| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"Paul Holbach" |
| Date: |
24 Nov 2006 07:08:58 AM |
| Object: |
Contingent Things |
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
#PH
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 08:22:07 AM |
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"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:1164373738.385353.6070@m7g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
#PH
The whole is always greater then the sum of its parts.
BOfL
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 08:31:20 AM |
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Brian Fletcher schrieb:
The whole is always greater then the sum of its parts.
You mean the whole is something "over and above" its parts, i.e not
identical to them?
I don't think so: "Composition as Identity"
See:
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cjs4f/composition.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/#4.3
#PH
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 07:35:37 PM |
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"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:1164378680.726179.236630@l12g2000cwl.googlegroups.com...
Brian Fletcher schrieb:
The whole is always greater then the sum of its parts.
You mean the whole is something "over and above" its parts, i.e not
identical to them?
I don't think so: "Composition as Identity"
Any object has two realities. The image within the eye of the beholder and
the structure "of itself".
My first motorcycle from 1966 has long "dematerialised" but live on !!!
BOfL
See:
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cjs4f/composition.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/#4.3
#PH
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| User: "Bill Snyder" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 05:34:16 PM |
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"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:1164373738.385353.6070@m7g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
If X exists, then it is contingent. I.e., for everything that exists, there
is a cause for its existence. That includes the universe or any alleged
EXISTENT god. Of course if something neither exists nor does not exist,
then the principle may not apply to that thing (please do not ask what such
a thing might be; I have no idea or concept of such a thing, even though I
have the words to say it).
But, contrary to some of the things which you said in other responses to
responders, the whole is a sum of its parts only if you have a complete
denumerable set of its parts. Since an "indenumerably infinite" whole would
have parts which were themselves infinite, that would have no bearing on
your question, since any infinity worth its name is indenumerable :)!.
Denumerable infinites are really finite sets in disguise; you just can't
completely count them, due to the denumerable infinity of the appropriate
kind numbers. Such disguised infinities pervade the conceptual universe.
BS
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 07:54:53 PM |
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"Bill Snyder" <wsnyder@nethere.com> wrote in message
news:otudnYRyu7PlHPrYnZ2dnUVZ_tWdnZ2d@nethere.com...
"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote in message
news:1164373738.385353.6070@m7g2000cwm.googlegroups.com...
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
If X exists, then it is contingent. I.e., for everything that exists,
there is a cause for its existence. That includes the universe or any
alleged EXISTENT god. Of course if something neither exists nor does not
exist, then the principle may not apply to that thing (please do not ask
what such a thing might be; I have no idea or concept of such a thing,
even though I have the words to say it).
This is why many feel comfortable wioth Zen principles (or non principles).
You are aiming at a moving target.
BOfL
But, contrary to some of the things which you said in other responses to
responders, the whole is a sum of its parts only if you have a complete
denumerable set of its parts. Since an "indenumerably infinite" whole
would have parts which were themselves infinite, that would have no
bearing on your question, since any infinity worth its name is
indenumerable :)!. Denumerable infinites are really finite sets in
disguise; you just can't completely count them, due to the denumerable
infinity of the appropriate kind numbers. Such disguised infinities
pervade the conceptual universe.
BS
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| User: "Citizen Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 08:36:10 AM |
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On 24 Nov 2006 05:08:58 -0800, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
You are describing what Existential Metaphysics (Ontology) calls
mutable being.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
The Being whose essence is existence is immutable. That Being is
called the Supreme Being in Existential Metaphysics.
--
Rope, Tree, Journalist - some assembly required.
Chain, Pickup, Politician - some assembly required.
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 07:43:43 PM |
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"Citizen Bob" <spam@uce.gov> wrote in message
news:456702f4.71247359@news-server.houston.rr.com...
On 24 Nov 2006 05:08:58 -0800, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
You are describing what Existential Metaphysics (Ontology) calls
mutable being.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
The Being whose essence is existence is immutable. That Being is
called the Supreme Being in Existential Metaphysics.
And BOfL by BOfL.
BOfL
--
Rope, Tree, Journalist - some assembly required.
Chain, Pickup, Politician - some assembly required.
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| User: "Wordsmith" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 02:25:52 PM |
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On Nov 24, 6:08 am, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHEN...@freenet.de> wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
#PH
There's some kind of tautology lurking in this thought, but to nail it
down I need to mull it over.
