From:

It didn't. Saddam bribed UN officials, France, & Russia in the Food For Oil
scandal. It allowed him to amass millions of dollars to restart his wmd
program. It was the first step. Quoting the Duelfer report: "Saddam had every
intent of restarting the program. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear
capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure
and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic
missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities."

[snip your cherry picking]

Good grief, Saddam was not a nuclear threat when we invaded,
correct? That was the context of the second question.
Saddam can be a threat to a strategically vital region of
the US without being a nuclear threat.

Well, Charlie Brown, the issue is what Kerry thought at the time of the
invasion, not after the fact. And before the invasion he believed Saddam was a
nuclear threat. But for him, and you, to argue that he was not a threat after
the fact is more then a bit disingenous.
http://www.c-span.org/vote2004/kerryspeech.asp

So, I guess the question is whether Kerry was lying then or was is he lying
now.

Now let's see some more of the Duelfer Key findings:

Key Findings
Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his
alone. He wanted to end sanctions while preserving the capability to
reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when
sanctions were lifted.

* Saddam totally dominated the Regime's strategic decision making. He
initiated most of the strategic thinking upon which decisions were made,
whether in matters of war and peace (such as invading Kuwait),
maintaining WMD as a national strategic goal, or on how Iraq was to position
itself in the international community. Loyal dissent was discouraged and
constructive variations to the implementation of his wishes on
strategic issues were rare. Saddam was the Regime in a strategic sense and his
intent became Iraq's strategic policy.

* Saddam's primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to have UN sanctions lifted,
while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need to
cooperate with UN inspections-to gain support for lifting sanctions-with his
intention to preserve Iraq's intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of
foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the
end of the Regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or
otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and
jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring.

* The introduction of the Oil-For-Food program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key
turning point for the Regime. OFF rescued Baghdad's economy from a terminal
decline created by sanctions. The Regime quickly came to see that OFF could be
corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and
to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential
WMD-related development.

* By 2000-2001, Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions
and undermine their international support. Iraq was within striking distance of
a de facto end to the sanctions regime, both in
terms of oil exports and the trade embargo, by the end of 1999. Saddam wanted
to recreate Iraq's WMD capability-which was essentially destroyed in 1991-after
sanc-
tions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized, but probably with a different
mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to
develop a nuclear capability-in an incremental fashion,
irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks-but he
intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW)
capabilities.

* Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi
officials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region. The wish
to balance Israel and acquire status and in uence in the Arab world were also
considerations, but secondary.

* Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s
shaped Saddam's belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam's view, WMD helped to
save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war
chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic
missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during
Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing
their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role
in crushing the Shi'a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire.

* The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of
WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifi able group of WMD policy
makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieu-
tenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with
Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them.

Subject: Re: Favorite Part of the Debate
From: waitingforgodot@samuel.beckett
Date: 10/11/2004 12:03 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id: <57mlm0tnqjlo24brbqqpadg94ngq9odcb6@4ax.com>

On Mon, 11 Oct 2004 16:43:33 GMT,

<(((*> Good grief, Saddam was not a nuclear threat when we invaded,
<(((*> correct? That was the context of the second question.
<(((*> Saddam can be a threat to a strategically vital region of
<(((*> the US without being a nuclear threat.

Logic is not her strong point.

Tara J. Ballance
Montreal, Canada