On Jul 14, 4:58 am, "Larry Hewitt" <larryh...@comporium.net> wrote:

<hiroshima_fa...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1184381199.541749.204760@22g2000hsm.googlegroups.com...

However, the casualty rates projected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
pointed to 1,200,000 American casualties (including 267,000
fatalities) for the invasion of southern Kyushu and then the Tokyo
Plain.

Nope.

You are wrong. That is what the projected rates by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff pointed to. And this was before they knew of the huge
military buildup in southern Kyushu. Estimates based on knowledge of
the buildup waiting on southern Kyushu would have been far higher.

And had Japan not surrendered even after we took Tokyo, the casualty
rate would have kept climbing beyond that.

But regardless, it doesn't matter whether Truman got the numbers right
or not. All the historians make it quite clear that the main motive
for dropping the bombs was to try to make Japan surrender. They
couldn't do otherwise given all the evidence that this was the main
concern. Even if Truman did get the estimate of potential casualties
wrong, ending the war was still his motive.


.

As I stated, based on casualty rates, particularly those of the invasion
of
Olinawa and Iwo Jima, army planners at the time put the casualty rate at
between 250,000 and 500,000. Much of that number was naval personnel, and
could not be definitely quantified because it was not known how long
Japan
could continue the intensive kamikaze attacks.

Yes, people made a variety of estimates. Some were low. But that
does not change the fact that other estimates were high.


.

Somwehow the higher 500,000 figure, not the range, became dogme. And
then,
as I noted, Truman apparntly rounded up the half million to a full
million.

When Truman spoke of a million lives, he was likely thinking of taking
all of Japan by force, not just southern Kyushu and the Tokyo Plain.


.

The War Department had a study commissioned to determine the cost of
taking all of Japan by force (not just southern Kyushu and the Tokyo
Plain). That study came back with 1,700,000 to 4,000,000 American
casualties (including 400,000 to 800,000 fatalities).

Never a serious study.

It was serious enough for the War Department to consider it.


.

Also, the estimates for the cost of taking southern Kyushu were made
before we saw the massive troop buildup on the island to repel our
invasion.

Except the Jpanaes home islands were isolated by summer of '45. aaThe
bulk
off the Japanese army and the navy special (ground) forces were stranded
on
the continent or on bypassed Islands and could not get home. This
"massive
builduop" was little more than a citzens militia, poorly armed,
untrained,
hungry, and poorly motivated.

No, the massive buildup was the Japanese Army, not a citizen militia.
They were not trying to get home. They were waiting to fight to the
death when our troops came ashore.


.

By this time the isol;ation of Japan was nearly compl;ete. Imports o d
oil,
coal, iron ore and other essentials, thanks mostly to subnarine
interdiction, were limited to the fes remain small freighters (the tanker
fleet was just about totally destroyed) slipping accros the sea of japan.

The fleet stayed in port to be destoryed at the docks because they didn;t
have the oil to sortie them for even a kamikaze run.

Between the incesant bombing campaign and the lack of raw materials
Jpans
mettalurgy production was near zero. All major manufacturing was
destroyed

This wouldn't stop the 900,000 troops in southern Kyushu from fighting
our soldiers as they came ashore.


.

--- again, note that Hiroshima and Nagasaki _were not_ militarily
important targets, but were te most intact sities left.

When the targets for the A-bombs were selected, the firebombing
campaign had only destroyed a handful of Japanese cities.


.

What historians will also tell you is that a surrender was in
negotiation
in
early august, and that plans for dropping hte bomb were rushed before
Japan
actually surrenedered --- especially the Nagasaki bomb.

I doubt any historian would say that.

Doubt all you want, its true.

The record is quite clear on when Japan contacted us.

No historian would make such an obvious blunder as to claim that Japan
contacted us before August 10.


.

The Emperor was even l;etting it be known that he wanted the war to end,

Wanting the war to end and doing something to end the war are two
different things.

The war was not going to end until he actually did something to end
it. He only did so after Nagasaki was bombed.


.

Part of the problem was the insistence on "unconditinal" surrender. The
royalists wanted some assurance that th emperor would remain and
berespected. A minor demand to end a war, _if_ Truman was really
interested
in a negotiated peace.

That was a minor problem.

