but the people
are right for a reason which these do not fathom.
2. In having distinguished men by external marks, as birth or wealth. The
world again exults in showing how unreasonable this is; but it is very
reasonable. Savages laugh at an infant king.
3. In being offended at a blow, or in desiring glory so much. But it is very
desirable on account of the other essential goods which are joined to it;
and a man who has received a blow, without resenting it, is overwhelmed with
taunts and indignities.
4. In working for the uncertain; in sailing on the sea; in walking over a
plank.
325. Montaigne is wrong. Custom should be followed only because it is
custom, and not because it is reasonable or just. But people follow it for
this sole reason, that they think it just. Otherwise they would follow it no
longer, although it were the custom; for they will only submit to reason or
justice. Custom without this would pass for tyranny; but the sovereignty of
reason and justice is no more tyrannical than that of desire. They are
principles natural to man.
It would, therefore, be right to obey laws and customs, because they are
laws; but we should know that there is neither truth nor justice to
introduce into them, that we know nothing of these, and so must follow what
is accepted. By this means we would never depart from them. But people
cannot accept this doctrine; and, as they believe that truth can be found,
and that it exists in law and custom, they believe them and take their
antiquity as a proof of their truth, and not simply of their authority apart
from truth. Thus they obey laws, but they are liable to revolt when these
are proved to be valueless; and this can be shown of all, looked at from a
certain aspect.
326. Injustice.--It is dangerous to tell the people that the laws are
unjust; for they obey them only because they think them just. Therefore it
is necessary to tell them at the same ti
.
|
