| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Immortalist" |
| Date: |
07 Apr 2004 11:34:29 PM |
| Object: |
Re: Is democracy freedom? |
"not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
news:Z84dc.6108$qV6.2994@fed1read04...
Democracy can vote to kill whoever the members want.
A just king could provide a very nice environment. Why
is there a linking of democracy with freedom?
Rights are limits upon the state and are harder to change than to elect
people. Institutions like religion and business sustain a force against the
activities of the state.
It may be the US Constitution that tries to ensure the "God
given rights" that we try to exercise, but it surely isn't just by
democracy. Hitler's Germany was a democracy that elected
him. If Russia had had a two party system for its election with
no difference between the candidates would it have been a
democracy?
I offer an unedited quote;
The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
- Democracy and Liberty
"Suppose elections are free and fair and those elected are racists,
fascists, separatists," said the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke about
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. "That is the dilemma." Indeed it is, and not merely
in Yugoslavia's past but in the world's present. Consider, for example, the
challenge we face across the Islamic world. We recognize the need for
democracy in those often-repressive countries. But what if democracy
produces an Islamic theocracy or something like it? It is not an idle
concern. Across the globe, democratically elected regimes, often ones that
have been re-elected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely ignoring
constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic
rights. This disturbing phenomenon-visible from Peru to the Palestinian
territories, from Ghana to Venezuela-could be called "illiberal democracy."
For people in the West, democracy means "liberal democracy": a political
system marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the rule of
law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of
speech, assembly, religion, and property. But this bundle of freedoms-what
might be termed "constitutional liberalism"-has nothing intrinsically to do
with democracy and the two have not always gone together, even in the West.
After all, Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany via free elections.
Over the last half-century in the West, democracy and liberty have merged.
But today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western
political fabric, are coming apart across the globe. Democracy is
flourishing; liberty is not.
In some places, such as Central Asia, elections have paved the way for
dictatorships. In others, they have exacerbated group conflict and ethnic
tensions. Both Yugoslavia and Indonesia, for example, were far more tolerant
and secular when they were ruled by strongmen (Tito and Suharto,
respectively) than they are now as democracies. And in many nondemocracies,
elections would not improve matters much. Across the Arab world elections
held tomorrow would probably bring to power regimes that are more
intolerant, reactionary, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic than the
dictatorships currently in place.
In a world that is increasingly democratic, regimes that resist the trend
produce dysfunctional societies-as in the Arab world. Their people sense the
deprivation of liberty more strongly than ever before because they know the
alternatives; they can see them on CNN, BBC, and Al-Jazeera. But yet, newly
democratic countries too often become sham democracies, which produces
disenchantment, disarray, violence, and new forms of tyranny. Look at Iran
and Venezuela. This is not a reason to stop holding elections, of course,
but surely it should make us ask, What is at the root of this troubling
development? Why do so many developing countries have so much difficulty
creating stable, genuinely democratic societies? Were we to embark on the
vast challenge of building democracy in Iraq, how would we make sure that we
succeed?
First, let's be clear what we mean by political democracy. From the time of
Herodotus it has been defined, first and foremost, as the rule of the
people. This definition of democracy as a process of selecting governments
is now widely used by scholars. In The Third Wave, the eminent political
scientist Samuel P. Huntington explains why:
Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the
inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by elections may be
inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special
interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good.
These qualities make such governments undesirable but they do not make them
undemocratic. Democracy is one public virtue, not the only one, and the
relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can only be
understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from the other
characteristics of political systems.
This definition also accords with the commonsense view of the term. If a
country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it "democratic."
When public participation in a country's politics is increased-for example,
through the enfranchisement of women-that country is seen as having become
more democratic. Of course elections must be open and fair, and this
requires some protections for the freedom of speech and assembly. But to go
beyond this minimal requirement and label a country democratic only if it
guarantees a particular catalog of social, political, economic, and
religious rights-which will vary with every observer-makes the word
"democracy" meaningless. After all, Sweden has an economic system that many
argue curtails individual property rights, France until recently had a state
monopoly on television, and Britain has a state religion. But they are all
clearly and identifiably democracies. To have "democracy" mean,
subjectively, "a good government" makes it analytically useless.
Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the procedures
for selecting government but, rather, government's goals. It refers to the
tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual's
autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source-state, church, or
society. The term marries two closely connected ideas. It is liberal*
because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks and
Romans, that emphasizes individual liberty. It is constitutional because it
places the rule of law at the center of politics. Constitutional liberalism
developed in Western Europe and the United States as a defense of an
individual's right to life and property and the freedoms of religion and
speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks on the power of
government, equality under the law, impartial courts and tribunals, and the
separation of church and state. In almost all of its variants,
constitutional liberalism argues that human beings have certain natural (or
"inalienable") rights and that governments must accept a basic law, limiting
its own powers, to secure them. Thus in 1215 at Runnymede, England's barons
forced the king to limit his own authority. In the American colonies these
customs were made explicit, and in 1638 the town of Hartford adopted the
first written constitution in modern history. In 1789 the American
Constitution created a formal framework for the new nation. In 1975 Western
nations set standards of behavior even for nondemocratic regimes. Magna
Carta, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the American Constitution, and
the Helsinki Final Act are all expressions of constitutional liberalism.
*I use the term "liberal" in the nineteenth-century sense, meaning concerned
with individual economic, political, and religious liberty, which is
sometimes called "classical liberalism," not in the modern, American sense,
which associates it with the welfare state, affirmative action, and other
policies.
Since 1945 Western governments have, for the most part, embodied both
democracy and constitutional liberalism. Thus it is difficult to imagine the
two apart, in the form of either illiberal democracy or liberal autocracy.
The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
Believing in democracy without watching the government and
what it does especially to other who can not defend themselves
is not good.
