| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"Sir Frederick" |
| Date: |
26 Sep 2005 06:01:38 AM |
| Object: |
Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
Achromatopes : those without the delusional color qualia use other
colorless cues. (I know proving a negative is difficult, but examples
help.)
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0375700730/qid=1127730337/sr=1-11/ref=sr_1_11/002-2680023-7750443?v=glance&s=books
"The Island of the Colorblind"
by Oliver Sacks
Reader Review :
Having thoroughly enjoyed 'The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat' I opted to make this my second Dr. Sacks outing. Once again the
good doctor provides compelling, humane, interesting stories about odd physiological conditions and the cultures that foster and
contend with them. In multiple episodes that have him traveling to small volcanic islands in Micronesia, the entertaining
neurologist studies a group of people who have been born without the ability to see color. Accompanying him is a Nordic specialist
in this genetic trait, and one who also happens to share the same condition. As the troupe moves about the islands, they meet and
talk with the achromatopes; the natives and Knut evince a feeling of camaraderie. Dr. Sacks plumbs their depths to hear them
describe their world in terms of textures and monochrome shades, completely barren of color. Along the way, he experiences a taste
of their 'night' lives, the skills they have developed to compensate for their lack of color sight. The next topic in the island
hopping takes them to Guam where Sacks sees the patients of an associate who suffer from lytico-bodig, a degenerative condition
which causes paralysis [not unlike Dr. Sacks' own neurological patients] and eventual dissolution. Having struck only a certain age
bracket on the islands, the mysterious disease has confounded science for almost four decades and has almost killed off its victims.
Finally, he treks to Rota to walk among the ancient Cycad plants that have captured his imagination since childhood. This novel
appealed to the adventurer's spirit while I was reading it, listening to Dr. Sacks describes the beauty of the island culture and
the supremely languid pace of life. Dr. Sacks' writing is not only aesthetically entertaining, but his case studies continue to
pique the interest of the intellect. However, one is never so bowled over by the beauty of the surroundings as to forget the real
human cases being presented. It is indeed an odd combination, this beauty and tragedy, but one that works very well in this novel
producing an enjoyable read.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcneill@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
http://members.cox.net/fmmcneill
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"Discovery consists of seeing what everybody has
seen and thinking what nobody has thought."
-- Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (1893-1986)
:-))))Snort!)
**************************************
.
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| User: "Edgar Svendsen" |
|
| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 10:02:26 AM |
|
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"Sir Frederick" <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:nojfj19r0f46b23vjaj7q5o4tf7gkneoa2@4ax.com...
Achromatopes : those without the delusional color qualia use other
colorless cues. (I know proving a negative is difficult, but examples
help.)
I'm confused. There may be a sense in which color qualia are delusional,
but, for me, there is a more important sense in which color qualia
correspond to measurable (i.e. "real") aspects of the world. If I see a
traffic light, and my color blind chauffer asks "What color is it?" and I
answer "It's red", how am I deluded? We stop and don't get nailed by cross
traffic.
Maybe it would be more accurate to say "partly delusional color qualia" if
you're convinced there is a delusional element?
Ed
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0375700730/qid=1127730337/sr=1-11/ref=sr_1_11/002-2680023-7750443?v=glance&s=books
"The Island of the Colorblind"
by Oliver Sacks
Reader Review :
Having thoroughly enjoyed 'The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat' I opted
to make this my second Dr. Sacks outing. Once again the
good doctor provides compelling, humane, interesting stories about odd
physiological conditions and the cultures that foster and
contend with them. In multiple episodes that have him traveling to small
volcanic islands in Micronesia, the entertaining
neurologist studies a group of people who have been born without the
ability to see color. Accompanying him is a Nordic specialist
in this genetic trait, and one who also happens to share the same
condition. As the troupe moves about the islands, they meet and
talk with the achromatopes; the natives and Knut evince a feeling of
camaraderie. Dr. Sacks plumbs their depths to hear them
describe their world in terms of textures and monochrome shades,
completely barren of color. Along the way, he experiences a taste
of their 'night' lives, the skills they have developed to compensate for
their lack of color sight. The next topic in the island
hopping takes them to Guam where Sacks sees the patients of an associate
who suffer from lytico-bodig, a degenerative condition
which causes paralysis [not unlike Dr. Sacks' own neurological patients]
and eventual dissolution. Having struck only a certain age
bracket on the islands, the mysterious disease has confounded science for
almost four decades and has almost killed off its victims.
