A Typology of Atheism
Used broadly, the term atheism includes many variations. Traditional
atheism holds that there is not, never was, and never will be a God. There
are many advocates of this view, including Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx,
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Antony Flew.
Mythological atheists, such as Friedrich Nietzsche, believe that the
God-myth was once a live model by which men lived but has since
died-killed by the advancement of modern man's understanding and culture.
A short-lived form of dialectical atheism, which was held by Thomas J. J.
Altizer and others, proposed that the once alive, transcendent God
actually died in the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ. The impact of
this was realized in modern times.5
Finally, there are semantical atheists who claim that God-talk is dead.
This view was held by Paul Van Buren6 and others influenced by the logical
positivists7 who had seriously challenged the meaningfulness of language
about God. Those who hold this particular view may not be actual atheists
at all, for they can admit to the existence of God and yet believe that it
is impossible to talk about him in meaningful terms. But as Feuerbach once
said, those who say that God is alive but claim that we cannot know
anything about him have lost all taste for religion.
There are still other ways to designate the various kinds of atheists. One
such way is by the particular philosophy that shapes the expression of
their atheism. One could therefore speak of existential atheists
(Jean-Paul Sartre), marxistic atheists (Karl Marx), psychological atheists
(Sigmund Freud), capitalistic atheists (Ayn Rand),8 behavioristic atheists
(B. F. Skinner),9 and so on.
In this chapter we shall discuss atheism in a metaphysical sense. Thus we
are speaking about philosophical atheists who give reasons for their
belief that no God exists in or beyond the world, as opposed to practical
atheists who simply live as though there were no God.
Some Representatives of Atheism
Friedrich Nietzsche
One of the most colorful advocates of atheism was Friedrich Nietzsche. His
rejection of God was instinctive and incisive. With the denial of God,
Nietzsche denied all value (hence, nihilism) based on God. Although he was
reared in a Lutheran pastor's home, Nietzsche rebelled violently against
his religious training.
God
Nietzsche believed that God never existed, basing his belief on several
grounds.10 He held that it is impossible to have a self-caused being. He
also thought that the presence of evil in the world ruled out a benevolent
Creator, and he felt that the basis for belief in God was purely
psychological. Nietzsche exhorted, "I beseech you, my brothers, remain
faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of other
worldly hopes!" He added, "Once the sin against God was the greatest sin;
but God died, and these sinners died with Him. To sin against the earth is
now the most dreadful thing."11
Despite Nietzsche's atheism, he did believe that the God-myth was once
very much alive. It was the model on which medieval and reformation Europe
had based its manner of life. That culture, however, Nietzsche saw in
decay. Modernity had caught up to modern man, and he could no longer
believe in God. "God is dead!" Nietzsche cried. Thus, modern man must bury
God and move on. What he meant was not that an actual being which had once
been alive was now dead, but that man no longer needed the psychological
"crutch" of belief in God.
Ethics
For Nietzsche, the shocking realization of God's "death" brought the
conclusion that all God-based values and absolutes also had died. Hence,
Nietzsche rejected traditional Judeo-Christian values in an almost violent
manner. Even such general principles as "injure no man" were questioned by
Nietzsche.12 And he ridiculed the Christian principle of love with these
words: "Why, you idiots.. 'How about praising the one who sacrifices
himself?' "13 Indeed, Christianity "is the greatest of all conceivable
corruptions.. I call it the one immoral blemish of mankind."14
Just what did Nietzsche offer in place of traditional Christian values? He
proposed that modern man go "beyond good and evil."15 He suggested a
transvaluation of all values which would reject the soft, feminine virtues
of love and humility for the hard, manlike virtues of harshness and
suspicion.
Man
According to Nietzsche, man is mortal. There is no afterlife. The best
that one can do to overcome the limits of his own mortality is to will the
eternal recurrence of the same state of affairs.16 That is, he must will
to come back and live the same life over and over forever.
Since there is no God, and thus no objective values to discover, men must
create their own values. Men must not be overcome by the meaninglessness
and emptiness of life. Rather, they must become overcomers-supermen.
The world
Since God does not exist, the world is all there is. Matter is in motion,
and life moves in cycles. The world is real, and God is an illusion. There
is no God to whom we must be faithful. Nietzsche viewed "God as the
declaration of war against life, against nature . the deification of
nothingness, the will of nothingness pronounced holy."17 Hence, man is
exhorted to "remain faithful to the earth."
History and goal
Man's history, like his destiny, is cyclical. Nietzsche rejected any
Christian goal-oriented end in favor of a more oriental view of cyclical
recurrence. History is not going anywhere. There are no ultimate goals to
achieve on earth, no paradise to regain. There is simply an individual
life to live by courage and creativity. Man creates his own destiny here,
and there is no hereafter-except the eternal recurrence of the same state
of affairs. The supermen are the geniuses who form destiny. "They say, 'It
shall be thus!' They determine the 'whether' and the 'to what end' of
mankind.. Their knowledge is creating."18
Ludwig Feuerbach
Even before Nietzsche, a young Hegelian philosopher named Ludwig Feuerbach
was destined to make a permanent atheistic mark upon the world by his
unique denial of God. Working from within a Hegelian framework, he was
able to stand Hegel's pantheistic system on its head and conclude atheism.
Later, Karl Marx incorporated Feuerbach's atheism into his own economic
theory, where it remains as a part of official marxist ideology.
God
For Feuerbach, God is nothing more than a projection of human imagination.
