Religion is the first response to ignorance. This is a ground for
speculation.
Philosophy is the second response, a means of organisation.
Science is the third step, a true application. Idea meets universe.
Each step requires us to abandon some parts of the former; and
formalise, test and refine other parts.
Science is the ideal. It is the secret weapon behind Western
Civilisation, but anyone can do it.
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
22 May 2005 02:50:35 PM |
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Is there a difference between truth & reality?
'Reality' is 'out there', it is 'real'.
But as soon as we try to describe 'reality', i.e. speak of 'truth' this
involves conscious categorising of what we experience (our experience
of reality).
And we can categorise in many different ways.
e.g. the coat is black, or the coat is big, etc.
So maybe it could be helpful to say that there is reality & there are
many descriptions of reality, which we refer to as 'truths'.
Thus, when we ask if it is true the coat is black? so long as we are
agreeing what is a coat & what is black, we should be in agreement
whether the coat is black or not.
Science asks similiar questions like, does the earth go around the sun?
Observations providing evidence & agreement on what we are actually
asking should result in broad agreement.
But when we get to more complex questions such as is the materialist
conception of history true? evidence & agreement on meaning is not so
forthcoming & we can't test human history is laboratory-style
conditions.
There will be many desriptions of the reality of human history.
We cannot say that the materialist conception is undoubtably true.
Although there is perhaps a lot less evidence, it may be that the
description that God created the earth in 6 days (resting on the 7th)
is a better description of reality.
Although such questions are much more difficult to answer, surely we
should still weigh up the evidence, i.e. have a scientific approach,
whereby what we believe is a testable hypothesis that cannot be proved,
only disproved.
To believe in something that isn't testable surely means that we should
at least acknowlegde this fact.
To not be absolutely certain about a truth, a description of reality,
that cannot be disproved.
And equally, those holding to 'truths' that are testable, should
acknowledge that such scientific truths can never be proved, i.e. let
in a little bit of doubt.
.
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| User: "Acme Diagnostics" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
22 May 2005 08:27:04 PM |
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wrote:
Is there a difference between truth & reality?
No. They are the same thing.
'Reality' is 'out there', it is 'real'.
But as soon as we try to describe 'reality', i.e. speak of 'truth' this
involves conscious categorising of what we experience (our experience
of reality).
That's true too. You have committed the fallacy of the ambiguous
middle. Two definitions of "truth." First, you put it in the same
level of description as "reality." That is commonly called
"Truth" (big "T"). Then you descend to the human level of
description, which is a huge descent thru at least one other
level btw, where there is now a human point-of-view. That is
commonly called "truth" (small t). I.e. a true belief, i.e.
whatever you truly believe, is "truth" for you.
And we can categorise in many different ways.
e.g. the coat is black, or the coat is big, etc.
This should be "What a human will think and say is 'black' N%
of the time." It's a different argument, a reliability argument.
So maybe it could be helpful to say that there is reality & there are
many descriptions of reality, which we refer to as 'truths'.
When "we" say or refer to it as a description of it, that is
correct. Small t. There are many human POVs.
Thus, when we ask if it is true the coat is black? so long as we are
agreeing what is a coat & what is black, we should be in agreement
whether the coat is black or not.
We agree that humans will think the coat is black n% of the time.
We find that n is extremely high, but not 100%.
Science asks similiar questions like, does the earth go around the sun?
Observations providing evidence & agreement on what we are actually
asking should result in broad agreement.
This is a third argument. Neither reality ("Truth"), not true
belief ("truth"), but science. It may seek to get closer to
Truth (big "T"), or to reliability, depending, but does not seek
true belief.
But when we get to more complex questions such as is the materialist
conception of history true? evidence & agreement on meaning is not so
forthcoming & we can't test human history is laboratory-style
conditions.
Complexity of questions is a fourth argument, and has more to
do with logic than Truth, truth, and science. It is closer to
reliability. It is not a distinction in the arguments so far
presented.
There will be many desriptions of the reality of human history.
We cannot say that the materialist conception is undoubtably true.
No "materialist" distinction has been defined to categorize this
term in any of the arguments presented. But it seems you (would
like to) equate it with all of them: Truth, truth, reliability,
science, logic.
Reasoning (which is apparently what you are attempting to do here
and the only basis I have for invoking "fallacy") is hard. You
need to make distinctions between and within all of these
concepts. When you do, and if your argument holds, then you could
think of the two sides that have been exhaustively argued as
"black and white."
I've found that most of the best reasoners (myself emphatically
excluded) do curiously think in terms of "black and white." But
not at the beginning as here with having started to make
distinctions, or during their analysis, but at the end with all
distinctions of relevant importance having been made.
Although there is perhaps a lot less evidence, it may be that the
description that God created the earth in 6 days (resting on the 7th)
is a better description of reality.
This is a "truth" small "t". If you believe it, it is true for
you, i.e. from your own POV. It has nothing to do with
Truth (big T), science, or reliability. It has more to do with
logic, which it violates all over the place. But it is still
logically possible that God created the universe in situ ten
minutes ago. One could cling to that. Many do. But it fails the
reliability (probability) test, aka "things that apparently work"
test.
Although such questions are much more difficult to answer,
Complexity is not a distinction between Reality, Truth, truth,
science, etc. It affects reliability, especially human ability
to do logic without error. One of the two big distinctions there
is whether we are constructing (we're terrible at that) or
refuting (we're great at that). Unfortunately for creationists,
the logic direction involved is "refuting."
surely we
should still weigh up the evidence, i.e. have a scientific approach,
whereby what we believe is a testable hypothesis that cannot be proved,
only disproved.
Science is wonderful in our search for reality and reliability.
This does not relate to your argument about truth (small "t") and
how creationism is true for someone from their POV.
To believe in something that isn't testable surely means that we should
at least acknowlegde this fact.
Scientists, when being scientists, do not "believe" in evolution.
That does not apply. It isn't part of the scientific method.
To not be absolutely certain about a truth, a description of reality,
that cannot be disproved.
Now you're switching in the other middle term, Truth (big "T").
Fallacy of ambiguous middle. These are two separate arguments.
You can't switch between them as if Truth=truth. They are
as different as dogs and "groovy." It is like arguing:
All dogs are mammals.
All groovy things are art.
Therefore all dogs are art.
Of course there's a good well-known reason why the two
unrelated terms Truth and truth are spelled the same. The
fallacy is most intentional. The same thing happens in politics
all the time. Best known example currently in the U.S. is
"Patriot Act."
And equally, those holding to 'truths' that are testable, should
acknowledge that such scientific truths can never be proved, i.e. let
in a little bit of doubt.
Very little, in that case. One in a bazillion. But any scientist,
when being a scientist, will tell you it's always there. There is
no dispute about this. (Well, other than in newsgroups.)
You can make and not lose this argument. You need to deny
reasoning and logic to do it, but that's ok. Nobody has
"proved" that those describe reality any better than faith.
It argues to a draw. This has been known forever in the
real world, i.e. outside of Usenet. But nobody has proven
absolutley that the "real world" is any closer to reality than
"Usenet." Just deny "real world" and it again argues to a draw
wrt "Truth" and "Reality."
Larry
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| User: "Tron" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
24 May 2005 10:30:37 PM |
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Hi there,
"Acme Diagnostics" <LFinezapthis@partpostmark.net> skrev i melding
news:429130ef$0$91627$bb4e3ad8@newscene.com...
duvinrouge@servihoo.com wrote:
Is there a difference between truth & reality?
No. They are the same thing.
Whoa.
"Truth" is generally taken to concern the relation between propositions
and states of affairs in the world.
A proposition is true "if it says of what is that it is, and of what is
not, that it is not" (Guess who?).
(Reality has truth for all platonists, who like to say things like " a
true giraffe" etc. according to the giraffe's congruence with the Ideal
Giraffe.)
"Reality", OTOH, is the sum of these states of affairs, the facts and
the sum of facts. Conditions at given space-time points or areas.
That's true too. You have committed the fallacy of the ambiguous
middle. Two definitions of "truth." First, you put it in the same
level of description as "reality." That is commonly called
"Truth" (big "T").
I think we agree in substance, but this usage is alien to me. (Could be
my background ...).
Then you descend to the human level of
description, which is a huge descent thru at least one other
level btw, where there is now a human point-of-view. That is
commonly called "truth" (small t). I.e. a true belief, i.e.
whatever you truly believe, is "truth" for you.
Nah. True belief is justified true belief, as in:
- A state of affairs p must obtain
- the person must believe p
- the belief in p must be justified.
Whatever you truly believe is either "belief" or "certainty", but not
necessarily truth.
Beleif and certainty are psychological states, truth is a quality of the
relation between your beliefs and the states of affairs that obtain in
the world.
Apart from that, let him have the full broadsides.
T
.
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| User: "Acme Diagnostics" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
25 May 2005 07:13:02 PM |
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"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote:
"Acme Diagnostics" <LFinezapthis@partpostmark.net> skrev i melding
news:429130ef$0$91627$bb4e3ad8@newscene.com...
duvinrouge@servihoo.com wrote:
Hi there,
Hello!
