| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"John Jones" |
| Date: |
20 Nov 2007 02:04:25 PM |
| Object: |
Are logics simply about the behaviours of familiar objects? |
This is a little investigation into the nature of modern logics
and(argued) their Aristotelian heritage:
What do the signs of logic and mathematics represent? The ideas of
self-identity, order, space, time, sequence, set, etc., cannot be
expressed by the sign through the sign's own efforts. And it is
impossible for any logic or mathematics to present a purely formal,
metaphysically empty face, for their own strings mirror behaviours in
the physical world -.
In pursuit of an answer to the above question, I say that we 'map' our
ideas, our metaphysics, about objects to logico-mathematical signs.
These signs move in such ways that they have the behaviours of the
objects we have mapped to them. These manoevures are called logic and
mathematics.
What marks out logic and mathematics from standard english? Not
indeterminacy or vagueness. To express a 'logical language' would
simply mean making the ideas expressed in linguistic strings or
English sentences behave like physical objects - an unnecessary effort
I might suggest. I also suggest that a union of syntax and semantics
in language would fail, as a semantic language expresses more than a
syntactically directed logic0-mathematics.
In all cases logical and mathematical manouevures mirror the
behaviours of physical objects. We do not allow signs to vanish in
logical or mathematical strings and proofs - signs are accountable,
just like physical objects. For this reason all logic is fundamentally
Aristotelian whose signs and metaphysics express through and through
spatio-temporal objecthood. The only non-Aristotelian logic is Kant's,
but it has never been explored.
Problems with all modern logics, based as they are on standard
(physical object based-) Aristotelian logic come to a head in
paradoxes concerning totality where objects are forced to stand in for
their own conditions of presentation, problems for which Russell and
Quine offered unsatisfactory Aristotelian based solutions. But Logic,
as it stands, can never resolve the problems of totality (among
others) until it distinguishes between objects and their conditions of
enablement. Wittgenstein hints at such a resolution, without spelling
it out, in Tractatus 3.333 where he says that the two F's in
F(F(fx)
are different symbols. In the absence of a definitive account of the
difference, I would suggest that the inner symbol is object-based
Aristotelian, while the outer is Kantian. The logics involved are
quite distinct.
.
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| User: "Michael Gordge" |
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| Title: Re: Are logics simply about the behaviours of familiar objects? |
20 Nov 2007 03:17:40 PM |
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On Nov 21, 5:04 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
What do the signs of logic and mathematics represent?
Logic is a concept, a tool of cognition, its the art or process of non-
contradictory identification, and math is the logical use of numbers,
numbers are used to measure existing sensory units.
2 + 2 = 4 means nothing unless and until the number is directly
associated with or directly linked to units of sensory existence.
2 WHAT + 2 WHAT = 4 WHAT, explain the WHAT, and THEN math (the logical
use of numbers) means something in reality and not until.
The ideas of
self-identity,
There is no such thing, YOU must do the identifying and you do so
without contradiction.
A is A
Cat is Cat, Dog is Dog, Clock is Clock
Two seperate entities can not both exist in the same place at the same
moment. Not even as ideas, e.g. calling a perception and an elephant
"objects" without explaining the difference is saying that A is B, its
NOT, A is A.
Michael Gordge
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Are logics simply about the behaviours of familiar objects? |
20 Nov 2007 08:52:15 PM |
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On Nov 20, 1:17 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
On Nov 21, 5:04 am, John Jones <jonescard...@aol.com> wrote:
What do the signs of logic and mathematics represent?
Logic is a concept, a tool of cognition, its the art or process of non-
contradictory identification, and math is the logical use of numbers,
numbers are used to measure existing sensory units.
2 + 2 = 4 means nothing unless and until the number is directly
associated with or directly linked to units of sensory existence.
2 WHAT + 2 WHAT = 4 WHAT, explain the WHAT, and THEN math (the logical
use of numbers) means something in reality and not until.
So you are proposing that we have an inborn number sense that needs to
be suplemented with sensory data, or are you saying that the sense
data does this all on its own?
The ideas of
self-identity,
There is no such thing, YOU must do the identifying and you do so
without contradiction.
A is A
Cat is Cat, Dog is Dog, Clock is Clock
Two seperate entities can not both exist in the same place at the same
moment. Not even as ideas, e.g. calling a perception and an elephant
"objects" without explaining the difference is saying that A is B, its
NOT, A is A.
Michael Gordge
.
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| User: "Michael Gordge" |
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| Title: Re: Are logics simply about the behaviours of familiar objects? |
20 Nov 2007 10:55:17 PM |
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On Nov 21, 11:52 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
So you are proposing that we have an inborn number sense...
You (presuming you contradict the way you write and are actually
normal) you were born with the sense / faculty of, sight sound smell
feel and touch, but alas, not a number sense, numbers dont exist in
reality, they exist as a man made tool used to measure quantity of
units, yes thats right, MAN MADE.
or are you saying that the sense
data does this all on its own?
You will either or all, see, hear, smell, touch feel an elephant, more
than an elephant, or several elephants, I cant help that, that's the
way sensory reality works.
Man used to draw all of the elephants that he saw in a day on the cave
walls, from memory, until there came a day when a really really clever
man (rules out your Kantian lot eh?) who invented a method to save
lots and lots of energy and paint, he called that invention numbers.
MG
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