W : )
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 07:52:04 PM |
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"Wordsmith" <wordsmith@rocketmail.com> wrote in message
news:1164399952.905690.184850@f16g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
On Nov 24, 6:08 am, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHEN...@freenet.de> wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
#PH
There's some kind of tautology lurking in this thought, but to nail it
down I need to mull it over.
W : )
Can you recommend any good mullers? :-0)
BOfL
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| User: "chazwin" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 01:16:43 PM |
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Paul Holbach wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
#PH
Do you mean by contingent: what has the ground of its being not in
itself but in somewhat else. OR that which is not necessary but not
impossible OR Dependent upon conditions or events.
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 02:16:30 PM |
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chazwin schrieb:
Paul Holbach wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
Do you mean by contingent: what has the ground of its being not in
itself but in somewhat else. OR that which is not necessary but not
impossible OR Dependent upon conditions or events.
I use "contingent" in the way it is commonly used in modal logic.
"An entity C is a contingent being if and only if <C exists> is a
contingent truth. The predicate 'might not have existed' is true of
such a C."
(D. M. Armstrong in his "Truth and Truthmakers", p. 85)
p is a contingent truth =def <>p & <>~p
x is a contingent being / <x exists> is a contingent truth
=def
<>exists(x) & <>~exists(x)
(exists(x) implies <>exists(x))
#PH
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 02:24:34 PM |
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Paul Holbach schrieb:
chazwin schrieb:
Do you mean by contingent: what has the ground of its being not in
itself but in somewhat else. OR that which is not necessary but not
impossible OR Dependent upon conditions or events.
I use "contingent" in the way it is commonly used in modal logic.
In the logical sense, the non-relational property of contingency is one
thing and the relational property of dependency another.
Unfortunately, the ordinary language expression "contingent (on)" is
practically synonymous with "dependent (on)".
#PH
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 02:29:59 PM |
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Paul Holbach schrieb:
In the logical sense, the non-relational property of contingency is one
thing and the relational property of dependency another.
Unfortunately, the ordinary language expression "contingent (on)" is
practically synonymous with "dependent (on)".
Merriam-Webster distinguishes two meanings of "contingent":
(1) not logically necessary
(2) dependent on or conditioned by something else
(http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=contingent)
It's the first one that matters here:
An object is contingent iff its existence is logically unnecessary.
#PH
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 03:40:03 PM |
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Paul Holbach schrieb:
An object is contingent iff its existence is logically unnecessary.
To be precise, an object is contingent iff its existence is neither
necessary nor impossible.
#PH
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
25 Nov 2006 08:35:17 PM |
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Paul Holbach wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
#PH
I've ben thinking. How about ... a disjunctive tautology?
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things - Fallacies of Composition & Division |
24 Nov 2006 10:12:05 AM |
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Paul Holbach wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
#PH
This requires some background knowledge about "composition, division,
conotation, denotation, and other grammar concepts;
-------------------------------
1. FALLACY OF COMPOSITION
Composition as identity is the thesis that a thing is identical to its
parts. For example, the bicycle is identical to the wheels, frame,
seat, gears, pedals, brakes, and chain. (You could break the bicycle
down into smaller parts, and the identity claim would hold.)
Note what the view is not:
It is not that a composite
object is identical to the
sum or set of its parts.
Rather, a composite is
identical to its parts,
plural.
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cjs4f/composition.html
A fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true
of the whole from the fact that it is true of some (or even every) part
of the whole. For example: "This fragment of metal cannot be broken
with a hammer, therefore the machine of which it is a part cannot be
broken with a hammer." This is clearly fallacious, because many
machines can be broken into their constituent parts without any of
those parts being so breakable.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_composition
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mereological_nihilism
The fallacy of Composition is committed when a conclusion is drawn
about a whole based on the features of its constituents when, in fact,
no justification provided for the inference. There are actually two
types of this fallacy, both of which are known by the same name
(because of the high degree of similarity).
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/composition.html
----------------------------
2. FALLACY OF DIVISION
The Fallacy of Division is similar to the Fallacy of Composition, but
in reverse. Here, someone is taking an attribute of a whole or a class
and assuming that it must also necessarily be true of each part or
member. The Fallacy of Division takes the form of:
1. X has property P. Therefore, all parts of X have this property P.
http://atheism.about.com/library/FAQs/skepticism/blfaq_fall_division.htm
A fallacy of division occurs when one reasons logically that something
true of a thing must also be true of at least some of its constituents.
An example:
1. A Boeing 747 can fly unaided across the ocean
2. If a Boeing 747 can fly unaided across the ocean, then one of its
jet engines can fly unaided across the ocean.