Is there a difference between truth & reality?
No. They are the same thing.
Whoa.
"Truth" is generally taken to concern the relation between propositions
and states of affairs in the world.
A proposition is true "if it says of what is that it is, and of what is
not, that it is not" (Guess who?).
Sorry, my stack of cards with definitions of "true" was so high I
knocked it all over the floor in my rush to answer. <g>
(Reality has truth for all platonists, who like to say things like " a
true giraffe" etc. according to the giraffe's congruence with the Ideal
Giraffe.)
Agree, but isn't this "truth" (small t)? Isn't it true for Tron
and everyone who satisfies "generally taken" to agree with what
Tron just said?
Truths (small t) that can be different for each human,
can be composed of different definitions of truth (small and
big T) as well as other things.
Tron can describe or define these truths (small t) for lots of
different people, but they still only remain truths (small t)
from each of those POVs.
"Reality", OTOH, is the sum of these states of affairs, the facts and
the sum of facts. Conditions at given space-time points or areas.
Isn't that again reality for Tron and everyone who agrees with
what Tron just said? How can you know that (euphemism) God
would agree?
That's true too. You have committed the fallacy of the ambiguous
middle. Two definitions of "truth." First, you put it in the same
level of description as "reality." That is commonly called
"Truth" (big "T").
I think we agree in substance, but this usage is alien to me. (Could be
my background ...).
<Guffaw!>
Existence. What is objectively real = reality. Absolute truth, or
Truth (big "T"). What God (euphemism for Great Scheme of Things)
knows.
Then you descend to the human level of
description, which is a huge descent thru at least one other
level btw, where there is now a human point-of-view. That is
commonly called "truth" (small t). I.e. a true belief, i.e.
whatever you truly believe, is "truth" for you.
Nah. True belief is justified true belief, as in:
- A state of affairs p must obtain
- the person must believe p
- the belief in p must be justified.
That would be justified true belief. I was talking about plain
old true belief, not justified in any way other than that the
true believer truly believes it.
This is what I believe. You can't change it for me because
it's not a wishy-washy belief, it's a true belief.
Whatever you truly believe is either "belief" or "certainty", but not
necessarily truth.
Well it *isn't* truth for you or anyone else in the world or all
history, or God, or inhabitants of Rigel 5, unless they happen
to agree with me.
It's truth for me. I may truly believe I can walk on air. If I
then walk off the roof of a building, my belief might change or
it might not. But even as I hit the ground my belief is still
truth for me.
Belief and certainty are psychological states, truth is a quality of the
relation between your beliefs and the states of affairs that obtain in
the world.
(Meta-time) But that's just a truth for Tron and everyone who
agrees with what you just said. You (perhaps in concert with
them) have no objective basis for claiming otherwise. You are
only humans. You might be in error, for instance. Or you might be
a brain in a jar. Or anything I can imagine, or anything I can't.
Apart from that, let him have the full broadsides.
T
Larry
p.s. Email received.
.
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| User: "Acme Diagnostics" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
26 May 2005 12:28:02 AM |
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"Acme Diagnostics" <LFinezapthis@partpostmark.net> wrote:
"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote:
"Acme Diagnostics" <LFinezapthis@partpostmark.net> skrev i melding
duvinrouge@servihoo.com wrote:
Hi there,
Hello!
Is there a difference between truth & reality?
No. They are the same thing.
Whoa.
"Truth" is generally taken to concern the relation between propositions
and states of affairs in the world.
A proposition is true "if it says of what is that it is, and of what is
not, that it is not" (Guess who?).
Sorry, my stack of cards with definitions of "true" was so high I
knocked it all over the floor in my rush to answer. <g>
(Reality has truth for all platonists, who like to say things like " a
true giraffe" etc. according to the giraffe's congruence with the Ideal
Giraffe.)
Agree, but isn't this "truth" (small t)? Isn't it true for Tron
and everyone who satisfies "generally taken" to agree with what
Tron just said?
Truths (small t) that can be different for each human,
can be composed of different definitions of truth (small and
big T) as well as other things.
Tron can describe or define these truths (small t) for lots of
different people, but they still only remain truths (small t)
from each of those POVs.
"Reality", OTOH, is the sum of these states of affairs, the facts and
the sum of facts. Conditions at given space-time points or areas.
Isn't that again reality for Tron and everyone who agrees with
what Tron just said? How can you know that (euphemism) God
would agree?
That's true too. You have committed the fallacy of the ambiguous
middle. Two definitions of "truth." First, you put it in the same
level of description as "reality." That is commonly called
"Truth" (big "T").
Oops. I said "commonly." And again below. I don't have a
sufficient basis for that. I have simply stated a definition that
everyone I can remember has shared so far, and vaguely recall
(probably) from a beginner philosophy course (probably James,
Pierce et al). I trust that you know what is "generally taken."
Thanks for correcting me.
Larry
I think we agree in substance, but this usage is alien to me. (Could be
my background ...).
<Guffaw!>
Existence. What is objectively real = reality. Absolute truth, or
Truth (big "T"). What God (euphemism for Great Scheme of Things)
knows.
Then you descend to the human level of
description, which is a huge descent thru at least one other
level btw, where there is now a human point-of-view. That is
commonly called "truth" (small t). I.e. a true belief, i.e.
whatever you truly believe, is "truth" for you.
Nah. True belief is justified true belief, as in:
- A state of affairs p must obtain
- the person must believe p
- the belief in p must be justified.
That would be justified true belief. I was talking about plain
old true belief, not justified in any way other than that the
true believer truly believes it.
This is what I believe. You can't change it for me because
it's not a wishy-washy belief, it's a true belief.
Whatever you truly believe is either "belief" or "certainty", but not
necessarily truth.
Well it *isn't* truth for you or anyone else in the world or all
history, or God, or inhabitants of Rigel 5, unless they happen
to agree with me.
It's truth for me. I may truly believe I can walk on air. If I
then walk off the roof of a building, my belief might change or
it might not. But even as I hit the ground my belief is still
truth for me.
Belief and certainty are psychological states, truth is a quality of the
relation between your beliefs and the states of affairs that obtain in
the world.
(Meta-time) But that's just a truth for Tron and everyone who
agrees with what you just said. You (perhaps in concert with
them) have no objective basis for claiming otherwise. You are
only humans. You might be in error, for instance. Or you might be
a brain in a jar. Or anything I can imagine, or anything I can't.
Apart from that, let him have the full broadsides.
T
Larry
p.s. Email received.
.
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| User: "Tron" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
29 May 2005 03:56:59 PM |
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Hi,
"Acme Diagnostics" <LFinezapthis@partpostmark.net> skrev i melding
news:42951427$0$50266$bb4e3ad8@newscene.com...
Whoa.
"Truth" is generally taken to concern the relation between
propositions
and states of affairs in the world.
A proposition is true "if it says of what is that it is, and of what
is
not, that it is not" (Guess who?).
Sorry, my stack of cards with definitions of "true" was so high I
knocked it all over the floor in my rush to answer. <g>
There are probably a lot of definitons of truth, but I would maintain -
supported by Google's wonderful "define"-function - that a majoirty of
uses pertains the relationship between something cognitive (including
verbal) and some state of affairs, fact, reality, the world.
(Reality has truth for all platonists, who like to say things like " a
true giraffe" etc. according to the giraffe's congruence with the
Ideal
Giraffe.)
Agree, but isn't this "truth" (small t)? Isn't it true for Tron
and everyone who satisfies "generally taken" to agree with what
Tron just said?
Well, now you have led the argument ad absurdum.
Detour: Three phases of philosophy
1) "Direct realism": philosophers naively assume reason capable of
grasping the world and the essence of things, and do a lot of
ontological speculation (Plato to, say, Aquinas).
2) Epistemology: Before attempting ontology, we should investigate the
capability of huma reason to grasp the world (Locke, I think, continuing
via Hume, to Kant, to Hegel, etc.)
3) The Linguistic turn: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein focus on language's
capability to express insight.
"Truth" as a concept was developed in the first phase, and my definition
was from that time.
Of course you can go Gorgias on me and say that no one has access to
reality, so we can't really use the word "reality" with any
justification. However, I am not describing reality or any aspect or
element of it, only citing the concept of it as a pair in a comparison.
Naturally, we don't actually "know" that there IS a reality out there,
but you of all people seem to utilize it as one of your fundamental
assumptions, so this criticism is a bit out of character for you, I
feel.
So your last above, it seems to me, confuses the issues of whether or
not "truth" is to be defined as a relationship between something we
believe or say on the one hand and the things we believe this or say
this of on hte other hand, and the question of how many people think
this is so, which is an empirical question. To the degree that truth is
a matter of definition, the number of users is relevant, though.
In the widest definition of truth, it is anything opposed to that which
is false, and as such may, particularly in conjunction with some form of
idealism, be used to indicate something which is in accord with its own
idea, something which "truly is that which it is", like "a true friend".
With the decline of idealism, this use is less frequent now.
Truths (small t) that can be different for each human,
can be composed of different definitions of truth (small and
big T) as well as other things.
Tron can describe or define these truths (small t) for lots of
different people, but they still only remain truths (small t)
from each of those POVs.