Finally, he treks to Rota to walk among the ancient Cycad plants that have
captured his imagination since childhood. This novel
appealed to the adventurer's spirit while I was reading it, listening to
Dr. Sacks describes the beauty of the island culture and
the supremely languid pace of life. Dr. Sacks' writing is not only
aesthetically entertaining, but his case studies continue to
pique the interest of the intellect. However, one is never so bowled over
by the beauty of the surroundings as to forget the real
human cases being presented. It is indeed an odd combination, this beauty
and tragedy, but one that works very well in this novel
producing an enjoyable read.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcneill@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
http://members.cox.net/fmmcneill
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"Discovery consists of seeing what everybody has
seen and thinking what nobody has thought."
-- Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (1893-1986)
:-))))Snort!)
**************************************
.
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| User: "Sir Frederick" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 10:18:24 AM |
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On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 15:02:26 GMT, "Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote:
"Sir Frederick" <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:nojfj19r0f46b23vjaj7q5o4tf7gkneoa2@4ax.com...
Achromatopes : those without the delusional color qualia use other
colorless cues. (I know proving a negative is difficult, but examples
help.)
I'm confused. There may be a sense in which color qualia are delusional,
but, for me, there is a more important sense in which color qualia
correspond to measurable (i.e. "real") aspects of the world. If I see a
traffic light, and my color blind chauffer asks "What color is it?" and I
answer "It's red", how am I deluded? We stop and don't get nailed by cross
traffic.
Maybe it would be more accurate to say "partly delusional color qualia" if
you're convinced there is a delusional element?
Ed
My sole motivation in pursuing these topics is how
to build machine intelligences that also experience subjective
events and processes as we biological intelligences do.
Nomenclature is important in understanding.
If we can't understand the subjective then we must accept
magic. I am willing to do that, but then it must be shown how
to implement that in the machines.
Without magic (whatever that is?), then I surmise delusion.
I know how to build delusions in machines. I go with
the nomenclature I can implement, thus delusion.
.
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| User: "Edgar Svendsen" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 08:48:47 PM |
|
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"Sir Frederick" <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:4l3gj1lrp463t5fqfg723uhn1tehhltjj5@4ax.com...
On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 15:02:26 GMT, "Edgar Svendsen"
<solon013@earthlink.net> wrote:
"Sir Frederick" <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:nojfj19r0f46b23vjaj7q5o4tf7gkneoa2@4ax.com...
Achromatopes : those without the delusional color qualia use other
colorless cues. (I know proving a negative is difficult, but examples
help.)
I'm confused. There may be a sense in which color qualia are delusional,
but, for me, there is a more important sense in which color qualia
correspond to measurable (i.e. "real") aspects of the world. If I see a
traffic light, and my color blind chauffer asks "What color is it?" and I
answer "It's red", how am I deluded? We stop and don't get nailed by
cross
traffic.
Maybe it would be more accurate to say "partly delusional color qualia" if
you're convinced there is a delusional element?
Ed
My sole motivation in pursuing these topics is how
to build machine intelligences that also experience subjective
events and processes as we biological intelligences do.
OK. Wouldn't it be easier to make a baby? More pleasant too.
It would be useful to build a machine that perceives and can talk about what
it perceives, but I don't see the need to make it experience those
perceptions as we do. Plus, I think it would be very difficult for two
reasons. One, we don't have a very good understanding of how we do it.
