| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"John Jones" |
| Date: |
17 Sep 2007 05:05:48 PM |
| Object: |
Analytic and definition |
'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
alone.
'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
reassertions of a physical ontology?
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| User: "brian fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
17 Sep 2007 06:37:11 PM |
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"John Jones" <jonescardiff@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1190066748.288306.248730@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...
'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
alone.
'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
reassertions of a physical ontology?
So THATS what I chose to remain single....:-)
You are correct. All people who understand that principle are wise in the
way of semantics.
How's that for a reassertion !!!...
Life's A Ball,
If Only You Know It....
BOfL
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| User: "kevirwin" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
17 Sep 2007 07:09:52 PM |
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On Sep 17, 7:37 pm, "brian fletcher" <brian...@bigpond.net.au> wrote:
"John Jones" <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1190066748.288306.248730@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...> 'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
alone.
'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
reassertions of a physical ontology?
So THATS what I chose to remain single....:-)
You are correct. All people who understand that principle are wise in the
way of semantics.
How's that for a reassertion !!!...
Life's A Ball,
If Only You Know It....
BOfL
Well, speaking of semantics, are you a bachelor if you're wife died
(widower) or if you're wife permanently left you legally (divorced)...{I
was both...}..I'm unmarried, so do I qualify as a bachelor???
Hey, I think most of philosophy {especially in this forum) is
semantics anyway,
K e v
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| User: "brian fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
18 Sep 2007 06:49:33 PM |
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"kevirwin" <kevirwin@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:1190074192.004465.201140@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...
On Sep 17, 7:37 pm, "brian fletcher" <brian...@bigpond.net.au> wrote:
"John Jones" <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1190066748.288306.248730@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com...> 'All
unmarried men are batchelors'.
This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
alone.
'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
reassertions of a physical ontology?
So THATS what I chose to remain single....:-)
You are correct. All people who understand that principle are wise in the
way of semantics.
How's that for a reassertion !!!...
Life's A Ball,
If Only You Know It....
BOfL
Well, speaking of semantics, are you a bachelor if you're wife died
(widower) or if you're wife permanently left you legally (divorced)...{I
was both...}..I'm unmarried, so do I qualify as a bachelor???
Hey, I think most of philosophy {especially in this forum) is
semantics anyway,
Thats the tip of the iceberg Kev ;-). Same reason the Titanic doesnt seem to
leave our group consciousness.
You could be a semantic batchelor if you so choose hehehehehe
BOfL
K e v
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| User: "S. Jouanny" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
19 Sep 2007 04:45:21 AM |
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On Mon, 17 Sep 2007 15:05:48 -0700, John Jones <jonescardiff@aol.com>
wrote:
'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
alone.
'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
reassertions of a physical ontology?
That example you gave is an example given from judgments, not objects.
All that the above can say is, if there is a bachelor, then he is
unmarried.
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| User: "John Jones" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
19 Sep 2007 01:50:47 PM |
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On Sep 19, 10:45?am, S. Jouanny <stevenjouanzolaamd...@hotmail.co.uk>
wrote:
On Mon, 17 Sep 2007 15:05:48 -0700, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com>
wrote:
'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
alone.
'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
reassertions of a physical ontology?
That example you gave is an example given from judgments, not objects.
All that the above can say is, if there is a bachelor, then he is
unmarried.
----------------
All that the above can say is, if there is a bachelor, then he is
unmarried
I am trying to see what reformulations such as these are doing with a
definition. It seems also that a judgement places a definition into an
ontological framework. Thus we have for a judgement IF ....THEN....,
which seems to turn a definition into a causality. I was saying that
an analytic statement does the same thing - attributes causility or
physical existence criteria to definitions (and judgements).