Man is uniquely a self-conscious being. When he reflects upon himself, he
calls it "God." God is nothing more than the highest and best that man
sees in himself. The attributes given to God are really the result of
man's self-discovery of what is best in himself:
.. the object of any subject is nothing else than the subject's own nature
taken objectively. Such as are a man's thoughts and dispositions, such is
his God; so much worth as a man has, so much and no more has his God.
Consciousness of God is self-consciousness, knowledge of God is
self-knowledge. By his God thou knowest the man, and by the man his God;
the two are identical.19
Man
Man is an animal who has reached self-consciousness. This is a qualitative
change. Lower animals have consciousness but not self-consciousness; that
is, they are aware of their environment, but are unable to ponder their
own nature. Self-consciousness enables man to reflect on himself and, by
so doing, to come to know his own nature as "God." Without this ability to
reflect on and project his own nature and call it "God," there would be no
religion. So man is the religious animal.20
Ethics
The main aim of Feuerbach's ethics was to redirect man's energies from the
other world to this one, from heaven to earth. His principal aim was to
turn "the friends of God into friends of man, believers into thinkers,
worshippers into workers, candidates for the other world into students of
this world, Christians, who on their own confession are half-animal and
half-angel, into men-whole men."21
History and goal
Feuerbach was critical of both the Hegelian and Christian ideas that
history is progressing or heading toward some goal. History is not, as
Hegel held, the footprints of God in the sands of time. History reveals
only man's progressive self-understanding. Religion is the necessary evil
by which man comes to this increased understanding of himself in what he
first believes to be God. In actuality, however, this self-understanding
is only a projection of the best that is in man.22
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980)
Another popular form of atheism in the twentieth century is existential
atheism. The writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus have been a
significant source of this movement.
God
Like other atheists, Sartre believed God's existence was impossible
because God must be, by his very nature, a self-caused being. But one
would have to exist prior to himself in order to cause himself, which is
impossible. In Sartre's terms, the "being-for-itself" can never become the
"being-in-itself."23 The contingent (dependent) being cannot become the
necessary (independent) being. Nothing cannot become something. For any
being to cause its own existence would necessitate that it exist prior to
its existing, which is impossible. Therefore, since a self-caused being
cannot exist, God cannot exist.
Man
For Sartre, man is a useless passion, an empty bubble on the sea of
nothingness. Man's basic project is to become God. But it is impossible
for contingent man to become a necessary being, for the subjective to
become objective, or for freedom to become determined. Man is utterly free
in his subjective being-in his consciousness and awareness. He is, in
fact, condemned to freedom. If one were to attempt to escape his destiny,
he would still be freely fleeing it. Even suicide is an act of freedom by
which one vainly attempts to avoid his freedom. So the essence of man is
absolute freedom, but absolute freedom has no objective or definable
nature. Man is more than an objective essence; he is also a subjective
existence.
Ethics
There are no absolute or objective moral prescriptions. For "no sooner had
you [Zeus] created me than I ceased to be yours," wrote Sartre. "I was
like a man who's lost his shadow. And there was nothing left in heaven, no
right or wrong, nor anyone to give me orders.. For I, Zeus, am a man, and
every man must find out his own way."24
Not only are there no divine imperatives or moral prescriptions imposed
upon man, but also there are no objective values. In the last lines of his
famous Being and Nothingness, Sartre wrote, "it amounts to the same thing
whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations."25 According to
Sartre, all human activities are equivalent. We must, in fact, repudiate
this "spirit of seriousness" that assumes there are absolute or objective
values and accept the basic absurdity and subjectivity of life.
What then should man do? Since there are no ultimate and objective values,
man must create his own values. He should act for himself and, if he will,
for all mankind. But there is no ethical obligation to do the latter. Each
person is responsible for the use of his own unavoidable freedom. What is
"good" is whatever he chooses.
The world and destiny
The world for Sartre is real but contingent. It is simply there. Like
man's life, it is a given. Philosophically, it is uncaused. It is the
field in which man performs his subjective choices. It has no objective
meaning, and is therefore absurd. Each man must revolt against this
absurdity and create his own subjective meaning. And the fact that several
people affirm common subjective projects (Sartre himself had certain
marxist leanings) does not constitute objective meaning. Each person is
the result of his own choices. For example, Sartre said, "I am my books."
Yet each man transcends the world (project) he creates. The author is more
than his words. He is more than the being he creates. He is the nothing
(freedom) out of which it was created.
Some Basic Beliefs of Atheism
The arguments for atheism are largely negative in nature- they are really
arguments against theism. The arguments fall into roughly two categories:
the arguments against proofs for God's existence, and the arguments
against God's existence. In the former category, most atheists draw
heavily on the skepticism of David Hume and the agnosticism of Immanuel
Kant.
The Rejection of Theistic Arguments
The traditional theistic arguments fall into four main categories:
cosmological, teleological, ontological, and moral. In brief, the
cosmological argument says:
1. Every effect has a cause.
2. The universe is an effect.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
One of the most famous proponents of this argument was Thomas Aquinas
(1224-1274).26
The teleological argument declares in brief:
1. Every design has a designer.
2. The universe manifests design.
3. Therefore, the universe has a designer.
This argument was forcefully presented by William Paley (1743-1805).27
The ontological argument can be stated in two ways: First,
1. God is by definition an absolutely perfect being.
2. An absolutely perfect being cannot lack anything.
3. But a being that exists has something that a being that does not
exist lacks-namely, existence.
4. Therefore, an absolutely perfect being must exist.28
Second,
1. God is by definition a necessary being.
2. But a necessary being cannot not exist (otherwise, it would not be
a necessary being).
