"
follows from no proof of "cannot be", the way that Septic argues that
Gods "MUST BE" impossible because they "CANNOT BE' shown to exist.
.
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
07 Dec 2005 04:54:07 PM |
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"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-790136.13344607122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com...
In article <dtudncn1lPpsCQveRVn-ug@comcast.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@nospam.net> wrote:
"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-3020CD.19274306122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com...
Actually, the absence of any proof of "must not" is the logical
equivalent of "might be"
That was still argument _ad ignorantiam_ last time I checked
As usual, Septic did not check carefully enough.
You are mistaken. I found the following in _Introduction to Logic_ which
says your argument is logical fallacy for which you theists have been
FAMOUS lo these hundreds of years since Galileo's time at least:
<quote>
Famous in the history of science is the argument _ad ignorantiam_ given
in criticism of Galileo, when he showed leading astronomers of his time
the mountains and valleys on the moon that could be seen through his
telescope. Some scholars of that age, absolutely convinced that the
moon was a perfect sphere, as theology and Aristotelian science had
long taught, argued against Galileo that, although we see what appear
to be mountains and valleys, the moon is in fact a perfect sphere,
because all its apparent irregularities are filled in by an invisible
crystalline substance. And this hypothesis, which saves the perfection
of the heavenly bodies, Galileo could not prove false!
Galileo, to expose the argument _ad ignorantium_, offered another of
the same kind as a caricature. Unable to prove the nonexistence of the
transparent crystal supposedly filling the valleys, he put forward the
equally probable hypothesis that there were, rearing up from the
invisible crystalline envelope on the moon, even greater mountain
peaks -- but made of crystal and thus invisible! And this hypothesis
his critics could not prove false.
</quote>
(Copi and Cohen, _Introduction to Logic_, p. 117)
[In this case the term, 'hypothesis' means theist conjecture, a
speculative, 'might be' imagining with no basis in fact.]
As Chris Lee points out, there is no reason to even consider the
hypothesis there might be a god:
http://tinylink.com/?6664ZqVskh
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
07 Dec 2005 09:53:11 PM |
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In article <I8ydnb3DOMmX9QreRVn-tg@comcast.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@nospam.net> wrote:
"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-790136.13344607122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com...
In article <dtudncn1lPpsCQveRVn-ug@comcast.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@nospam.net> wrote:
"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-3020CD.19274306122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com..
.
Actually, the absence of any proof of "must not" is the logical
equivalent of "might be"
That was still argument _ad ignorantiam_ last time I checked
As usual, Septic did not check carefully enough.
You are mistaken. I found the following in _Introduction to Logic_ which
says your argument is logical fallacy for which you theists have been
FAMOUS lo these hundreds of years since Galileo's time at least:
The only trouble is that Septic does not understand what he has found
and misuses it to claim a tautology is not a tautology.
A supposition of possibility can only be refuted by a proof of
impossibility. Anything less leaves the question open, which does not
refute the supposition.
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
07 Dec 2005 08:30:40 AM |
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OS XI wrote:
"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-3020CD.19274306122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com...
Actually, the absence of any proof of "must not" is the logical
equivalent of "might be"
That was still argument _ad ignorantiam_
False, sir. Two bags full, Septic.
Jeff
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
07 Dec 2005 10:26:32 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
[snip]
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
It appears that Goober is inclined to want to assume his desired
conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain function), which
is the fallacy of begging the question.
If you'd like to try to justify that accusation, be my guest.
You justified it by clearly showing your inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above
Begs the question.
Yes, your BS argument above is begging the question (assuming the
deessired conclusion as a premise), that is what I am telling you.
You have an inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above), which is the fallacy of begging
the question. You would never get away with it even in a freshman lab
class. Try it on some experimental psychologists at your nearest
university. Let us know how you make out.
*You* beg the question. I renew my invitation for you to justify your
accusation.
Goober.
.
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
08 Dec 2005 01:17:09 AM |
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Goober wrote:
*You* beg the question.
No, it is YOU begging the question by assuming your desired conclusion
(there might be a mind separate from brain function - see your BS
argument), which is the fallacy of begging
the question. You would never get away with it even in a freshman lab
class. Try it on some experimental psychologists at your nearest
university. Let us know how you make out.