I think this is just muddling the issue. The use which we make, and want
to and sometimes need to make, of the concept "truth", is precisely that
which is invariant irrespective of the subject. To call that which is
the content of some person's subjective certainty or belief "the truth"
(no matter how typographically garnished), is at best a metaphorical use
of the word, indicating that some person's conviction may be so strong
as to enable (or condemn) this person to act upon the conviction as if
it held the same security as if it were true.
Accepting subjective truth, i.e. denying that there is something which
is factual no matter who the observer is, is a relativist standpoint.
In some areas the truth of a proposition will be subject-dependent, i.e.
(1) "John (5 feet 2 inches) is taller than Peter (4 feet 4 inches)",
but only because the subject matter is relationial (or comparational).
But if John is indeed 5 feet 2 inches in length, and Peter is indeed 4
feet 4 inches in length, and we use length as the basis for ascribing
tallness, with the longer length being the most tallness, then the truth
of the sentence (1) is not observer dependent. (Examples where a
particular person - Roger - cannot see this, for instance because of
perspective, like when John is standing on Roger's eyes, do not pertain
fact or truth, but only perception and the possibility of error).
"Reality", OTOH, is the sum of these states of affairs, the facts and
the sum of facts. Conditions at given space-time points or areas.
Isn't that again reality for Tron and everyone who agrees with
what Tron just said? How can you know that (euphemism) God
would agree?
Again, this is a problem if I were trying to claim the existence of
"reality" and ascribe this or that property to it; which I don't: I am
giving the definition of the word. One fine tenet of Ph. of language is
that one may have concepts that denote nothing (like "nothing"), which
essentially fulfill the same function in language as Zero does in
mathematics. One may speak of concepts without referring to any entity.
As to the concept: "Reality", as you will know, is derived from the
latin word for a thing ("res"); having reality is "being a thing", and
Reality is All Things, or the world, that which, like truth, is
independent of any observer (I saw you quoted Rand on this). This, of
course, is merely linguistic accident. For a contrast, us east and north
germanics don't have a "thingity", but an "effectity", a "workity", what
the Germans call "Wirklichkeit" , and we "virkelighet", i.e. that which
is effectually there and of which we can track the effects.
.... I was talking about plain
old true belief, not justified in any way other than that the
true believer truly believes it.
Here you use the word "true" in a platonist sense, then: whatever the
believer really really really believes, is truly a belief, i.e. it fills
the blueprint definition of "belief" to the last iota - but that hasn't
got anything at all to do with whether or not the content of that belief
corresponds to anything (and you will know that reality is an incredibly
small subset of all the things that can be the content of belief).
This is what I believe. You can't change it for me because
it's not a wishy-washy belief, it's a true belief.
Platonist, platonist, nyah nyah nyah.
p.s. Email received.
Hope I wasn't to forward, rushing in where angels dread the fool.
T
.
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| User: "Acme Diagnostics" |
|
| Title: Re: Truth |
30 May 2005 01:03:02 AM |
|
|
"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote:
"Acme Diagnostics" <LFinezapthis@partpostmark.net> skrev i melding
news:42951427$0$50266$bb4e3ad8@newscene.com...
Hi,
Hey. (I'm being a "southerner" today.)
Whoa.
"Truth" is generally taken to concern the relation between
propositions
and states of affairs in the world.
A proposition is true "if it says of what is that it is, and of what
is
not, that it is not" (Guess who?).
Sorry, my stack of cards with definitions of "true" was so high I
knocked it all over the floor in my rush to answer. <g>
There are probably a lot of definitons of truth, but I would maintain -
supported by Google's wonderful "define"-function - that a majoirty of
uses pertains the relationship between something cognitive (including
verbal) and some state of affairs, fact, reality, the world.
Yes. I hope you saw my post where I accepted your correction
about what was "generally taken" as truth.
(Reality has truth for all platonists, who like to say things like " a
true giraffe" etc. according to the giraffe's congruence with the
Ideal
Giraffe.)
Agree, but isn't this "truth" (small t)? Isn't it true for Tron
and everyone who satisfies "generally taken" to agree with what
Tron just said?
Detour: Three phases of philosophy
1) "Direct realism": philosophers naively assume reason capable of
grasping the world and the essence of things, and do a lot of
ontological speculation (Plato to, say, Aquinas).
2) Epistemology: Before attempting ontology, we should investigate the
capability of huma reason to grasp the world (Locke, I think, continuing
via Hume, to Kant, to Hegel, etc.)
3) The Linguistic turn: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein focus on language's
capability to express insight.
"Truth" as a concept was developed in the first phase, and my definition
was from that time.
Of course you can go Gorgias on me and say that no one has access to
reality, so we can't really use the word "reality" with any
justification.
Please note that this will apply below.
However, I am not describing reality or any aspect or
element of it, only citing the concept of it as a pair in a comparison.
Naturally, we don't actually "know" that there IS a reality out there,
but you of all people seem to utilize it as one of your fundamental
assumptions, so this criticism is a bit out of character for you, I
feel.
Yes I see, you are in a different context, quite plausible, and I
agree with you.
So your last above, it seems to me, confuses the issues of whether or
not "truth" is to be defined as a relationship between something we
believe or say on the one hand and the things we believe this or say
this of on hte other hand, and the question of how many people think
this is so, which is an empirical question. To the degree that truth is
a matter of definition, the number of users is relevant, though.
Agree. And I also see your point about "confusion." I think I
will plead guilty to that.
In the widest definition of truth, it is anything opposed to that which
is false, and as such may, particularly in conjunction with some form of
idealism, be used to indicate something which is in accord with its own
idea, something which "truly is that which it is", like "a true friend".
With the decline of idealism, this use is less frequent now.
Agree.
Truths (small t) that can be different for each human,
can be composed of different definitions of truth (small and
big T) as well as other things.
Tron can describe or define these truths (small t) for lots of
different people, but they still only remain truths (small t)
from each of those POVs.
I think this is just muddling the issue. The use which we make, and want
to and sometimes need to make, of the concept "truth", is precisely that
which is invariant irrespective of the subject.
I agree this is a more common definition.
To call that which is
the content of some person's subjective certainty or belief "the truth"
(no matter how typographically garnished), is at best a metaphorical use
of the word, indicating that some person's conviction may be so strong
as to enable (or condemn) this person to act upon the conviction as if
it held the same security as if it were true.
Here I'll refer you to my explanation at the end.
Accepting subjective truth, i.e. denying that there is something which
is factual no matter who the observer is, is a relativist standpoint.
In some areas the truth of a proposition will be subject-dependent, i.e.
(1) "John (5 feet 2 inches) is taller than Peter (4 feet 4 inches)",
but only because the subject matter is relationial (or comparational).
But if John is indeed 5 feet 2 inches in length, and Peter is indeed 4
feet 4 inches in length, and we use length as the basis for ascribing
tallness, with the longer length being the most tallness, then the truth
of the sentence (1) is not observer dependent. (Examples where a
particular person - Roger - cannot see this, for instance because of
perspective, like when John is standing on Roger's eyes, do not pertain
fact or truth, but only perception and the possibility of error).
Agree with all.
"Reality", OTOH, is the sum of these states of affairs, the facts and
the sum of facts. Conditions at given space-time points or areas.
Isn't that again reality for Tron and everyone who agrees with
what Tron just said? How can you know that (euphemism) God
would agree?
Again, this is a problem if I were trying to claim the existence of
"reality" and ascribe this or that property to it; which I don't: I am
giving the definition of the word. One fine tenet of Ph. of language is
that one may have concepts that denote nothing (like "nothing"), which
essentially fulfill the same function in language as Zero does in
mathematics. One may speak of concepts without referring to any entity.
I agree with that semantic distinction.
As to the concept: "Reality", as you will know, is derived from the
latin word for a thing ("res"); having reality is "being a thing", and
Reality is All Things, or the world, that which, like truth, is
independent of any observer (I saw you quoted Rand on this). This, of
course, is merely linguistic accident. For a contrast, us east and north
germanics don't have a "thingity", but an "effectity", a "workity", what
the Germans call "Wirklichkeit" , and we "virkelighet", i.e. that which
is effectually there and of which we can track the effects.
You mean "as you will know *now* - Yes, now I know. <g>
Whether I'll know tomorrow is a different story!
.... I was talking about plain
old true belief, not justified in any way other than that the
true believer truly believes it.
I think I may be guilty of some Torkelling in my reply to you,
but that wasn't my intention. I'm really sorry about that. I was
thinking that I was expressing the general view, but thereafter
realized that that was incorrect.
Here you use the word "true" in a platonist sense, then: whatever the
believer really really really believes, is truly a belief, i.e. it fills
the blueprint definition of "belief" to the last iota - but that hasn't
got anything at all to do with whether or not the content of that belief
corresponds to anything (and you will know that reality is an incredibly
small subset of all the things that can be the content of belief).
This is what I believe. You can't change it for me because
it's not a wishy-washy belief, it's a true belief.
Platonist, platonist, nyah nyah nyah.