3. Therefore, a necessary being necessarily exists.
St. Anselm (1033-1109) is credited with developing both forms of this
argument.
The moral argument for God's existence has been presented by many since
Kant's time. A popular version of it, espoused by C. S. Lewis, is as
follows.29
1. There are objective moral laws.
2. Moral laws come from a moral lawgiver.
3. Therefore, a moral lawgiver exists.
Most of the atheists' objections to these arguments are traceable to the
writings of David Hume (1711-1776)30 and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).31 The
following is a summary of their objections.
Even if the universe has a cause, it need not be infinite. A finite cause
is adequate to explain a finite effect.
If there is a cause of the universe, then it cannot be perfect since the
world is imperfect. If a cause resembles its effects, then the world must
have been caused by an imperfect, finite, male and female group of gods.
In our own experience we know that causes of imperfect things are
themselves finite and imperfect.
There is no need to assume the existence of an intelligent cause
(designer) of the world; chance can explain the apparent design that the
world displays. Given enough time, any lucky combination will result. The
universe may be a happy accident.
There is no way to prove the principle of causality. We never experience
causal connections. We only see one event in nature followed by another
but never see it caused by another. For example, just because the sun
always rises after the rooster crows does not mean it rises because the
rooster crows.
It is possible to have an infinite series of causes. If everything is
caused, then we can go backward forever asking, "What caused that?" Hence,
there is no need to stop at a first, uncaused cause that necessarily
exists.
It is always possible to conceive of anything, including God, as not
existing. Hence, nothing exists necessarily. Therefore, even God must not
exist necessarily; hence, he cannot be a necessary being; hence, God must
not exist at all.
The concept of a necessary or uncaused being makes no sense. It is not
self-explanatory, nor can it be explained in terms of some other
condition. Hence, as an unconditioned concept, it has no conditions for
understanding it.
There cannot be a necessary being because no statements about existence
can be logically necessary. The opposite of any state of affairs is
logically possible. Therefore, no state of affairs is logically necessary.
The universe as a whole does not need a cause; only the parts do. The
parts depend on the whole universe, but the whole does not depend on
anything else.
All theistic arguments are based on the ontological argument. But this
argument is invalid because it assumes (wrongly) that existence is a
predicate or perfection which adds something to the concept of the
subject.
What is logically necessary does not necessarily exist. It is logically
necessary for a triangle to have three sides, but it is not necessary for
any three-sided thing to exist.
We cannot validly infer a real cause from effects that we experience.
There is an insurpassable gulf between the thing-to-me (appearances) and
the thing-in-itself (reality). We cannot know the latter; we know things
only as they appear to us but not as they really are.
Assuming that the principle of causality applies to reality leads to
contradictions. For example: there must be a first cause to initiate the
causality in a series; yet there cannot be a first cause since it too
needs a cause; and so on infinitely.
The Rejection of Theism
Not only have atheists agreed with skeptics and agnostics that the
arguments for theism fail to prove that God does exist, but some atheists
have also offered arguments to show that God does not exist.
A cosmological disproof of God32 can be stated in this manner:
1. God is a self-caused being.
2. But it is impossible to cause one's own being for a cause is prior
to its effect, and one cannot exist prior to one's existence.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
A teleological disproof of God33 can be stated as follows:
1. The universe either was designed or happened by chance.
2. Chance is an adequate cause of the universe.
3. Therefore, the universe need not have been designed.
One atheist has given an ontological disproof of God:34
1. God is by definition a necessary (uncaused) being.
2. But necessity cannot apply to being.
3. Therefore, God cannot exist.
In support of the crucial second premise, he noted that necessity is a
logical term, not an ontological one. That is, necessity applies to
propositions, not to being or reality.
A moral disproof of God's existence is by far the most popular. One of the
most popular versions of this argument is expressed in this way:35
1. If God were all-good, he would destroy evil.
2. If God were all-powerful, he could destroy evil.
3. But evil has not been destroyed.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.
There are, of course, other arguments against God's existence. But these
will suffice to illustrate the kind of reasoning atheists use to justify
their case.
The Tenets of Atheism
God does not exist. There is no God; only the world exists. God is an
invention of man. God did not create man; man created God. There are good
and sufficient reasons for believing that God does not exist. The fact of
evil in this world is one such reason.
The world is eternal. The universe has always existed. If it is not
eternal, then it came into existence out of nothing and by nothing. At any
rate, the universe was not created. It is self-sustaining and
self-perpetuating. As one nontheist put it, "The COSMOS is all there is,
all there was, and all there ever will be."36 If asked, "What caused the
world?" most atheists would reply, as did Bertrand Russell, that it was
not caused; it is just there. Only the parts of the universe need a cause.
The parts all depend on the whole, but the whole needs no cause. If we ask
for a cause for the universe, then we must ask for a cause for God. And if
we do not need a cause for God, then neither do we need one for the
universe.
If one insists that everything needs a cause, then the atheist simply
insists that one moves backward through an infinite series of causes
wherein he never arrives at a first cause (i.e., God). For if everything
must have a cause, then this first cause must have a cause. Thus, it
really is not first at all, nor is anything else.37
Evil exists. Unlike pantheists, who deny the reality of evil, atheists
strongly affirm it. In fact, while pantheists affirm the reality of God
and deny the reality of evil, atheists affirm the reality of evil and deny
the reality of God. They believe that theists are inconsistent in trying
to hold to the reality of both God and evil.