Your BS argument goes something like this:
Assume M = a mental event
Assume B = a brain event
B is not the same as M
Scientists can observe B but cannot observe M
Therefore there might be a mind separate from brain function because
scientists can't prove that hypothesis (that 'might be' conjecture)
false.
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
08 Dec 2005 02:39:05 AM |
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In article <1134026229.612952.85050@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@gmail.com> wrote:
Goober wrote:
*You* beg the question.
No, it is YOU begging the question by assuming your desired conclusion
(there might be a mind separate from brain function
Unless Septic has access to proof that a mind separate from the brain is
impossible, Septic is not allowed to beg the question by assuming that
it is impossible.
The question remains open until there is proof sufficient to determine
which hypothesis is correct.
To beg the question as Septic is trying to do with the Argumentum ad
Ignorantiam that it is impossible because there is no proof that it is
possible is anti-science at its worst!
.
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
08 Dec 2005 12:37:12 PM |
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"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-D14A34.01390508122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com...
Unless Septic has access to proof that a mind separate from the brain
is
impossible ...
There you go again, trying to get away with arguing _ad ignorantiam_
that there might be an invisible X because there is no proof your
hypothesis is false, logical fallacy for which you theists have been
famous for hundreds of years:
<quote>
Famous in the history of science is the argument _ad ignorantiam_ given
in criticism of Galileo, when he showed leading astronomers of his time
the mountains and valleys on the moon that could be seen through his
telescope. Some scholars of that age, absolutely convinced that the
moon was a perfect sphere, as theology and Aristotelian science had
long taught, argued against Galileo that, although we see what appear
to be mountains and valleys, the moon is in fact a perfect sphere,
because all its apparent irregularities are filled in by an invisible
crystalline substance. And this hypothesis, which saves the perfection
of the heavenly bodies, Galileo could not prove false!
Galileo, to expose the argument _ad ignorantium_, offered another of
the same kind as a caricature. Unable to prove the nonexistence of the
transparent crystal supposedly filling the valleys, he put forward the
equally probable hypothesis that there were, rearing up from the
invisible crystalline envelope on the moon, even greater mountain
peaks -- but made of crystal and thus invisible! And this hypothesis
his critics could not prove false.
</quote>
(Copi and Cohen, _Introduction to Logic_)
[In this case the term, 'hypothesis' means theist conjecture, a
speculative, 'might be' imagining with no basis in fact.]
As Chris Lee points out, there is no reason to even consider the
hypothesis there might be a god:
http://tinylink.com/?6664ZqVskh
.
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| User: "Virgil" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
08 Dec 2005 07:40:04 PM |
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In article <GsWdnVX-2IbP4AXenZ2dnUVZ_s2dnZ2d@comcast.com>,
"OS XI" <oessxi@nospam.net> wrote:
"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-D14A34.01390508122005@comcast.dca.giganews.
com...
Unless Septic has access to proof that a mind separate from the
brain is impossible ...
There you go again, trying to get away with arguing _ad ignorantiam_
that there might be an invisible X because there is no proof your
hypothesis is false
So we are supposed to accept Septic's Argumentum ad Ignorantiam that
there MUST NOT be a mind separate from the brain, because there is
insufficient evidence of one to conclude that there is one?
A claim of "MUST" or "MUST NOT" is essential to the existence of a
fallacy of Argumentum ad Ignorantiam. Mere "might" or "might not" are
insufficient.
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
08 Dec 2005 02:22:48 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
"Virgil" <ITSnetNOTcom#virgil@COMCAST.com> wrote in message
news:ITSnetNOTcom%23virgil-D14A34.01390508122005@comcast.dca.giganews.com...
Unless Septic has access to proof that a mind separate from the brain
is
impossible ...
arguing _ad ignorantiam_
False. As already explained, Septic.
<snip Fallacy of Argumentum ad Nauseum from Septic; again>
Jeff
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
08 Dec 2005 04:12:13 AM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
*You* beg the question.
No,
Yep.
it is YOU begging the question by assuming your desired conclusion
(there might be a mind separate from brain function - see your BS
argument),which is the fallacy of begging
the question. You would never get away with it even in a freshman lab
class. Try it on some experimental psychologists at your nearest
university. Let us know how you make out.