Well, I am a "platonist" (as I understand the term) in
some contexts, e.g. math. But here I don't think I am anything
so lofty. Just a poor broken down brain programmer (BP). I am
refering to the frequent run-of-the-mill opening in BP known to
me as "The Transitional Phrase (declined)."
The transitional phrase that I declined is "Although such
questions are much more difficult to answer," that occurs in this
text snippet:
it may be that the description that God created the earth in
6 days (resting on the 7th) is a better description of reality.
[Pp] Although such questions are much more difficult to answer,
Which occurs in the PB exercise, as I see it, intended
or not, here:
http://tinyurl.com/bdqdp
(Of course that question is not in the least difficult to answer.)
In this context, I assert that there are only two applicable
definitions of "truth:" 1) reality = absolute truth = Truth
(big T) = What "god" knows, and 2) "truth," (small T) which is
what any individual or group of humans truly believe = God's
words = whatever one likes to excerpt from the bible.
2) could be expanded to "all other definitions besides 1)"
which would include all your definitions save Gorgias, without
affecting the logic of my argument, but I chose to focus
to the most applicable to increase the force of my argument.
Note that this context is competitive. That doesn't change
the definitions of "truth" in philosophy, but it changes their
applicability.
Unfortunately, BP is the ultimate exercise in the obscure. In
these cases it always takes forever to expose it. Thus before
typing a long-winded justification of both my interpretation of
the post and why I didn't just point out my disgreement, I will
wait to see if anyone is interested. In that unlikely event, no
problem since it's already typed.
Hope I wasn't too forward, rushing in where angels dread the fool.
No, it was great. I'm having a lot of fun with it (most
informative and entertaining. Learning and thinking).
Larry
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| User: "Acme Diagnostics" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
30 May 2005 09:32:01 AM |
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"Acme Diagnostics" <LFinezapthis@partpostmark.net> wrote:
"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote:
How interesting to read something a day later.<g>
Unfortunately, BP is the ultimate exercise in the obscure. In
these cases it always takes forever to expose it. Thus before
typing a long-winded justification of both my interpretation of
the post and why I didn't just point out my disgreement, I will
wait to see if anyone is interested. In that unlikely event, no
problem since it's already typed.
"Thus before typing" - "It's typed already." - Hehe. Seems this
is one of those reality things we can't imagine! I meant "Thus
before posting."
Larry
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| User: "Tron" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
31 May 2005 09:03:34 PM |
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Hei,
.....
Platonist, platonist, nyah nyah nyah.
Well, I am a "platonist" (as I understand the term) in
some contexts, e.g. math. But here I don't think I am anything
so lofty. Just a poor broken down brain programmer (BP). I am
refering to the frequent run-of-the-mill opening in BP known to
me as "The Transitional Phrase (declined)."
The transitional phrase that I declined is "Although such
questions are much more difficult to answer," that occurs in this
text snippet:
it may be that the description that God created the earth in
6 days (resting on the 7th) is a better description of reality.
[Pp] Although such questions are much more difficult to answer,
Which occurs in the PB exercise, as I see it, intended
or not, here:
http://tinyurl.com/bdqdp
(Of course that question is not in the least difficult to answer.)
Who wrote this post? A bit muddled thinking, there (mostly good,
though).
The author gives examples of, althought does not state, something akin
to the hypothesis that observation is theory-dependent, in the sense
that theory determines what is to be regarded as "an entity" and "an
occurrence", i.e. what is there to be observed, in the first place.
Theories like the "materialist conception of history" generally predate
investigation; they determine how one investigates. That 's why it is a
bit funny to see him reccommend "weighing the evidence" and talking
about testable hypotheses etc. The evidence to weighed is a result of
the theory, and the machinery for testing hypotheses is specified by the
theory, and will more often than not confirm for that very reason. The
only external criterion left would be some sort of pragmatic test, and
this is not universally valid, as such "truth" of any ideology (to be
crass) obviously depends on the intentionsof the user. A view that helps
e.g. a revolutionary to make revolution works well for him, while a view
that helps those he rebels against prevent his revolution, works better
for them.
The same goes for science. Natural science only makes sense once we
posit the reality of reality, and since we want to make sense, we posit
that when (preferably somewhat before) we start doing science. After
that, all observations will confirm that there indeed is a world out
there. There is nothing empirically observable in external reality that
could lead to an overthrow of the assumption that reality is real.
This is something of that kook aspect we have already discussed; it
seems inescapable. One can only try to keep one's head when all about
one are losing theirs etc. For me, it means never going "all out" on
conviction "because it _must_ be true"; although in some instances we
don't have that luxury, we simply have to decide to go with what we
have. Well .... to err is human, so why not err a little now and then?
In this context, I assert that there are only two applicable
definitions of "truth:" 1) reality = absolute truth = Truth
(big T) = What "god" knows, and 2) "truth," (small T) which is
what any individual or group of humans truly believe = God's
words = whatever one likes to excerpt from the bible.
For me its just a matter of terminological clarity. Why use truth/Truth
when you can use truth/reality, and truth/truth when you can use
truth/conviction (or /belief, /certainty etc.)? Implied reservations as
to extension are not visible unless one knows the code, e.g. your
typographical one. Why not just stick to using (after 2500 years) well
established differing labels for differing concepts?
I agree on most of the properties you ascribe to the various phenomena.
I just like neat pigeonholing.
2) could be expanded to "all other definitions besides 1)"
which would include all your definitions save Gorgias, without
affecting the logic of my argument, but I chose to focus
to the most applicable to increase the force of my argument.
Popper, eh? World 1 (facts); World 2 (our daily interaction with W1),
World 3 (our interpretation of W1 based on - and isolated form it by -
W2).
Note that this context is competitive. That doesn't change
the definitions of "truth" in philosophy, but it changes their
applicability.
Unfortunately, BP is the ultimate exercise in the obscure. In
these cases it always takes forever to expose it.
Maybe I lost you there, at the end.
T
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| User: "Acme Diagnostics" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
01 Jun 2005 08:54:02 AM |
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"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote:
Hei,
Ohio.
(I'm gonna run out of these pretty fast.)
[excerpt of OP]
it may be that the description that God created the earth in
6 days (resting on the 7th) is a better description of reality.
[Pp] Although such questions are much more difficult to answer,
Which occurs in the PB exercise, as I see it, intended
or not, here:
http://tinyurl.com/bdqdp
(Of course that question is not in the least difficult to answer.)
Who wrote this post? A bit muddled thinking, there (mostly good,
though).
My erstwhile hypothetical brain programmer, to whom I was
replying in my problematic post. The nic should be at the top of
the linked post.
The author gives examples of, althought does not state, something akin
to the hypothesis that observation is theory-dependent, in the sense
that theory determines what is to be regarded as "an entity" and "an
occurrence", i.e. what is there to be observed, in the first place.
Theories like the "materialist conception of history" generally predate
investigation; they determine how one investigates.
Yes, this was not defined in the post.
That 's why it is a
bit funny to see him reccommend "weighing the evidence" and talking
about testable hypotheses etc.
Ah, this "a bit funny" is one of the tests I use in finding the
most probable context of a post. What context removes that "bit
funny?" More precisely, what context most probably removes that
"bit funny" in your judgement which might legitimately be
different from my judgment?
A recent addition to the terminology of BP is "plausible
deniability." (God bless the good old USA). That's why I said
your interpretation was quite plausible.
The evidence to weighed is a result of
the theory, and the machinery for testing hypotheses is specified by the
theory, and will more often than not confirm for that very reason.
Right. In subjects with no good empirical test, if you set out to
prove something, you will always succeed. Well, we all wind
up doing that despite best efforts, but it's important to
remember that we did it and keep appropriate reservations in
mind. It's important to ask "Ok, I think this. But how did I
arrive at this?" In which direction did my logic flow? That's why
"prediction" should always be an element of "confirmation." (Not
telling you anything, of course.)
The
only external criterion left would be some sort of pragmatic test, and
this is not universally valid, as such "truth" of any ideology (to be
crass) obviously depends on the intentionsof the user.
Could you explain this further? My distinction
is that there is no "good" pragmatic test available, certainly in
the example at hand (creationism). But you seem to offer another
distinction, "intention of the user." Could you give an example
where there is a good empirical ("pragmatic" even better) test
that is passed, but where the demonstration or confirmation is
invalidated because of the "intention of the user?"
(...In ten words or less...)
Empirical: The facts as observed, not as they should be.
Pragmatic: The facts as they are. not as they should be.
The distinction is probably the "works test." Maybe throw
in practice and/or redundant experience.
A view that helps
e.g. a revolutionary to make revolution works well for him, while a view
that helps those he rebels against prevent his revolution, works better
for them.
This narrows it down somewhat, but once the good empirical test
is made (the revolution either succeeds or fails), one or the
other theory is confirmed (to the value of the one sample,
whatever that is in context). Correct?
The same goes for science. Natural science only makes sense once we
posit the reality of reality, and since we want to make sense, we posit
that when (preferably somewhat before) we start doing science.
I think of some favorite labeling here. We posit a context for
the reality of science. Within that context, science is real.
