| Topic: |
Religions > Atheism |
| User: |
"Immortalist" |
| Date: |
07 Oct 2003 02:49:32 PM |
| Object: |
Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
Across the globe and throughout history, human beings have engaged in a
variety of religious practices and have held a diversity of religious
beliefs. These phenomena have been explained in a variety of different ways
by anthropologists, psychologists, and other scholars, as well as by
religious practitioners themselves, with varying degrees of success. Perhaps
more puzzling, and just in need of an explanation, is the fact that human
beings have religion in the first place.
According to Boyer, it is only now, with recent contributions of the
cognitive and neural sciences and evolutionary biology to the understanding
of the nature and origins of the human mind, that we are in position to
successfully provide such an explanation. Religion Explained attempts just
such an explanation, drawing on cutting edge research in a variety fields
and Boyer’s own fieldwork experience.
Religion, Boyer suggests, is a by-product of the way our minds evolved to
negotiate the natural and, more importantly, the social world. Boyer’s
naturalistic and cognitivist approach is at variance with many established
traditions in the study of the religion and his approach may seem
wrong-headed to many. Be that as it may, he has produced a challenging and
thought-provoking book, containing many insights that transcend what some
might see as the limitations of his approach.
http://www.semcoop.com/detail/0465006965
The explanation for religious beliefs and behaviours is to be found in the
way all human minds work. I really mean all human minds, not just the minds
of religious people or of some of them. I am talking about humanminds
because what matters here are prop-erties of minds that are found in all
members of our species with normal brains. The discoveries I will mention
here are about the ways minds in general (menís or womenís, British or
Brazilian, young or old) function.
This may seem a rather strange point of departure if we want to explain
something as diverse as religion. Beliefs are different in different people;
some are religious and some are not. Also, obviously, beliefs are different
in different places. Japanese Buddhists do not seem to share much, in terms
of religious notions, with Amazonian shamans or American Southern Baptists.
How could we explain a phenomenon (religion) that is so variable in terms of
something (the brain) that is the same everywhere? This is what I describe
in this book.
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/BoyerBook.htm
In my research I try to describe functional specialisations in various
mental systems, using and gathering evidence from cognitive development,
behavioural experiments, and neural functioning. An important goal is to
describe the way such functional systems emerge in the course of cognitive
development. A third goal is to show how this understanding of the mind
helps us understand and explain cultural phenomena like social systems and
religious representations. All this is based on the assumption that
evolution by natural selection resulted in a particular cognitive
architecture, in particular in the division of labour between a large number
of specialised learning systems.
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/Research.htm
Religious Thought and Behaviour As By-products of Brain Function.
Religious concepts activate various functionally distinct mental systems,
present also in non-religious contexts, and ‘tweak’ the usual inferences of
these systems. They deal with detection and representation of animacy and
agency, social exchange, moral intuitions, precaution against natural
hazards and understanding of misfortune. Each of these activates distinct
neural resources or families of networks. What makes notions of supernatural
agency intuitively plausible? This article reviews evidence suggesting that
it is the joint, coordinated activation of these diverse systems, a
supposition that opens up the prospect of a cognitive neuroscience of
religious beliefs.
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/BoyerTiCS.pdf
Cognitive developmental evidence is sometimes conscripted to support
"naturalized epistemology" arguments to the effect that a general epistemic
stance leads children to build theory-like accounts of underlying properties
of kinds. A review of the evidence suggests that what prompts conceptual
acquisition is not a general epistemic stance but a series of
category-specific intuitive principles that constitute an evolved "natural
metaphysics". This consists in a system of categories and category-specific
inferential processes founded on definite biases in prototype formation.
Evidence for this system provides a better understanding of the limited
"plasticity" of ontological commitments as well as a computationally
plausible account of their initial state, avoiding ambiguities about
innateness. This may provide a starting point for a "naturalized
epistemology" that takes into account evolved proper-ties of human
conceptual structures.
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/Abstracts.htm
The Inferential Instinct:
(naive or "direct epistemology")
....a naturalistic account of cultural representations that describes how
evolved conceptual dispositions make humans likely to acquire certain
concepts more easily than others. The aggregated result of these individual
acquisition processes channels cultures along particular paths, with the
result that some concepts are both relatively stable within a group and
recurrent among different groups.
Cultural transmission, like other forms of human communication, does not
consist in a ‘downloading’ of concepts from one mind to another. It requires
inferential processes, whereby people attend to cues in other people’s
behavior, infer their communicative intentions, build concepts on this basis
of what they inferred (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993; Sperber,1996). As
a result, cultural transmission is a process whereby people constantly
create variants of other people’s representations. Concepts that are stable
in one group and recurrent between groups are concepts that were selected in
the transmission process, against a whole variety of variants that were
forgotten, discarded and modified.
http://www.anth.ucsb.edu/projects/esm/IAM/PBoyer.html
Culturally successful religious concepts are the outcome of selective
processes that make some concepts more likely than others to be easily
ac-quired, stored and transmitted. Among the constructs of human
imagination, some connect to intuitive ontological principles in such a way
that they con-stitute a small catalogue of culturally successful
supernatural concepts. Experimental and anthropological evidence confirm the
salience and trans-mission potential of this catalogue. Among these
supernatural concepts, cog-nitive capacities for social interaction
introduce a further selection. As a re-sult, some concepts of supernatural
agents are connected to morality, group-identity, ritual and emotion. These
typical "religious" supernatural agents are tacitly presumed to have access
to information that is crucial to social interac-tion, an assumption that
boosts their spread in human groups.
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/FunctionalOrigins.pdf
....Why are we humans predisposed to have only these kinds of religious
concepts? Boyer’s answer, in brief, is that our brains have been "designed
by evolution" to employ particular cognitive systems that help us to make
sense of "particular aspects of objects around us and produce specific kinds
of inferences about them." There are, for instance, brain–systems in this
sense that deal with inanimate objects, others that deal with human persons,
and yet others that deal with supernatural agents. Just as our brains have
become by evolution such that they inevitably (and mostly unconsciously)
deploy the complex inferential systems that permit us to survive and get
around in a world of inanimate objects, so they also have become such that
we find ideas about full–access strategic agents to be plausible because
these ideas generate for us rich inferences about how to behave and what
choices to make, and they do so with particular richness in a social context
in which we can reasonably assume that everyone else shares such ideas.
Boyer thus reverses many traditional attempts to explain religion away. It
is not that we invent the gods because by so doing we can meet needs
otherwise difficult to satisfy, or because they permit us to explain things
otherwise hard to explain, or because they give us the illusion of comfort
in a harsh and comfortless world, or because they give us persuasive reasons
to act morally. It is, rather, that evolution has equipped us (or most of
us) with certain proclivities or dispositions to explain misfortune, gain
scarce social goods, and act morally (by which Boyer means, roughly, acting
in such a way as evolutionarily to benefit either ourselves or the tribe).
Moreover, these proclivities dispose us to accept and act upon the idea that
there are gods—or, if you prefer, full–access strategic agents. Evolution,
in Boyer’s story, makes all of us likely worshipers in much the same way
that it makes all of us likely language–users. We are innately predisposed
for both, and so such disparate religious traditions as Christian theology,
Islamic law, and Buddhist metaphysics are merely different forms of baroque
ornamentations added on to an evolutionary edifice.
....Boyer’s explanation for the attractiveness of Mass–going is that it is a
"snare for thought that produces highly salient effects by activating
special systems in the mental basement."
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0201/reviews/griffiths.html
"(A) penetrating scientific analysis of religion. (...) Boyer is at his best
in describing the countless peculiar religious rituals he and his
anthropological brethren have recorded -- and especially in identifying the
shortcomings of virtually every explanation for religion ever offered. As a
consequence, however, Boyer himself fails to provide a satisfactory
explanation because he knows that religion is not a single entity resulting
from a single cause." - Michael Shermer, The Washington Post
Boyer is careful not to focus merely on the religions his readers are likely
to be familiar with. He did field work in Cameroon, among the Fang, and so
he likes to use their belief-systems as examples, and he also draws on other
anthropological and historical accounts to bring in the full, rich variety
of religion. But his focus is on what is common to all forms of religion --
or, more accurately, what leads mankind to invent, adopt, and follow these
belief-systems that, considered rationally, are generally simply bizarre
(and often quite ridiculous).
As he shows, there are some clear reasons why these odd belief-systems
arise, and why people follow them. From the idea of "memes" (see also Susan
Blackmore's The Meme Machine (see our review)) to why specific beliefs are
adopted and others aren't, Boyer suggests how belief systems arise, adapt
(and are adapted), and thrive. He offers many particularly interesting
biologically- and neurologically-based reasons for specific beliefs and
attitudes -- many of which, one finds, are common (in some form) to
practically all religions. And he finds common templates behind supernatural
concepts, for example.
