"Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <rbaker4@msnn.com> wrote in message

"Ron Baker, Pluralitas!" <rbaker4@msnn.com> wrote in message

We can demonstrate the non-existence of certain conceptions of
God, as

Yes, to reasonable people, but when it comes to God
theists are not reasonable people.

Actually, I think there are many theists who enage in quite

discussions on the logical coherence of various conceptions of God
(William Lane Craig immediately comes to mind, and his various

for why he adheres to one conception of God while rejecting

Hmm. I just pulled up a web page on him.
I'll have to read further.

For an example of theists attempting to call certain conceptions of
God into doubt on rational grounds, one need not look any further than
a Christian-Muslim debate. Many atheists have noted that the Romans
used to accuse the Christians of "atheism," and follow that by noting
that Christians are close to being atheists in the sense that they
deny the existence of every other deity. Muslims engage in the same
sort of religious particularism (dare I say Monotheistic chauvinism?).

;)

One example might be the debate on the "Concept of God in Islam and
Christianity" between William Lane Craig and Shabir Ally, which can be
listened to for free here:

http://shabirally.com/debates.asp

I listened to the first 10 minutes or so.
I'm curious about the differences they might debate
but it is difficult to have great concern about the
theological fine points (such as how loving God is)
when the very 'existence of God' elephant is standing in
the room.

I find this debate to be very interesting, because Muslims generally
come out on top in Muslim-Christian debate (mainly because the Muslim
debater repeats a bunch of Biblical contradictions memorized before
the debate, while the Christian is wholly ignorant of Islam and the
Qur'an, thus giving many in attendance that Islam some how wins by
default), however in this debate the Christian clearly won. What's
worse, the Christian won on the very subject that Christians are
generally afraid to debate with Muslims: the ontology of God (as the
monadic ontology that Islam's strict Monotheist posits for God is so
easy to present to a crowd, while the Trinity often results in tangled
arguments). Craig even gives Swinburne's argument for why traditional
theists should side with a multipersonal conception of God rather than
a monadic/unipersonal ontology...

Video and text have their relative advantages.
I can read faster than they can talk but with the
video you can see the contemporaneous environment
and hear their inflection.
I'll give it another shot later.

They sell the video on both Craig and Ally's respective sites, and I
do not think a text transcript yet exists...

Are we going to have to define 'cause'?

That is pretty hard to do, but I will tentatively define a cause as an
action(?) or agent that results in another thing moving or performing
an action. So if a billiard ball crashes into another billiard ball,
and the second one moves, I assume that the first one "caused" the
second one to move (though I imagine here we start to get into
problems). I think the notion of cause is pretty clear.

I think we can proceed.
(But let me present this: cause is the changing of the configuration
of one system of matter/energy by interaction with
another system of matter/energy.
In which case the universe has a beginning but no cause.)

Hmmmm... Interesting. It'll probably take me a while to digest this
defintion of cause, and why it results in, necessarily, the universe
being uncaused.

and feel that if hard
determinism is true, no conversation is worthwhile (and this one
certainly breaks down).

I don't see that.

Does determinism allow for chaos or randomness?

Hard determinism, as far as I know, certainly does not. The position

Quatum Mechanics says that some physical actions are
absolutely random.
QM has convinced me.

The big question on my mind has always been the following: on what
philosophical grounds could one ever conclude that an event just
witnessed was truly random or uncaused.?

In addition there is chaos theory: that with repetitive nonlinear

even given perfect knowledge of the initial conditions and the
rules of operation, the state at some time in the future is not
predictable.

I know absolutely nothing about Chaos theory. Care to recommend a
book?

I would think that determinism could accommodate the above
randomness and chaos, no?

Well, at least in the sense that it is at least possible for the above
claims to be true, while the actions of human beings being truly
deterministic. I suppose.

Or is it called something else? Or are there different
versions of determinism?

Maybe there's a bunch (i.e. more than three), but I haven't done the
sufficient reading on this subject.

If we do have free will (as I believe,
admittedly due wholly to personal experience), then there has to

non-mechanical, uncaused element to our decision making, whatever

may be.

What is free will?

The ability to freely choose or make decisions. So, for example,

Then my computer has free will.

Does it freely choose or make decisions? Or does it only do what it is
commanded to do?