Even within science there are different
contexts that (supposedly, for most) define different realities
(QM), The "description" in "level of description" essentially
means "context." Then, taking science as a whole, all of it is
only one "context," but scientists take that to be "reality in
that context." Of course this is all the "context" many people
need or choose to consider, and that seems to work fine for them.
But we who like to do the meta-step like to say that it is only
one "context" and maybe that's our "intention of the user."
Anyway, this is how I agree with you and the science devotee at
the same time. The religious devotee too, because in that
context "reality" is meant to be in the highest, i.e. final,
level of description, aka God, aka "Final Truth" (recall the
"Mastermind" joke), i.e. Truth (big T).
Interesting: Did people like Sagan mean this Final Truth when
refering to "The Great Scheme of Things?" Well, I think that's
intentionally vague, sidestepping determinism, "the designer,"
etc. Could be, doesn't need to be. I like it best. I'm always a
little vague, intentional or not.
After
that, all observations will confirm that there indeed is a world out
there. There is nothing empirically observable in external reality that
could lead to an overthrow of the assumption that reality is real.
Hey, that's a very fine point, wonderfully explained. I wish I
had made it! I will certainly steal it. Can I credit you, at
least for the wording?
This is something of that kook aspect we have already discussed; it
seems inescapable. One can only try to keep one's head when all about
one are losing theirs etc. For me, it means never going "all out" on
conviction "because it _must_ be true"; although in some instances we
don't have that luxury, we simply have to decide to go with what we
have. Well .... to err is human, so why not err a little now and then?
I'm sure we have discussed a person's "fact book." The few facts
that contradict the concensus or are substantially
argumentative, but that we will not spend the time to argue
because life is too short? I think we must all have such a fact
book for pragmatic reasons, but realize that we could waste
a decade of thinking. But then everything in life is a game of
chance. Facts in our fact book must undergo the most rigorous
testing of which we are capable with resources commensurate with
the cost of being wrong. This alone doesn't make a person a
kook - otherwise we who do philosophy would all be kooks.
(Hmmmm...)
definitions of "truth:" 1) reality = absolute truth = Truth
(big T) = What "god" knows, and 2) "truth," (small T) which is
For me its just a matter of terminological clarity. Why use truth/Truth
when you can use truth/reality,
Because in the religious context Truth *is* Reality and
vice versa. If you deny this you'll never get anywhere with
them. And we find True Believers in many other fields
lacking good empirical tests. It's just most obvious in
religion. The nice thing about religion is that they don't
hide it. In all other fields of which I am aware, most
significantly politics, they do their best to hide it. Of
course cults hide it too.
and truth/truth when you can use
truth/conviction (or /belief, /certainty etc.)?
Yes, anywhere outside of the religious context I would say that
that distinction goes without saying. "But your beliefs aren't
true - N people with X credentials disagree. Everyone in history
has disagreed, called it nonsense. It's not scientifically
verifiable. It is logically inconsistent. It fails the "works"
test. I can prove to you right now, empirically and logically
that it is false. It makes no sense whatsoever. It even violates
the faith of X multiples of people, the greatest and most famous
faith reasoners of all times, those who have conquered the world
with it, compared to just one of you who has no credentials
whatsever and are just a snot-nosed teenager who hasn't
accomplished anything in life. It rests entirely on your own
faith with no basis whatsever except that you truly believe it.
Therefore it is not "truth."
But still for that one person, from that one person's
point-of-view only, it is true. If you want a definition, you
could say that these true believers define "truth" for themselves.
Most "plonkable" are the many True Believers here who define
truth as any opinion they hold. Can be in any field at all,
usually all fields at the same time. <g>
Implied reservations as
to extension are not visible unless one knows the code, e.g. your
typographical one. Why not just stick to using (after 2500 years) well
established differing labels for differing concepts?
I agree on most of the properties you ascribe to the various phenomena.
I just like neat pigeonholing.
Well, this "belief=true" is an essential tool of brain
programming (including deprogramming, reprogramming, and defense
against). If you try to redefine "truth" for them, you get
nowhere. You have to use that def. of truth, then trick them in
other ways. Surely I've violated debating rule #4 - "Saying too
much." Anyway, you can't rewire their brains. You have to
reprogram them. By adulthood, the faith thing is hard-wired.
Even in the rare case or extreme circumstances where you
could, you usually wouldn't want to - personality collapse.
Think of some people you know well, and some true things
you could say to them that would turn them into blathering
idiots - but you would never say them under any conditions.
Outside of that context, it my have no use at all. I think that,
throughout most of history there was no defense needed or
desired. I could blab forever about evidence that there was
a lot of "reprogramming" behind the scenes, but that's too
argumentative. These days, we have people with it printed on
their business cards.
2) could be expanded to "all other definitions besides 1)"
which would include all your definitions save Gorgias, without
affecting the logic of my argument, but I chose to focus
to the most applicable to increase the force of my argument.
Popper, eh? World 1 (facts); World 2 (our daily interaction with W1),
World 3 (our interpretation of W1 based on - and isolated form it by -
W2).
Well, I've had various mentors, chosen for talents far removed
from academic philosophy, save the college professors, most of
whom were trying to teach me how to cheat on my taxes. Whether
they read all these people (I have no idea whatsever) or thought
it up independently, really makes no difference for my purposes,
though it must be super tedious for you in our conversations. But
I do appreciate your translations.
Note that this context is competitive. That doesn't change
the definitions of "truth" in philosophy, but it changes their
applicability.
Unfortunately, BP is the ultimate exercise in the obscure. In
these cases it always takes forever to expose it.
Maybe I lost you there, at the end.
In defensive PB, e.g. critical reading of material by someone
cleverly and most obscurely masking an agenda, the writer
is always the "adversary," especially where there will be
repeated contact as likely here. An adversarial position changes
the tools and techniques we use in reasoning, or maybe better to
say the probabilities of success of these tools. Cooperative v.
uncooperative, good faith v. bad faith, blah blah. I know those
distinctions are well known in academia (semantics, law, for
example).
Larry
"There is nothing empirically observable in external reality that
could lead to an overthrow of the assumption that reality is
real." -Tron Furu
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| User: "Tron" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
01 Jun 2005 08:55:16 PM |
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Ohayo goazaiimashita,
"Acme Diagnostics" <LFinezapthis@partpostmark.net> skrev i melding
news:429dbdab$0$50328$bb4e3ad8@newscene.com...
On rereading this, I see that I have lost the OP out of sight (long time
ago). I mostly speak from the outside of the Creatonist debate in the
original thread. That is why I think I have missed some points; and
maybe what I write is a bit irrelevant.
sry
.....>>That 's why it is a
bit funny to see him reccommend "weighing the evidence" and talking
about testable hypotheses etc.
Ah, this "a bit funny" is one of the tests I use in finding the
most probable context of a post. What context removes that "bit
funny?" More precisely, what context most probably removes that
"bit funny" in your judgement which might legitimately be
different from my judgment?
Uiiih .... I haven't really thought about it.
The problem itself is a bit like someone who wonders how you can produce
straight rulers with exact inch marks,
and then reccommends finding a ruler to use as a benchmark. The chicken
and egg thing.
a) Science is unproblematic because of its measurable subject matter.
b) "Humanities" has a more problematic, unmeasurable subject matter.
c) We should, however, use the methods of science in the humanities.
While he may be right overall, he is not right on this level, and the
formulation is self-contradictory.
And that is, come to think of it, not the least bit funny. Problem
solved?
As to your questions, do you mean "what context must I assume for this
to make sense"?
I don't know if there is that much conversational charity available ....
Well ... :
First of all, it is only the lead-in to that (last?) paragraph that is
problematic. IF one reads it as a loose, concersational shortcut for
saying "we should take as much (methodological) care as the natural
sciences do in order to maximize the quality of our results", it is OK.
What he actually says, though, is "we should use the methodology of
natural science in order to take care that we maximize the quality of
our results" after having just explained why this is not readily doable.
A recent addition to the terminology of BP is "plausible
deniability." (God bless the good old USA). That's why I said
your interpretation was quite plausible.
The evidence to weighed is a result of
the theory, and the machinery for testing hypotheses is specified by
the
theory, and will more often than not confirm for that very reason.
Right. In subjects with no good empirical test, if you set out to
prove something, you will always succeed.
It's worse than that. It is like asking someone how long a meter is, and
he answers "Let me measure, in order to give you an exact answer .....
I'm applying the meter stick now .... well, well, well! - it seems it is
1 meter long." You only get out what you put in. There is no failure in
the apparatus, except that it is a closed loop ...
.....
The
only external criterion left would be some sort of pragmatic test, and
this is not universally valid, as such "truth" of any ideology (to be
crass) obviously depends on the intentionsof the user.
Could you explain this further? My distinction
is that there is no "good" pragmatic test available, certainly in
the example at hand (creationism). But you seem to offer another
distinction, "intention of the user." Could you give an example
where there is a good empirical ("pragmatic" even better) test
that is passed, but where the demonstration or confirmation is
invalidated because of the "intention of the user?"
(...In ten words or less...)
Empirical: The facts as observed, not as they should be.
Pragmatic: The facts as they are. not as they should be.
The distinction is probably the "works test." Maybe throw
in practice and/or redundant experience.