....there are interesting scientific explanations behind many aspects of
religious thought.
http://www.complete-review.com/reviews/religion/boyerp.htm
There is, in addition, a further deep fissure in the book’s fabric of
argument. Boyer wants to provide an evolutionary explanation for the
plausibility of religious belief and practice, and in so doing to show that
it should not be taken seriously in its claims about the way things are. But
such explanations ought to be applicable to Boyer’s own views, since he
claims that everything about our cognitive life can be explained by appeal
to our evolutionary history. What is it, then, about evolutionary selection
that makes Boyer’s views (his physicalism, his evolutionism, his touching
faith in science and its high priests, his apocalyptic enthusiasm for what
science can now do) probative? Boyer does not say. His views are,
apparently, exempt from the very process of investigation they require. The
whole program is thus performatively incoherent, propounding as it does a
method of analysis that ought to be applicable to all claims and arguments,
and yet exempting itself from that very process. Again Boyer seems not to
see the difficulty, and this strains the credulity and the patience of the
reader.
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0201/reviews/griffiths.html
Pascal Boyer's Home Page;
author: ReligionExplained
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/
.
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| User: "darth_versive" |
|
| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
30 Oct 2003 11:50:25 AM |
|
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"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<vo6695gru135cf@corp.supernews.com>...
<snip>
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/FunctionalOrigins.pdf
...Why are we humans predisposed to have only these kinds of religious
concepts? Boyer?s answer, in brief, is that our brains have been "designed
by evolution" to employ particular cognitive systems that help us to make
sense of "particular aspects of objects around us and produce specific kinds
of inferences about them." There are, for instance, brain?systems in this
sense that deal with inanimate objects, others that deal with human persons,
and yet others that deal with supernatural agents. Just as our brains have
become by evolution such that they inevitably (and mostly unconsciously)
deploy the complex inferential systems that permit us to survive and get
around in a world of inanimate objects, so they also have become such that
we find ideas about full?access strategic agents to be plausible because
these ideas generate for us rich inferences about how to behave and what
choices to make, and they do so with particular richness in a social context
in which we can reasonably assume that everyone else shares such ideas.
Boyer thus reverses many traditional attempts to explain religion away. It
is not that we invent the gods because by so doing we can meet needs
otherwise difficult to satisfy, or because they permit us to explain things
otherwise hard to explain, or because they give us the illusion of comfort
in a harsh and comfortless world, or because they give us persuasive reasons
to act morally. It is, rather, that evolution has equipped us (or most of
us) with certain proclivities or dispositions to explain misfortune, gain
scarce social goods, and act morally (by which Boyer means, roughly, acting
in such a way as evolutionarily to benefit either ourselves or the tribe).
Moreover, these proclivities dispose us to accept and act upon the idea that
there are gods?or, if you prefer, full?access strategic agents. Evolution,
in Boyer?s story, makes all of us likely worshipers in much the same way
that it makes all of us likely language?users. We are innately predisposed
for both, and so such disparate religious traditions as Christian theology,
Islamic law, and Buddhist metaphysics are merely different forms of baroque
ornamentations added on to an evolutionary edifice.
These explanations are not necessarily either/or. That is, on a
subjective, experiential level, religion could fulfill these functions
that many traditional explantions ascribe to it, and yet at the same
time, it could do so because evolution has equipped us to perform
these functions.
So therefore, rather than throw all the traditional explanations out,
and conceive of Boyer's evolutionary psychology explanation as a
mutually-exclusive alternative, it might be better to integrate both
types of explanations together--that is, explanations at the
subjective-experience level, and those at the
functional-cognitive-architecture level.
Also, it might be wise to include conceptual systems not traditionally
thought of as "religion" in the explanatory framework: such things as
political ideologies and philosophical perspectives, etc. Many of
these have a number of characteristics that are similar to religious
systems of thought.
For example, the Hegelian dialectic is not normally conceived of as a
"supernatural agent" within Marxism, or by secular students of
Marxism, but it has all the hallmarks of being one, at the
functional-cognitive-architecture level, and also seems very much like
one, at the subjective-experience level. At least in my view.
DV
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
30 Oct 2003 02:34:39 PM |
|
|
"darth_versive" <darth_versive@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:8e0e3045.0310300950.65a8da04@posting.google.com...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:<vo6695gru135cf@corp.supernews.com>...
<snip>
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/FunctionalOrigins.pdf
...Why are we humans predisposed to have only these kinds of religious
concepts? Boyer?s answer, in brief, is that our brains have been
"designed
by evolution" to employ particular cognitive systems that help us to
make
sense of "particular aspects of objects around us and produce specific
kinds
of inferences about them." There are, for instance, brain?systems in
this
sense that deal with inanimate objects, others that deal with human
persons,
and yet others that deal with supernatural agents. Just as our brains
have
become by evolution such that they inevitably (and mostly unconsciously)
deploy the complex inferential systems that permit us to survive and get
around in a world of inanimate objects, so they also have become such
that
we find ideas about full?access strategic agents to be plausible because
these ideas generate for us rich inferences about how to behave and what
choices to make, and they do so with particular richness in a social
context
in which we can reasonably assume that everyone else shares such ideas.
Boyer thus reverses many traditional attempts to explain religion away.
It
is not that we invent the gods because by so doing we can meet needs
otherwise difficult to satisfy, or because they permit us to explain
things
otherwise hard to explain, or because they give us the illusion of
comfort
in a harsh and comfortless world, or because they give us persuasive
reasons
to act morally. It is, rather, that evolution has equipped us (or most
of
us) with certain proclivities or dispositions to explain misfortune,
gain
scarce social goods, and act morally (by which Boyer means, roughly,
acting
in such a way as evolutionarily to benefit either ourselves or the
tribe).
Moreover, these proclivities dispose us to accept and act upon the idea
that
there are gods?or, if you prefer, full?access strategic agents.
Evolution,
in Boyer?s story, makes all of us likely worshipers in much the same way
that it makes all of us likely language?users. We are innately
predisposed
for both, and so such disparate religious traditions as Christian
theology,
Islamic law, and Buddhist metaphysics are merely different forms of
baroque
ornamentations added on to an evolutionary edifice.
These explanations are not necessarily either/or. That is, on a
subjective, experiential level, religion could fulfill these functions
that many traditional explantions ascribe to it, and yet at the same
time, it could do so because evolution has equipped us to perform
these functions.
So therefore, rather than throw all the traditional explanations out,
and conceive of Boyer's evolutionary psychology explanation as a
mutually-exclusive alternative, it might be better to integrate both
types of explanations together--that is, explanations at the
subjective-experience level, and those at the
functional-cognitive-architecture level.
There are many ways to include and eclude various conceptions and theories
and yours doesn't seem bad. The reviewer hasn't really grasped Boyer's
thoughts here but maybe I have the wrong take on his ideas after reading the
complete book.
Boyer does mainly use old theories from anthropology combined with the
search for instinctual inference systems. This direction opens a whole new
can of worms. Hardly time to be overly critical of a quickly evolving field.
Boyer also like you claims and explains many non-religeous institutions and
social arrangements. The reviewer was probably responding to Boyers
counter-attacks on traditional veiws of universal religious capacities. For
every concept biased by one religion he sjows a tribe or people who do
precisely the same without the religion.
Also, it might be wise to include conceptual systems not traditionally
thought of as "religion" in the explanatory framework: such things as
political ideologies and philosophical perspectives, etc. Many of
these have a number of characteristics that are similar to religious
systems of thought.
For example, the Hegelian dialectic is not normally conceived of as a
"supernatural agent" within Marxism, or by secular students of
Marxism, but it has all the hallmarks of being one, at the
functional-cognitive-architecture level, and also seems very much like
one, at the subjective-experience level. At least in my view.
Marx would have responded "superstructural agent" and probably talk of these
wonderful clas attributes.
DV
.
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| User: "darth_versive" |
|
| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
31 Oct 2003 12:28:41 PM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<vq2ti8rg6us2c2@corp.supernews.com>...
"darth_versive" <darth_versive@yahoo.com> wrote in message
<snip>
These explanations are not necessarily either/or. That is, on a
subjective, experiential level, religion could fulfill these functions
that many traditional explantions ascribe to it, and yet at the same
time, it could do so because evolution has equipped us to perform
these functions.
So therefore, rather than throw all the traditional explanations out,
and conceive of Boyer's evolutionary psychology explanation as a
mutually-exclusive alternative, it might be better to integrate both
types of explanations together--that is, explanations at the
subjective-experience level, and those at the
functional-cognitive-architecture level.
There are many ways to include and eclude various conceptions and theories
and yours doesn't seem bad. The reviewer hasn't really grasped Boyer's
thoughts here but maybe I have the wrong take on his ideas after reading the
complete book.
Boyer does mainly use old theories from anthropology combined with the
search for instinctual inference systems. This direction opens a whole new
can of worms. Hardly time to be overly critical of a quickly evolving field.
Boyer also like you claims and explains many non-religeous institutions and
social arrangements. The reviewer was probably responding to Boyers
counter-attacks on traditional veiws of universal religious capacities. For
every concept biased by one religion he sjows a tribe or people who do
precisely the same without the religion.