Second, we've evolved over millions of years to do it our way, and that
evolution was under constraints that the machine doesn't have. I speculate
that a machine that did the functional equivalent of experiencing would be
much easier to make. And it could probably pass the Turing test; it could
talk about it's "experiences" without having to do all the complex things
human bodies, nervous systems and brains do.
Ed
Nomenclature is important in understanding.
If we can't understand the subjective then we must accept
magic. I am willing to do that, but then it must be shown how
to implement that in the machines.
Without magic (whatever that is?), then I surmise delusion.
I know how to build delusions in machines. I go with
the nomenclature I can implement, thus delusion.
.
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 03:23:04 PM |
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Human behaviour is complex: start to mimic the complexity and you'll
probably find you're halfway there (machines ullulate and thrash around
when they're damaged, for instance).
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 02:26:29 PM |
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Sir Frederick <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in
news:4l3gj1lrp463t5fqfg723uhn1tehhltjj5@4ax.com:
If we can't understand the subjective then we must accept
magic. I am willing to do that, but then it must be shown how
to implement that in the machines.
There is no possibility of understanding the subjective by trying to reduce
it to the objective. Color qualia (and all other qualia) are the forms in
which responses to external phenomena present themselves; they allow us to
distinguish among different stimuli (they are the names we give to these
differences). There is no need whatever to reduce them to anything beyond
themselves. Their role is nominal; any method of marking and manipulating
those distinctions will suffice.
Without magic (whatever that is?), then I surmise delusion.
I know how to build delusions in machines. I go with
the nomenclature I can implement, thus delusion.
Delusion implies falsity and deception. Qualia are neither. Saying that the
color red is a delusion is as nonsensical as saying that the word "red" is
a delusion. They are both merely markers --- the qualia marking a
distinguishable stimulus, the word marking the qualia. The first evolved by
the nervous system for internal communication, the second evolved in speech
communities for external communication. Both are arbitrary, but that
doesn't render them "false," much less useless.
I suspect the sense that qualia are "delusions" reflects some underlying
commitment to realism. Give that up and you may have better luck with your
machines.
.
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 05:47:04 PM |
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"Publius" <m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
news:KMOdnZicTtj41qXeRVn-vA@comcast.com...
Sir Frederick <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in
news:4l3gj1lrp463t5fqfg723uhn1tehhltjj5@4ax.com:
If we can't understand the subjective then we must accept
magic. I am willing to do that, but then it must be shown how
to implement that in the machines.
There is no possibility of understanding the subjective by trying to
reduce
it to the objective. Color qualia (and all other qualia) are the forms in
which responses to external phenomena present themselves; they allow us to
distinguish among different stimuli (they are the names we give to these
differences). There is no need whatever to reduce them to anything beyond
themselves. Their role is nominal; any method of marking and manipulating
those distinctions will suffice.
Without magic (whatever that is?), then I surmise delusion.
I know how to build delusions in machines. I go with
the nomenclature I can implement, thus delusion.
Delusion implies falsity and deception. Qualia are neither. Saying that
the
color red is a delusion is as nonsensical as saying that the word "red" is
a delusion. They are both merely markers --- the qualia marking a
distinguishable stimulus, the word marking the qualia. The first evolved
by
the nervous system for internal communication, the second evolved in
speech
communities for external communication. Both are arbitrary, but that
doesn't render them "false," much less useless.
I suspect the sense that qualia are "delusions" reflects some underlying
commitment to realism. Give that up and you may have better luck with your
machines.
Well said Publius.
If you built one Fred, it would look very much like the one you see when you
look in the mirror. Trouble is, it will be unlikely to recognise itself, so
will try to duplicate itself.
BOfL
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 08:40:39 PM |
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Publius wrote:
Sir Frederick <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in
news:4l3gj1lrp463t5fqfg723uhn1tehhltjj5@4ax.com:
If we can't understand the subjective then we must accept
magic. I am willing to do that, but then it must be shown how
to implement that in the machines.