Man is material. Man is matter in motion. He has no immortal soul. There
is no mind apart from man's brain. Nor is there a soul independent of
man's body. While not all atheists are strict materialists who identify
the soul with the body, most do believe that if man has a soul, then it is
dependent on the body. The soul, in fact, dies when the body dies. The
soul and mind may be more than the body, the way a shadow is more than a
tree. But as the shadow of a tree ceases to exist when the tree does, so
too the soul does not survive the body's death.38
Ethics are relative. It is generally agreed among atheists that there are
no moral absolutes. Certainly there are no divinely authorized absolutes.
There may be some widely accepted and long-enduring values, but absolutely
binding laws would seem to imply an absolute lawgiver (i.e., God). Hence,
such laws are rejected by atheists.
Since values are not discovered by man from some revelation of God, they
must be created by man. Many atheists believe that values emerge by trial
and error. Often the right action is described in terms of what will bring
the greatest good in the long run.39 Some frankly acknowledge that
relative and changing situations determine what is right or wrong. Others
speak about expedient behavior (what "works"), and some work out their
whole ethic in terms of self-interest. But virtually all atheists
recognize that man must determine his own values, since there is no God to
reveal what is right and wrong. As the Humanist Manifesto put it,
"Humanism asserts that the nature of the universe depicted by modern
science makes unacceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantee of human
values."40
Man's destiny is death. Most atheists see no eternal destiny for
individual persons, though some speak of a kind of collective immortality
of the race. But the denial of individual immortality notwithstanding,
many atheists are Utopians who believe in an earthly paradise to come. In
Walden Two, B. F. Skinner proposed a behaviorally controlled utopia.41
Karl Marx believed an economic dialectic of history would inevitably
produce a communist paradise. Others, like Ayn Rand, believe that pure
capitalism could produce a more perfect society. And still others believe
that human reason and science can produce a social utopia. Virtually all
recognize the ultimate mortality of the human race but console themselves
in the belief that its destruction is millions of years away.
An Evaluation of Atheism
Some Contributions of Atheism
Atheists have provided many insights into the nature of reality. Several
are worthy of note here.
The presence of evil. Unlike pantheists, atheists do not ignore the
reality of evil. In fact, most atheists have a keen sensitivity to evil
and injustice. They rightly point to the imperfection of this present
world and to the need for injustice to be judged and corrected. In this
regard they are right that an all-loving, all-powerful God, if he existed,
would certainly do something about this situation.
Contradictions in some concepts of God. In contending that God is not
caused by another, some theists have spoken of God as though he were a
self-caused being (causa sui). This is certainly a contradiction, as
atheists have pointed out. No being can cause its own existence, since to
do this, the being would have to exist and not exist at the same time. To
cause existence is to move from nonexistence to existence. But
nonexistence cannot cause existence. Nothing cannot cause something.
Hence, to cause his own existence one would have had to exist prior to his
having existed, which is impossible. On this point atheists are right.
Positive human values. Many atheists are humanists. Along with others they
affirm the value of man and human culture. They earnestly pursue both the
arts and the sciences, as well as express deep concern in ethical issues.
Most atheists believe that racism, hatred, and bigotry are wrong. Most
atheists commend freedom and tolerance. Atheists are not without many
other positive human values and moral traits.42
The loyal opposition. Atheists serve another role: they are the loyal
opposition to theists and others who believe in some kind of God. It is
difficult for anyone to see the fallacies in his own thinking. Monologues
seldom produce a refined product of thought. Atheists serve as a
significant corrective to invalid reasoning by believers. Their arguments
against theism should cause dogmatic theists to pause and ponder their
beliefs and should help temper the zeal with which many believers glibly
dismiss unbelief. Without atheists, those who believe in God would lack a
significant opposition with which to have a dialogue and clarify their own
concepts of God.
Some Criticisms of Atheism
Despite the varied contributions of atheism, many believe that the
position that God does not exist lacks adequate rational support. First of
all, they point out that it is not sufficient to merely attack the
arguments for theism. Even if one could disprove the validity of theistic
arguments, this would not prove atheism, since there are other views that
accept non-theistic concepts of God. Furthermore, theists have given
answers to the atheists' objections to theism.
If the objections against theistic arguments are invalidated, then much of
the evidence for atheism fails. Therefore, we will first analyze the
alleged invalidity of the atheists' objections to theistic arguments,
considering them in the same order presented above.43
A finite cause needs an infinite cause. Contrary to the atheist, the
theist holds that one finite or contingent being cannot cause another for
the simple reason that everything cannot be contingent (dependent). There
must be at least one independent being on which all dependent beings
depend. Likewise, all beings cannot be effects; at least one being must be
the cause.
The principle of causality states only that "every finite (contingent,
dependent) being needs a cause." This means that the cause of all finite
beings cannot itself be finite. If it were, then it too would need a
cause. Therefore, the cause of all finite beings must be an infinite
being.44
The cause of the universe must be perfect. One can argue that if there
were no perfect standard by which we could measure things in the world, we
could not judge any of them to be imperfect. To say that something is not
perfect is to imply that we know what is perfect.45 Further, just because
imperfections have appeared in the universe does not mean they were made
imperfect initially, any more than the present imperfect state of medieval
works of art reflects their original condition.