The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
....IT ALL STARTED when Constantine decided to move. In A.D. 324 the leader
of the greatest empire in the world went east, shifting his capital from
Rome to Byzantium, the old Greek colony, at the mouth of the Black Sea,
which he promptly renamed Constantinople. Why abandon Rome, the storied seat
of the empire? Constantine explained that he did it "on command of God."
....Greece was not the birthplace of liberty as we understand it today.
Liberty in the modern world is first and foremost the freedom of the
individual from arbitrary authority, which has meant, for most of history,
from the brute power of the state. It implies certain basic human rights:
freedom of expression, of association, and of worship, and rights of due
process. But ancient liberty, as the enlightenment philosopher Benjamin
Constant explained, meant something different: that everyone (actually,
every male citizen) had the right to participate in the governance of the
community.
- The Paradox of Catholicism
Rome's most concrete legacy has been the Roman Catholic Church, which the
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes called "the ghost of the deceased Roman
Empire sitting crowned upon [its] grave." The culture of Rome became the
culture of Catholicism. Through the church were transmitted countless
traditions and ideas-and, of course, Latin which gave educated people all
over Europe a common language and thus strengthened their sense of being a
single community. To this day the ideas and structure of the Catholic
Church-its universalism, its hierarchy, its codes and laws-bear a strong
resemblance to those of the Roman Empire.
The Catholic Church might seem an odd place to begin the story of liberty.
As an institution it has not stood for freedom of thought or even, until
recently, diversity of belief. In fact, during the Middle Ages, as it grew
powerful, it became increasingly intolerant and oppressive, emphasizing
dogma and unquestioning obedience and using rather nasty means to squash
dissent (recall the Spanish Inquisition). To this day, its structure remains
hierarchical and autocratic. The church never saw itself as furthering
individual liberty. But from the start it tenaciously opposed the power of
the state and thus placed limits on monarchs' rule. It controlled crucial
social institutions such as marriage and birth and death rites. Church
properties and priests were not subject to taxation-hardly a small matter
since at its height the church owned one-third of the land in Europe. The
Catholic Church was the first major institution in history that was
independent of temporal authority and willing to challenge it. By doing this
it cracked the edifice of state power, and in nooks and crannies individual
liberty began to grow.
The struggles between church and state began just over fifty years after
Constantine's move. One of Constantine's successors, the emperor Theodosius,
while in a nasty dispute with the Thessalonians, a Greek tribe, invited the
whole tribe to Milan-and orchestrated a blood-curdling massacre of his
guests: men, women, and children. The archbishop of Milan, a pious priest
named Ambrose, was appalled and publicly refused to give the emperor Holy
Communion. Theodosius protested, resorting to a biblical defense. He was
guilty of homicide, he explained, but wasn't one of the Bible's heroic
kings, David, guilty not just of homicide but of adultery as well? The
archbishop was unyielding, thundering back, in the English historian Edward
Gibbon's famous account, "You have imitated David in his crime, imitate then
his repentance." To the utter amazement of all, for the next eight months
the emperor, the most powerful man in the world, periodically dressed like a
beggar (as David had in the biblical tale) and stood outside the cathedral
at Milan to ask forgiveness of the archbishop.
As the Roman Empire crumbled in the East, the bishop of Rome's authority and
independence grew. He became first among the princes of the church, called
"Il Papa," the holy father. In 800, Pope Leo III was forced to crown the
Prankish ruler Charlemagne as Roman emperor. But in doing so, Leo began the
tradition of "investiture," whereby the church had to bless a new king and
thus give legitimacy to his reign. By the twelfth century, the pope's power
had grown, and he had become a pivotal player in Europe's complex political
games. The papacy had power, legitimacy, money, and even armies. It won
another great symbolic battle against Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV, who in
1077 challenged-unsuccessfully-Pope Gregory VII's expansion of the power of
investiture. Having lost the struggle, Henry, so the legend goes, was forced
to stand barefoot in the snow at Canossa to seek forgiveness from the holy
father. Whether or not that tale is true, by the twelfth century the pope
had clearly become, in power and pomp, a match for any of Europe's kings,
and the Vatican had come to rival the grandest courts on the continent.
- The Geography of Freedom
The church gained power in the West for a simple reason: after the decline
of the Roman Empire, it never again faced a single emperor of Europe.
Instead, the Catholic Church was able to play one European prince against
another, becoming the vital "swing vote" in the power struggles of the day.
Had one monarch emerged across the continent, he could have crushed the
church's independence, turning it into a handmaiden of state power. That is
what happened to the Greek Orthodox Church and later the Russian Orthodox
Church (and, for that matter, to most religions around the world). But no
ruler ever conquered all of Europe, or even the greater part of it. Over the
millennia only a few tried-Charlemagne, Charles V, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm,
and Hitler. All were thwarted, most fairly quickly.
What explains this? Probably mountains and rivers. Europe is riven with
barriers that divide its highlands into river valleys bordered by mountain
ranges. Its rivers flow into sheltered, navigable bays along the long,
indented Mediterranean coastline-all of which means that small regions could
subsist, indeed thrive, on their own. Hence Europe's long history of many
independent countries. They are hard to conquer, easy to cultivate, and
their rivers and seas provide ready trade routes. Asia, by contrast, is full
of vast flatlands-the steppes in Russia, the plains in China-through which
armies could march unhindered. Not surprisingly, these areas were ruled for
millennia by centralized *empires.
*Africa is particularly unlucky in its geography. Despite being the
second-largest continent in the world it has the shortest coastline, much of
which is too shallow to develop ports. So it has historically had little
trade. Its rivers are not navigable, because they are either too shallow or,
where deep, scarred by rapids and waterfalls (dramatic scenery makes for
disasterous commerce in this case). Add to this tropical heat and
accompanying disease and one has a sad structural explanation for Africa's
underdevelopment.