Yes. Precisely. There are many different takes on the phenomena
described by Boyer and others, having to do with evolutionary
psychology, cognitive architecture, and the subjective experience of
various belief systems, etc. One should keep in mind that the field
is rapidly evolving, as you say. I would assume that many researchers
are looking at different aspects of these phenomena; like the old
"blind men and the elephant" story, each might tend to think that
their own particular area of study provides the key characteristic,
while the real task is to integrate the different pieces of the puzzle
into a coherent whole.
Also, it might be wise to include conceptual systems not traditionally
thought of as "religion" in the explanatory framework: such things as
political ideologies and philosophical perspectives, etc. Many of
these have a number of characteristics that are similar to religious
systems of thought.
For example, the Hegelian dialectic is not normally conceived of as a
"supernatural agent" within Marxism, or by secular students of
Marxism, but it has all the hallmarks of being one, at the
functional-cognitive-architecture level, and also seems very much like
one, at the subjective-experience level. At least in my view.
Marx would have responded "superstructural agent" and probably talk of these
wonderful clas attributes.
Yes. And that would be another hallmark of "religious" systems of
thought: to frame the criticism of one's own system of thought in
terms which assume that very system of thought to be correct. The
parallels just keep multiplying! ;)
All the more reason to keep in mind the idea that these other types of
thinking belong to the same general category of thought as is commonly
described as "religious". Whatever the underlying cognitive processes
involved, it seems to permeate more of our thinking than many of us
would like to admit. I myself prefer the more neutral terms
"conceptual frameworks," "systems of thought," "frames," or "cognitive
schema," etc. Religions, political ideologies, and philosophical
perspectives, etc. should be thought of as merely subsets of this more
general category, according to my way of thinking, that is.
DV
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
01 Nov 2003 02:59:43 PM |
|
|
"darth_versive" <darth_versive@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:8e0e3045.0310311028.5ee7a065@posting.google.com...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:<vq2ti8rg6us2c2@corp.supernews.com>...
"darth_versive" <darth_versive@yahoo.com> wrote in message
<snip>
These explanations are not necessarily either/or. That is, on a
subjective, experiential level, religion could fulfill these functions
that many traditional explantions ascribe to it, and yet at the same
time, it could do so because evolution has equipped us to perform
these functions.
So therefore, rather than throw all the traditional explanations out,
and conceive of Boyer's evolutionary psychology explanation as a
mutually-exclusive alternative, it might be better to integrate both
types of explanations together--that is, explanations at the
subjective-experience level, and those at the
functional-cognitive-architecture level.
There are many ways to include and eclude various conceptions and
theories
and yours doesn't seem bad. The reviewer hasn't really grasped Boyer's
thoughts here but maybe I have the wrong take on his ideas after reading
the
complete book.
Boyer does mainly use old theories from anthropology combined with the
search for instinctual inference systems. This direction opens a whole
new
can of worms. Hardly time to be overly critical of a quickly evolving
field.
Boyer also like you claims and explains many non-religeous institutions
and
social arrangements. The reviewer was probably responding to Boyers
counter-attacks on traditional veiws of universal religious capacities.
For
every concept biased by one religion he sjows a tribe or people who do
precisely the same without the religion.
Yes. Precisely. There are many different takes on the phenomena
described by Boyer and others, having to do with evolutionary
psychology, cognitive architecture, and the subjective experience of
various belief systems, etc. One should keep in mind that the field
is rapidly evolving, as you say. I would assume that many researchers
are looking at different aspects of these phenomena; like the old
"blind men and the elephant" story, each might tend to think that
their own particular area of study provides the key characteristic,
while the real task is to integrate the different pieces of the puzzle
into a coherent whole.
They are more interested in the neural assemblies necessary for making such
inferences as the anti-reductionist analogy you gave.
Also, it might be wise to include conceptual systems not traditionally
thought of as "religion" in the explanatory framework: such things as
political ideologies and philosophical perspectives, etc. Many of
these have a number of characteristics that are similar to religious
systems of thought.
For example, the Hegelian dialectic is not normally conceived of as a
"supernatural agent" within Marxism, or by secular students of
Marxism, but it has all the hallmarks of being one, at the
functional-cognitive-architecture level, and also seems very much like
one, at the subjective-experience level. At least in my view.
Marx would have responded "superstructural agent" and probably talk of
these
wonderful clas attributes.
Yes. And that would be another hallmark of "religious" systems of
thought: to frame the criticism of one's own system of thought in
terms which assume that very system of thought to be correct. The
parallels just keep multiplying! ;)
Science is confrontational and discovered the medications that kept me ma
alive for more years than she would have. But a concern with the instinctual
inference systems that partially bring about our system of thought, is
somewhat different than defending some side of a debate. These people are on
a search not a saffari.
All the more reason to keep in mind the idea that these other types of
thinking belong to the same general category of thought as is commonly
described as "religious". Whatever the underlying cognitive processes
involved, it seems to permeate more of our thinking than many of us
would like to admit. I myself prefer the more neutral terms
"conceptual frameworks," "systems of thought," "frames," or "cognitive
schema," etc. Religions, political ideologies, and philosophical
perspectives, etc. should be thought of as merely subsets of this more
general category, according to my way of thinking, that is.
DV
I agree but your naming of these events is strange; nuetral? Should science
be neutral or should science try to discover something further? Are you
saying that these people are trying to uncover instinctual inference systems
because of a side or a contention or a non-neutral position? Or are you
concerned with the language used?
.
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| User: "darth_versive" |
|
| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
02 Nov 2003 12:28:20 PM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<vq87pb2gb0a186@corp.supernews.com>...
"darth_versive" <darth_versive@yahoo.com> wrote in message
<snip>
I myself prefer the more neutral terms
"conceptual frameworks," "systems of thought," "frames," or "cognitive
schema," etc. Religions, political ideologies, and philosophical
perspectives, etc. should be thought of as merely subsets of this more
general category, according to my way of thinking, that is.
DV
I agree but your naming of these events is strange; nuetral? Should science
be neutral or should science try to discover something further? Are you
saying that these people are trying to uncover instinctual inference systems
because of a side or a contention or a non-neutral position? Or are you
concerned with the language used?
I didn't mean that science should be neutral about trying to discover
something further. I meant that the *terms* "conceptual framework,"
"cognitive schema," etc. are more politically or ideologically neutral
than such terms as "religion," "creed," "faith," etc. That is, less
likely to raise hackles among the general public when they are
discussed as phenomena to be studied. That's all I meant by my use of
the word "neutral." Perhaps a better term than "neutral" would have
been "clinical."
DV
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
03 Nov 2003 01:29:33 PM |
|
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"darth_versive" <darth_versive@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:8e0e3045.0311021028.7ca267a4@posting.google.com...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:<vq87pb2gb0a186@corp.supernews.com>...
"darth_versive" <darth_versive@yahoo.com> wrote in message
<snip>
I myself prefer the more neutral terms
"conceptual frameworks," "systems of thought," "frames," or "cognitive
schema," etc. Religions, political ideologies, and philosophical
perspectives, etc. should be thought of as merely subsets of this more
general category, according to my way of thinking, that is.
DV
I agree but your naming of these events is strange; nuetral? Should
science
be neutral or should science try to discover something further? Are you
saying that these people are trying to uncover instinctual inference
systems
because of a side or a contention or a non-neutral position? Or are you
concerned with the language used?
I didn't mean that science should be neutral about trying to discover
something further. I meant that the *terms* "conceptual framework,"
"cognitive schema," etc. are more politically or ideologically neutral
than such terms as "religion," "creed," "faith," etc. That is, less
likely to raise hackles among the general public when they are
discussed as phenomena to be studied. That's all I meant by my use of
the word "neutral." Perhaps a better term than "neutral" would have
been "clinical."
DV
Yes, I think there will be much conflict in the future as science focuses on
what really makes us tick. I only scanned up to the last chapter so far but
a look at these headings should reveal how hard it might be to devise a
language for all this anew when anthropology has the stuff already. But the
anthropological terms are probably more like the ones to your liking anyway:
Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought
Pascal Boyer
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0465006965/
Copyright © 2001 by Pascal Boyer
Published by Basic Books,
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
ISBN 0-465-00695-7
1. Religion.
I. Title. BL48.B64382001 200-dc21
CONTENTS
------------------------------------------
[0] - Flaps & Acknowledgments
------------------------------------------
[1] - WHAT IS THE ORIGIN?
[A] - GIVING AIRY NOTHING A LOCAL HABITATION
[B] - ORIGIN SCENARIOS
[C] - UNFAMILIAR DIVERSITY
[D] - INTELLECTUAL SCENARIOS: MIND DEMANDS AN EXPLANATION
- The mind as a bundle of explanation machines
[E] - EMOTIVE SCENARIOS: RELIGION PROVIDES COMFORT
[F] - SOCIAL SCENARIOS: RELIGION AS GOOD THING FOR SOCIETY
[G] - RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL MIND
[H] - THE SLEEP OF REASON: RELIGION AS AN ILLUSION
[I] - TURNING THE QUESTION UPSIDE DOWN
[J] - CULTURE AS MEMES
[K] - TOOL KIT 1: CULTURE AS MEMES
[L] - DISTORTION IS OF THE ESSENCE
[M] - HOW TO CATCH CONCEPTS WITH TEMPLATES
[N] - EPIDEMICS OF CULTURE
[O] - TOOL KIT 2: CULTURAL EPIDEMICS
[P] - A PUZZLEMENT OF QUESTIONS
[Q] - EXPLAINING NOTHING: MAGIC BULLETS VS. AGGREGATE RELEVANCE
------------------------------------------
[2] - WHAT SUPERNATURAL CONCEPTS ARE LIKE
[A] - IS RELIGION JUST STRANGENESS?