Your BS argument goes something like this:
Assume M = a mental event
Assume B = a brain event
B is not the same as M
Scientists can observe B but cannot observe M
Therefore there might be a mind separate from brain function because
scientists can't prove that hypothesis (that 'might be' conjecture)
false.
Since this is prima facie attempt to justify your claim, I'll address it.
You purport to accuse me of making the following argument:
1) Assume M = a mental event
2) Assume B = a brain event
3) B is not the same as M
4) Scientists can observe B but cannot observe M
5) Scientists can't prove the hypothesis "there might be a mind separate
from brain function" false.
6) Therefore there might be a mind separate from brain function.
I made no such argument and here's why....
a) I have never claimed (5) or it's parenthesis.
b) In (1) and (2) you confound *token* mental events with mental
*types*. My argument defending functionalism related to mental *types*,
not mental *tokens*. I made this perfectly clear. Yet you express them
as tokens, not types.
Here is what I *defined* (not "assumed"):
M = a mental event OF KIND K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event OF
KIND K
B = a brain event OF KIND N
Do you see the word "kind"? It's lot a long or complicated word. I would
say that most 6 year olds have a good enough grasp of it. It means a
*type* of thing.
c) In one or two relatively brief arguments (arguments for
functionalism) I argued that M events constitute a functional kind, and
as such it is not identical with a material kind (B events). That claim
is entirely compatible with the claim that every M event is a B event.
That argument did not use "B is not the same as M" as a premise.
d) In *other* arguments I argued that conscious M events are not
third-party observable but are inferred from subjective evidence (S
events). This has nothing to do with functionalism of arguments about
functionalism. It is simply a report of the fact that you cannot
directly observe, for example, my consciousness. All you could do is
observe my brain states and *infer* that those brain states are my
mental states from subjective evidence.
The claim that one cannot directly observe mental events needs to be
treated with care, however. Clearly, if a brain event is mental event,
then observing a brain event is, in a perfectly natural sense, observing
a mental event. But what is *not* observed is the mental event as it
appears from the inside - the feeling or qualitative aspect that is
essential to it being that mental state. You look at a brain event and
truthfully say "I am looking at a pain state", but what you are not
observing is the way it feels for that person to be in that state. What
it feels like to be in that state is essential to it being that kind of
conscious state. So there is a very real sense (and the sense in which I
made my claims) in which one does not observe such mental events. There
is always things that cannot be third-party verified about such states.
That argument did not use "B is not the same as M" as a premise.
e) The conclusion of the argument you mistakenly attribute to me, does
not appear in the premises. Even if it were my argument, it does not
appear to be begging the question.
Goober.
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| User: "OS XI" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
08 Dec 2005 11:33:06 AM |
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Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
*You* beg the question.
No,
Yep.
it is YOU begging the question by assuming your desired conclusion
(there might be a mind separate from brain function - see your BS
argument),which is the fallacy of begging
the question. You would never get away with it even in a freshman lab
class. Try it on some experimental psychologists at your nearest
university. Let us know how you make out.
Your BS argument goes something like this:
Assume M = a mental event
Assume B = a brain event
B is not the same as M
Scientists can observe B but cannot observe M
Therefore there might be a mind separate from brain function because
scientists can't prove that hypothesis (that 'might be' conjecture)
false.
Since this is prima facie attempt to justify your claim, I'll address it.
You purport to accuse me of making the following argument:
1) Assume M = a mental event
2) Assume B = a brain event
3) B is not the same as M
4) Scientists can observe B but cannot observe M
5) Scientists can't prove the hypothesis "there might be a mind separate
from brain function" false.
6) Therefore there might be a mind separate from brain function.
I made no such argument and here's why....
a) I have never claimed (5) or it's parenthesis.
b) In (1) and (2) you confound *token* mental events with mental
*types*. My argument defending functionalism related to mental *types*,
not mental *tokens*. I made this perfectly clear. Yet you express them
as tokens, not types.
Here is what I *defined* (not "assumed"):
M = a mental event OF KIND K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event OF
KIND K
B = a brain event OF KIND N
Do you see the word "kind"? It's lot a long or complicated word. I would
say that most 6 year olds have a good enough grasp of it. It means a
*type* of thing.
c) In one or two relatively brief arguments (arguments for
functionalism) I argued that M events constitute a functional kind, and
as such it is not identical with a material kind (B events). That claim
is entirely compatible with the claim that every M event is a B event.