Europe's topography made possible the rise of communities of varying
sizes-city-states, duchies, republics, nations, and empires. In 1500 Europe
had within it more than 500 states, many no larger than a city. This variety
had two wondrous effects. First, it allowed for diversity. People, ideas,
art, and even technologies that were unwelcome or unnoticed in one area
would often thrive in another. Second, diversity fueled constant competition
between states, producing innovation and efficiency in political
organization, military technology, and economic policy. Successful practices
were copied; losing ways were cast aside. Europe's spectacular economic and
political success-what the economic historian Eric Jones has termed "the
European miracle"-might well be the result of its odd geography.
- Lords and Kings
Geography and history combined to help shape Europe's political structure.
The crumbling of the Roman Empire and the backwardness of the German tribes
that destroyed it resulted in decentralized authority across the continent;
no ruler had the administrative capacity to rule a far-flung kingdom
comprising so many independent tribes. By contrast, in their heyday, Ming
and Manchu China, Mughal India, and the Ottoman Empire controlled vast lands
and diverse peoples. But in Europe local landlords and chieftains governed
their territories and developed close ties with their tenants. This became
the distinctive feature of European feudalism-that its great landowning
classes were independent. From the Middle Ages until the seventeenth
century, European sovereigns were distant creatures who ruled their kingdoms
mostly in name. The king of France, for example, was considered only a duke
in Brittany and had limited authority in that region for hundreds of years.
In practice if monarchs wanted to do anything-start a war, build a fort-they
had to borrow and. bargain for money and troops from local chieftains, who
became earls, viscounts, and dukes in the process.
Thus Europe's landed elite became an aristocracy with power, money, and
legitimacy-a far cry from the groveling and dependent courtier-nobles in
other parts of the world. This near-equal relationship between lords and
kings deeply influenced the course of liberty. As Guido de Ruggiero, the
great historian of liberalism, wrote, "Without the effective resistance of
particular privileged classes, the monarchy would have created nothing but a
people of slaves." In fact monarchs did just that in much of the rest of the
world. In Europe, on the other hand, as the Middle Ages progressed, the
aristocracy demanded that kings guarantee them certain rights that even the
crown could not violate. They also established representative bodies-
parliaments, estates general, diets-to give permanent voice to their claims.
In these medieval bargains lie the foundations of what we today call "the
rule of law." Building on Roman traditions, these rights were secured and
strengthened by the power of the nobility. Like the clash between church and
state, the conflict between the aristocracy and the monarchy is the second
great power struggle of European history that helped provide, again
unintentionally, the raw materials of freedom.
The English aristocracy was the most independent in Europe. Lords lived on
their estates, governing and protecting their tenants. In return, they
extracted taxes, which kept them both powerful and rich. It was, in one
scholar's phrase, "a working aristocracy": it maintained its position not
through elaborate courtly rituals but by taking part in politics and
government at all levels. England's kings, who consolidated their power
earlier than did most of their counterparts on the continent, recognized
that (heir rule depended on co-opting the aristocracy-or at least some part
of it. When monarchs pushed their luck they triggered a baronial backlash.
Henry II, crowned king in 1154, extended his rule across the country,
sending judges to distant places to enforce royal decrees. He sought to
unify the country and create a common, imperial law. To do this he had to
strip the medieval aristocracy of its powers and special privileges. His
plan worked but only up to a point. Soon the nobility rose up in arms-
literally-and after forty years of conflict, Henry's son, King John, was
forced to sign a truce in 1215 in a field near Windsor Castle. That
document, Magna Carta, was regarded at the time as a charter of baronial
privilege, detailing the rights of feudal lords. It also had provisions
guaranteeing the freedom of the church and local autonomy for towns. It came
out (in vague terms) against the oppression of any of the king's subjects.
Over time the document was interpreted more broadly by English judges,
turning it into a quasi constitution that enshrined certain individual
rights. But even in its day, Magna Carta was significant, being the first
written limitation on royal authority in Europe. As such, the historian Paul
Johnson noted, it is "justly classified as the first of the English Statutes
of the Realm,* from which English, and thus American, liberties can be said
to flow."
*The collection of English laws that make up its "unwritten constitution."
The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
Articles by Fareed Zakaria
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/archive.html
.
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| User: "michael" |
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| Title: Re: Is democracy freedom? |
09 Apr 2004 03:40:50 AM |
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"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> says:
"not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
news:Z84dc.6108$qV6.2994@fed1read04...
Democracy can vote to kill whoever the members want.
A just king could provide a very nice environment. Why
is there a linking of democracy with freedom?
Rights are limits upon the state and are harder to change than to elect
people. Institutions like religion and business sustain a force against
the
activities of the state.
Except of course when religion or business IS the state,
as in theocracies like Iran or corporate plutocracies like
the US.
michael
"I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes
me to tremble for the safety of my country. . . . corporations have been
enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the money
power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the
prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and
the Republic is destroyed."
-- U.S. President and Prophet Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 21, 1864
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Is democracy freedom? |
09 Apr 2004 11:55:57 AM |
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"michael" <copsR@yourdoor.com> wrote in message
news:40766166$1_1@news.iprimus.com.au...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> says:
"not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
news:Z84dc.6108$qV6.2994@fed1read04...
Democracy can vote to kill whoever the members want.
A just king could provide a very nice environment. Why
is there a linking of democracy with freedom?
Rights are limits upon the state and are harder to change than to elect
people. Institutions like religion and business sustain a force against
the
activities of the state.
Except of course when religion or business IS the state,
as in theocracies like Iran or corporate plutocracies like
the US.
michael
Are you saying I claimed that what you say is not the case or is not
possible? I agree greatly with what you say, but it is harder to vote out a
theocracy than to initiate campaign reforms. If the people are tweaked and
bent upon getting the big money upghta *****, the only recourse for the
politicians and plutocrats is to try and keep people's minds off from
political coruption and reforms, in constitutional democracies.