[B] - ACQUIRING NEW CONCEPTS
- Some necessary jargon
[C] - TEMPLATES IN RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS: STEP 1
- Counterintuitive biology
- Counterintuitive mentation
[D] - TEMPLATES IN RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS: STEP 2
[E] - WHAT IS INTUITIVE IN THE PARANORMAL
[F] - FROM CATALOGUES TO EXPERIMENTS
- Recall, counterintuitives and oddities
- Memory effects do not change (much) with culture
- Violations remain circumscribed
- Theological correctness
[G] - SILLY TALES OR SERIOUS RELIGION?
------------------------------------------
[3] - THE KIND OF MIND IT TAKES
[A] - THE GUEST'S VIEW OF THE MIND
[B] - TO CATCH A THIEF (USING INFERENCE SYSTEMS)
1. Understanding the physics of solid objects
2. Understanding physical causation
3. Detecting goal-directed motion
4. Keeping track of who's who
5. Linking structure to function
6. Understanding mental representation
[C] - WHEELS WITHIN WHEELS: SYSTEMS IN THE BRAIN
[D] - WHAT EVERY NURSERY-SCHOOL CHILD KNOWS
1. If you open up a crocodile, what will you find inside?
2. Why do some things move of their own accord?
3. Are there different people out there?
4. How many objects are out there?
[E] - INNATENESS AND DEVELOPMENT
[F] - THE ARCHITECTURE AND THE DESIGNER
[G] - TOOL KIT 3: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
[H] - LIFE IN THE COGNITIVE NICHE
- Humans are information-hungry
- Humans are cooperators
- Inference systems in the social mind
--- A hypertrophied social intelligence.
--- A taste for gossip.
--- Adaptations for social exchange.
--- Evaluation of trust.
--- Coalitional dynamics.
[I] - DECOUPLING AND CONSTRAINTS
[J] - BY-PRODUCTS AND SALIENT GADGETS
------------------------------------------
[4] - WHY GODS AND SPIRITS?
[A] - RELIGION IS PRACTICAL
[B] - GODS AND SPIRITS AS PERSONS
[C] - SUPERNATURAL AGENTS AND DANGEROUS BEASTS
[D] - ARE GODS REALLY LIKE PREDATORS?
[E] - GODS/SPIRITS AS PARTNERS: IMAGINARY COMPANIONS/FRIENDS
[F] - STRATEGIC INFORMATION
[G] - GODS AND SPIRITS AS SPECIAL PERSONS
[H] - RELEVANCE IN CULTURAL TRANSMISSION
[I] - ANTHROPOLOGICAL TOOL KIT 4: RELEVANCE & TRANSMISSION
[J] - RELEVANCE OF FULL-ACCESS AGENTS
[K] - CONSEQUENCES OF FULL-ACCESS AGENTS
------------------------------------------
[5] - WHY DO GODS AND SPIRITS MATTER?
[A] - LEGISLATORS, EXEMPLARS, ONLOOKERS
[B] - MORAL REASONING AND MORAL FEELINGS
[C] - EARLY MORALITY
[D] - DISPOSITIONS FOR COOPERATION
[E] - BEYOND OPPORTUNISM
[F] - GENERAL DISPOSITIONS, VARIABLE JUDGEMENTS
[G] - FULL-ACCESS AGENTS AND MORAL INTUITIONS
[H] - WITCHES AND MISFORTUNE
[I] - EVIL EYES AND ANGRY GODS
[J] - MISFORTUNE AS A SOCIAL THING
[K] - CAUSES AND REASONS OF MISFORTUNE
[L] - MISFORTUNE AS SOCIAL INTERACTION
[M] - SUPERNATURAL AGENTS AS EXCHANGE PARTNERS
[N] - GODS AND SPIRITS ARE PARASITIC
------------------------------------------
[6] - WHY IS RELIGION ABOUT DEATH?
[A] - DISPLACED TERROR AND COLD COMFORT
[B] - DEATH RITUALS: SOMETHING MUST BE DONE
[C] - THE BODY AS THE ISSUE
- Vague notions about death & dead in general
- More detailed representations of recently dead
- Rituals are about consequences for the living
- The rituals are all about corpses
[D] - POLLUTION AND ITS CAUSES
[E] - DEATH, PREDATION AND INTUITION
[F] - WHAT IS A PERSON?
[G] - WHEN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS ARE NOT IN HARMONY
[H] - CORPSES INDUCE DISSOCIATION
[I] - FOCUSED GRIEF & FEAR VERSUS GENERAL TERROR
[J] - DEAD BODIES & SUPERNATURAL AGENTS
------------------------------------------
[7] - WHY RITUALS?
[A] - ACTIONS OF GREAT MOMENT (AND LESS MEANING)
[B] - SALIENT GADGETS
[C] - THE INTUITIVE SENSE OF URGENCY
[D] - OBSESSIVE RULES
[E] - URGENCY AND RITUAL PRECAUTIONS
[F] - EXCHANGE WITH SLEEPING PARTNERS
[G] - MARKING AND CREATING OCCASIONS
[H] - GAME THEORY IS FOR ALIENS
[I] - THE MAGIC OF SOCIETY
[J] - RELEVANCE OF RITUAL GADGETS
[K] - BANAL TRANSCENDENCE: OPENING 4 GODS & SPIRITS
[L] - WHAT GODS DO (AND WHAT IS DONE TO THEM)
[M] - WHAT WE KNOW IS NOT THE EXPLANATION OF RITUALS
------------------------------------------
[8] - WHY DOCTRINES, EXCLUSION AND VIOLENCE?
[A] - ONE DOCTRINE TOO FEW
[B] - SEVERAL DOCTRINES TOO MANY
[C] - LOCAL SPECIALISTS
[D] - ORIGINS OF THE GUILDS
[E] - THE CONCEPTS OFFERED BY LITERATE GUILDS
[F] - GUILDS AND LITERACY
[G] - THE MIRAGE OF THEOLOGICAL CORRECTNESS
[H] - THE TRAGEDY OF THE THEOLOGIAN
[I] - COMMON GODS CREATE A COMMUNITY (OR DO THEY?)
[J] - ESSENCE CONCEPTS AND COALITIONAL INTUITIONS
[K] - FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE PRICE OF DEFECTION
------------------------------------------
[9] - WHY BELIEF?
[] not scanned yet...
------------------------------------------
Further readings
Notes
References
Index
Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought
Pascal Boyer
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0465006965/
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
08 Oct 2003 01:30:29 PM |
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On Instinctual Inference Systems & How they Are Templates [roads] in Which
Particualar Memes Are Traffic.
-------------
Boyer focuses on the inference systems and intuitive expectations of evolved
human brain capacities to account for the biocultural origin of religious
concepts and supernatural agents (e.g., gods, ghosts, demons, spirits, and
witches).
How and why do religions deal with death?
How do infants have precise intuitions and how do we know this?
Why is fundamentalism a biological process?
Why is religion here to stay?
["religious concepts are parasitic upon other mental capacities"] ...the
variety of human religious concepts is not infinite, suggesting an
underlying pattern in the way certain kinds of religious concepts engage the
mind by "successful activation of a whole variety of mental systems." These
patterns increase the probability that such concepts will be remembered and
transmitted.
http://www.wordtrade.com/society/anthropologyreligion.htm
....there is no simple explanation for religious consciousness. Some aspects
relate to inference systems in the brain (how we think about causality and
ontology), others relate to features of our social awareness (how we
represent and interact with persons), and still others relate to how
memories are processed and stored....an analysis of the inference-systems
that govern our perception of cause-effect relations, systems organized by
natural selection that produce concepts of unseen powers and agencies.
Consider the concept of momentum. We all know that if you throw a baseball
it will continue (roughly) in a straight path forward before falling to the
ground (rather than flying at the speed of light towards Jupiter, etc.) No
one teaches us to think that way. Instead this pattern of inference forms
part of our intuitive psychology of physical objects: human beings grasped
the concept of momentum long before Newton gave it a theoretical
explanation. Moreover we all know that a seedling may grow into a tree, but
not into a snake or zebra. We know this because we come equipped with an
intuitive folk-biology that provides us with the relevant inference
structures to predict the behaviour of organic life. These inferential
structures, which suit us well to the circumstances of biological existence,
employ concepts of unseen powers. Next Boyer looks to the systems that
generate internally structured beliefs regarding the causal effects of
various human activities. When I throw a ball it flies, when I plant a
seedling it grows, when I kick Paul, he groans, and so on. Generalizing,
humans can engage in activities that produce reliable outcomes.