3. One of its jet engines can fly unaided across the ocean
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_division
-------------------------------
3. DISCUSSION
The Fallacies of Composition and Division
(a) "Terms" are words or
phrases that designate
classes.
(b) "General terms" designate
classes with more than one
member, e.g., common nouns
such as "book" or "tree."
(c) "Singular terms" designate
individuals, e.g., proper nouns
("The Taj Mahal"), or proper
names ("Princess Diana").
(d) "Non-denoting terms" refer
to the empty class (also known
as the "null set"), e.g.,
"mermaid."
(e) The "denotation" of a term is,
for general terms, the class of
things in the world to which the
term correctly applies. Philosophical
synonyms for "denotation" are "reference"
and "extension." For example, the
denotation (or "reference" or "extension")
of the term "book" is all books. Of course,
as discussed in the handout "Open and
Closed Concepts and the Continuum Fallacy,"
for most terms, strictly-defined classes of
things to which terms refer (strictly-defined
denotations) don't really exist, since most
concepts are open. For example, most of the
time we can say whether or not something is
a book (the things on shelves in libraries
are, the things in cages in zoos are not);
yet we are still puzzled about whether a text
existing entirely online should be called a
book. It's okay that most concepts are open
and denotations can be fuzzy; that's how
language works.
(f) The (("connotation")) of a term is the
list of membership conditions for the
denotation. Philosophical synonyms for
"connotation" are "sense," "intension," and
"real definition." Note this sense of
"connotation" differs from the literary sense.
Again, as language and thought evolves,
connotations get modified.
The connotation of the general term "square"
is "rectangular and equilateral." The denotation
of the general term "square" is all squares.
Now let's focus on general terms only.
We often use general terms as the subjects of statements. (A statement
is a kind of sentence - the kind of sentence that states that
something is so, as opposed to questions or exclamations or commands,
which don't explicitly claim anything. Statements are also called
assertions or claims. A statement has a subject and a predicate. The
subject of the statement is what it's about. The predicate of a
statement is what's said about the subject.)
Here are some examples of statements whose subjects are general terms.
The subjects of the statements are in italics; the predicates of the
statements are the non-italicized parts.
"Cats are mammals."
"Dogs are never vegetarians."
"Animals have roamed the earth
longer than humans."
"Passengers on this airline have
their choice of three meals."
In the first statement above, the predicate is "are mammals". Note
that the noun "mammals" in the predicate is also a general term
denoting a class. The statement "Cats are mammals" says that the
class of cats is a subclass of the class of mammals. Or, all the
members of the denotation of "cats" are also members of the
denotation of "mammals."
The fallacies of composition and division arise from ambiguity in the
denotation of general terms in cases like (1) - (4) above, where the
general term functions as the subject of a statement.
When a general term is the subject of a statement, the predicate of the
statement can apply to it collectively or distributively .
Consider the following two statements:
1. Passengers on this airline
fly millions of miles a year.
2. Passengers on this airline
have their choice of three meals.
These statements have the same subject term ("passengers on this
airline"). But notice that the predicates apply to this subject
differently. In the first sentence, the predicate "fly millions of
miles a year" is true of passengers on this airline considered as a
group, but it is not true of each passenger, since many airline
passengers do not fly millions of miles a year. However, the collective
mileage of all the passengers considered as a group does amount to
millions of miles a year, so in that sense the statement is true.
In the second sentence, the predicate "have their choice of three
meals" is true of each passenger, but it is not true of the
passengers considered as a group. (It's not like there are only three
meals that all the passengers have to share, so each passenger gets
only a few molecules - no, each passenger can choose among three
whole meals.)
A predicate applies to a general-term subject collectively if and only
if the statement is true of the denotation of the subject term
considered as a whole unit, but the statement is not necessarily true
of each member of the denotation. In statement (1) above, the predicate
applies collectively.
A predicate applies to a general-term subject distributively if and
only if the statement is true of each member of the denotation, but not
necessarily true of the denotation considered as a whole. In statement
(2) above, the predicate applies distributively.
Here is a simple rule to remember the difference. Ask yourself,
"Could I rephrase this statement beginning with the word "each"
and preserve truth value?" If yes, the predicate applies
distributively. If no, the predicate applies collectively. This simple
rule works well in many cases.
Try it!
1. Cats are mammals.
2. Animals have roamed the
earth longer than humans.
In (1) the predicate applies distributively, since it's true that
each cat is a mammal. So you could reasonably argue:
Cats are mammals.
Fluffy is a cat.
So Fluffy is a mammal.