There is no possibility of understanding the subjective by trying to reduce
it to the objective. Color qualia (and all other qualia) are the forms in
which responses to external phenomena present themselves; they allow us to
distinguish among different stimuli (they are the names we give to these
differences). There is no need whatever to reduce them to anything beyond
themselves. Their role is nominal; any method of marking and manipulating
those distinctions will suffice.
OK, I can mostly agree with this but have one picky point. I tried
to bring it up when I mentioned blind sight a week or so ago.
That point is:
It is possible to distinguish the functional roll played by qualia from
the qualia. Because this is possible it is also possible to implement
the functional role without implementing qualia at all. (or at least to
a major extent, Sir Frederick's inability to recognize the second order
role qualia plays seems to indicate he lacks qualia. He can use the
words mostly correctly but the finer details are missing. It is as if
a blind person were to say "sight is a delusion" and "I want to make
machines experience sight the same way humans do."
Without magic (whatever that is?), then I surmise delusion.
I know how to build delusions in machines. I go with
the nomenclature I can implement, thus delusion.
Delusion implies falsity and deception. Qualia are neither. Saying that the
color red is a delusion is as nonsensical as saying that the word "red" is
a delusion. They are both merely markers --- the qualia marking a
distinguishable stimulus, the word marking the qualia. The first evolved by
the nervous system for internal communication, the second evolved in speech
communities for external communication. Both are arbitrary, but that
doesn't render them "false," much less useless.
I suspect the sense that qualia are "delusions" reflects some underlying
commitment to realism. Give that up and you may have better luck with your
machines.
Could you fill this paragraph out? Surely everyone today believe we
know
through our senses and that the senses are of us not of the thing
sensed
even as we disagree on the specifics surrounding this schema.
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 11:03:45 PM |
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wrote in
news:1127785239.066124.317710@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
That point is:
It is possible to distinguish the functional roll played by qualia
from the qualia. Because this is possible it is also possible to
implement the functional role without implementing qualia at all.
Sure one can distinguish between the role played by qualia and the qualia
themselves. But one will need a marker of some sort to play that
functional role. The role played by the word "red" may also be played by
"rot" or "roja." But if no one is playing a role, then that role is
absent from the stage (though the play may remain perfectly charming and
comprehensible without it).
[ . . .] Sir Frederick's inability to recognize the
second order role qualia plays seems to indicate he lacks qualia. He
can use the words mostly correctly but the finer details are missing.
It is as if a blind person were to say "sight is a delusion" and "I
want to make machines experience sight the same way humans do."
I doubt Sir Fred is missing qualia. I suspect he wishes to disparage them
because he is a realist and he cannot account for them within that
framework. But I'll let Fred speak for himself.
BTW, even a blind person may admit color qualia to his ontology, even
though he does not experience them. That is because they can explain why
others can make certain discriminations he cannot. In other words, they
have explanatory value, which is the only reason for admitting any entity
into one's ontology. They serve a purpose.
I suspect the sense that qualia are "delusions" reflects some
underlying commitment to realism. Give that up and you may have
better luck with your machines.
Could you fill this paragraph out? Surely everyone today believe we
know
through our senses and that the senses are of us not of the thing
sensed
even as we disagree on the specifics surrounding this schema.
Eeeek! That is an 800 lb. gorilla question. I'll answer it briefly by
admitting I'm a neo-Kantian. I.e., there is an external world out there
which impinges upon us in various ways. But the specific forms of those
effects of which we are aware are creations of our own physiology and
neural wiring. We then re-construct the external world via concepts
synthesized from that sensory data. We postulate entities and processes
in order to organize that data, and make it comprehensible. If the
entities postulated help us anticipate future experience, they exist.
That is the only "real world" of which we can claim any direct knowledge.
.
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| User: "Sir Frederick" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
27 Sep 2005 07:36:02 AM |
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On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 23:03:45 -0500, Publius <m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
I doubt Sir Fred is missing qualia. I suspect he wishes to disparage them
because he is a realist and he cannot account for them within that
framework. But I'll let Fred speak for himself.