That argument did not use "B is not the same as M" as a premise.
d) In *other* arguments I argued that conscious M events are not
third-party observable but are inferred from subjective evidence (S
events). This has nothing to do with functionalism of arguments about
functionalism. It is simply a report of the fact that you cannot
directly observe, for example, my consciousness. All you could do is
observe my brain states and *infer* that those brain states are my
mental states from subjective evidence.
Will you please briefly outline one or two (or as many as you wish) of
those arguments you insist are different so that we can have a close
look at how they are constructed?
You know, like this:
Premises:
1.
2.
3.
Valid inference:
Conclusion:
as in:
Premises:
1. M = a mental event OF KIND K
2. S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event
OF
KIND K
3. B = a brain event OF KIND N
Valid inference:
Conclusion:
.
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| User: "Goober" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
09 Dec 2005 04:24:32 AM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
*You* beg the question.
No,
Yep.
it is YOU begging the question by assuming your desired conclusion
(there might be a mind separate from brain function - see your BS
argument),which is the fallacy of begging
the question. You would never get away with it even in a freshman lab
class. Try it on some experimental psychologists at your nearest
university. Let us know how you make out.
Your BS argument goes something like this:
Assume M = a mental event
Assume B = a brain event
B is not the same as M
Scientists can observe B but cannot observe M
Therefore there might be a mind separate from brain function because
scientists can't prove that hypothesis (that 'might be' conjecture)
false.
Since this is prima facie attempt to justify your claim, I'll address it.
You purport to accuse me of making the following argument:
1) Assume M = a mental event
2) Assume B = a brain event
3) B is not the same as M
4) Scientists can observe B but cannot observe M
5) Scientists can't prove the hypothesis "there might be a mind separate
from brain function" false.
6) Therefore there might be a mind separate from brain function.
I made no such argument and here's why....
a) I have never claimed (5) or it's parenthesis.
b) In (1) and (2) you confound *token* mental events with mental
*types*. My argument defending functionalism related to mental *types*,
not mental *tokens*. I made this perfectly clear. Yet you express them
as tokens, not types.
Here is what I *defined* (not "assumed"):
M = a mental event OF KIND K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event OF
KIND K
B = a brain event OF KIND N
Do you see the word "kind"? It's lot a long or complicated word. I would
say that most 6 year olds have a good enough grasp of it. It means a
*type* of thing.
c) In one or two relatively brief arguments (arguments for
functionalism) I argued that M events constitute a functional kind, and
as such it is not identical with a material kind (B events). That claim
is entirely compatible with the claim that every M event is a B event.
That argument did not use "B is not the same as M" as a premise.
d) In *other* arguments I argued that conscious M events are not
third-party observable but are inferred from subjective evidence (S
events). This has nothing to do with functionalism of arguments about
functionalism. It is simply a report of the fact that you cannot
directly observe, for example, my consciousness. All you could do is
observe my brain states and *infer* that those brain states are my
mental states from subjective evidence.
Will you please briefly outline one or two (or as many as you wish) of
those arguments you insist are different so that we can have a close
look at how they are constructed?
You know, like this:
Premises:
1.
2.
3.
Valid inference:
Conclusion:
as in:
Premises:
1. M = a mental event OF KIND K
2. S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event
OF
KIND K
3. B = a brain event OF KIND N
Valid inference:
Conclusion:
Once you retract your accusation that I begged the question, I'd be
delighted to oblige.
(On the other hand, if you feel confident enough to continue to maintain
that I beg the question, then you must presumably feel confident enough
that you understand my argument(s), in which case your request for more
formal rendition is unnecessary.)
Goober.
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
08 Dec 2005 08:21:58 AM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
*You* beg the question.
No,
Yes, sir. Two bags full, Septic.
Jeff
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
06 Dec 2005 09:54:24 AM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
[snip]
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
It appears that Goober is inclined to want to assume his desired
conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain function), which
is the fallacy of begging the question.
If you'd like to try to justify that accusation, be my guest.
You justified it by clearly showing your inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain
function - see your BS argument above
Begs the question.