This leads to an issue that I, as a person with no
real background in computer science or programming, have grappled
with: I have tinkered with computer programs (the first being
Hypercard for the mac back in the early 90s) that could allegedly do
things at random (most recently I've done this with Java script). I
mean, you tell the computer, for example, to pick a number, at random,
from 1 to 10, and if it is 1, do action A, if 2, perform action B, et
cetera. The problem I have pondered is this: is it truly random, and
if so, how?

I wonder this because if these choices actually are
random, much of my argumentation falls away (at least with regard to
causality). If a computer can actually do something that is perfectly
random, that is akin to a choice being made in a vacuum, something
purely mechanical happening uncaused. Is this what you were alluding
to?

It is an interesting subject, but one I know next to nothing
about.

suppose I am looking at two doors, and after a moment of apparent
contemplation, walk through the second. A hard determinist would argue
that the only reason I did that was because of external factors that
caused me to do such - in no way did I actually freely choose to do
so. A believer in free will would argue that I freely chose to walk

What is 'freely chose'?

Um, I'm not sure how to answer. With all due respect, I figured it was
obvious.

I mean to be able to choose, rather than being forced to make
that choice.

through that door rather than the other (or at least there is the
possibility that I could have made a choice). There is a rough middle
ground, where we are moved towards certain choices, but still have a
choice (such a soft determinist position, I think, still, ultimately
leaves room for free will).

I think this is basically an ad ignorantiam argument.
The mechanism of decission is so complex plus random
and chaotic that it is hard to recognize.

Do dogs have free will?

I think it is possible. Pavlov be damned.

Do jelly fish have free will?
Do amoebae have free will?

I think it becomes highly unlikely this low on the intelligence scale.

You asked if nature could be the first cause. I would say it is
certainly possible, but I would argue that if that is the case
"nature" would have to be a personal agent. Why? Because I find

notion of an uncaused (and a first cause is by definition uncaused
since it is not preceded by any causes) mechanical first cause to

absurd.

Why? Your view sounds like a matter of taste.

Maybe so, and maybe I'm the positive claimant here, but I really
cannot see this discussion progressing if the the otherside does not
present a sensible model of a non-personal (mechanical) agent moving
without being caused to do so.

I'm sorry but the burden is really yours.

I know. I conceded to that above when I wrote that I'm the positive
claimant, though the concession was admittedly soft since it was
prefaced by the word "maybe."

How can you say that the universe can't *just be*
but say that God *can* *just be*?

The universe it self could, I suppose, just be, which is why my
version of the first cause argument talks strictly about cause and
effect, and the nature of a first cause in a causal chain.

Why must the uncaused cause have volition?
Why can't the uncaused cause be absent volition?
What do you have other than 'gut feel' that
the uncaused cause has volition?
What is this supposed volition or will?
What does the uncaused cause desire?

Maybe it is not much more than a gut feeling, but it is ultimately
from a disjunctive syllogism. I imagine a first cause being personal
or mechanical, and then find the idea of a mechanical first cause to
be simply absurd. It is like a can opener, for no reason, getting up
and opening a can on its own.

Maybe this will help you with the argument:
The universe is filled with details (orderly and chaotic)
that have no corelation with any of the supposed
wills of God that I have heard.

I don't understand. Elaborate.

This is why, in the past, I have asked how one can conceive of
something getting up and moving uncaused, but not itself

any volition. Hence my billiard ball analogies. Care to give your
thoughts up to this point?

Yup. See above, especially the rain thing.

I don't understand the rain analogy. Care to elaborate?

(The rain analogy may no longer fit with my
current understanding of your position.)

It seems you are saying that if something moves the
cause is either purely mechanical or it contains
non-mechanical volition.
Let me ask you, how do you tell the difference?

Well, in certain instances we may not be able to tell the difference.

The difference (whether we can spot it or not) would, however, be
whether the cause had some sort of consciousness/volition.

And what about the probabilities?
P(E) probability that evil exists.
P(E|G) probability that evil exists, given God.

I think we would have to agree to a definition of evil, but there

none that I have seen thus far that I agree with (and you're

not going to side with the traditional monotheist notion of evil

being that which "Gawd" condemns, possible examples being
homosexuality, eating pork, owning a dog, wearing polyester on
fridays, or watching reruns of the TV show "Friends").

;)

Glad we're in agreement thus far. =D

I have always
felt that if there are no objective moral laws, we cannot sensibly
define evil, and then the argument from evil falls apart.