As far as disparagement of qualia goes, it is so in the sense of the
Copernican Revolution and some sort of maturing of the culture out
of its medieval state. In other words 'qualia' may simply be
another of the many false folk lore theories we support.
As far as missing qualia : I probably miss some of the 'self'
qualia. Being somewhat autistic, there are symptoms. For
example last week I was watching a 'panda cam' on animalplanet.com,
the mother and cub interaction produced some 'feelings'
in me that were new. I have never had such subjective
experience around any primate folk mother and child, even
my own several mothers and my 'child within'.
There are probably more fundamental missing qualia, but they
are missing, so I wouldn't know, unless they started to 'kick in'
due to brain changes.
--
Best,
Frederick Martin McNeill
Poway, California, United States of America
mmcneill@fuzzysys.com
http://www.fuzzysys.com
http://members.cox.net/fmmcneill
*************************
Phrase of the week :
"Discovery consists of seeing what everybody has
seen and thinking what nobody has thought."
-- Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (1893-1986)
:-))))Snort!)
**************************************
.
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| User: "alan jones" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
28 Sep 2005 09:19:45 AM |
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Sir Frederick wrote:
On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 15:02:26 GMT, "Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote:
"Sir Frederick" <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:nojfj19r0f46b23vjaj7q5o4tf7gkneoa2@4ax.com...
Achromatopes : those without the delusional color qualia use other
colorless cues. (I know proving a negative is difficult, but examples
help.)
I'm confused. There may be a sense in which color qualia are delusional,
but, for me, there is a more important sense in which color qualia
correspond to measurable (i.e. "real") aspects of the world. If I see a
traffic light, and my color blind chauffer asks "What color is it?" and I
answer "It's red", how am I deluded? We stop and don't get nailed by cross
traffic.
Maybe it would be more accurate to say "partly delusional color qualia" if
you're convinced there is a delusional element?
Ed
My sole motivation in pursuing these topics is how
to build machine intelligences that also experience subjective
events and processes as we biological intelligences do.
Nomenclature is important in understanding.
If we can't understand the subjective then we must accept
magic. I am willing to do that, but then it must be shown how
to implement that in the machines.
Without magic (whatever that is?), then I surmise delusion.
I know how to build delusions in machines. I go with
the nomenclature I can implement, thus delusion.
I like the subjective goals you set for you machine and so I
bring my subjectivity to bare.
Imagine as a machine those things you would value most. In
machine terms, this would be data, it would be memory, from
the efficient use of the cache, through to the begrudging use
of virtual memory. As a machine you might arrange your
responses to information based on this connection between the
information and your internal state. Other machine factors
would include CPU usage, core temperature, as a reflection
of CPU usage, as well as of course, factors connected to the
expansion of knowledge.
As a machine you would exist to process knowledge and so
it could be said, you would need knowledge to exist.
It seems to me a machine qualia would have to extend out
of this connection between information and the machine's
internal state. Indeed you might make these internal states
attribute of knowledge. Every evolved function would with
it these assessment of cost and benefit. Against this you
would need an idea of the ideal, something to work towards,
something which wasn't static and so would drive your
pursuit of knowledge. A sense of a reward for knowledge,
or varying degrees of rewards, ranging from the negative
to the most euphoric.
The ability to feel, is the ability to sense the effect of
information or nutrient on your person. It seems to me,
this subjectivity would have to be built into your machine.
Viewed only as a tool, we might say this idea of 'feeling'
was unnecessary to the machine's function, however as
intelligence, i see this component as a necessary to
thought. Feelings though, would be in terms the machine
valued.
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 03:23:34 PM |
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Sir Frederick wrote:
On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 15:02:26 GMT, "Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote:
"Sir Frederick" <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:nojfj19r0f46b23vjaj7q5o4tf7gkneoa2@4ax.com...
Achromatopes : those without the delusional color qualia use other
colorless cues. (I know proving a negative is difficult, but examples
help.)