Boyer explains ritual action in virtue of the interaction between these two
systems. Given that our cognitive systems predispose us to think both that
hidden causal forces operate in nature, and that our actions have effects,
we are naturally disposed to engage in practices in which we act to
influence hidden powers in favourable ways. We seek to influence the hidden
world of causation to further our interests by relating our activities to
it.
http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/eras/edition_4/bulbulia.htm
No, that's not it at all. Memetics studies how the
future is influenced by differential selection of
replicating cultural elements. It is orthogonal to
cognitive science, not a replacement for it.
Indeed. Cognitive science may eventually be up to the task of predicting
what memes would do well in the meme pool given the common features of human
minds. Again, Boyer's book is largely about the mental mechanisms,
particularly inference mechanisms, evolution has shaped in our brains/minds.
But memetics itself is only about replicating information (cultural
elements) in human minds and the differential selection of that information.
http://cfpm.org/~majordom/memetics/2000/15509.html
....religious ideas have spread as memes--though modified in cultural
transmission by various human cognitive inference systems...:
"The notion of human culture as a huge set of copy-me programs is very
seductive and it is certainly on the right track, but it is only a starting
point. Why are some memes better than others? Why is singing Land of Hope
and Glory after hearing it once much easier than humming a tune from
Schoenberg's Pierrot lunaire? What exactly makes moralistic ancestors better
for transmission than immoral ghosts? This is not the only problem. A much
more difficult one is that if we look a bit more closely at cultural
transmission between human beings, what we see does not look at all like
replication of identical memes. On the contrary, the process of transmission
seems guaranteed to create an extraordinary profusion of baroque variations.
This is where the analogy with genes is more hindrance than help. Consider
this. You (and I) carry genes that come from a unique source (a meiotic
combination of our parents' genes) and we will transmit them unchanged
(though combined with a partner's set) to our offspring. In the meantime,
nothing happens; however much you may work out at the gym, you will not have
more muscular children. But in mental representations the opposite is true.
The denizens of our minds have many parents (in those thousands of
renditions of Land of Hope and Glory, which one is being replicated when I
whistle the tune?) and we constantly modify them." (p.38)
"Before we accept emotion-oriented scenarios of religion's origins, we
should probe their assumptions... Consider a simple emotion like the fear
induced by the lurking presence of a predator. In many animals, including
humans, this results in dramatic somatic events--most noticeably, a
quickened heartbeat and increased perspiration. But other systems are doing
complex work. For instance, we have to choose among several behaviors in
such situations--freeze or flee or fight--a choice that is made by
computation, that is, by mentally going through a variety of aspects of the
situation and evaluating the least dangerous option. So fear is not just
what we experience about it; it is also a program, in some ways comparable
to a computer program. It governs the resources of the brain in a special
way, quite different from what happens in other circumstances. Fear
increases the sensitivity of some perceptual mechanisms and leads reasoning
through complicated sets of possible outcomes... In the case of fear
triggered by predators, it seems quite clear that natural selection designed
our brains in such a way that they comprise this specific program." (p.
21-22)
"Even though we know nothing about the particular cultural context of these
descriptions, we can see how each of them combines a particular ontological
category and a special characteristic:
(31) Thirsty people disappear [PERSON] + special biology, physics
(32) Cologne spirits [PERSON] + invisible + drinks perfume
(33) People with flying organ [PERSON] + extra organ
(34) Counterintelligence wristwatch [TOOL] + detects enemies
(36) gourmet mountain [NATURAL OBJECT] + digestion
(37) Guardian river [NATURAL OBJECT] + incest abhorrence
(38) Guardian forest [NATURAL OBJECT] + likes a good tune
This, obviously, is a terribly simplified description of people's actual
representations. But that is an advantage. Summarizing concepts in this way
highlights a very important property of religious concepts. Each of these
entries in the mental encyclopedia includes an ontological entry between
brackets and a 'tag' for special features of the new entry. These tags added
to the default category seem very diverse, but they have one property in
common: The information contained by the tags contradicts information
provided by the ontological category.
Since this is a rather important property, allow me to elaborate on the
point a bit. When you activate an ontological category, such as ANIMAL, this
delivers all sorts of expectations about the object as a member of the
ANIMAL category. Now the concepts listed above seem to (i) activate those
categories and (ii) produce something that goes against what the categories
stipulate... To sum up, religious concepts invariably include information
that is counterintuitive relative to the category activated." (p. 64-65)
Readers who prefer rigorous empiricism to abstract reasoning will doubt some
of Boyer's fundamental ideas:
"So it seems sensible that a 'one thing led to many things' scenario is
apposite for cultural phenomena... But we can approach the question from
another angle. Indeed, we can and should turn the whole 'origin explanation
upside down, as it were, and realize the many forms of religion we know are
not the outcome of a historical diversification but of a constant
reduction... The religious concepts we observe are relatively successful
ones selected among many other variants... To explain religion we must
explain how human minds, constantly faced with lots of potential 'religious
stuff,' constantly reduce it to much less stuff." (p. 32)
"So we should abandon the search for a historical origin of religion in the
sense of a point in time (however long ago) when people created religion
where there was none. All scenarios that describe people sitting around and
inventing religion are dubious. Even the ones that see religion as slowly
emerging out of confused thoughts have this problem. In the following
chapters, I will show how religion emerges (has its origins, if you want) in
the selection of concepts and the selection of memories. Does this mean that
at some point in history people had lots of possible versions of religion
and that somehow one of them proved more successful? Not at all. What it
means is that at all times and all the time, indefinitely many variants of
religious notions were and are created inside individual minds. Not all
these variants are equally successful in cultural transmission. What we call
a cultural phenomenon is the result of a selection that is taking place all
the time and everywhere." (p. 33)
http://naturalscience.com/ns/books/book14.html
Consciousness underlies non-rational and supernatural beliefs, which are a
universal attribute of all human societies and would therefore appear to
reflect innate qualities of the mind. Pascal Boyer in Religion Explained
(2001) maintains that the social inference system in the mind evolved to
handle innate notions of morality and situations of misfortune. He describes
some fundamental features common to all "supernatural explanations " as
follows: " Our evolution as a species of cooperators is sufficient to
explain the actual psychology of moral reasoning, the way children and
adults represent moral dimensions of action. But then this requires no
special concept of religious agent, no special code, no model to follow.
However once you have concepts of supernatural agents with strategic
information, these are made more salient and relevant by the fact that you
can easily insert them in moral reasoning that would be there in any case.
To some extent religious concepts are parasitic upon moral intuitions." 4
Clearly there is a genetic origin to these explanations but to take us
further it is necessary to explore the cultural conditioning that turns such
explanations into driving forces in human development. It is one thing to
have supernatural explanations; it is something else to insist on conformity
in beliefs about that supernatural explanation. That takes us to the second
feature.
Increasing self-awareness has led humans to ever more elaborate efforts to
structure their environment as the development of language and then symbolic
storage systems made possible far more complex forms of human organization.
Edelman summarizes the issue as follows: "Meaning takes shape in terms of
concepts that depend on categorizations based on value. It grows with the
history of remembered body 4 Pascal Boyer, Religion Explained, (2001), Basic
Books, p. 191 5
Sensations and mental images. The mixture of events is individual and, in
large measure, unpredictable. When in society, linguistic and semantic
capabilities arise and sentences involving metaphor are linked to thought,
the capability to create new models of the world grows at an explosive rate.
But one must remember that, because of its linkage to value and the concept
of self, this system of meaning is almost never free of affect; it is
charged with emotions." (p. 170) The widely varied experiences of humans in
different settings have produced immensely varied cultures with different
combinations of supernatural beliefs and institutions, but the important
point is that it is the complex interplay between these genetic
predispositions and varied experiences of humans in different settings that
gives us a starting point in understanding the process of societal change.
How do we account for cultural variation? Some evolutionary theorists have
created a parallel category to genes to explain cultural evolution. They use
the term memes to describe the intergenerational transfer of cultural
attributes. 5 But such an extension is clearly misdirected. Cultural traits
do not possess attributes parallel to those of genes and indeed the growing
literature of the new institutional economics makes abundantly clear that
institutions must be explained in terms of the intentionality of humans. It
is particularly the development of informal norms that have salience for
incorporating the blend of moral inference of genetic origin with the
intentional aims of humans, which together provide the backbone of what we
should mean by the term culture.
This term was popularized by Richard Dawkins, CITE and is featured in D.
