getrich@1upandup.com wrote:

Sean Carroll wrote:

getrich@1upandup.com wrote:

There is nothing
rational about having rationalism,

So only people who do not believe in rationality are rational?

Congratulations, I think you just founded a new school of philosophy!

I was saying there is nothing rational about having rationalism is a
philosophy. What I am saying is that philosophies people pick are
often not done rationally, and there is a meta level beyond the
philosophical view of rationalism, that is not rational.

Of course, many people believe in rationalism for irrational reasons.
But I do not see any way one can be rational at all without accepting
*some* form of rationalism, any more than you can be a historian without
accepting the existence of history. Maybe you can believe there are some
problems solvable by reason and others beyond it, but I don't think (I
may be quibbling semantics here) that is a 'rejection of rationalism' so
much as it is simply a rationalism that is not dogmatic.

Godel's theorem also points
to a breakdown in rationalism.

It does nothing of the sort. It points to a breakdown in *formal logic*.
All it says is that any mathematical system rich enough to include basic
arithmetic has theorems that are true but cannot be proved within the
system. It is always possible to pick a metalanguage, or a broader
system with an extra assumption, that proves these theorems rationally.

For example, say you have a theorem that says, 'There is no number for
which the function f(x) is greater than one million.' (f is some
arbitrary function with as complex a definition as you like.) And say
that you have proved, using G=F6del's theorem, that this theorem is
undecidable within the system.

If it is undecidable, then it must be impossible to prove it wrong
(within the system). If it is impossible to prove it wrong, then there
must be no number you can find that contradicts it; if there were, you
could prove it wrong by simply bringing forth that number as a
counterexample. And if there is no number you can pick that will
contradict it, it must be true. Thus you have proved, *rationally*, that
the theorem is true, even though G=F6del says it's 'undecidable' *within
the system*.

G=F6del's theorem simply contradicts pure formalist theory, not
rationality itself. Without rationality, you could not even prove
G=F6del's theorem in the first place.

If one considers wisdom consisting of the whole of knowledge, and
philosophy as the love of wisdom, then there is a school of philosophy
that transcends rationalism. And not all forms of wisdom is rational.

Perhaps, but it is possible to believe that rational wisdom is the most
reliable and firmest form of wisdom, even if it is not the *only* form.

--
--Sean
http://spclsd223.livejournal.com/
'Just 'cause he says I hit him doesn't make it true. Watch. "I am
surrounded by naked cheerleaders." See?' --Dr Gregory House

getrich@1upandup.com wrote:

Sean Carroll wrote:

getrich@1upandup.com wrote:

There is nothing
rational about having rationalism,

So only people who do not believe in rationality are rational?

Congratulations, I think you just founded a new school of philosophy!

I was saying there is nothing rational about having rationalism is a
philosophy. What I am saying is that philosophies people pick are
often not done rationally, and there is a meta level beyond the
philosophical view of rationalism, that is not rational.

Of course, many people believe in rationalism for irrational reasons.
But I do not see any way one can be rational at all without accepting
*some* form of rationalism, any more than you can be a historian without
accepting the existence of history. Maybe you can believe there are some
problems solvable by reason and others beyond it, but I don't think (I
may be quibbling semantics here) that is a 'rejection of rationalism' so
much as it is simply a rationalism that is not dogmatic.

It does nothing of the sort. It points to a breakdown in *formal logic*.
All it says is that any mathematical system rich enough to include basic
arithmetic has theorems that are true but cannot be proved within the
system. It is always possible to pick a metalanguage, or a broader
system with an extra assumption, that proves these theorems rationally.

G=F6del's theorem simply contradicts pure formalist theory, not
rationality itself. Without rationality, you could not even prove
G=F6del's theorem in the first place.

If one considers wisdom consisting of the whole of knowledge, and
philosophy as the love of wisdom, then there is a school of philosophy
that transcends rationalism. And not all forms of wisdom is rational.

Perhaps, but it is possible to believe that rational wisdom is the most
reliable and firmest form of wisdom, even if it is not the *only* form.