"I see in the near future a crisis approaching that unnerves me and causes
me to tremble for the safety of my country. . . . corporations have been
enthroned and an era of corruption in high places will follow, and the
money
power of the country will endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon
the
prejudices of the people until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and
the Republic is destroyed."
-- U.S. President and Prophet Abraham Lincoln, Nov. 21, 1864
.
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| User: "not a philosopher" |
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| Title: Re: Is democracy freedom? |
08 Apr 2004 12:41:51 AM |
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"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:46SdnUwBk9-lSundRVn-vw@comcast.com...
:
: "not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
: news:Z84dc.6108$qV6.2994@fed1read04...
: >
: > Democracy can vote to kill whoever the members want.
: > A just king could provide a very nice environment. Why
: > is there a linking of democracy with freedom?
: >
:
: Rights are limits upon the state and are harder to change than to elect
: people. Institutions like religion and business sustain a force against
the
: activities of the state.
:
: > It may be the US Constitution that tries to ensure the "God
: > given rights" that we try to exercise, but it surely isn't just by
: > democracy. Hitler's Germany was a democracy that elected
: > him. If Russia had had a two party system for its election with
: > no difference between the candidates would it have been a
: > democracy?
: >
:
: I offer an unedited quote;
:
: The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
:
: - Democracy and Liberty
:
: "Suppose elections are free and fair and those elected are racists,
: fascists, separatists," said the American diplomat Richard Holbrooke about
: Yugoslavia in the 1990s. "That is the dilemma." Indeed it is, and not
merely
: in Yugoslavia's past but in the world's present. Consider, for example,
the
: challenge we face across the Islamic world. We recognize the need for
: democracy in those often-repressive countries. But what if democracy
: produces an Islamic theocracy or something like it? It is not an idle
: concern. Across the globe, democratically elected regimes, often ones that
: have been re-elected or reaffirmed through referenda, are routinely
ignoring
: constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic
: rights. This disturbing phenomenon-visible from Peru to the Palestinian
: territories, from Ghana to Venezuela-could be called "illiberal
democracy."
:
: For people in the West, democracy means "liberal democracy": a political
: system marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the rule of
: law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of
: speech, assembly, religion, and property. But this bundle of freedoms-what
: might be termed "constitutional liberalism"-has nothing intrinsically to
do
: with democracy and the two have not always gone together, even in the
West.
: After all, Adolf Hitler became chancellor of Germany via free elections.
: Over the last half-century in the West, democracy and liberty have merged.
: But today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western
: political fabric, are coming apart across the globe. Democracy is
: flourishing; liberty is not.
:
: In some places, such as Central Asia, elections have paved the way for
: dictatorships. In others, they have exacerbated group conflict and ethnic
: tensions. Both Yugoslavia and Indonesia, for example, were far more
tolerant
: and secular when they were ruled by strongmen (Tito and Suharto,
: respectively) than they are now as democracies. And in many
nondemocracies,
: elections would not improve matters much. Across the Arab world elections
: held tomorrow would probably bring to power regimes that are more
: intolerant, reactionary, anti-Western, and anti-Semitic than the
: dictatorships currently in place.
:
: In a world that is increasingly democratic, regimes that resist the trend
: produce dysfunctional societies-as in the Arab world. Their people sense
the
: deprivation of liberty more strongly than ever before because they know
the
: alternatives; they can see them on CNN, BBC, and Al-Jazeera. But yet,
newly
: democratic countries too often become sham democracies, which produces
: disenchantment, disarray, violence, and new forms of tyranny. Look at Iran
: and Venezuela. This is not a reason to stop holding elections, of course,
: but surely it should make us ask, What is at the root of this troubling
: development? Why do so many developing countries have so much difficulty
: creating stable, genuinely democratic societies? Were we to embark on the
: vast challenge of building democracy in Iraq, how would we make sure that
we
: succeed?
:
: First, let's be clear what we mean by political democracy. From the time
of
: Herodotus it has been defined, first and foremost, as the rule of the
: people. This definition of democracy as a process of selecting governments
: is now widely used by scholars. In The Third Wave, the eminent political
: scientist Samuel P. Huntington explains why:
:
: Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the
: inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by elections may be
: inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by special
: interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good.
: These qualities make such governments undesirable but they do not make
them
: undemocratic. Democracy is one public virtue, not the only one, and the
: relation of democracy to other public virtues and vices can only be
: understood if democracy is clearly distinguished from the other
: characteristics of political systems.
:
: This definition also accords with the commonsense view of the term. If a
: country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it "democratic."
: When public participation in a country's politics is increased-for
example,
: through the enfranchisement of women-that country is seen as having become
: more democratic. Of course elections must be open and fair, and this
: requires some protections for the freedom of speech and assembly. But to
go
: beyond this minimal requirement and label a country democratic only if it
: guarantees a particular catalog of social, political, economic, and
: religious rights-which will vary with every observer-makes the word
: "democracy" meaningless. After all, Sweden has an economic system that
many
: argue curtails individual property rights, France until recently had a
state
: monopoly on television, and Britain has a state religion. But they are all
: clearly and identifiably democracies. To have "democracy" mean,
: subjectively, "a good government" makes it analytically useless.
:
: Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the procedures
: for selecting government but, rather, government's goals. It refers to the
: tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual's
: autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source-state, church,
or
: society. The term marries two closely connected ideas. It is liberal*
: because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks
and
: Romans, that emphasizes individual liberty. It is constitutional because
it
: places the rule of law at the center of politics. Constitutional
liberalism
: developed in Western Europe and the United States as a defense of an
: individual's right to life and property and the freedoms of religion and
: speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks on the power of
: government, equality under the law, impartial courts and tribunals, and
the
: separation of church and state. In almost all of its variants,
: constitutional liberalism argues that human beings have certain natural
(or
: "inalienable") rights and that governments must accept a basic law,
limiting
: its own powers, to secure them. Thus in 1215 at Runnymede, England's
barons
: forced the king to limit his own authority. In the American colonies these
: customs were made explicit, and in 1638 the town of Hartford adopted the
: first written constitution in modern history. In 1789 the American
: Constitution created a formal framework for the new nation. In 1975
Western
: nations set standards of behavior even for nondemocratic regimes. Magna
: Carta, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the American Constitution,
and
: the Helsinki Final Act are all expressions of constitutional liberalism.