Chance does not explain the origin of all things; an intelligent cause is
needed. The skeptic would not argue that the very words he uses to express
his skepticism are a purely chance product and not an expression of an
intelligent being. If he did claim this, then his words would have no
meaning and hence no truth value to refute theism. Neither would a
scientist claim that the presidential faces on Mount Rushmore were the
result of chance. Only intelligent intervention adequately explains these
results. Yet there is more information in DNA, the simplest form of life,
than in either the skeptic's words or Mount Rushmore. Hence, the theist
contends that only an intelligent creator is adequate to account for this
vast complexity of information in the code of life.46
The principle of causality does not need to be proven. Countering the
theist's claims, atheists often assert that every event has a cause. They
note that even the skeptic David Hume never denied the principle of
causality; he merely denied that it was either mathematically true or
provable by experience. In fact, Hume believed the principle of causality
was certain and that it would be absurd to deny it. He wrote:
I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise
without a cause: I only maintained, that our certainty of the falsehood of
that proceeded neither from intuition nor demonstration; but from another
source.47
Theists believe that it is absurd to deny causality because it would mean
that nothing produced something. But it takes something to produce
something.
It is not possible to have an actually infinite series of causes. Theists
have argued that abstract mathematical infinites are possible, but an
actual, concrete infinite series is not. For example, there is an infinite
number of mathematical points between the left end and the right end of a
book shelf, but one cannot get an infinite number of actual books, or even
sheets of paper, on the shelf, no matter how thin they are.48 Likewise,
there cannot be an actual infinite number of causes going back in space
and time. No matter how many causes one has, there could always be more.
But nothing can be longer than what is actually infinitely long. Hence, an
actual infinite number of events or causes is impossible.
It is logically possible that nothing ever existed, including a necessary
being. Most theists agree with atheists that it is possible for a
necessary being not to exist. If no world (including us right now and you
as you read this) ever existed, then it is also logically possible that no
necessary being ever existed. That is, it is logically possible that
nothing ever existed, including God. On this the atheists are right.
However, if there is a necessary being, then it is not possible that he
not exist, since, by definition, a necessary being cannot not exist. In
like manner, there need not be any triangular-shaped things in existence,
but if there are, then they must have three sides. In short, a logically
necessary being need not necessarily actually exist. But if an actually
necessary being exists, then it must necessarily actually exist. It cannot
not exist. Hence, the atheists' objection to the concept of a necessary
being applies only to a logically necessary being, not to an actually
necessary being.
The concept of necessary, or uncaused, being does make sense. A contingent
being is one that can not exist. A necessary being is one that cannot not
exist. Since the latter is logically and actually the opposite of the
other, then to reject the coherence of a necessary being would involve
rejecting the coherence of a contingent being. But those are the only two
kinds of being there can be. Hence, as theists point out, to reject the
meaningfulness of the concept of a necessary being would be to reject the
meaningfulness of all being. But to say that "all being is meaningless" is
to make a statement about being which purports to be meaningful. This is
self-defeating.
Another way that theists defend the meaningfulness of the concept of an
uncaused being is to point to the atheist's concept of an uncaused
universe. Most atheists believe that it is meaningful to speak of a
universe that had no cause but is simply there.49 But if the concept of an
uncaused universe is meaningful, then so is the concept of an uncaused
God. Both are uncaused beings.
Statements about existence can be necessary. Theists argue that if
statements about existence cannot be necessarily true, then neither can
the atheist's claim be true. That is, the claim that "there are no
existentially necessary statements" claims itself to be an existentially
necessary statement. If it is not, then it does not succeed in refuting
the theists' claim. Unless it really proves that no statements about
existence are necessarily true, then it follows that one such statement
may be true. But the statement that "no statements about existence are
necessarily true" is itself a statement about existence. Hence, if this
statement is necessarily true, then it defeats itself. And if it is not
necessarily true, it does not defeat theism. In either case the theist
insists that it fails to disestablish his claim.
The universe as a whole does need a cause. Theists argue that either the
whole universe is equal to all its parts or it is more than all its parts.
If it is equal to them, then it too needs a cause. Adding dependent parts
will never equal anything more than a dependent whole, no matter how big
it is. Adding up effects never yields a cause; it produces only a big pile
of effects. On the other hand, if the universe is more than all its
effects, then it must be uncaused and necessary. Since the effects (parts)
are caused and contingent, then the whole must be uncaused and necessary.
(If the whole were not uncaused, then it too would be caused and
contingent just like all the parts of the universe.) But to claim that
there is a something more, transcendent, uncaused, and necessary, on which
everything in the universe is dependent, is to claim exactly the same
thing the theist means by a necessary being on which all contingent beings
depend for their existence.
The theist asks the nontheist: If everything in the universe-every
contingent being-suddenly ceased to exist, would there be anything left in
existence? If not, then the universe as a whole is contingent too, since
the existence of the whole is dependent on the parts. But if something
remained after every contingent part of the universe suddenly ceased to
exist, then there really is a transcendent, necessary, uncaused something
which is not dependent on the universe for its existence. In either case,
the theist contends that the atheist's claim fails.
All arguments for God's existence are not based on an invalid ontological
argument. First of all, most theists believe that the ontological argument
need not assume that existence is a perfection or predicate that adds to
the concept of the subject. Existence does not have to be a predicate; one
can simply say that everything that exists must be predicated according to
one or more modes of existence (for example, contingently, necessarily, or
impossibly).50
Further, all one needs to do is begin with an ontological definition of
God in which God is defined as a necessary being, not an ontological
argument for God.51 It is no more illegitimate to define God before one
seeks to discover whether he exists than it is to describe a mermaid
before one goes deep sea diving in search of one.
The theistic argument for God is parallel to the argument for a
three-sided object, which can be stated as follows:
1. If there is a triangular object, then it must have three sides.
2. This three-sided imprint in concrete is evidence for the existence
of a triangular object.