Ooo.
Well there's a problem. You say there must be an
objective evil but you don't agree with any known
definition. That *is* a problem.
What is your best approximation?

Very quickly, I would note that I have not positively asserted that
there must be objective evil. It is actually my sincere position that
"evil" is purely subjective.

Does the same go for 'good' or 'order'?

Good? Yes. Order? I'm not so sure. I think order is very clear, like
the difference between a puddle and a toy car. The latter has parts
that fit together and have a purpose, and were not just thrown
together in any order (though I suppose on the atomic level the same
could be said of water in a puddle).

I just had a long discussion with a Catholic fellow by
the name of Scott on this.
We were pretty much in agreement.
(For the record: he is practicing member of the RCC
and I am an atheist.)
We agreed that evil is subjective and relative.

(And I just remembered that he also said that the Pope
is infallible. ;)

That is becoming a tough position to maintain with the Popes
disagreeing with one another, condemning positions past Popes
affirmed. Oh well...

To me, evil is whatever I don't like.
I don't like murder. (Because I don't want to be
murdered.)
I don't like stealing. (Because I don't want anybody
to steal from me.)

Because our perception is subjective I don't think
anything can be absolute or truely objective.
Evil is relative.

Despite that, I'm sure that we can both agree that
there is evil.
Or am I wrong? Are you going to argue that what
might commonly be called evil is not because it
is part of God's plan?

What I would argue is roughly along the lines of the mutual conclusion
you and Scott reached: evil is purely subjective. While I am a huge
admirer of William Lane Craig, I disagree strongly with him on the
issue of objective moral laws. He claims that there are certain
actions that we can all agree are evil, and he gives the example of
raping a child. I disagree. While my own personal subjective notion of
morality results in me being strongly opposed to raping children,
human beings are no in unanamous agreement on this issue. Case in
point would be the ahaadeeth (Islamic traditions) that record that
Muhammad, in his fifties, consumated his marriage to his wife Ayesha
when she was only nine years old:

http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/vhadith.html

Regardless of whether these traditions are historically accurate (I
have my doubts), the fact is that many millions of Muslims accept them
as such. I, as a Westerner, cannot fathom how a man in his fifties
could engage in sexual intercourse with a nine year old girl without
the action being identical to rape. Of course, for many (though surely
not all!) Muslims, the notion of "rape" within marriage is absurd. If
a man is married to a girl (even one as young as nine), and forces
himself upon her, that is not rape to them.

The point of this long winded rant is that I can think of few things
more horrible than raping a child, but even this (under specific
circumstances) is not consider evil by millions of people.

In discussion of the subjectivity of evil the extreme examples
are typically cited.
The objectivist typically responds "Obviously (Hitler, say) was evil".
The current constant low level (sorta) nagging social issues can
effectively be used in such an argument.
They are problems of evil. e.g. the death penalty, abortion,
homosexuality, extra-legal punishment.
You can show rational persons and views on both sides of most of
those issues, issues that are not extreme or black and white
but still issues of evil.
If you present one of those complicated issues to the objectivist
and ask for the objective truth he will have to either conceed
subjectivism or ludicrously insist that their own personal view is the
objective truth.

Okay.

Furthermore, taking the theistic definition of evil as "that which
Gawd condemns," it seems that most theistic religions firmly believe
that their God allows evil to exist (alleged evils that run the
gauntlette from murder to homosexuality to eating shellfish). So what

There is much discussion of evil in the Bible.
The Bible says evil exists.

I agree, though "evil" according to the Bible (or according to popular
Judeo-Christian exegesis applied to the Bible) often includes, as per
the definition above, that which God condemns (such as homosexuality,
fabricating representations of God to serve as a focal point during
worship, eating shell fish, or possibly even having long hair). I
think the Biblical conception of evil would be drastically different
from your own.

are the chances that this sort of God would exist given the existence
of "evil". It would seem that the existence of evil does not negate
the existence of this conception of God (which, it is presupposed,
allows evil to exist).

By itself, the existence of evil does not negate
all deity concepts.
But the existence of evil may be contradictory,
conflicting, or incompatible with the other supposed
properties of God.

Agreed, particularly a deity who is defined as being opposed to
actions that continue to take place while simultaneously being able to
stop such actions. Traditional argument from evil sort of deal...