:
: *I use the term "liberal" in the nineteenth-century sense, meaning
concerned
: with individual economic, political, and religious liberty, which is
: sometimes called "classical liberalism," not in the modern, American
sense,
: which associates it with the welfare state, affirmative action, and other
: policies.
:
: Since 1945 Western governments have, for the most part, embodied both
: democracy and constitutional liberalism. Thus it is difficult to imagine
the
: two apart, in the form of either illiberal democracy or liberal autocracy.
:
: The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
:
: > Believing in democracy without watching the government and
: > what it does especially to other who can not defend themselves
: > is not good.
: >
:
: The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
:
: ...IT ALL STARTED when Constantine decided to move. In A.D. 324 the leader
: of the greatest empire in the world went east, shifting his capital from
: Rome to Byzantium, the old Greek colony, at the mouth of the Black Sea,
: which he promptly renamed Constantinople. Why abandon Rome, the storied
seat
: of the empire? Constantine explained that he did it "on command of God."
:
: ...Greece was not the birthplace of liberty as we understand it today.
: Liberty in the modern world is first and foremost the freedom of the
: individual from arbitrary authority, which has meant, for most of history,
: from the brute power of the state. It implies certain basic human rights:
: freedom of expression, of association, and of worship, and rights of due
: process. But ancient liberty, as the enlightenment philosopher Benjamin
: Constant explained, meant something different: that everyone (actually,
: every male citizen) had the right to participate in the governance of the
: community.
:
: - The Paradox of Catholicism
:
: Rome's most concrete legacy has been the Roman Catholic Church, which the
: English philosopher Thomas Hobbes called "the ghost of the deceased Roman
: Empire sitting crowned upon [its] grave." The culture of Rome became the
: culture of Catholicism. Through the church were transmitted countless
: traditions and ideas-and, of course, Latin which gave educated people all
: over Europe a common language and thus strengthened their sense of being a
: single community. To this day the ideas and structure of the Catholic
: Church-its universalism, its hierarchy, its codes and laws-bear a strong
: resemblance to those of the Roman Empire.
:
: The Catholic Church might seem an odd place to begin the story of liberty.
: As an institution it has not stood for freedom of thought or even, until
: recently, diversity of belief. In fact, during the Middle Ages, as it grew
: powerful, it became increasingly intolerant and oppressive, emphasizing
: dogma and unquestioning obedience and using rather nasty means to squash
: dissent (recall the Spanish Inquisition). To this day, its structure
remains
: hierarchical and autocratic. The church never saw itself as furthering
: individual liberty. But from the start it tenaciously opposed the power of
: the state and thus placed limits on monarchs' rule. It controlled crucial
: social institutions such as marriage and birth and death rites. Church
: properties and priests were not subject to taxation-hardly a small matter
: since at its height the church owned one-third of the land in Europe. The
: Catholic Church was the first major institution in history that was
: independent of temporal authority and willing to challenge it. By doing
this
: it cracked the edifice of state power, and in nooks and crannies
individual
: liberty began to grow.
:
: The struggles between church and state began just over fifty years after
: Constantine's move. One of Constantine's successors, the emperor
Theodosius,
: while in a nasty dispute with the Thessalonians, a Greek tribe, invited
the
: whole tribe to Milan-and orchestrated a blood-curdling massacre of his
: guests: men, women, and children. The archbishop of Milan, a pious priest
: named Ambrose, was appalled and publicly refused to give the emperor Holy
: Communion. Theodosius protested, resorting to a biblical defense. He was
: guilty of homicide, he explained, but wasn't one of the Bible's heroic
: kings, David, guilty not just of homicide but of adultery as well? The
: archbishop was unyielding, thundering back, in the English historian
Edward
: Gibbon's famous account, "You have imitated David in his crime, imitate
then
: his repentance." To the utter amazement of all, for the next eight months
: the emperor, the most powerful man in the world, periodically dressed like
a
: beggar (as David had in the biblical tale) and stood outside the cathedral
: at Milan to ask forgiveness of the archbishop.
:
: As the Roman Empire crumbled in the East, the bishop of Rome's authority
and
: independence grew. He became first among the princes of the church, called
: "Il Papa," the holy father. In 800, Pope Leo III was forced to crown the
: Prankish ruler Charlemagne as Roman emperor. But in doing so, Leo began
the
: tradition of "investiture," whereby the church had to bless a new king and
: thus give legitimacy to his reign. By the twelfth century, the pope's
power
: had grown, and he had become a pivotal player in Europe's complex
political
: games. The papacy had power, legitimacy, money, and even armies. It won
: another great symbolic battle against Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV, who in
: 1077 challenged-unsuccessfully-Pope Gregory VII's expansion of the power
of
: investiture. Having lost the struggle, Henry, so the legend goes, was
forced
: to stand barefoot in the snow at Canossa to seek forgiveness from the holy
: father. Whether or not that tale is true, by the twelfth century the pope
: had clearly become, in power and pomp, a match for any of Europe's kings,
: and the Vatican had come to rival the grandest courts on the continent.
:
: - The Geography of Freedom
:
: The church gained power in the West for a simple reason: after the decline
: of the Roman Empire, it never again faced a single emperor of Europe.
: Instead, the Catholic Church was able to play one European prince against
: another, becoming the vital "swing vote" in the power struggles of the
day.