You have an inclination to want to assume
your desired conclusion
False, sir. Two bags full, Septic.
Jeff
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
04 Dec 2005 02:22:38 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
Goober wrote:
OS XI wrote:
David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
[snip]
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
It appears that Goober is inclined to want to assume his desired
conclusion (there might be a mind separate from brain function), which
is the fallacy of begging the question.
If you'd like to try to justify that accusation, be my guest.
You justified it
False, sir. One bag full, Septic. And in any event, he challenged
_you_ to justify it, and you've failed. (Hint to Septic: simply
repeating the accusation does not justify the accusation and in fact
constitutes a blatant Fallacy of Argumentum ad Nauseum on your part, as
usual. Ho hum.)
Jeff
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
04 Dec 2005 02:19:51 PM |
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OS XI wrote:
David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
<dmojvv$56p$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca>:
David Jensen wrote:
On Tue, 29 Nov 2005 01:18:10 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
<dmh6da$884$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca>:
...
A point that I've been making is that sometimes subjective evidence is
entirely acceptible as scientific evidence. I've given you examples from
cognitive science. This occurs especially where the object of study is
consciousness, which is not amenable to third=party verification (at
least in the first instance - if we can detect neural correlates of
mental states then we may not need further subjective evidence for when
such states occur. But that itself relies on subjective evidence in
order to establish the correlation.)
There are certainly times in which we are limited to subjective evidence
because of the limits of our current ability to do research, but that
hardly makes it acceptable, it only makes it the best available. But
even that, we have found, does have correlates that we can crudely
measure today. There is no purely subjective evidence that we accept as
scientific evidence to support a hypothesis.
If science uses a body of data to make inferences then it is acceptable
to science. Ideal it might not be - we might prefer all our evidence to
be third party verifiable and directly observable - but acceptable it
certainly is.
As you point out, we can crudely measure mental states by observing
brain states. But note that this is true only to the extent that we have
relied upon subjective reports of those mental states to establish such
crude corrleations in the first place.
While scientists seldom do behavioral observation on humans, it is
routine on other animals.
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
It appears that Goober is inclined to want to assume his desired
conclusion
False, sir. One bag full, Septic.
Jeff
.
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| User: "Goober" |
|
| Title: Re: aa - TQOTM nomination |
02 Dec 2005 09:14:58 PM |
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David Jensen wrote:
On Thu, 01 Dec 2005 20:52:34 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
<dmojvv$56p$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca>:
David Jensen wrote:
On Tue, 29 Nov 2005 01:18:10 -0800, in alt.atheism
Goober <go.away@nowhere.com> wrote in
<dmh6da$884$1@nntp.itservices.ubc.ca>:
...
A point that I've been making is that sometimes subjective evidence is
entirely acceptible as scientific evidence. I've given you examples from
cognitive science. This occurs especially where the object of study is
consciousness, which is not amenable to third=party verification (at
least in the first instance - if we can detect neural correlates of
mental states then we may not need further subjective evidence for when
such states occur. But that itself relies on subjective evidence in
order to establish the correlation.)
There are certainly times in which we are limited to subjective evidence
because of the limits of our current ability to do research, but that
hardly makes it acceptable, it only makes it the best available. But
even that, we have found, does have correlates that we can crudely
measure today. There is no purely subjective evidence that we accept as
scientific evidence to support a hypothesis.
If science uses a body of data to make inferences then it is acceptable
to science. Ideal it might not be - we might prefer all our evidence to
be third party verifiable and directly observable - but acceptable it
certainly is.
As you point out, we can crudely measure mental states by observing
brain states. But note that this is true only to the extent that we have
relied upon subjective reports of those mental states to establish such
crude corrleations in the first place.
While scientists seldom do behavioral observation on humans, it is
routine on other animals.
Right - when trying to investigate consciousness of non-human animals we
are often forced to rely purely on behavioural clues. This is because
asking non-human animals to report their mental states verbally isn't
very effective. When scientists *infer* conscious states from overt
behaviour they do so by analogy with similar enough human behaviour and
their conscious states (which brings us back to the issue at hand). But
not a single scientist has directly observed the consciousness of any
other animal (including other humans). It's an *inference* from observed
behaviour, and the evidence lacks (at least in the first instance) third
party verifiability.