3. Therefore, a three-sided object exists.
Likewise,
1. If God exists, then he must necessarily (independently) exist.
2. The existence of contingent (dependent) being(s) is evidence that a
necessary being exists.
3. Therefore, a necessary being necessarily exists.
Thus, the argument for God's existence does not depend on the ontological
argument. Rather, it depends on the validity of the cosmological inference
that every contingent being must have a necessary being as its cause.
It is true, but irrelevant, that what is logically necessary does not
necessarily exist. Theists do not need to argue, and most don't, that
because it is logically necessary to define God as a necessary being, then
such a being must exist. Rather, most theists insist that the existence of
contingent being(s) is evidence that a necessary being exists. But not all
theists insist that a logically necessary being demands that it actually
exist, any more than the logical necessity that triangles have three sides
demands that some triangular object actually exists. In short, this
objection of atheism applies only to an ontological argument, not to a
cosmological argument.
Causes can be validly inferred from effects. Theists insist that if this
were not true, then we could not validly infer that there was an atheist's
mind behind the atheist's thoughts and objections. Furthermore, even the
atheist assumes that there is a real theist's mind (cause) behind the
theist's writings (effects). He does not assume that the cause is only
apparent and not real; he assumes that it takes a real mind (cause) to
produce real effects (writings).
In fact, the whole distinction between the thing-to-me (appearance) and
the thing-in-itself (reality) is self-defeating. The very distinction
between appearance and reality presupposes that we can know something
about reality. Otherwise, how could one make such a distinction?52 The
only way one can say that the line ends at a particular point is if one
can see beyond it. Likewise, one must know where appearance ends and
reality begins in order to draw the line. In short, one cannot deny all
connection between reality and appearance unless he knows some connection
between them.
The principle of causality does not lead to contradictions. According to
theists, the nontheist misunderstands the principle of causality. He
assumes, wrongly, that the principle insists that "every thing has a
cause." If this were true, then it would follow that one should never stop
seeking a cause, even for God. However, this is not what most theists mean
by the principle of causality. The principle need not be stated as "every
being has a cause": rather, it is "every finite, or contingent, being has
a cause." Thus, there is no contradiction between a first cause, which is
infinite, and the principle of causality which holds that all finite
beings need a cause. Once one arrives at an infinite and necessary being,
there is no need to seek a further cause. A necessary being needs no cause
for its own existence. It exists because it must exist. It cannot not
exist. Only what can not exist (namely, a contingent being) needs an
explanation of why it exists rather than not existing. Therefore, it is
meaningless to ask of a necessary being why it exists rather than not
existing. That would be similar to asking why circles must be round. They
just are.
Now that we have discussed the theistic response to the atheists'
arguments against theism, let us consider the theistic reply to the
arguments for atheism. According to theists:
The ontological disproof fails. Theists claim that the ontological
disproof of God boomerangs. In order for it to be a real disproof, it must
be necessarily true. But if it is a necessarily true statement about
reality that no necessarily true statements about reality can be made,
then the proof destroys itself by being an example of what it claims is
impossible. On the other hand, if atheists claim that the statement that
no necessarily true statements about reality can be made is not
necessarily true, then it is no longer a disproof because it might be
wrong.
The cosmological disproof fails. Theists contend that the cosmological
disproof for God fails because it wrongly assumes that God must be defined
as a self-caused being. However, God is not a self-caused being; God can
be an uncaused being. This is precisely what classical theism means by
God's aseity (self-existence).53 God is the uncaused cause of all else
that exists. Certainly no atheist who believes that the universe is
uncaused can claim that the concept of an uncaused being is meaningless.
If it is meaningful to speak of an uncaused universe, then certainly it is
meaningful to refer to an uncaused God.
The teleological disproof fails. The problem with the teleological
disproof is that, at best, it shows only a possibility of a chance origin
of the universe, not the necessity of a chance origin. Simply because it
is logically and mathematically possible for the universe to have taken
its present shape without an intelligent cause, it does not unequivocally
follow that it actually did. We could all agree that it is mathematically
possible for a dictionary to result from an explosion in a printing shop.
But if repeated observations in the present are the key to events of the
past, then we have grounds for believing that a dictionary was not really
formed that way.
Put another way, based on observations in the present, it seems more
likely that some intelligent being created the human brain, which contains
more genetic information than all the major libraries of the world, than
that purely nonintelligent forces caused its development. It is a repeated
observed fact that it takes intelligence to convey information.54 For
example, if we were to see a simple message, such as "drink Coke," written
in the sky, we would immediately assume it was produced by an intelligent
source, even if we could not see an airplane. Certainly, we must also
conclude that the presence of highly complex information, such as that
found in the DNA of living things, indicates an intelligent source that
produced it.
The moral disproof fails.55 Despite their popularity as arguments against
God, theists hold that the moral disproofs are also self-defeating. For
example, if "destroy" means "annihilate," it becomes obvious that God
cannot destroy evil without destroying the basis for morality (that is,
the free moral agent). In other words, as long as a free agent decides to
do evil, then the only way for God to destroy evil is to destroy the free
agent's ability to make free moral choices. But once the very basis for
morality is destroyed, it is senseless to speak of a moral problem of
evil. There can be a moral problem only if there are moral beings. But if
man is only a robot with no free choice, then there is no moral problem.
Hence, there is no basis for asking why God does not destroy the morally
bad situation called evil.