I'm confused. There may be a sense in which color qualia are delusional,
but, for me, there is a more important sense in which color qualia
correspond to measurable (i.e. "real") aspects of the world. If I see a
traffic light, and my color blind chauffer asks "What color is it?" and I
answer "It's red", how am I deluded? We stop and don't get nailed by cross
traffic.
Maybe it would be more accurate to say "partly delusional color qualia" if
you're convinced there is a delusional element?
Ed
My sole motivation in pursuing these topics is how
to build machine intelligences that also experience subjective
events and processes as we biological intelligences do.
Nomenclature is important in understanding.
If we can't understand the subjective then we must accept
magic. I am willing to do that, but then it must be shown how
to implement that in the machines.
Without magic (whatever that is?), then I surmise delusion.
I know how to build delusions in machines. I go with
the nomenclature I can implement, thus delusion.
Well...after many moons working with text,visuals and colour
I don't agree that the perception of colour is delusional
or the feelings it generates. Visual perception is at least
natural to those who percieve it, it is more natural than the
'qualia' or those sensations we feel when reading.
'Concretization' (a term coined by R.Ingarden,philosopher)
describes the way a reader will interpret what is read, which
to me will vary a hell of a lot more between two people
than if the same two were looking at the same scene.
N.
.
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
26 Sep 2005 05:55:12 PM |
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<mimo_545@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1127766214.545222.256100@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Sir Frederick wrote:
On Mon, 26 Sep 2005 15:02:26 GMT, "Edgar Svendsen"
<solon013@earthlink.net> wrote:
"Sir Frederick" <mmcneill@fuzzysys.com> wrote in message
news:nojfj19r0f46b23vjaj7q5o4tf7gkneoa2@4ax.com...
Achromatopes : those without the delusional color qualia use other
colorless cues. (I know proving a negative is difficult, but examples
help.)
I'm confused. There may be a sense in which color qualia are
delusional,
but, for me, there is a more important sense in which color qualia
correspond to measurable (i.e. "real") aspects of the world. If I see a
traffic light, and my color blind chauffer asks "What color is it?" and
I
answer "It's red", how am I deluded? We stop and don't get nailed by
cross
traffic.
Maybe it would be more accurate to say "partly delusional color qualia"
if
you're convinced there is a delusional element?
Ed
My sole motivation in pursuing these topics is how
to build machine intelligences that also experience subjective
events and processes as we biological intelligences do.
Nomenclature is important in understanding.
If we can't understand the subjective then we must accept
magic. I am willing to do that, but then it must be shown how
to implement that in the machines.
Without magic (whatever that is?), then I surmise delusion.
I know how to build delusions in machines. I go with
the nomenclature I can implement, thus delusion.
Well...after many moons working with text,visuals and colour
I don't agree that the perception of colour is delusional
or the feelings it generates. Visual perception is at least
natural to those who percieve it, it is more natural than the
'qualia' or those sensations we feel when reading.
'Concretization' (a term coined by R.Ingarden,philosopher)
describes the way a reader will interpret what is read, which
to me will vary a hell of a lot more between two people
than if the same two were looking at the same scene.
N.
Just more variations of relativity, and meaningful co existance.
I wonder how many 'recognised' the characters in the move Lord Of The Rings
after reading the book.?
Even with the "same scene" observers, they will be looking from different
angles, so objectively they will see things differently.
The Zen koan "you can never cross the same river twice" illustrates the
point. For day to day living, it doesnt matter.To start the search within,
it is very significant.
BOfL
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
27 Sep 2005 04:43:25 AM |
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Even with the "same scene" observers, they will be looking from different angles, so objectively they will see things differently.
Erm, doesn't that just mean "They will see things subjectively, and
these descriptions will differ from an objective description"?
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
27 Sep 2005 08:08:40 AM |
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"Sleepyhead" <simonharpham@usa.net> wrote in message
news:1127814205.017420.317240@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Even with the "same scene" observers, they will be looking from different
angles, so objectively they will see things differently.