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| User: "S. Jouanny" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
20 Sep 2007 11:19:28 AM |
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On Wed, 19 Sep 2007 11:50:47 -0700, John Jones <jonescardiff@aol.com>
wrote:
I am trying to see what reformulations such as these are doing with a
definition. It seems also that a judgement places a definition into an
ontological framework. Thus we have for a judgement IF ....THEN....,
which seems to turn a definition into a causality. I was saying that
an analytic statement does the same thing - attributes causility or
physical existence criteria to definitions (and judgements).
No, to me, you are confusing logical relations, such as antecedent and
consequent, with real relations, such as cause and effect. As Kant
knew, causality cannot be derived from logical tautologies, following
Hume.
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| User: "John Jones" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
20 Sep 2007 01:12:52 PM |
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On Sep 20, 5:19?pm, S. Jouanny <stevenjouanzolaamd...@hotmail.co.uk>
wrote:
On Wed, 19 Sep 2007 11:50:47 -0700, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com>
wrote:
I am trying to see what reformulations such as these are doing with a
definition. It seems also that a judgement places a definition into an
ontological framework. Thus we have for a judgement IF ....THEN....,
which seems to turn a definition into a causality. I was saying that
an analytic statement does the same thing - attributes causility or
physical existence criteria to definitions (and judgements).
No, to me, you are confusing logical relations, such as antecedent and
consequent, with real relations, such as cause and effect. As Kant
knew, causality cannot be derived from logical tautologies, following
Hume.
---------------------------
I agree with that. But it seems that when we move from
'A batchelor is an unmarried man'
to
'if there is a batchelot then he is an unmarried man'
then the latter way of putting it seems to be making an existence/
causal claim.
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| User: "S. Jouanny" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
20 Sep 2007 02:08:19 PM |
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On Thu, 20 Sep 2007 11:12:52 -0700, John Jones <jonescardiff@aol.com>
wrote:
I agree with that. But it seems that when we move from
'A batchelor is an unmarried man'
to
'if there is a batchelot then he is an unmarried man'
then the latter way of putting it seems to be making an existence/
causal claim.
That would be a synthetic judgment, no? Any claim about existence is
synthetic according to Kant, as it involves going beyond the concept.
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| User: "John Jones" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
20 Sep 2007 02:50:15 PM |
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On Sep 20, 8:08?pm, S. Jouanny <stevenjouanzolaamd...@hotmail.co.uk>
wrote:
On Thu, 20 Sep 2007 11:12:52 -0700, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com>
wrote:
I agree with that. But it seems that when we move from
'A batchelor is an unmarried man'
to
'if there is a batchelot then he is an unmarried man'
then the latter way of putting it seems to be making an existence/
causal claim.
That would be a synthetic judgment, no? Any claim about existence is
synthetic according to Kant, as it involves going beyond the concept.
I know that Hume placed causality as a subjective experience and
opened it to doubt accordingly. Kant said that causality cannot be put
in doubt because there is no causality apart from our subjective
construction. This led some authors to think that Kant was proposing a
phenomenalism where experiences are only guesses as to what is
actually going on. But, and I should have thought of this sooner,
there can be no costing of Kant's subjectivism as a genetic tale or
even as a subjectivism, simply because there is nothing to which it
can be compared. Kant's 'subjectivism' is not a subjectivism because,
as Frege might say, it is an unanalysable simple.
So 'If...then... statements' (coming from Russell I think), if they
are existence claims, then they are synthetic for Kant. Yes, for Kant
it goes beyond the concept. In fact, Russells formulation hardly looks
logical at all. In fact, I always had my suspicions about Russells
idea. But then I was never happy with what Frege said either. It
seemed like they both had to impress a priviliged physicalism into
their logic, not that anyone noticed.
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| User: "S. Jouanny" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
20 Sep 2007 03:01:57 PM |
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On Thu, 20 Sep 2007 12:50:15 -0700, John Jones <jonescardiff@aol.com>
wrote:
. But then I was never happy with what Frege said either. It
seemed like they both had to impress a priviliged physicalism into
their logic, not that anyone noticed.