Dennett's Consciousness Explained, Little Brown, 1991. Searle devotes a
chapter (chapter 5) to a biting criticism of Dennett in The Mystery of
Consciousness. The powerful influence of myths, superstitio ns, and
religions in shaping early societies came from their role in establishing
order (the subject of chapter 8) and conformity. Ideological conformity to
this day is a major force in reducing the costs of maintaining order, but it
comes with the additional societal costs of preventing institutional change,
punishing deviants and serving as the source of endless human conflict with
the clash of competing religions. Thus the expansion of consciousness is not
only the source of the wonders of human creativity and the rich
civilizations that humans have created but also a source of intolerance,
prejudice, and human conflict. It could hardly be otherwise given its
central role in human intentionality. Conformity has still another cost in a
world of uncertainty. In the long run it produces stagnation and decay as
humans confront ever new challenges in a non ergodic world that requires
innovative institutional creation because no one can know the right path to
survival. Therefore institutional diversity that allows for a range of
choices is a superior survival trait as Hayek has reminded us. Religious
diversity such as Luther and Calvin produced has long been celebrated as
providing just such a stimulus, as Weber's famous argument reminds us. But a
more fundamental source of creativity has been the evolution of
institutional diversity in general, of which Protestantism was one
illustration and symptomatic of the overall diversity in thinking associated
with the Renaissance.
Political fragmentation in western Europe played just such a role in
creating diverse and competing institutional settings for diverse beliefs
and hence economic institutions which were critical in the relative rise of
Europe as well as critical to the growth of impersonal exchange which
underlies modern economic growth. All this is the subject of chapter 10
below.
http://www.esnie.org/pdf/north2003/chap4_consciousness.pdf
For eons, people naturally have talked about millions of exceedingly
parochial and contextual matters but also about some objects and things that
are not directly observable. It is after all a hallmark of the "modern
mind"-the mind that we have had for millennia-that we entertain plans,
conjectures; speculate on the possible as well as the actual. Among the
millions of messages exchanged, some are attention grabbing because they
violate intuitions about objects and beings in our environment. These
counterintuitive descriptions have a certain staying power, as memory
experiments suggest. They certainly provide the stuff that good stories are
made of. They may mention islands that float adrift or mountains that digest
food or animals that talk. These are generally taken as fiction though the
boundary between a fictional story and an account of personal experience is
often difficult to trace. Some of these themes are particularly salient
because they are about agents. This opens up a rich domain of possible
inferences. When you talk about agents, you wonder to what extent they are
similar to unseen and dangerous predators. You can also try to imagine what
they perceive, what they know, what they plan and so on, because there are
inference systems in your mind that constantly produce such speculations
about other people. Among these accounts, some suggest that counterintuitive
agents have information about relevant aspects of interaction between the
people exchanging these messages. This gives speakers and listeners a strong
motivation to hear, tell or perhaps challenge such stories. This also allows
a further development, whereby people can combine their moral intuitions
with the notion that such agents are indeed informed of the morally relevant
aspects of what they do and what others do to them.
When counterintuitive agents are construed in this way, it becomes easy to
connect them to salient cases of misfortune, because we are predisposed to
see misfortune as a social event, as someone's responsibility rather than
the outcome of mechanical processes. So the agents are now described as
having powers such that they can visit disasters upon people, which adds to
the list of their counterintuitive properties and probably to their
salience. People who have such concepts will probably end up connecting them
with the strange representations and emotions caused by the presence of dead
people, because this presence creates a strange cognitive state in which
various mental systems-those geared to predation and to the identification
of persons-produce incompatible intuitions. We sense both that the dead are
around and that they cannot be around. If you have concepts like that, at
some point it will make sense to connect them with the various repeated and
largely meaningless actions that you often perform with some fear that
nonperformance will result in grave danger. So there are now rituals
directed at these agents. Since many rituals are performed in contexts where
social interaction has non-obvious properties, it will become easy to
conceive of these agents as the very life of the group you are in, as the
bedrock of social interaction. If you live in a large enough group, there
will probably be some people who seem better skilled at producing
convincing messages from the counterintuitive agents. These people will
probably be considered as having some special internal quality that makes
them different from the rest of the group. They will also end up taking on a
special role in ritual performances. If you live in a large group with
literate specialists, these will probably at some point start changing all
these concepts to provide a slightly different, more abstract, less
contextual, less local version. It is also very likely that they will form a
manner of corporation or guild with attendant political goals. But their
version of concepts is not really optimal, so that it will always be
combined in most people's minds with spontaneous inferences that are not
compatible with the literate doctrine.
When the story of religion is told this way, it seems to amount to an
extraordinary conspiracy. Religious concepts and norms and the emotions
attached to them seem designed to excite the human mind, linger in memory,
trigger multiple inferences in the precise way that will get people to hold
them true and communicate them. Whoever designed religion, or designs each
religion, seems to have uncanny prescience of what will be successful with
human minds.
But there is of course no designer, and no conspiracy either. Religious
concepts work that way, they realize the miracle of being exactly what
people will transmit, simply because other variants were created and
forgotten or abandoned all along. The magic that seems to produce such
perfect concepts for human minds is merely the effect of repeated selective
events. A complex organ, the human mind produces a multitude of
mini-scenarios, evanescent links between thoughts and new concepts that
quickly degrade. This maelstrom of elusive thought is certainly not what we
are aware of, because in a sense the only thoughts that we entertain
consciously have already passed a number of cognitive hurdles. But even
explicit thoughts that we entertain are not all equally likely to produce
similar thoughts in other people; far from it. You must remember that in the
domain of inference-production many will be called and few will be chosen.
One of my Fang friends thought that spirits were two-dimensional and always
stood sideways when facing human beings lest they be detected. But this
ingenious notion was perhaps too complex. Most people quickly forgot it or
distorted it. Other inferences have more staying power.
I have explained religion in terms of systems that are in all human minds
and that do all sorts of precious and interesting work but that were not
really designed to produce religious concepts of behaviors. There is no
religious instinct, no specific inclination in the mind, no particular
disposition for these concepts, no special religion center in the brain, and
religious persons are not different from nonreligious ones in essential
cognitive functions. Even faith and belief seem to be simple by-products of
the way concepts and inferences are doing their work for religion in much
the same way as for other domains.
Instead of a religious mind, what we have found is a whole frustration of
invisible hands. One of these guides human attention toward some possible
conceptual combinations; another enhances recall of some of these; yet
another process makes concepts of agents far easier to acquire if they imply
strategic agency, connections to morality, etc. The invisible hand of
multiple inferential systems in the mind produces all sorts of connections
between these concepts and salient occurrences in people's lives. The
invisible hand of cultural selection makes it the case that the religious
concepts people acquire and transmit are in general the ones most likely to
seem convincing to them, given their circumstances.
I call this a frustration because religion is portrayed here as a mere
consequence or side effect of having the brains we have, which does not
strike one as particularly dramatic. But religion is dramatic, it is central
to many people's existence, it is involved in highly emotional experience,
it may lead people to murder or self-sacrifice. We would like the
explanation of dramatic things to be equally dramatic. For similar reasons,
people who are shocked or repulsed by religion would like to find the single
source of what is for them such egregious error, the crossroads at which so
many human minds take the wrong turn, as it were. But the truth is that
there is no such single point, because many different cognitive processes
conspire to make religious concepts convincing.
I am of course slightly disingenuous in describing this as a frustration,
when I think it is such a Good Thing. That we fail to identify hidden hands
and simple designs and instead discover a variety of underlying processes
that we know how to study sometimes happens in scientific endeavors and is
always for the better. The progress is not just that we understand religion
better because we have better knowledge of cognitive processes. It is also,
conversely, that we can highlight and better understand many fascinating
features of our mental architecture by studying the human propensity toward
religious thoughts. One does learn a lot about these complex biological
machines by figuring out how they manage to give airy nothing a local
habitation and a name.
http://www.wordtrade.com/society/anthropologyreligion.htm
...................................
http://www.ghg.net/phf/disbelief/origins_of_gods.htm
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| User: "Jasbird" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
24 Oct 2003 03:58:09 PM |
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On Tue, 7 Oct 2003 12:49:32 -0700, "Immortalist"
<Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote:
According to Boyer, it is only now, with recent contributions of the
cognitive and neural sciences and evolutionary biology to the understanding
of the nature and origins of the human mind, that we are in position to
successfully provide such an explanation [of religion].
What has 'evolutionary biology' got to do with philosophy? Our genome
may have been mapped but the precise functions of the genes are, as
yet, unknown.
I suggest that evolutionary biology has more in common with gambling
where one guesses which horse will run a race based upon past form.
The problem being that one can't be sure that the jockey hasn't taken
a bribe.
Religion Explained attempts just such an explanation,
I don't think so.
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/BoyerBook.htm
Oh, OK. I'll read this evolutionary biology nonsense. But isn't there
a speculative psuedo-sciences newsgroup for that kind of thing? Is
that what news:sci.philosophy.meta is for?, surely not. Shouldn't that
ng be for meta philosophies of science? I think evolutionary biology
is more like Lamarkism - of psuedo-science that seeks to justify the
status quo. A bit like religion, in some respects.
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| User: "Reason" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
27 Oct 2003 07:49:30 AM |
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"Jasbird" <Jasbird#dead-mail-box#@myrealbox.com> wrote in message
news:ru3jpvkagdon1i7vq33vhlu6dphjua2mr7@4ax.com...
On Tue, 7 Oct 2003 12:49:32 -0700, "Immortalist"
<Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote:
I suggest that evolutionary biology has more in common with gambling
where one guesses which horse will run a race based upon past form.
The problem being that one can't be sure that the jockey hasn't taken
a bribe.