: Had one monarch emerged across the continent, he could have crushed the
: church's independence, turning it into a handmaiden of state power. That
is
: what happened to the Greek Orthodox Church and later the Russian Orthodox
: Church (and, for that matter, to most religions around the world). But no
: ruler ever conquered all of Europe, or even the greater part of it. Over
the
: millennia only a few tried-Charlemagne, Charles V, Napoleon, Kaiser
Wilhelm,
: and Hitler. All were thwarted, most fairly quickly.
:
: What explains this? Probably mountains and rivers. Europe is riven with
: barriers that divide its highlands into river valleys bordered by mountain
: ranges. Its rivers flow into sheltered, navigable bays along the long,
: indented Mediterranean coastline-all of which means that small regions
could
: subsist, indeed thrive, on their own. Hence Europe's long history of many
: independent countries. They are hard to conquer, easy to cultivate, and
: their rivers and seas provide ready trade routes. Asia, by contrast, is
full
: of vast flatlands-the steppes in Russia, the plains in China-through which
: armies could march unhindered. Not surprisingly, these areas were ruled
for
: millennia by centralized *empires.
:
: *Africa is particularly unlucky in its geography. Despite being the
: second-largest continent in the world it has the shortest coastline, much
of
: which is too shallow to develop ports. So it has historically had little
: trade. Its rivers are not navigable, because they are either too shallow
or,
: where deep, scarred by rapids and waterfalls (dramatic scenery makes for
: disasterous commerce in this case). Add to this tropical heat and
: accompanying disease and one has a sad structural explanation for Africa's
: underdevelopment.
:
: Europe's topography made possible the rise of communities of varying
: sizes-city-states, duchies, republics, nations, and empires. In 1500
Europe
: had within it more than 500 states, many no larger than a city. This
variety
: had two wondrous effects. First, it allowed for diversity. People, ideas,
: art, and even technologies that were unwelcome or unnoticed in one area
: would often thrive in another. Second, diversity fueled constant
competition
: between states, producing innovation and efficiency in political
: organization, military technology, and economic policy. Successful
practices
: were copied; losing ways were cast aside. Europe's spectacular economic
and
: political success-what the economic historian Eric Jones has termed "the
: European miracle"-might well be the result of its odd geography.
:
: - Lords and Kings
:
: Geography and history combined to help shape Europe's political structure.
: The crumbling of the Roman Empire and the backwardness of the German
tribes
: that destroyed it resulted in decentralized authority across the
continent;
: no ruler had the administrative capacity to rule a far-flung kingdom
: comprising so many independent tribes. By contrast, in their heyday, Ming
: and Manchu China, Mughal India, and the Ottoman Empire controlled vast
lands
: and diverse peoples. But in Europe local landlords and chieftains governed
: their territories and developed close ties with their tenants. This became
: the distinctive feature of European feudalism-that its great landowning
: classes were independent. From the Middle Ages until the seventeenth
: century, European sovereigns were distant creatures who ruled their
kingdoms
: mostly in name. The king of France, for example, was considered only a
duke
: in Brittany and had limited authority in that region for hundreds of
years.
: In practice if monarchs wanted to do anything-start a war, build a
fort-they
: had to borrow and. bargain for money and troops from local chieftains, who
: became earls, viscounts, and dukes in the process.
:
: Thus Europe's landed elite became an aristocracy with power, money, and
: legitimacy-a far cry from the groveling and dependent courtier-nobles in
: other parts of the world. This near-equal relationship between lords and
: kings deeply influenced the course of liberty. As Guido de Ruggiero, the
: great historian of liberalism, wrote, "Without the effective resistance of
: particular privileged classes, the monarchy would have created nothing but
a
: people of slaves." In fact monarchs did just that in much of the rest of
the
: world. In Europe, on the other hand, as the Middle Ages progressed, the
: aristocracy demanded that kings guarantee them certain rights that even
the
: crown could not violate. They also established representative bodies-
: parliaments, estates general, diets-to give permanent voice to their
claims.
: In these medieval bargains lie the foundations of what we today call "the
: rule of law." Building on Roman traditions, these rights were secured and
: strengthened by the power of the nobility. Like the clash between church
and
: state, the conflict between the aristocracy and the monarchy is the second
: great power struggle of European history that helped provide, again
: unintentionally, the raw materials of freedom.
:
: The English aristocracy was the most independent in Europe. Lords lived on
: their estates, governing and protecting their tenants. In return, they
: extracted taxes, which kept them both powerful and rich. It was, in one
: scholar's phrase, "a working aristocracy": it maintained its position not
: through elaborate courtly rituals but by taking part in politics and
: government at all levels. England's kings, who consolidated their power
: earlier than did most of their counterparts on the continent, recognized
: that (heir rule depended on co-opting the aristocracy-or at least some
part
: of it. When monarchs pushed their luck they triggered a baronial backlash.
: Henry II, crowned king in 1154, extended his rule across the country,
: sending judges to distant places to enforce royal decrees. He sought to
: unify the country and create a common, imperial law. To do this he had to
: strip the medieval aristocracy of its powers and special privileges. His
: plan worked but only up to a point. Soon the nobility rose up in arms-
: literally-and after forty years of conflict, Henry's son, King John, was
: forced to sign a truce in 1215 in a field near Windsor Castle. That
: document, Magna Carta, was regarded at the time as a charter of baronial
: privilege, detailing the rights of feudal lords. It also had provisions
: guaranteeing the freedom of the church and local autonomy for towns. It
came
: out (in vague terms) against the oppression of any of the king's subjects.
: Over time the document was interpreted more broadly by English judges,
: turning it into a quasi constitution that enshrined certain individual
: rights. But even in its day, Magna Carta was significant, being the first
: written limitation on royal authority in Europe. As such, the historian
Paul
: Johnson noted, it is "justly classified as the first of the English
Statutes
: of the Realm,* from which English, and thus American, liberties can be
said
: to flow."