In (2), the predicate applies collectively but not distributively,
since it's not true that each animal has roamed the earth longer than
humans. So you can't reasonably argue:
Animals have roamed the earth
longer than humans.
My dog Spot is an animal.
So Spot has roamed the earth
longer than humans.
Do you see that collective and distributive predication matter, then? I
hope so!
Now let's look at some fallacious arguments, where the fallacy
consists in confusion of collective and distributive predication. Many
of these arguments are obviously bad, and funny. For example,
Twenty percent of the men who
attend WVC are married.
Jack attends WVC.
So twenty percent of Jack is
married.
What's wrong exactly? It's that the predicate "married" applies
to the subject "twenty percent of the men who attend WVC"
collectively; in other words, if you consider the whole group of guys
who attend WVC, you'll find that twenty percent of the whole group
are married. The predicate is not true of each man (it doesn't apply
distributively; it's true of some and false of others), but it does
apply to the men considered as a whole.
Arguments like this are said to commit the fallacy of division. The
fallacy of division consists in assuming (wrongly) that a predicate
that applies collectively must also apply distributively.
Here's another silly argument:
The atoms comprising this barrel
of bricks are practically weightless.
So this barrel of bricks is
practically weightless.
The predicate "practically weightless" is true of each atom; i.e.,
it is true of the barrel of bricks distributively, if you think of the
barrel of bricks as a collection of atoms. Yet the predicate is clearly
false when you think of the barrel of bricks as a whole; barrels of
bricks have noticeable weight.
Arguments like this are said to commit the fallacy of composition. The
fallacy of composition consists in assuming (wrongly) that predicate
that applies to a subject distributively must also apply collectively.
These examples have been silly, but they point to deep philosophical
issues. For example, many people would agree with the following
argument:
Everything in the universe
has a cause.
So the universe as a whole
must have a cause.
Now, the predicate "caused" is true of everything in the universe
(nothing is uncaused); in other words, the predicate "caused" is
true of the universe distributively. But from that, can we be certain
it's true collectively as well? No, because we know that predicates
true distributively are not necessarily true collectively. This
argument commits the fallacy of composition.
Here's another, more complex and extremely common argument:
1. All the individual cells
comprising my body lack consciousness
(i.e., no individual cell is conscious).
2. Therefore, my body can't be
conscious.
3. But I am conscious.
4. Therefore, I must be more than
a mere body. I must have a mysterious
non-physical component to account
for my consciousness.
I hope you see that the move from (1) to (2) is clearly a fallacy of
composition. What's true of my cells (me distributively) is not
necessarily true of me (me collectively). So the argument consisting of
statements (2) through (4), though of modus tollens form and valid, is
still unsound.
Emergent Properties
Some properties emerge only after you combine things into wholes. Such
properties are called, not surprisingly, emergent properties. That's
often why what's true of the parts isn't necessarily true of the
wholes, and vice-versa. Using John Searle's famous example, being wet
is an emergent property of water. None of the water molecules are wet.
But wetness happens when you put enough of those molecules together.
Obviously, then, the following argument is silly:
1. All the individual molecules
comprising this water lack wetness.
2. Therefore, this water can't
be wet.
3. But this water is wet.
4. Therefore, this water must be
more than these mere molecules. This
water must have a mysterious non-physical
component to account for its wetness.
The move from (1) to (2) is an obvious fallacy of composition because
wetness is an emergent property. Searle says consciousness is an
emergent property of brains just like wetness is an emergent property
of water. Neither wetness nor consciousness necessarily requires
anything non-physical to explain it.
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/composition_and_division.htm
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things - Fallacies of Composition & Division |
24 Nov 2006 11:41:54 AM |
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Immortalist schrieb:
-------------------------------
1. FALLACY OF COMPOSITION
Composition as identity is the thesis that a thing is identical to its
parts. For example, the bicycle is identical to the wheels, frame,
seat, gears, pedals, brakes, and chain. (You could break the bicycle
down into smaller parts, and the identity claim would hold.)
Note what the view is not:
It is not that a composite
object is identical to the
sum or set of its parts.
Rather, a composite is
identical to its parts,
plural.
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cjs4f/composition.html
The whole is the sum of its parts, and the parts collectively are the
sum and hence the whole.
For example, the whole [1 + 2 + 3] is the sum of its parts 1,2,3 (taken
individually), and 1 and 2 and 3 collectively are the sum and hence the
whole.