A much bigger problem was the demand of the Japanese Army that there
be no surrender until after their troops in southern Kyushu had had an
opportunity to kill our troops as they came ashore.

Another big problem was the demands of the Japanese Army that the
surrender terms include:

a) no occupation of Japan
b) Japan be in charge of any war crimes trials
c) Japanese troops simply pack up and go home instead of surrendering
and being disarmed.


It was only on August 10 that the position of the Emperor became the
"only" sticking point.


.

The first time the government of Japan contacted us about any sort of
surrender was the day after Nagasaki was bombed.

Nope AS I noted, surrender terms and arpelies had been exchanged since
summer.

You are wrong. Japan did not contact us about surrender until August
10.


.

Before that date, the Japanese Army was insisting that there be no
surrender negotiations until after the 900,000 soldiers they had
waiting in southern Kyushu had had an opportunity to slaughter our
troops as they came ashore.

Absurd.

The demands of the Japanese Army were certainly absurd, but they made
the demands nonetheless.

Had the Japanese Army been more realistic, Japan may well have avoided
getting nuked.


.

What hsitorians will tell you is that by the time the bombs were
dropped
there were not major Japanexe targets, that Hiroshima and Nagasake
were
not
industiral or military targets ( that is why the conventional bombing
campaign bypassed them)

No, the historians who address that issue tend to be clear on the
military values of the targets.

Nope,

Hiroshima was a minor supply and command center.

Hiroshima was Japan's largest military town. Hiroshima's military
districts held tens of thousands of soldiers (giving it the highest
soldier/civilian ratio of any Japanese city). Hiroshima also held the
headquarters of the Japanese Second General Army, which was in charge
of repelling any US invasion of the southern half of the Japanese home
islands (including Kyushu, where we were planning to invade next).


.

Aside from the prot Nagasaki had little militaryvalue.

Nagasaki was targeted because of the massive Mitsubishi Shipyards
across the bay from the city.


.

Hiroshima was Japan's largest military town. Hiroshima's military
districts held tens of thousands of soldiers (giving it the highest
soldier/civilian ratio of any Japanese city). Hiroshima also held the
headquarters of the Japanese Second General Army, which was in charge
of repelling any US invasion of the southern half of the Japanese home
islands (including Kyushu, where we were planning to invade next).

Nope.

You are wrong. The above is an accurate description of the city.


.

Especially by 8/45 Hiroshima was a minor logistics and supply point. It
_had_ been an assembly point for troops headed overseas.

There were 43,000 soldiers in the city the day it was nuked.

Almost half of them were killed by the bomb.


.

But army command _knew_ that the sity ad little military value, judging
as
early as June that leaving the city unscathed by conventional attacks to
better judge the effects of the bomb would have little impact on the war.

The US government was aware of the soldiers in the city. They were
also aware that the city held the headquarters of the Japanese Second
General Army, which was in charge of repelling any US invasion of the
southern half of the Japanese home islands.

They left the city alone because it was off limits once selected as an
A-bomb target.


.

The second bomb was intended for Kokura Arsenal, a massive (4100' x
2000') arms-production complex. The secondary target was the
Mitsubishi Shipyards, a massive warship construction facility across
the bay from Nagasaki. Due to technical and weather difficulties, the
bomb ended up being dropped on Urakami, an industrial zone north of
Nagasaki. There it destroyed the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works, and
the Mitsubishi Torpedo Works.

Nope. That was one of the 4 original targets recommended by the Los
Alamos
Target Committee that was turned down by Washington.

Washington did not turn down the list. There was a bit of a squabble
over Kyoto, which the Secretary of War removed from the list, but
otherwise the list was accepted by Washington.


.

Before Japan attacked us, Pearl Harbor had been regarded as immune to
air-dropped torpedoes because the water was so shallow the torpedoes
would hit the ocean floor and embed themselves in the mud. This was
the only harbor in the world (outside Japan) that had such a natural
defense against air-dropped torpedoes. In order to attack us, Japan
had to develop entirely new torpedo technology designed specifically
for Pearl Harbor. The Mitsubishi Torpedo Works is the place that
designed and built those torpedoes.

So what?

So that factory was not a civilian target.


.

We had already tested the bombs -- the trinity test in New Mexico.