:
: *The collection of English laws that make up its "unwritten constitution."
:
: The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
:
: Articles by Fareed Zakaria
: http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/archive.html
Very relevant. So how does a people insure the rights of individuals
and minorities, and we are all part of some minority? Natural Law?
Was is de Toqueville who said that America is great because its
people are great? We are apparently not a nation of laws, after all,
at least by one meaning.
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: Is democracy freedom? |
08 Apr 2004 11:25:24 AM |
|
|
"not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
news:DC5dc.6962$qV6.2005@fed1read04...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:46SdnUwBk9-lSundRVn-vw@comcast.com...
:
: "not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
: news:Z84dc.6108$qV6.2994@fed1read04...
: >
: > Democracy can vote to kill whoever the members want.
: > A just king could provide a very nice environment. Why
: > is there a linking of democracy with freedom?
: The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
: http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
:
: Articles by Fareed Zakaria
: http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/archive.html
Very relevant. So how does a people insure the rights of individuals
and minorities, and we are all part of some minority? Natural Law?
Was is de Toqueville who said that America is great because its
people are great? We are apparently not a nation of laws, after all,
at least by one meaning.
"constitutional liberalism"-has nothing intrinsically to do with democracy?
Let me seperate the sentences in (one) of the paragraphs in the unedited
quote. Tell me if it answers you question amd if not where it falls short;
----
Constitutional liberalism is not about the procedures for selecting
government but, rather, government's goals. It refers to the tradition, deep
in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual's autonomy and
dignity against coercion, whatever the source-state, church, or society.
The term marries two closely connected ideas.
It is liberal* because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with
the Greeks and Romans, that emphasizes individual liberty.
*...the term "liberal" in the nineteenth-century sense, meaning concerned
with individual economic, political, and religious liberty, which is
sometimes called "classical liberalism," not in the modern, American sense,
which associates it with the welfare state, affirmative action, and other
policies.
It is constitutional because it places the rule of law at the center of
politics.
Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United States
as a defense of an individual's right to life and property and the freedoms
of religion and speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks on the
power of government, equality under the law, impartial courts and tribunals,
and the separation of church and state.
In almost all of its variants, constitutional liberalism argues that human
beings have certain natural (or "inalienable") rights and that governments
must accept a basic law, limiting its own powers, to secure them.
Thus in 1215 at Runnymede, England's barons forced the king to limit his own
authority.
In the American colonies these customs were made explicit, and in 1638 the
town of Hartford adopted the first written constitution in modern history.
In 1789 the American Constitution created a formal framework for the new
nation.
In 1975 Western nations set standards of behavior even for nondemocratic
regimes. Magna Carta, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the American
Constitution, and the Helsinki Final Act are all expressions of
constitutional liberalism.
.
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| User: "not a philosopher" |
|
| Title: Re: Is democracy freedom? |
08 Apr 2004 02:27:50 PM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:QLydnW5oH_VK4OjdRVn-uw@comcast.com...
:
: "not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
: news:DC5dc.6962$qV6.2005@fed1read04...
: >
: > "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
: > news:46SdnUwBk9-lSundRVn-vw@comcast.com...
: > :
: > : "not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
: > : news:Z84dc.6108$qV6.2994@fed1read04...
: > : >
: > : > Democracy can vote to kill whoever the members want.
: > : > A just king could provide a very nice environment. Why
: > : > is there a linking of democracy with freedom?
:
: > : The Future of Freedom - Illiberal Democracy at Home & Abroad
: > : http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0393047644/
: > :
: > : Articles by Fareed Zakaria
: > : http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/archive.html
: >
: > Very relevant. So how does a people insure the rights of individuals
: > and minorities, and we are all part of some minority? Natural Law?
: > Was is de Toqueville who said that America is great because its
: > people are great? We are apparently not a nation of laws, after all,
: > at least by one meaning.
: >
:
: "constitutional liberalism"-has nothing intrinsically to do with
democracy?
:
: Let me seperate the sentences in (one) of the paragraphs in the unedited
: quote. Tell me if it answers you question amd if not where it falls short;
:
: ----
:
: Constitutional liberalism is not about the procedures for selecting
: government but, rather, government's goals. It refers to the tradition,
deep
: in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual's autonomy and
: dignity against coercion, whatever the source-state, church, or society.
:
: The term marries two closely connected ideas.
:
: It is liberal* because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning
with
: the Greeks and Romans, that emphasizes individual liberty.
:
: *...the term "liberal" in the nineteenth-century sense, meaning concerned
: with individual economic, political, and religious liberty, which is
: sometimes called "classical liberalism," not in the modern, American
sense,
: which associates it with the welfare state, affirmative action, and other
: policies.
:
: It is constitutional because it places the rule of law at the center of
: politics.
:
: Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United
States
: as a defense of an individual's right to life and property and the
freedoms
: of religion and speech. To secure these rights, it emphasized checks on
the
: power of government, equality under the law, impartial courts and
tribunals,
: and the separation of church and state.
:
: In almost all of its variants, constitutional liberalism argues that human
: beings have certain natural (or "inalienable") rights and that governments
: must accept a basic law, limiting its own powers, to secure them.
:
: Thus in 1215 at Runnymede, England's barons forced the king to limit his
own
: authority.
:
: In the American colonies these customs were made explicit, and in 1638 the
: town of Hartford adopted the first written constitution in modern history.
:
: In 1789 the American Constitution created a formal framework for the new
: nation.
:
: In 1975 Western nations set standards of behavior even for nondemocratic
: regimes. Magna Carta, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut, the American
: Constitution, and the Helsinki Final Act are all expressions of
: constitutional liberalism.
The idea of a "liberal democracy" is interesting and directly to the point.