Evolution is a lot like poker actually. Card (genes) are drawn and discarded
each hand (generation). After millions of "hands" the eventual result is a
few winners, and the others disappear.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
25 Oct 2003 12:21:20 PM |
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"Jasbird" <Jasbird#dead-mail-box#@myrealbox.com> wrote in message
news:ru3jpvkagdon1i7vq33vhlu6dphjua2mr7@4ax.com...
On Tue, 7 Oct 2003 12:49:32 -0700, "Immortalist"
<Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote:
According to Boyer, it is only now, with recent contributions of the
cognitive and neural sciences and evolutionary biology to the
understanding
of the nature and origins of the human mind, that we are in position to
successfully provide such an explanation [of religion].
What has 'evolutionary biology' got to do with philosophy? Our genome
may have been mapped but the precise functions of the genes are, as
yet, unknown.
I suggest that evolutionary biology has more in common with gambling
where one guesses which horse will run a race based upon past form.
The problem being that one can't be sure that the jockey hasn't taken
a bribe.
Religion Explained attempts just such an explanation,
I don't think so.
http://artsci.wustl.edu/~pboyer/BoyerBook.htm
Oh, OK. I'll read this evolutionary biology nonsense. But isn't there
a speculative psuedo-sciences newsgroup for that kind of thing? Is
that what news:sci.philosophy.meta is for?, surely not. Shouldn't that
ng be for meta philosophies of science? I think evolutionary biology
is more like Lamarkism - of psuedo-science that seeks to justify the
status quo. A bit like religion, in some respects.
Ha. That books gonna ***** all kinds of pretty ***** up, I love this kind of
event.
On the blotter; a realists cornocopia of self-justifying aprehensions. So
beware.
.
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| User: "Richard F Hall" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
09 Nov 2003 06:51:54 AM |
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Dear Reader:
First, thank you for introducing me to the thoughts of Pascal Boyer.
His work has stimulated some thoughts of my own.
From the evidence, let's say, it appears as though the brain is the
mind. However, for reasons that may not be too apparent, we can still
leave a little room for doubt about that.
Never the less, science has shown us that blood rushes to certain
areas of the brain in all of us when we think of certain things. This
suggests that these specific areas are the areas the thinking is
taking place. This can also be reinforced by psychometric tests that
can, from analyzing the tests that show poor results, pin-point the
location of brain damage, so surgeons will know where to look. When
specific areas are damaged, we know that other areas of the brain will
attempt to take over, but the result is never as good as the original.
Those who maintain that humans are all equal, and that genetic changes
have nothing to do with the brain, and have not taken place in 50,000
years are simply not paying attention to the program. The evidence of
inherent characteristics can be seen in similarities between identical
twins raised apart. Family traits, including everything from talents
to criminal histories, also are evidence of inherent characteristic.
The variation of characteristics is evidenced by the many bell-like
shaped variations of scores against numbers of people in virtually
every measurement of human activity and form. All this points to the
idea that humans are not created equal and that inherent propensities
do exist. The more complex an organ is, such as the human brain, the
more unstable an aspect of our genetics. The brain with its domain
specific paths is highly sensitive to evolutionary factors.
The concept that specific paths in the brain are dedicated to the
representation of particular aspects of what one perceives as reality
has finally inched its way into religious ideology. At this point it
would be safe to identify religious abstraction as "supernatural
concepts". This doesn't mean that there are genes for this, but that
the design of the brain leaves us with a propensity for this. An
alcoholic who is never in contact with alcohol will never become an
alcoholic, just as a person with musical talent will never realize
their talent without music. One should also recognize that a
propensity has to be developed and reinforced as socially advantageous
and must not be contradicted by personal experience.
In my mind there is no doubt that some individuals, perhaps most,
"know" the reality of a "supernatural concept" such as a personal
relationship with "God" just as much as I find this untenable. Yet,
as I recognize the reality of the final departure of loved
individuals, there is no doubt in my mind that the notion of us being
together after death is of great comfort. I have even found myself
professing such thoughts for consolation.
The theory that concepts (memes) are following evolutionary steps is
very appealing to those who have studied the history of humanity with
ideologies in mind. The idea that concepts that appeal to those
working parts of our brains for which we have a propensity, reinforced
by our obligatory social nature and the causal physical evolution, are
the concepts which we will embrace also makes sense against the
evidence.
Although the theories of memetic evolution fill books, a short
treatment is possible here. For instance, extinction through warfare
is one of the major contributors to memetic evolution. Any aspect of
humanity that would technologically advantage the group, or make it
stronger, or larger, would have a positive evolutionary influence by
preventing such extinction. One could also consider the impact of
greater trust among similarly thinking humans. This would lead to
greater success, and could be an evolutionary factor as well.
So, now we have arrived at an anatomical aspect of the evolution of
religious and secular thought. We all tend to lean toward the
available philosophy that most suits the domain specific paths of our
idiosyncratic brains. There are the creative individuals (in the
vanguard of evolution or the tangents of nonsense), the teachers, the
taught, and those who don't get it but tag along.
Is the atheist, like the individual who is blind from birth, merely in
possession of a brain that is deficient of the specific paths
sensitive to the religious experience? Intelligent humans are all
capable of seeing the same evidence, yet the theist will disregard the
atheistic notion due it's contradiction of their personal experience.
In this light, some might see atheism as a disability of
conceptualization; however, on the other hand, no one misses the
excess body hair of our distant ancestors.
If I have held your interest this far, you might do me a favor.
Ralph Hall, author of Measure of Truth, mentions that there are
fundamental qualities in all religions which appeal to all human
brains. These fundamentals are: "reverence" (identification,
dedication, and humility) and "faith".
He didn't offer this as original thought. Does anyone know where this
idea might have come from?
Psychologically speaking I can see the evolutionary advantages of
these qualities: "identification" with a group, when strengthened,
builds a larger, potentially more successful group. "Dedication"
brings a life into focus and gives meaning and purpose to existence.
"Humility" is not quite as obvious, but can be comforting in times of
individual trouble and doubt. This also has other more subtle
advantages. "Faith", though having unsettling connotations for some,
is held by everyone for some things. Why does one turn to science?
One has faith in it.
Thanks in advance.
Richard F Hall
http://www.seanet.com/~realistic/chpt7.html
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| User: "kati sinenmaa" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
09 Nov 2003 07:50:01 AM |
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Richard F Hall wrote:
every measurement of human activity and form. All this points to the
idea that humans are not created equal and that inherent propensities
do exist. The more complex an organ is, such as the human brain, the
Yes. The matter is just so. The sameness is absolutely impossible.
There is only one thing in every thing;
There is only one total dimension.
There is only one principle in the universe
There is only one You,
There is only one God,
There is only one mind
Etc.
PS.
The personality is the same as the total dimension.
Some one can see a thing only in personal way...
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| User: "Richard F Hall" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
10 Nov 2003 02:00:09 AM |
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On Sun, 09 Nov 2003 15:50:01 +0200, kati sinenmaa <zinenmaa@yahoo.com>
wrote:
Richard F Hall wrote:
every measurement of human activity and form. All this points to the
idea that humans are not created equal and that inherent propensities
do exist. The more complex an organ is, such as the human brain, the
Yes. The matter is just so. The sameness is absolutely impossible.
There is only one thing in every thing;
There is only one total dimension.
There is only one principle in the universe
There is only one You,
There is only one God,
There is only one mind
Etc.
PS.
The personality is the same as the total dimension.
Some one can see a thing only in personal way...
Ahh, Kati, you are familiar with the solipsist viewpoint..
This is very poetic.
Rich
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| User: "kati sinenmaa" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
10 Nov 2003 03:35:11 AM |
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"Richard F Hall"
There is only one God,
There is only one mind
Etc.
Ahh, Kati, you are familiar with the solipsist viewpoint..
This is very poetic.
Hmmm.. I think that my thoughts are not mine, but God's.
Like i am not i, but my billions of cells are using my mouth in order
that They can say all these truths.
Every single cell of my body will be stepped to the stage
(into the top of my tongue) and speak how things are.
This is excatly how we are the cells of God's body.
every single human being use God's voicemechanism
to tell to everyones how things are.
This succeed, because there exists only one principle.
God could not be very divine if He has many principles
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| User: "Richard F Hall" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
11 Nov 2003 10:39:21 AM |
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On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 11:35:11 +0200, "kati sinenmaa"
<sinenmaa@yahoo.org> wrote:
Dear Kati:
There is only one God,
There is only one mind
Etc.
Thank you for your kind words. I would like to respond to them
with the words of my humble perspective.
Hmmm.. I think that my thoughts are not mine, but God's.
Like i am not i, but my billions of cells are using my mouth in order
that They can say all these truths.
Generally speaking, whether one admits it or not, everyone bases one's
knowledge primarily on one's own most personal experience. Anything we
learn from sources "outside" becomes most doubtful when this
information contradicts one’s personal experience. Until contradiction
of this personal experience is recognized, each of us draws from
sources of trusted expertise which verify our information. This
verification, whether it be in the form of books, research journals,
individuals, social groups, or audio-visual sources, are all included
in one’s representational reality through a long evolution of
individualization in one’s social environment.