Erm, doesn't that just mean "They will see things subjectively, and
these descriptions will differ from an objective description"?
My point being that even logically, the objects will appear differently.
Ultimately there are really only subjective views, which collectively, form
a community.
BOfL
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
27 Sep 2005 08:14:18 AM |
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My point being that even logically, the objects will appear differently.
Ultimately there are really only subjective views, which collectively,
form
a community.
OK. Well I'm not arguing that people don't see things differently, just
that that of itself doesn't destroy the notion of 'objectivity'.
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
27 Sep 2005 05:37:04 PM |
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"Sleepyhead" <simonharpham@usa.net> wrote in message
news:1127826858.533417.310610@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
My point being that even logically, the objects will appear differently.
Ultimately there are really only subjective views, which collectively,
form
a community.
OK. Well I'm not arguing that people don't see things differently, just
that that of itself doesn't destroy the notion of 'objectivity'.
If everybody sees everything differently (not even considering the "meaning
to them" of what they see), what is objectivity if nor a collaboration for
common communication.
Mathematicians can come to identical conclusions, but their method and modis
operandi to achieve their results will have different significance effects
on their individuality.
I suppose, based on that view, computers are objective. Problem is , they
dont know it, and we do, so we are back to subjectivity once more :-))..
I love it when I watch the mind "going round in circles" :-))
BOfL
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
27 Sep 2005 06:56:06 AM |
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Brian Fletcher wrote:
Even with the "same scene" observers, they will be looking from different
angles, so objectively they will see things differently.
What sort of angle were you thinking about?
Overall,seeing in colour makes up a small portion of visual perception,
but interpreting a text relies totally upon imagination doesn't it?
and seeing something 'out-there' is immediately registered by the
senses?
How you interpret what you read suggests to me a system for
interpreting
language. How you interpret what you sense may be via a pre or proto
system
of/for classification with its own metasyntax. I wouldn't call all
sense
data examples of the 'subjective' or all verbally/textually
communicable
sense impressions 'objective'.
To me a simple model might run something like this:-
visual object-->sense data-->data classification--->translation into
words.
visual text-->language interpretation-->data retrival-->imagination.
So,on a wild and wacky tack,you could argue that if you get a machine
to read and interpret text,it has rudimentory imagination, & if you get
it to read sense data and classify it, its a database...only when it
can
translate and communicate its aquired database into humanly compatible
format we might begin mistaking its output as genuine examples computer
consciousness?
N.
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Achromatopes : Those Without the Color Delusion |
27 Sep 2005 08:19:00 AM |
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<mimo_545@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1127822166.097065.9590@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Brian Fletcher wrote:
Even with the "same scene" observers, they will be looking from different
angles, so objectively they will see things differently.
What sort of angle were you thinking about?
An angle other than the position of my focal point related to the object
being observed.
Overall,seeing in colour makes up a small portion of visual perception,
but interpreting a text relies totally upon imagination doesn't it?
and seeing something 'out-there' is immediately registered by the
senses?
Which are purely subjective. I like the breakdown of the word to image-in.
How you interpret what you read suggests to me a system for
interpreting
language. How you interpret what you sense may be via a pre or proto
system
of/for classification with its own metasyntax. I wouldn't call all
sense
data examples of the 'subjective' or all verbally/textually
communicable
sense impressions 'objective'.
Objective means a "common interpretation" of the subjective. Useful for
buying bananas, useless for communicating "subtle truths".
To me a simple model might run something like this:-
visual object-->sense data-->data classification--->translation into
words.
visual text-->language interpretation-->data retrival-->imagination.
The "image-in" resonates well.
So,on a wild and wacky tack,you could argue that if you get a machine
to read and interpret text,it has rudimentory imagination, & if you get
it to read sense data and classify it, its a database...only when it
can
translate and communicate its aquired database into humanly compatible
format we might begin mistaking its output as genuine examples computer
consciousness?
Consciousness is an aspect of life.
Id love to hear computers arguing "that" point :-)))
BOfL
N.
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