How do we differentiate the modern definition of "liberal" with the way it
was used then? What would be the opposite of a "liberal democracy" in
today's terms?
.
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|
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| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: Is democracy freedom? |
09 Apr 2004 10:47:34 AM |
|
|
"not a philosopher" <no@email.com> wrote in message
news:XIhdc.14434$qV6.8614@fed1read04...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
The idea of a "liberal democracy" is interesting and directly to the
point.
How do we differentiate the modern definition of "liberal" with the way it
was used then? What would be the opposite of a "liberal democracy" in
today's terms?
"constitutional liberalism; the institutions that sustain unpopular
liberties."
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/interviews/salon.html
"...the rise of illiberal democracy -that is, of freely elected governments
that fail to safeguard basic liberties. Constitutional liberalism is
theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy ... Today
the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political
fabric, are coming apart in the rest of the world. Democracy is flourishing;
constitutional liberalism is not ... Western policymakers [should] not only
increase their efforts to foster constitutional liberalism but diminish
their support for elections, [which] suggests that "liberal autocracies" are
preferable to illiberal democracies..."
http://tinyurl.com/f54i
"...the rise of "illiberal democracies" -- states that hold free elections
but do not honor the rule of law and the rights of their citizens -- calls
into question one of the core goals of American foreign policy: exporting
democracy. It is not democracy alone that makes states peaceful and benign
but liberal democracy. Without the protection of individual rights and the
constraints on centralized power that accompany constitutional liberalism,
democracy is prone to abuses of power and, especially in diverse societies,
ethnic rivalry and conflict. Only when democratic governance evolves amid
preexisting liberal protections does it lead to the oft-heralded democratic
peace. With half of the world's democracies illiberal, the spread of
elections, far from producing a more harmonious world, is leading to
increased instability ... U.S. policymakers [should] end their fixation on
ballot boxes and emphasize reviving constitutionalism and the rule of
law..."
http://tinyurl.com/f551
"...while 118 of the world's 193 countries are now democratic, instead of
rejoicing there is growing unease over what happens after multi-party
elections in many of these countries.This is perhaps illustrated by the
dilemma described by Richard Holbrooke, a United States diplomat, shortly
before elections in Bosnia in September 1996: how should one react if the
elections were to be declared free and fair, but the victors were 'racists,
fascists, separatists'?..."
"...for almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal
democracy - 'a political system marked not only by free and fair elections,
but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of
basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property'... this latter
'bundle of freedoms' [defines] constitutional liberalism, something which is
'theoretically different and historically distinct from democracy'. But
although democracy and constitutional liberalism are not inextricably
linked, they have come to be associated with each other in the world's more
established democracies..."
"...While democracy constitutes the process of electing governments,
constitutional liberalism embodies the goals of the state - to safeguard a
substantial degree of individual liberty by defending such things as the
right of free speech and equality before the law..."
"...In many countries, however, the link between democracy and
constitutional liberalism has become severed or distorted. Thus, while
'democracy is flourishing, constitutional liberalism is not'... the severing
of the link between democracy and constitutional liberalism results in
'illiberal democracy' or 'liberal autocracy'..."
"...An unfortunate risk in almost any democracy is that it can allow despots
to take office via the ballot box. This of course is nothing new, the most
famous example being the case of the Nazi Party in Germany in the 1930s..."
"...Liberalism is wary of powerful governments. The temptation to increase
government intervention in society, perhaps on the noblest of grounds, is
often present. This is especially so in newly democratic countries with
acute social problems, which provide fertile ground for the development of
illiberal democracy. A democratic government which has ousted a patently
undemocratic one may believe it has immense moral authority to act for 'the
people', to provide the symbolic and material goods that its electorate
craves, or perhaps merely to bring about law and order. In so doing, it sets
about gathering power, both horizontally (from other branches of national
government), and vertically (from the lower tiers of government, as well as
from private citizens)..."
"...While few would deny that governments in developing countries should
have adequate police powers, 'the trouble comes from all the other
political, social, and economic powers that they accumulate'. When this
happens ... the result is usually neither order nor good government ... the
greatest threats to human liberty and happiness in this century have not
been from disorder but rather from brutally strong, centralised states such
as Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Maoist China. And the Third World is
'littered with the bloody handiwork of strong states'..."
"...a democratic system of government can be as contemptuous of human rights
and civil liberties as an undemocratic one. John Stuart Mill remarked in On
Liberty that as a country became democratic, people would believe that 'too
much importance had been attached to the limitation of power itself. That
was a response against rulers whose interests were opposed to those of the
people'. In other words, people would feel that once they were in charge of
the government, there would be no need to be cautious of its power since
'the nation did not need to be protected against its own will'... Similarly
Alexis de Tocqueville warned that since democracy vested 'absolute
sovereignty' in the majority of an electorate, there was a clear danger of
the 'tyranny of the majority'..."
http://tinyurl.com/f53h
------------------------
http://tinyurl.com/f540
.
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| User: "Lord Calvert" |
|
| Title: Re: Is democracy freedom? |
08 Apr 2004 04:10:06 PM |
|
|
The idea of a "liberal democracy" is interesting and directly to the point.
How do we differentiate the modern definition of "liberal" with the way it
was used then? What would be the opposite of a "liberal democracy" in
today's terms?
I don't think you can have just one opposite. The major benefit of a liberal
democracy like ours is allegedly supposed to be is the concept of a government
limited in power. There are inherent restrictions placed on what government can
do. Because of that, constitutional democracy is opposite of both absolutism
and anarchy. It has sufficient order to maintain freedom and sufficient
individual liberty to exercise it.
Rich Goranson, Amherst, NY, USA (aa#MCMXCIX, a-vet#1)
EAC Department of Applied Rattan Use
"Without faith we might relapse into scientific or rational thinking, which
leads by a slippery slope toward constitutional democracy." - Robert Anton
Wilson
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