Yes, and Goedels' incompleteness theorems are a sort of Kantian
critique of logical system building: What they (formalist systems) can
tell us, and what they can't know. Or, how far they can be
consistent, or complete, without overstepping.
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| User: "John Jones" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
20 Sep 2007 04:33:37 PM |
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On Sep 20, 9:01?pm, S. Jouanny <stevenjouanzolaamd...@hotmail.co.uk>
wrote:
On Thu, 20 Sep 2007 12:50:15 -0700, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com>
wrote:
. But then I was never happy with what Frege said either. It
seemed like they both had to impress a priviliged physicalism into
their logic, not that anyone noticed.
Yes, and Goedels' incompleteness theorems are a sort of Kantian
critique of logical system building: What they (formalist systems) can
tell us, and what they can't know. Or, how far they can be
consistent, or complete, without overstepping.
Interesting, that I suspect that Goedel is a 'transcendental realist'.
That is, against Kant, he believes that things can exist in
themselves. An example is 'self-reference' - isn't an act of self-
reference an act or function that can only be accomplished by and for
things in themselves? It is for that reason that I would place Goedel
as an anti-Kantian. But then who isn't? All non-Copernican
philosophies, like transcendental realisms (Berkely, Liebniz, Frege,
anyone you care to mention) are anti-Kantian. I spent some time these
last few months checking up on all this for a thesis.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
17 Sep 2007 10:37:24 PM |
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On Sep 17, 3:05 pm, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
alone.
'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition. To make it
into an existence claim, i.e. an analytic claim, we have to include
objects that exist. So we put in 'all' for 'an'-- 'all' signifies
objects. We then say 'all unmarried men are batchelors'.
But isn't a batchelor or an unmarried man an object nevertheless?
Isn't an analytic statement merely a reassertion of a physical
ontology? And aren't all analytic statements rather quaint
reassertions of a physical ontology?
[1] Analyticity and circularity
[2] Critique and influence
######################
[1] Analyticity and circularity
#######################
Most of Quine's argument against analyticity in the first four
sections is focused on showing that different explanations of
analyticity are circular. The main purpose is to show that no
satisfactory explanation of analyticity has been given.
Quine begins by making a distinction between two different classes of
analytic statements. The first one is called logically true and has
the form:
(1) No unmarried man is married
A sentence with that form is true independent of the interpretation of
"man" and "married", so long as the logical particles "no", "un-", and
"and" have their ordinary English meaning.
The statements in the second class have the form:
(2) No bachelor is married.
A statement with this form can be turned into a statement with form
(1) by changing synonyms with synonyms, in this case "bachelor" with
"unmarried man". It is the second class of statements that lack
characterization according to Quine. The notion of the second form of
analyticity leans on the notion of synonymy, which Quine believes is
in as much need of clarification as analyticity. Most of Quine's
following arguments are focused on showing how explanations of
synonymy end up being dependent on the notions of analyticity,
necessity, or even synonymy itself.
How do we reduce sentences from the second class to a sentence of
class (1)? Some might propose definitions. "No bachelor is married"
can be turned into "No unmarried man is married" because "bachelor" is
defined as "unmarried man". But, Quine asks: how do we find out that
"bachelor" is defined as "unmarried man"? Clearly, a dictionary would
not solve the problem, as a dictionary is a report of already known
synonyms, and thus is dependent on the notion of synonymy, which Quine
holds as unexplained.
A second suggestion Quine considers is an explanation of synonymy in
terms of interchangeability. Two linguistic forms are (according to
this view) synonymous if they are interchangeable without changing the
truth-value. That is, in all contexts without change of truth value.
But consider the following example:
(3)"Bachelor" has less than ten letters.