Every single cell of my body will be stepped to the stage
(into the top of my tongue) and speak how things are.
I heartily agree with these words, "Every single cell of my body will
be stepped to the stage (into the top of my tongue) and speak". This
calls for the most "honest response", the cumulative experience of
every cell in our bodies... me too.
This is the viewpoint of the singular, unobstructed, direct experience
in the broadest sense of the word. It is an idiosyncratic, dynamic
presentation of consciousness representing one's existence itself. The
idea that that which is inside one's self, including all things inside
that represent things outside, can only be "proven" to one's self by
one's self may seem a tautology, but is exemplified by "I think, there
fore I am". All the rest of philosophy must start here, if one can
reach this space in one's mentality.
This is excatly how we are the cells of God's body.
every single human being use God's voicemechanism
to tell to everyones how things are.
From your words here, it is my impression that you are experiencing a
unity with God that is very powerful in your representation of
reality. This representation also ties you in with every other
humman. Very good. Me too.
This succeed, because there exists only one principle.
God is all, true? And, in that greatness, with which you identify,
there is the [non-subjective] perfection of only one principle. I can
understand this.
God could not be very divine if He has many principles
What I'm saying, here, is that those things which are perceived as
non-subjective do not have to be objective for that reason. It is
possible for something subjective to be misinterpreted as
non-subjective. When addressing things from the solipsist viewpoint,
one might think that they are non-subjective things because they have
or can have objective perceptions according to their circumstances.
However, it is also true that they may not actually represent what one
might otherwise think. The issue of solipsist analysis is whether they
are what we think them to be.. or whether or not they are something
else.
There is no doubt that some individuals, perhaps most, "know" the
reality of a "supernatural concept", such as a personal relationship
with "God", just as much as I find this untenable. However, Kati,
like the individual who is blind from birth, I may merely in
possession of a brain that is deficient of the specific paths
sensitive to "the religious experience". Intelligent humans, like you
and me, are all capable of seeing the same evidence, yet the theist
will disregard the atheistic notion due it's contradiction of their
personal experience and visa-versa. In this light, some might see me
as having a disability of conceptualization.
The important thing is how we meet and what we want for each other.
May peace and happiness be in your life, Kati, and may you find
freedom and love in your life.
Richard F Hall
Realistic Idealism
http://www.seanet.com/~realistic/idealism.html
.
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| User: "Daniel Pineo" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
11 Nov 2003 10:46:29 AM |
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In article <3fb1095f.2166333@supernews.seanet.com>, Richard F Hall wrote:
On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 11:35:11 +0200, "kati sinenmaa"
<sinenmaa@yahoo.org> wrote:
Dear Kati:
There is only one God,
There is only one mind
Etc.
Thank you for your kind words. I would like to respond to them
with the words of my humble perspective.
Hmmm.. I think that my thoughts are not mine, but God's.
Like i am not i, but my billions of cells are using my mouth in order
that They can say all these truths.
Generally speaking, whether one admits it or not, everyone bases one's
knowledge primarily on one's own most personal experience. Anything we
learn from sources "outside" becomes most doubtful when this
information contradicts one’s personal experience. Until contradiction
of this personal experience is recognized, each of us draws from
sources of trusted expertise which verify our information. This
verification, whether it be in the form of books, research journals,
individuals, social groups, or audio-visual sources, are all included
in one’s representational reality through a long evolution of
individualization in one’s social environment.
Every single cell of my body will be stepped to the stage
(into the top of my tongue) and speak how things are.
I heartily agree with these words, "Every single cell of my body will
be stepped to the stage (into the top of my tongue) and speak". This
calls for the most "honest response", the cumulative experience of
every cell in our bodies... me too.
This is the viewpoint of the singular, unobstructed, direct experience
in the broadest sense of the word. It is an idiosyncratic, dynamic
presentation of consciousness representing one's existence itself. The
idea that that which is inside one's self, including all things inside
that represent things outside, can only be "proven" to one's self by
one's self may seem a tautology, but is exemplified by "I think, there
fore I am". All the rest of philosophy must start here, if one can
reach this space in one's mentality.
This is excatly how we are the cells of God's body.
every single human being use God's voicemechanism
to tell to everyones how things are.
From your words here, it is my impression that you are experiencing a
unity with God that is very powerful in your representation of
reality. This representation also ties you in with every other
humman. Very good. Me too.
This succeed, because there exists only one principle.
God is all, true? And, in that greatness, with which you identify,
there is the [non-subjective] perfection of only one principle. I can
understand this.
God could not be very divine if He has many principles
What I'm saying, here, is that those things which are perceived as
non-subjective do not have to be objective for that reason. It is
possible for something subjective to be misinterpreted as
non-subjective. When addressing things from the solipsist viewpoint,
one might think that they are non-subjective things because they have
or can have objective perceptions according to their circumstances.
However, it is also true that they may not actually represent what one
might otherwise think. The issue of solipsist analysis is whether they
are what we think them to be.. or whether or not they are something
else.
There is no doubt that some individuals, perhaps most, "know" the
reality of a "supernatural concept", such as a personal relationship
with "God", just as much as I find this untenable. However, Kati,
like the individual who is blind from birth, I may merely in
possession of a brain that is deficient of the specific paths
sensitive to "the religious experience". Intelligent humans, like you
and me, are all capable of seeing the same evidence, yet the theist
will disregard the atheistic notion due it's contradiction of their
personal experience and visa-versa. In this light, some might see me
as having a disability of conceptualization.
The important thing is how we meet and what we want for each other.
May peace and happiness be in your life, Kati, and may you find
freedom and love in your life.
Richard F Hall
Realistic Idealism
http://www.seanet.com/~realistic/idealism.html
.
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| User: "Richard F Hall" |
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| Title: Re: Religion Explained & Direct Inference |
14 Nov 2003 07:14:52 AM |
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On 11 Nov 2003 11:46:29 -0500, Daniel Pineo
<dpineo@elnux1.cs.umass.edu> wrote:
I know Dan, sometimes there's nothing more to say..
In article <3fb1095f.2166333@supernews.seanet.com>, Richard F Hall wrote:
On Mon, 10 Nov 2003 11:35:11 +0200, "kati sinenmaa"
<sinenmaa@yahoo.org> wrote:
Dear Kati:
There is only one God,
There is only one mind
Etc.
Thank you for your kind words. I would like to respond to them
with the words of my humble perspective.
Hmmm.. I think that my thoughts are not mine, but God's.
Like i am not i, but my billions of cells are using my mouth in order
that They can say all these truths.
Generally speaking, whether one admits it or not, everyone bases one's
knowledge primarily on one's own most personal experience. Anything we
learn from sources "outside" becomes most doubtful when this
information contradicts one’s personal experience. Until contradiction
of this personal experience is recognized, each of us draws from
sources of trusted expertise which verify our information. This
verification, whether it be in the form of books, research journals,
individuals, social groups, or audio-visual sources, are all included
in one’s representational reality through a long evolution of
individualization in one’s social environment.
Every single cell of my body will be stepped to the stage
(into the top of my tongue) and speak how things are.
I heartily agree with these words, "Every single cell of my body will
be stepped to the stage (into the top of my tongue) and speak". This
calls for the most "honest response", the cumulative experience of
every cell in our bodies... me too.
This is the viewpoint of the singular, unobstructed, direct experience
in the broadest sense of the word. It is an idiosyncratic, dynamic
presentation of consciousness representing one's existence itself. The
idea that that which is inside one's self, including all things inside
that represent things outside, can only be "proven" to one's self by
one's self may seem a tautology, but is exemplified by "I think, there
fore I am". All the rest of philosophy must start here, if one can
reach this space in one's mentality.
This is excatly how we are the cells of God's body.
every single human being use God's voicemechanism
to tell to everyones how things are.
From your words here, it is my impression that you are experiencing a
unity with God that is very powerful in your representation of
reality. This representation also ties you in with every other
humman. Very good. Me too.
This succeed, because there exists only one principle.
God is all, true? And, in that greatness, with which you identify,
there is the [non-subjective] perfection of only one principle. I can
understand this.
God could not be very divine if He has many principles
What I'm saying, here, is that those things which are perceived as
non-subjective do not have to be objective for that reason. It is
possible for something subjective to be misinterpreted as
non-subjective. When addressing things from the solipsist viewpoint,
one might think that they are non-subjective things because they have
or can have objective perceptions according to their circumstances.
However, it is also true that they may not actually represent what one
might otherwise think. The issue of solipsist analysis is whether they
are what we think them to be.. or whether or not they are something
else.
There is no doubt that some individuals, perhaps most, "know" the
reality of a "supernatural concept", such as a personal relationship
with "God", just as much as I find this untenable. However, Kati,
like the individual who is blind from birth, I may merely in
possession of a brain that is deficient of the specific paths
sensitive to "the religious experience". Intelligent humans, like you
and me, are all capable of seeing the same evidence, yet the theist
will disregard the atheistic notion due it's contradicti | | | | | | | | |