A view that helps
e.g. a revolutionary to make revolution works well for him, while a
view
that helps those he rebels against prevent his revolution, works
better
for them.
This narrows it down somewhat, but once the good empirical test
is made (the revolution either succeeds or fails), one or the
other theory is confirmed (to the value of the one sample,
whatever that is in context). Correct?
IMHO, no. Remember the core of pragmatism: We can't really know what is
"out there" (World 1), we only know the results of our actions.
Empiricism still implicitly purports to study reality "as it is".
To some degree we might consider purpose (the stated goal) as part of an
action; more precisely, the goal determines what is an "action" (a means
to the end) and not just "something happening", a random event or
inconsequential state changes outside the causal chain leading up the
desired end state.
In the "revolution" example, an ideology that permits the revolutionary
to hate "the oppressors" will be effective, if for nothing else then at
least as a motivator. If they are indeed hateful, he will find his
ideology validated. If they are not, he will hate them for having
oppressed him while in fact being weak and ineffectual, "undeserving".
He might actually _make_ them hateful, as people tend to behave as they
are treated, and so _create the confirmation of his own ideology_.
In a creationist setting, the pious believer for some reason sees fit to
accept certain dogmata "as necessary for salvation". Since salvation is
the ultimate goal (...and it is, because that is one dogma ...), to give
up a dogma here and a dogma there will threaten his chances of eternal
bliss. Hence, no dogma must be sacrificed.
Since a dogma is a proposition about the world, and propositions about
the world are validated according to certain standards, the way to
safeguard the dogmata is to manipulate the standards such that they no
longer affect the content of dogma. This goes for rules of common sense,
evidence, logic etc.
In a scientist setting, the stated goal of science is to find truth. In
natural science, i.e. under the assumption of the reality of Reality
(the dogma of empirical science), we see fit to accept certain
propositions, rules, procedures etc as necessary to find truth. One of
these rules is that everything can be changed if the result is truer
than it would be without this change; i.e. science is open to progress
and development: "All dogmata can be sacrificed." (Of course, in this
system it isn't a sacrifice, it is more like a catharsis.)
In this sense, what is "true" depends to some degree on our goal, our
intentions, our motivation for doing something, our purpose. Something
is true if it conforms to that purpose, if it does not, it isn't true.
This is very much Popper's criticism against pseudo-sciences (his words)
like psychoanalysis, which simply cannot be invalidated, as there is
always an ad hoc explanation at hand to resolve apparent contradictions.
.... was that an answer?
The same goes for science. Natural science only makes sense once we
posit the reality of reality, and since we want to make sense, we
posit
that when (preferably somewhat before) we start doing science.
I think of some favorite labeling here. We posit a context for
the reality of science. Within that context, science is real.
Even within science there are different
contexts that (supposedly, for most) define different realities
(QM), The "description" in "level of description" essentially
means "context." Then, taking science as a whole, all of it is
only one "context," but scientists take that to be "reality in
that context." Of course this is all the "context" many people
need or choose to consider, and that seems to work fine for them.
But we who like to do the meta-step like to say that it is only
one "context" and maybe that's our "intention of the user."
Anyway, this is how I agree with you and the science devotee at
the same time. The religious devotee too, because in that
context "reality" is meant to be in the highest, i.e. final,
level of description, aka God, aka "Final Truth" (recall the
"Mastermind" joke), i.e. Truth (big T).
Have I heard the "Mastermind" joke? Can't recall any.
The above is why I posit a polarity in our minds, between what is true
and what is desirable.
And the desirable has (a motivational) primacy, using the true only to
achieve goals.
(I stumbled on this when I first began to wonder about sources of error.
How is it that people can make mistakes? What is a mistake? How does it
originate, how - and why - is it perpetuated? What is, e.g. "wishful
thinking"? What is (irrational) "hyper-rationality"?)
It is quite parallell to the creative/eliminative two step process.
Reality oriented search for truth gives us lists of things,
possibilities. If we didn't have any needs and desires, any motivation,
no direction for action, we could simply sit and read these computer
printouts about facts of the world, and be content. And if we didn't
need to accomodate physical laws and similar constraints, we could
simply wish and achieve. This is the ultimate goal, as I understand, of
magical thinking: how can you make your wishful thinking effective?
Butchering a cockerel? Yeah, right. You the scifi fan must have come
across novels where they have this transmogrification "materialyzer"
where you put in some shale and seawater from the beaches of the
otherwise empty, primordial planet, and that most useful device
rearranges the atoms to produce a steaming croissant and cafe au lait
served on a silver salver with today's "Times". Saves the author endless
pages of boring trivia like how to actually make a living on yon giant
liquid mercury planet.
No, in real life we pick from preferably viable alternatives, and
wishful thinking needs to be unwishful when actually grasping the world,
in order not to mis-invest scant resources. Just as we need goals in
order to select among alternatives (have you read Damasio's (?)
"Descartes' Error"? He describes how the world's first lobotomy patient
lost much of his desires, but instead of ending in some sort of serene
nirvana, he ended up in Buridans hell, never being able to chose, to
prefer something above something else), we need realistic options to
select from. Enter intelligence. (Insert pun on favourite unfavourite
group here.)
After
that, all observations will confirm that there indeed is a world out
there. There is nothing empirically observable in external reality
that
could lead to an overthrow of the assumption that reality is real.
Hey, that's a very fine point, wonderfully explained. I wish I
had made it! I will certainly steal it. Can I credit you, at
least for the wording?
It is just one application of the structure of the brain-in-a-vat
argument;
i.e.it is not mine. Be my guest (which is then perfectly unapt to say.
"Gorge yourself" doesn't sound very polite, though.)
I'm sure we have discussed a person's "fact book."
Don't think so. Funny, though, I have always envisaged that we enter
this world with some sort of Windows-like set of "templates"; many of
these are there for us to fill, some of them have "default settings",
but the dialogue boxes wont go away until we put at least something
there. (Did you see "Independence Day", btw? Remember the part when they
flew up to the alien mothership and loaded some virus, upon which it
exploded? Now, this is a big secret, so you must promise never to tell,
but it wasn't a virus, it was Windows 2000.)
The few facts
that contradict the concensus or are substantially
argumentative, but that we will not spend the time to argue
because life is too short? I think we must all have such a fact
book for pragmatic reasons, but realize that we could waste
a decade of thinking.
OK, I can also see that when you have filled out some boxes at random,
this data will be called by some other subordinate dll., and you can't
remove it any longer.
But then everything in life is a game of
chance. Facts in our fact book must undergo the most rigorous
testing of which we are capable with resources commensurate with
the cost of being wrong. This alone doesn't make a person a
kook - otherwise we who do philosophy would all be kooks.
(Hmmmm...)
You presume rationality in the economic sense, i.e. the ability to
foresee all consequences and to be able to range them. Some cost in
being wrong, there, too.
definitions of "truth:" 1) reality = absolute truth = Truth
(big T) = What "god" knows, and 2) "truth," (small T) which is
For me its just a matter of terminological clarity. Why use
truth/Truth
when you can use truth/reality,
Because in the religious context Truth *is* Reality and
vice versa. If you deny this you'll never get anywhere with
them.
Lucky me, then.
But I actually disagree. Even for Them, "God" is real, but "God is real"
is true.
But perhaps I misunderstand you?
But still for that one person, from that one person's
point-of-view only, it is true.
OK, but I wouldn't chose to personally describe it that way, and I would
also, if possible, protest them describing it that way.
....Anyway, you can't rewire their brains. You have to
reprogram them. By adulthood, the faith thing is hard-wired.
Even in the rare case or extreme circumstances where you
could, you usually wouldn't want to - personality collapse.
I can see that. There is some emotional component there,
a "way of being constructed" that remains even if one "removes the
faith".
You see it in apostates, they go at it with perfectly religious fervour.
Well, I've had various mentors, chosen for talents far removed
from academic philosophy, save the college professors, most of
whom were trying to teach me how to cheat on my taxes. Whether
they read all these people (I have no idea whatsever) or thought
it up independently, really makes no difference for my purposes,
though it must be super tedious for you in our conversations. But
I do appreciate your translations.
There is that to say of professionalism, and be it only in Academia,
that it supplies terminology and referential shortcuts (or, philosophy
departments are just another jargon pit).
I think my namedropping is somewhat defensible in that it, at best,
provides you with some indexing of your knowledge, enabling you to
pedigree it (for your Credentials department) and research it further
(with more ease and precision) and to cross-reference as you meet it
later. I like it, it is like tap dancing for the mind.
.....>
In defensive PB, e.g. critical reading of material by someone
cleverly and most obscurely masking an agenda, the writer
is always the "adversary," especially where there will be
repeated contact as likely here. An adversarial position changes
the tools and techniques we use in reasoning,
Gee ... I never figured you for a deconstructionist.
Harping on philosophy - martial arts parallells, are you familiar with
the concept of "attitude adjustment"?
It's an old officers' trick: if you scream, people react rather
primordially - most often they get frightened.
Doormen use it on violent drunks, a "short, sharp shock" to make them
forget about the bottle they were just now going to smash (generally
cutting up their hand). I wonder what the BP equivalent of a slap is.