Obviously "bachelor" and "unmarried man" are not interchangeable in
that sentence. To exclude that example and some other obvious
counterexamples, such as poetic quality, Quine introduces the notion
of cognitive synonymy. But does interchangeability hold as an
explanation of cognitive synonymy? Suppose we have a language without
modal adverbs like "necessarily". Such a language would be
extensional, in the way that two predicates which are true about the
same objects are interchangeable again without altering the truth-
value. Thus, there is no assurance that two terms that are
interchangeable without the truth-value changing are interchangeable
because of meaning, and not because of chance. For example, "creature
with a heart" and "creature with kidneys" share extension.
In a language with the modal adverb "necessarily" the problem is
solved, as salva veritate holds in the following case:
(4) Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men while it does
not hold for
(5) Necessarily all and only creatures with a heart are creatures with
kidneys.
We can see that the concepts of 'creature with a heart' and 'creature
with kidneys' have the same extension (presumably), but they are not
interchangeable salva veritate [two expressions that can be
interchanged without changing the truth-value of the statements in
which they occur]. It seems that the only way to assert the synonymy
is by supposing that the terms 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are
analytic and that the sentence "All and only all bachelors are
unmarried men" is analytic. So for salva veritate to hold as a
definition of synonymy, we need a notion of necessity and thus of
analyticity.
So, from the above example, it can be seen that in order for us to
distinguish between analytic and synthetic we must appeal to synonymy;
at the same time, we should also understand synonymy with
interchangeability salva veritate. However, such a condition to
understand synonymy is not enough so we not only argue that the terms
should be interchangeable, but necessarily so. And to explain this
logical necessity we must appeal to analyticity once again.
######################
[2] Critique and influence
#####################e
Paul Grice and P. F. Strawson criticized "Two Dogmas" in their text In
Defence of a Dogma. Among other things, they argue that Quine's
skepticism about synonyms leads to a skepticism about meaning. If
statements can have meanings, then it would make sense to ask "What
does it mean?". If it makes sense to ask "What does it mean?", then
synonymy can be defined as follows: Two sentences are synonymous if
and only if the true answer of the question "What does it mean?" asked
of one of them is the true answer to the same question, asked of the
other. They also draw the conclusion that discussion about correct or
incorrect translations would be impossible given Quine's argument.
Four years after Grice and Strawson published their paper, Quine's
book Word and Object was released. In the book Quine presented his
theory of indeterminacy of translation.
In 'Two Dogmas' revisited, Hilary Putnam argues that Quine is
attacking two different notions. Analytic truth defined as a true
statement derivable from a tautology by putting synonyms for synonyms
is near Kant's account of analytic truth as a truth whose negation is
a contradiction. Analytic truth defined as a truth confirmed no matter
what however, is closer to one of the traditional accounts of a
prioricity. While the first four sections of Quine's paper concern
analyticity, the last two concern a priority. Putnam considers the
argument in the two last sections as independent of the first four,
and at the same time as Putnam criticizes Quine, he also emphasizes
his historical importance as the first top rank philosopher to both
reject the notion of apriority and sketch a methodology without it.
In his book Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume
1 : The Dawn of Analysis Scott Soames (pp 360-361) has pointed out
that Quine's circularity argument needs two of the logical
positivists' central theses to be effective:
All necessary (and all a priori) truths are analytic
Analyticity is needed to explain and legitimate necessity.
It is only when these two theses are accepted that Quine's argument
holds. It is not a problem that the notion of necessity is presupposed
by the notion of analyticity if necessity can be explained without
analyticity. According to Soames, both theses were accepted by most
philosophers when Quine published Two Dogmas. Today however, Soames
holds both statements to be antiquated.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two_Dogmas_of_Empiricism
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| User: "Michael Gordge" |
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| Title: Re: Analytic and definition |
21 Sep 2007 01:35:16 AM |
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On Sep 18, 7:05 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
'All unmarried men are batchelors'.
This is said to be 'analytic' - it can be deduced from the proposition
alone.
'An unmarried man is a batchelor'. This is a definition.
Of what?
MG
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