On the other hand, if "destroy" merely means "defeat," without
annihilating free choice, then the atheist's argument still fails. In this
case the atheist assumes, wrongly, that evil never will be defeated. But
he could know this for sure only if he were omniscient. Therefore, he
would have to presume to be God in order to disprove God. This problem can
be clarified by making explicit something that is implied in the argument:
1. If God were all-good, he would defeat evil.
2. If God were all-powerful, he could defeat evil.
3. But evil is not yet defeated.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.
Once the time factor is made explicit in premise 3, a possibility of
escape from the atheist's conclusion emerges: God may yet defeat evil in
the future;56 therefore, it may be too early to retire God. And as long as
there is a possibility that God will put away evil in the future, one need
not conclude that God does not exist based on the existence of evil in the
world.
There is, of course, a way to plug up this possibility. The atheist could
substitute a new premise for 3 that reads:
3. But evil is not yet defeated, and it never will be.
This would make the argument valid. However, this new premise raises
another problem: How can one know for certain that evil will never be
defeated in the future unless he is omniscient? That is, how can any
finite being know for sure what will happen in the future? The fact that
evil has not been defeated up to this point does not establish beyond all
doubt that it will not ultimately be destroyed, just as the fact that the
world has not yet come to an end does not prove that it never will. So the
theist insists that the atheist's argument fails to disprove God.
Many other forms of the moral argument against God have been offered, but
these have similar results. The following is broadly representative of
such attempts:
1. An all-good God must have a good purpose for everything.
2. But some evil has no good purpose (e.g., rape or cruelty).
3. Therefore, no all-good God exists.
According to theists, the problem with this form of the argument is that
it confuses these two premises.57
a. There is no good purpose for some evil (an absolute statement of
fact based on having total knowledge).
b. I know of no good purpose for some evil (a statement based on
limited knowledge).
Since no finite person can claim to have total knowledge, we must all
concede that there may be some good purpose for evil even if no believer
in God knows what it is.58 It is possible that there is a God who knows
what this purpose is. In fact, if an all-knowing, all-loving God exists,
then it is necessary that there is a good purpose for all evil. If he did
not have such a purpose in mind for allowing evil, then he would not be
all-knowing and all-loving.
Here again, theists contend that the only way the atheist can succeed at
his argument is to assume omniscience and affirm that he knows with all
certainty that God could not possibly have a good purpose for all evil.
But here too the atheist must assume to be God in order to disprove God.
Therefore, it seems that atheists' objections to theistic arguments are
not valid. Likewise, their arguments to support atheism seem to lack a
solid foundation. This does not mean that there is no truth to anything
atheists claim. There are many positive values to what atheists believe,
including the reality of the material world and the affirmation of moral
principles. However, the basic position of atheism-that no God
exists-appears less than proven.
This does not mean that no one can believe the principles of atheism. They
obviously can, and many do. It simply means that atheism has not
conclusively established itself as true in relationship to other world
views. The door is still open for further exploration concerning whether
some kind of God exists.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further Reading
Atheism Explained
Altizer, Thomas J. J. The Gospel of Christian Atheism. Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1966.
Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover, 1946.
Camus, Albert. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays. Translated by Justin
O'Brien. New York: Vintage, 1955.
Fromm, Erich. Marx's Concept of Man. New York: Unger, 1966.
Huxley, Julian. Religion Without Revelation. New York: New American
Library, 1957.
Kurtz, Paul. A Secular Humanist Declaration. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1980.
Kurtz, Paul, ed. The Humanist Alternative: Some Definitions of Humanism.
Buffalo: Prometheus, 1973.
--, ed. Humanist Manifestos I and II. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1973.
Marx, Karl. The Portable Karl Marx. Edited by Eugene Kamenka. New York:
Penguin, 1983.
Nielsen, Kai. Ethics Without God. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1973.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Portable Nietzsche. Edited by Walter Kaufmann.
New York: Penguin, 1982.
Rand, Ayn. For the New Intellectual. New York: New American Library, 1961.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. Translated by Hazel E. Bames.
New York: Philosophical Library, 1956.
-- Essays in Existentialism. Edited by Wade Baskin. Secaucus: Citadel,
1974.
Stein Gordon, ed. An Anthology of Atheism and Rationalism. Buffalo:
Prometheus, 1984.
Atheism Evaluated
Craig, William Lane. The Kalam Cosmological Argument. London: Macmillan,
1979.
Ehrenfeld, David. The Arrogance of Humanism. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1981.
Evans, C. Stephen. Existentialism: The Philosophy of Despair and the Quest
Of Hope. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984.
Geisler, Norman L. Is Man the Measure? An Evaluation of Contemporary
Humanism. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983.
-- The Roots of Evil. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978.
Habermas, Gary R., and Antony Flew. Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The
Resurrection Debate. Edited by Terry L. Miethe. San Francisco: Harper and
Row, 1987.
Hackett, Stuart C. The Reconstruction of the Christian Revelation Claim: A
Philosophical and Critical Apologetic. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984.
Hartshorne, Charles. Beyond Humanism: Essays in the Philosophy of Nature.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1937.
Lewis, C. S. The Abolition of Man. New York: Macmillan, 1947.
-- The Problem of Pain. New York: Macmillan, 1940.
Moreland, J. P. Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity. Grand
Rapids: Baker, 1987.
Morey, Robert A. The New Atheism and the Erosion of Freedom. Minneapolis:
Bethany House, 1986.
Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974.
Varghese, Roy Abraham, ed. The Intellectuals Speak Out About God. Chicago:
Regnery Gateway, 1984.
[1]
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5 See Thomas J. J. Altizer, The Gospel of Christian Atheism (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1966).