T
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| User: "Acme Diagnostics" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
06 Jun 2005 01:50:03 AM |
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"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote:
Ohayo goazaiimashita,
Hehe! Very funny! Obviously we have a misspelled state.
On rereading this, I see that I have lost the OP out of sight (long time
ago). I mostly speak from the outside of the Creatonist debate in the
original thread. That is why I think I have missed some points; and
maybe what I write is a bit irrelevant.
sry
I intend to redeem the OP from my cynical insinuations should he
reappear. It's been unintentionally emphasized it into something
more than intended.
Ah, this "a bit funny" is one of the tests I use in finding the
most probable context of a post. What context removes that "bit
The problem itself is a bit like someone who wonders how you can produce
straight rulers with exact inch marks,
and then reccommends finding a ruler to use as a benchmark. The chicken
and egg thing.
a) Science is unproblematic because of its measurable subject matter.
b) "Humanities" has a more problematic, unmeasurable subject matter.
c) We should, however, use the methods of science in the humanities.
Well, if you can't find samples with numbers, you can always
guess the numbers. Then you just keep pumping them into equations
until you have enough decimal places of accuracy to make it
"science." Then, according to ancient tradition, if you word your
predictions carefully, they always come true sooner or later.
<snip more about context of post>
Interesting reading. Have no reply.
Right. In subjects with no good empirical test, if you set out to
prove something, you will always succeed.
It's worse than that. It is like asking someone how long a meter is, and
he answers "Let me measure, in order to give you an exact answer .....
I'm applying the meter stick now .... well, well, well! - it seems it is
1 meter long." You only get out what you put in. There is no failure in
the apparatus, except that it is a closed loop ...
Yes, I think you hit on that before and I declined comment. There
was a worthy poster in another group who went into that at length
and often. Never really saw an application for it so didn't pay
much attention. But in general I know you're correct about the
closed loop. Maybe an example of how it invalidates some
conscensus view would help if you want to get into it.
A view that helps
e.g. a revolutionary to make revolution works well for him, while a
is made (the revolution either succeeds or fails), one or the
other theory is confirmed (to the value of the one sample,
... Correct?
IMHO, no. Remember the core of pragmatism: We can't really know what is
"out there" (World 1), we only know the results of our actions.
Empiricism still implicitly purports to study reality "as it is".
I'll have to watch my use of those terms because I typically
have different definitions. Somehow they've worked so far, but
now I'll be more careful.
To some degree we might consider purpose (the stated goal) as part of an
action; more precisely, the goal determines what is an "action" (a means
to the end) and not just "something happening", a random event or
inconsequential state changes outside the causal chain leading up the
desired end state.
Agree. But doesn't it get a little fuzzy when the goal itself or
"thing that works" is simply an observation as in a scientific
experiment?
In the "revolution" example, an ideology that permits the revolutionary
to hate "the oppressors" will be effective, if for nothing else then at
least as a motivator. If they are indeed hateful, he will find his
ideology validated. If they are not, he will hate them for having
oppressed him while in fact being weak and ineffectual, "undeserving".
He might actually _make_ them hateful, as people tend to behave as they
are treated, and so _create the confirmation of his own ideology_.
Ok, now I see. Those goals do change what's "confirmed."
<snip some of "creation" example - agree>
Since a dogma is a proposition about the world, and propositions about
the world are validated according to certain standards, the way to
safeguard the dogmata is to manipulate the standards such that they no
longer affect the content of dogma. This goes for rules of common sense,
evidence, logic etc.
Right. The reason vs. religion argument always requires
a denial of logic at some point. Then it argues to a draw. But
if you use the "things that apparently work" test, reason wins.
That test can be justified with the "that's all we care about -
including in heaven" argument.
In a scientist setting, the stated goal of science is to find truth.
I think of that one as a high loading for the definition of
science unless you're just talking about "empirical truth," i.e.
truth by definition as in logic and math. Lowest loading I've
seen was "perform experiments so that new experiments can be
performed."
In
natural science, i.e. under the assumption of the reality of Reality
(the dogma of empirical science), we see fit to accept certain
propositions, rules, procedures etc as necessary to find truth. One of
these rules is that everything can be changed if the result is truer
than it would be without this change; i.e. science is open to progress
and development: "All dogmata can be sacrificed." (Of course, in this
system it isn't a sacrifice, it is more like a catharsis.)
Yes, and if you point is that it is limiting, I agree. One reason
I prefered spec science over science after the basics. I remember
studying astronomy and thinking, "Well, the next interesting
thing will happen in about 15 years. What now?"
In this sense, what is "true" depends to some degree on our goal, our
intentions, our motivation for doing something, our purpose. Something
is true if it conforms to that purpose, if it does not, it isn't true.
This is very much Popper's criticism against pseudo-sciences (his words)
like psychoanalysis, which simply cannot be invalidated, as there is
always an ad hoc explanation at hand to resolve apparent contradictions.
Right. At least with science you can get to "demonstrated." Maybe
"confirmed," and maybe even "conclusive." But at least
"demonstrated." With empirical fact and logic alone, you only get
to "probable" or "reliable" or speculative science.
.... was that an answer?
I'd characterize what you've said as "Truth is a matter of
definition, and here are the usual definitions." My definition
"truth = belief from the POV of the believer" is apparently an
uncommon one in philosophy, though I still assert that it exists
in some american philosophy textbook I read 40 years ago which of
course counts for nothing without a reference. It exists in the
narrow and misnamed field of "deprogramming." It has existed
in various arguments I've had with others.
The same goes for science. Natural science only makes sense once we
posit the reality of reality, and since we want to make sense, we
posit
that when (preferably somewhat before) we start doing science.
I think of some favorite labeling here. We posit a context for
the reality of science. Within that context, science is real.
<snip>
But we who like to do the meta-step like to say that it is only
one "context" <snip>
The above is why I posit a polarity in our minds, between what is true
and what is desirable.
And the desirable has (a motivational) primacy, using the true only to
achieve goals.
(I stumbled on this when I first began to wonder about sources of error.
How is it that people can make mistakes? What is a mistake? How does it
originate, how - and why - is it perpetuated? What is, e.g. "wishful
thinking"? What is (irrational) "hyper-rationality"?)
As one context for reality, science produces results, i.e. things
that work. I don't think wishful thinking fits into that.
Regardless of your wishes, things either work or they don't. But
in other contexts, e.g. the meta-context, we would have freedom
to do logic and guess probabilities. That's where I see a large
opportunity for wishful thinking. I think actual logic mistakes
are only 2% (or whatever) of the errors while unobjectivity
(wishful thinking mostly) accounts for 98% (or whatever). But re:
wishful thinking, that seems opposite to your usual priorities
regarding science vs. philosophy.
It is quite parallell to the creative/eliminative two step process.
Reality oriented search for truth gives us lists of things,
possibilities. If we didn't have any needs and desires, any motivation,
no direction for action, we could simply sit and read these computer
printouts about facts of the world, and be content. And if we didn't
need to accomodate physical laws and similar constraints, we could
simply wish and achieve. This is the ultimate goal, as I understand, of
magical thinking: how can you make your wishful thinking effective?
Butchering a cockerel? Yeah, right. You the scifi fan must have come
across novels where they have this transmogrification "materialyzer"
where you put in some shale and seawater from the beaches of the
otherwise empty, primordial planet, and that most useful device
rearranges the atoms to produce a steaming croissant and cafe au lait
served on a silver salver with today's "Times". Saves the author endless
pages of boring trivia like how to actually make a living on yon giant
liquid mercury planet.
That's sci fi, which I loath. Aside from childhood stories, I
only read spec sci - not one iota of current science to be
violated. My main goal was to learn valid speculations, not
to be entertained - well, that was what was entertaining, not
the stories. I hate space operas. For stories I prefer earthly
authors like Hitchcock and many others. Thus the above scenario
would be excluded - into the garbage immediately. In children's
books like Tom Swift, of course that's all there is. Also comics
and Fantasy (which also bores me to death).
Your point about wishful thinking remains a huge part of my
focus on objectivity in reasoning, obviously.
No, in real life we pick from preferably viable alternatives, and
wishful thinking needs to be unwishful when actually grasping the world,
in order not to mis-invest scant resources.
Objectivity is impossible for humans to achieve. But we can
certainly become more objective.
Just as we need goals in
order to select among alternatives (have you read Damasio's (?)
"Descartes' Error"? He describes how the world's first lobotomy patient
lost much of his desires, but instead of ending in some sort of serene
nirvana, he ended up in Buridans hell, never being able to chose, to
prefer something above something else), we need realistic options to
select from. Enter intelligence. (Insert pun on favourite unfavourite
group here.)
That would be a fair description of a susceptible person in the
captivity of an astute programmer as is found in various cults.
There is nothing empirically observable in external reality
i.e.it is not mine. Be my guest (which is then perfectly unapt to say.
"Gorge yourself" doesn't sound very polite, though.)
Among "it's not mine" and "be my guest" I will choose "be my
guest" since it's not an exact quote. I'm no academic. I prefer
quoting someone present and accounted for. Besides, the
wording is half of it.