Example: when a dog yelps we *infer* that it is experiencing pain, but
we never observe the conscious mental state of the dog. We might even
take this further and observe its brain. We might note that c-fibres
fire when it yelps. Again, we do not directly observe it's conscious
mental states.
Of course, you might say that (some) brain states *are* conscious mental
states, in which case we would be directly observing mental states. But
even so we cannot observe the first-person aspect of consciousness which
seems essential to individuating conscious states. We can observe bat
brains as much as we like but we will remain clueless *what it is like*
to be a bat - i.e. from the bat's perspective. Same with Mary - she can
know everything there is to know about the brain (including which
neurons fire when someone looks at a fire engine rather than, say, a
clear sky) and be clueless what red *looks like* or what the difference
is between the look of blue and the look of red.
And with a dog, we can *infer* pain states from c-fibres firing simply
because we have already infered pain-states from yelping. The yelping of
the dog is as much subjective evidence of pain states as human reports
of their mental lives.
To put a bit more preciseion on my point...
M = a mental event of kind K
S = a report by a subject that they are experiencing a mental event of
kind K
B = a brain event of kind N
One thing cognitive science is interested in is the relation of M events
to B events. How does science test the hypothesis that M events are (or
are caused by) B events? It can observe B events directly using fMRI
scanners or PET scanners, etc. But it cannot directly observe M events.
Come on. Unless some evidence to the contrary is found, the proper
statement of the null hypothesis is that the mind is the activity of the
brain. Until then, your statement is improperly formed.
Well, firstly, I happen to have a doctoral thesis on my desk which
argues (conclusively in my opinion - but I'm arguably biased) that
cognition extends beyond the boundaries of brain or skin.
If one adopts a mind-brain identity theory (which, if you're interested,
is actually rejected by most people in cognitive science these days -
Google "functionalism", the dominant default position in cognitive
science) then M-states *are* B-states, and when one observes a B-state
one observes an M-state. This changes absolutely nothing, because in
order to *establish* which M-states are B-states we must appeal to
subjective evidence.
Only the subject can directly observe M events. Hence cognitive science
uses S events to determine when there are M events. Only then can it
test the hypothesis about the relationship between M events and B
events. *Once* (and if) we have established with enough precision the
relationship between M events and B events, then we can just rely on B
events to determine when M events occur. But science must use S events -
subjective evidence for M events - in order to make any scientific
progress. It's just the nature of the game. It's not only acceptible
it's unavoidable.
What goes for cognitive science is repeated in human sciences in various
ways. Anthropologists don't even both examining brains - they simply
*ask* people what they believe and that's pretty much that so far as
primary data-gathering concerning beliefs goes. I see nothing wrong with
that. Sometimes people lie, but heck sometimes measuring instruments are
unreliable, that's no reason not to take them as evidence.
Anthropology is science only to the extent that it uses the scientific
method.
Duh! Same goes for physics.
Let's remember that doctors are not not practicing science in their day
to day dealings with patients.
That depends how narrowly you define science. Doctors gather data, form
hypotheses, and (at least often) test those hypotheses. That's pretty
much science in a nutshell, although it isn't primary science. But I
don't mind - I have a general claim which includes doctors and everyday
inferences from subjective evidence and a more specific claim concerning
the appeal to subjective evidence in certain sciences.
One that I don't accept.
Why? Aren't you just endorsing Freud's mistakes?
Whether Frued makes mistakes or not is beside the point here since the
issue is whether psychiatry and cognitive science sometimes makes a
necessary appeal to subjective evidence in order to prgress. And it does.
Proto-science progressed before the scientific method was involved. That
didn't make the prior method or apparent evidence reliable.
Non sequitur. See above.
Your claim doesn't make sense here.
If you say so - I still stand by it. Perhaps you can give me a clue what
you don't understand? My point is that talk about Frued or proto-science
is not to the point.
Using subjective statements is not science.
So you keep saying. Why not?
It may help us learn,
Oh! So do you admit that we learn things about the natural world from
subjective evidence? Pray tell, why then is it not science? (And don't
say "because it appeals to subjective evidence" - that just begs the
question)
but it
is no better science than most of what Freud did.
Stop trying to put up straw men or change the issue. I'm not treating
Freudian psychoanalysi | |