6 See Paul Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel (New York:
Macmillan, 1963).
7 See A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover, 1946),
chapter 1.
8 See Ayn Rand, For the New Intellectual (New York: New American Library,
1961).
9 See Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott
(New York: Doubleday, 1957); B. F. Skinner, About Behaviorism (New York:
Knopf, 1974).
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (Chicago: Henry Regnery,
1966), section 21, p. 23.
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann
(New York: Viking, 1966), prologue 3, p. 125.
12 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, section 187, p. 93.
13 Ibid., section 220, pp. 92-94.
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, trans. H. L. Mencken (New York: Knopf
1920), p. 230.
15 This whole idea is embodied in the book Nietzsche wrote by the same
title.
16 Nietzsche, The Will to Power.
17 Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, p. 18.
18 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, pp. 18, 19.
19 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), p. 12.
20 Ibid., p. 15.
21 Feuerbach, quoted in "An Introductory Essay," ibid., p. xi.
22 Ibid., pp. 29-32.
23 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New
York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 755-68.
24 Sartre, The Flies, in No Exit and Three Other Plays (New York: Vintage,
1947), pp. 121-23.
25 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 767.
26 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.2.3 in The Basic Writings of St.
Thomas Aquinas, trans. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1944).
27 See William Paley, Natural Theology (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1963), chapter 1.
28 This form follows what is sometimes considered Anselm's first statement
of the argument. See Saint Anselm, Proslogium, in St. Anselm: Basic
Writings, trans. S. N. Deane (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962), pp.
153-61.
29 See C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan,
1952), book 1, chapters 1-5.
30 Hume's objections are spelled out in his Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) as well as in his Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955).
31 Kant's objections are found in his Critique of Pure Reason, trans. L.
W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950).
32 See Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington
Square Press, 1966), pp. 758, 762.
33 See Hume, Dialogues, part 8.
34 See J. N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence Be Disproved?" in The
Ontological Argument: From St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers, ed.
Alvin Plantinga (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1965), pp.
111-12.
35 See Pierre Bayle, Selections from Bayle's Dictionary, trans. R. H.
Popkin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 157-58.
36 See Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 4.
37 Carl Sagan, Broca's Brain (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 287.
38 This view is called epiphenominalism.
39 This view is called utilitarianism. It was developed by John Stuart
Mill, Utilitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1962), chapter 2.
40 See Paul Kurtz, ed.. Humanist Manifestos I and II (Buffalo: Prometheus,
1973).
41 B. F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York: Macmillan, 1976), p. 182.
42 For a more detailed description of the values of atheistic forms of
humanism, see Norman L. Geisler, Is Man the Measure? An Evaluation of
Contemporary Humanism (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983), chapter 9.
43 For a parallel discussion to these objections, see Norman L. Geisler
and Winfried Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker,
1974), pp.191-207.
44 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.7.1 and 2 in Basic Writings of
St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Anton C. Regis (New York: Random House, 1944),
pp. 56-58.
45 This point has been made by many theists including Augustine, Anselm,
and more recently by Lewis in Mere Christianity, book 1, chapter 2.
46 The information in a single-celled organism would fill a whole volume
of an encyclopedia. And the genetic information in the human brain would
fill all the books in all the major libraries of the world (see Sagan,
Cosmos, p. 278).
47 David Hume, The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, 2 vols.
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1932), 1:187.
48 This argument has a long tradition among Arabian and Christian theists.
See William Lane Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument (London:
Macmillan, 1979), part 1.
49 Bertrand Russell and F. C. Copleston, "A Debate on the Existence of
God," in The Existence of God, ed. John Hick (New York: Macmillan, 1964),
p. 175.
50 See Charles Hartshorne, "The Necessarily Existent" in The Ontological
Argument: From St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers, ed. Alvin
Plantinga (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 129, 130.
51 This point is developed more fully in Norman L. Geisler, Christian
Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976), pp. 237-40.
52 See Stuart C. Hackett, The Resurrection of Theism: Prolegomena to
Christian Apology, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker; 1982), pp. 54, 60, 62, 65.
53 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.9 and 10, ibid., pp. 70-82.
54 Herbert Yockey has shown that there is a mathematically identical
relation between the information in a written language (which we know
comes from intelligent beings) and the information in the DNA of a living
cell. See "Self Organization, Origin of Life Scenarios and Information
Theory" in The Journal of Theoretical Biology 91 (1981): 13-31.
55 For a more detailed discussion of the many forms of the arguments for
evil, see Norman L. Geisler, The Roots of Evil (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1978)
56 This point is made effectively by C. S. Lewis in The Great Divorce (New
York: Macmillan, 1946). See especially pp. 69, 124.
57 See George Mavrodes, Belief in God: A Study of the Epistemology of
Religion (New York: Random House, 1970), chapter 4.
58 Theists claim to know of many purposes or results for many kinds of
evil. For example, warning pains have a good purpose. Tribulation often
produces patience. Some evils are necessary by-products of the abuse of
good things. For example, indigestion is an inevitable by-product of
abusing the freedom to eat; hangovers are by-products of misusing the
freedom to drink alcohol. Some consider these to be good by-products in
that they remind or admonish us to use our freedoms wisely. Since there
are good results of many evils, then theists concede that there may be
good results for all evils. If this is so, then the definitive case
against God from the presence of evil fails.
[1]Geisler, N. L., Geisler, N. L., & Watkins, W. D. (1989). Worlds apart :
A handbook on world views. Rev. ed. of: Perspectives, c1984.; Includes
indexes. (2nd ed.) (46). Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House.
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