<snip most of "fact book">
But then everything in life is a game of
chance. Facts in our fact book must undergo the most rigorous
You presume rationality in the economic sense, i.e. the ability to
foresee all consequences and to be able to range them. Some cost in
being wrong, there, too.
Right.
Because in the religious context Truth *is* Reality and
vice versa. If you deny this you'll never get anywhere with
them.
Lucky me, then.
But I actually disagree. Even for Them, "God" is real, but "God is real"
is true. But perhaps I misunderstand you?
Let's execute an "agree to disagree" on this one. It doesn't seem
to appear in any of our other discussions. If it comes up, we can
just use equivalents like "existence" or "belief" or "reality" or
"context" since we seem to be able to reach agreement on those in
whatever context. Like you said, "truth" is just a matter of
definition. We can just choose any one we want (i.e. yours or
mine or some other) for the length of whatever argument if needed.
I use "'X' where X=" a lot to overcome definitional disagreements
and it's worked great so far.
<snip for length>
I do appreciate your translations.
There is that to say of professionalism, and be it only in Academia,
that it supplies terminology and referential shortcuts (or, philosophy
departments are just another jargon pit).
I think my namedropping is somewhat defensible in that it, at best,
provides you with some indexing of your knowledge, enabling you to
pedigree it (for your Credentials department) and research it further
(with more ease and precision) and to cross-reference as you meet it
later. I like it, it is like tap dancing for the mind.
I can't use it in my published writing (well, extemely little and
never a required fact or conclusion in argument). But I
appreciate the context it provides. It is quite useful for that.
For instance, I have a lot more context about Aristotle now. I
can use that in a lot of ways without quoting him for specific
items. The only things I generally need permissions for are cute
quotes. Not part of arguments, just window dressing. Part of the
"loosening up" to open a mind to the argument to follow.
Harping on philosophy - martial arts parallells, are you familiar with
the concept of "attitude adjustment"?
It's an old officers' trick: if you scream, people react rather
primordially - most often they get frightened.
IIRC, I've been told that it's not very effective except in
emergencies where we'd all use it anyway. I've tried it in
business. It hasn't worked. It's never worked on me. Except
once with each person where you look for the emergency,
find none, then you just disrespect the person after that.
Big no-no in leadership. Of course in sports, basic training,
<loud whistle> "Wake up, ladies!" <g>
There's the reverse strategy too: "Kill the S.O.B. with
kindness." I'm told that works sometimes. I've had success with
it. Well, sometimes it's the only option anyway.
Doormen use it on violent drunks, a "short, sharp shock" to make them
forget about the bottle they were just now going to smash (generally
cutting up their hand). I wonder what the BP equivalent of a slap is.
Faked evidence.
I've employed those doormen. I don't recall that technique being
used but I always went for size, paying by the pound. Enough
size, well-constructed, and that's all that was needed in my bar.
Cops with nice big guns are also quite effective but more
expensive. The object is to avoid fights. Never had one when
there was a doorman. Had them when there wasn't.
Larry
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| User: "Tron" |
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| Title: Re: Truth |
16 Jun 2005 08:28:13 AM |
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Marhaba,
Back on track.
I'll be lagging a little behind, but at least I usually make a sketchy
"first impressions" draft whenever you post something. Lemme see what I
wrote ...
Well, if you can't find samples with numbers, you can always
guess the numbers. Then you just keep pumping them into equations
until you have enough decimal places of accuracy to make it
"science." Then, according to ancient tradition, if you word your
predictions carefully, they always come true sooner or later.
Hehehe. You read stuff like "How to lie with statistics"? (Darrrel Huff
(sp?) , IIRC.)
I had my fellow union members invest in a research report from a
university faculty.
The report itself was not overly impressive, and mostly stated what we
have said for years.
"But, " I argued, "it has Bar Charts. Now it is Science." An indeed, moe
people are listening to us now.
No wonder cosmetics companies refer to The Vitamin Institute of
Switzerland.
I would love to go there once.
Yes, I think you hit on that before and I declined comment. There
was a worthy poster in another group who went into that at length
and often. Never really saw an application for it so didn't pay
much attention. But in general I know you're correct about the
closed loop. Maybe an example of how it invalidates some
conscensus view would help if you want to get into it.
I think it is a "edge of the Universe" type of problem. If you examine
all debunked belief that is recorded in human history, you will see it
somewhere in the bunks of those about to take the jump off Science
Towers.
You will then also see why it was so difficult for the bunkee jumpers to
spot
their own mistake, and one gets a clue as to why it to some extent is
the misfits,
rebels and madmen who actually nudge Invention along.
You and I know that we are not at the end of Invention. What is it that
is keeping us, and all the brilliant, actually paid-to-discover people
from simply discovering a lot of brilliant and useful stuff? Hindsight
is so much easier that we find it hard to imagine that people once did
not understand the power of steam, etc. All I know is that our inability
to see around the corner of the future - or, "the Universe as seen from
outside" - is somehow linked to some belief that will in retrospect be
seen as erroneous, and which we either hold to be true or (most likely)
find so obvious as to not even examine. Perhaps we don't even see it as
"something", it just blends into the background or glares right before
our eyes.
This also brings out the value of childrens's questions. "Why is the
grass green?"
A merely bad answer is "Because it just is", while the worst is "Don't
ask such stupid questions."
OTOH I think explanations like this are only valid on a rather high
level of
description. In history of science, it is most easily seen on the level
of Kuhn style paradigms. In day to day smaller scale problems it won't
be as readily apparent, except in our individual psychological diagnoses
(neurosis, paranoia should be good for studying this ...), which do not,
or let's hope so, permit any consensus view.
Come to think of it, if you investigate public thinking about women
during the last 150 years, we have gone from "can't let them into
university ... their brains will overheat ..." etc. to something
entirely different (although, on academic women's issues, it seems to
me that
some of the old dons weren't too far off the mark). And this reflects in
a
thousand small events every day.
Would that fit your example of an invalidated closed consensus loop?
I'll have to watch my use of those terms because I typically
have different definitions.
They do originate in related, but yet slightly differing fields.
For a start they are both epistemological theories, but empiricism
concerns how things get into our heads, it is the "by perception" theory
of knowledge. All epistemology has a certain ontology as the other side
of its coin, and empiricism wouldn't make much sense if you didn't posit
something out there to be perceived. Think of hand-and glove.
Traditonal fights between rationalists and empiricists, etc. are also a
fight about what is out there.
Pragmatism differs from a lot of earlier philosophy, so much that it is
still philosophically scandalous in some quarters. Pragmatism is a
theory about truth, what truth is, and is not per se a theory of e.g.
perception (although it will entail one) nor a theory of what is out
there - and here is the rub: pragmatism says that this we will never
know. The only thing we will ever now is (epistemologically) that where
we can discover some difference, and (ethically) that which makes a
difference
for us. Ontologically, pragmatism says that We Are The Closed Loop,
Let's Run It. Pragmatism doesn't really care about "reality", only about
what does and doesn't work for us, and damn the Puppetmaster that stages
the play.
This is what "pragmatism" means, also: it is concerned with the doable,
pragmatic, practical, that which matters in praxis, the "works" aspect
of things ("pragmata" in greek).
Sooo .... Pragmatism drops empiricism's links to "reality" (which, btw,
have always been extremely tenuous; that was Hume's problem, empiricism
leads to extreme scepticism). But all the things that make stuff look
different to us - the differences we can spot - we must describe as that
which affects us and our senses differently, and so a perception theory
of .... well, perception ..... A sensation theory of perception, I think
I should say (although this is more narrow and perhaps erroneous) OR a
perception theory of knowledge (here I'm out of theory and knowledge
.....) is implied in pragmatism, so empiricism and pragmatism do go hand
in hand.
Pragmatism says of empiricism: You work fine, but forget the (reality)
input, and let's look at the (practical, "works") output.
Somehow they've worked so far, but
now I'll be more careful.
Hey, I just associate freely to whatever five chords you give me. At
best you will find something you consider as a means to express whatever
you wish to express with a tad more ease, but that's the goal, innit?
Have I depleted my stock of IMHOs and AFAIKs? Thanks to modern
technology, I can now send you an inexhaustible supply, enclosed in the
following microdot: .
To some degree we might consider purpose (the stated goal) as part of
an
action; more precisely, the goal determines what is an "action" (a
means
to the end) and not just "something happening", a random event or
inconsequential state changes outside the causal chain leading up the
desired end state.
Agree. But doesn't it get a little fuzzy when the goal itself or
"thing that works" is simply an observation as in a scientific
experiment?
Of course it weighs more heavily in production than in observation.
And in theory, observation should not be led astray by any purpose, even
though it, too, is of course a purposeful activity.
Here the problem lies in being able to shed enough assumptions for
observation to make a difference, i.e. permitting any interpretation
that conform with the data and with logic, in order to construct
hypotheses.
Let him hear who has ears, as the saying goes - how many are not able
to?
In a scientist setting, the stated goal of science is to find truth.
I think of that one as a high loading for the definition of
science unless you'r | | | | | | | | | | | |