A fallacy of composition arises when one infers that something is true
of the whole from the fact that it is true of some (or even every) part
of the whole. For example: "This fragment of metal cannot be broken
with a hammer, therefore the machine of which it is a part cannot be
broken with a hammer." This is clearly fallacious, because many
machines can be broken into their constituent parts without any of
those parts being so breakable.
The fallacy of composition is /not/ a formal fallacy, and so we need to
evaluate each case individually.
My contention is that in the case of the property of contingency this
fallacy is not committed!
Every whole all of whose parts are contingent is contingent too.
I fail to see how it might be possible for me to e.g. destroy every
part of my car and yet be impossible for me to destroy my entire car.
----------------------------
2. FALLACY OF DIVISION
The Fallacy of Division is similar to the Fallacy of Composition, but
in reverse. Here, someone is taking an attribute of a whole or a class
and assuming that it must also necessarily be true of each part or
member. The Fallacy of Division takes the form of:
1. X has property P. Therefore, all parts of X have this property P.
Whether a contingent whole could have non-contingent parts is a
different question (but a very interesting one indeed).
My question has been whether contingent parts could compose a
non-contingent whole.
My answer is: No!
#PH
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| User: "tg" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 08:33:47 AM |
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Paul Holbach wrote:
If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together.
Does anybody know any counterexample to this principle?
As far as I'm concerned, I'm unable to find one.
Wholes are by definition not contingent.
Maybe you are using the term in a special way, but you need to explain
more.
#PH
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 09:03:35 AM |
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tg schrieb:
Wholes are by definition not contingent.
???
Maybe you are using the term in a special way, but you need to explain
more.
Which term?
"whole" or "contingent"?
Anyway, I'm using neither one in a special way.
#PH
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| User: "tg" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 09:17:25 AM |
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Paul Holbach wrote:
tg schrieb:
Wholes are by definition not contingent.
???
Maybe you are using the term in a special way, but you need to explain
more.
Which term?
"whole" or "contingent"?
Anyway, I'm using neither one in a special way.
Well then, wholes are inevitable. What don't you get?
-tg
#PH
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 09:35:21 AM |
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tg schrieb:
Well then, wholes are inevitable. What don't you get?
For example, sentences such as <wholes are inevitable>.
#PH
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| User: "Citizen Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 09:34:05 AM |
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On 24 Nov 2006 06:33:47 -0800, "tg" <tgdenning@earthlink.net> wrote:
Wholes are by definition not contingent.
Then you are not whole.
--
Rope, Tree, Journalist - some assembly required.
Chain, Pickup, Politician - some assembly required.
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 09:38:28 AM |
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Citizen Bob schrieb:
On 24 Nov 2006 06:33:47 -0800, "tg" <tgdenning@earthlink.net> wrote:
Wholes are by definition not contingent.
Then you are not whole.
It's certainly not the case that wholes are defined as necessary
beings.
#PH
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| User: "Citizen Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 11:43:31 AM |
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On 24 Nov 2006 07:38:28 -0800, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
Citizen Bob schrieb:
On 24 Nov 2006 06:33:47 -0800, "tg" <tgdenning@earthlink.net> wrote:
Wholes are by definition not contingent.
Then you are not whole.
It's certainly not the case that wholes are defined as necessary
beings.
I do not understand this.
Does anyone understand it?
If "wholes are not contingent" and "wholes are not necessary", then
what are they?
--
Rope, Tree, Journalist - some assembly required.
Chain, Pickup, Politician - some assembly required.
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 07:42:40 PM |
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"Citizen Bob" <spam@uce.gov> wrote in message
news:45672f06.82530015@news-server.houston.rr.com...
On 24 Nov 2006 07:38:28 -0800, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
Citizen Bob schrieb:
On 24 Nov 2006 06:33:47 -0800, "tg" <tgdenning@earthlink.net> wrote:
Wholes are by definition not contingent.
Then you are not whole.
It's certainly not the case that wholes are defined as necessary
beings.
I do not understand this.
Does anyone understand it?
If "wholes are not contingent" and "wholes are not necessary", then
what are they?
All mental exercises come to the same question.
"If I dont know who or what I am, how can I understand who or what I'm
observing".
BOfL
--
Rope, Tree, Journalist - some assembly required.
Chain, Pickup, Politician - some assembly required.
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| User: "tg" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 10:06:57 AM |
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Paul Holbach wrote:
Citizen Bob schrieb:
On 24 Nov 2006 06:33:47 -0800, "tg" <tgdenning@earthlink.net> wrote:
Wholes are by definition not contingent.
Then you are not whole.
It's certainly not the case that wholes are defined as necessary
beings.
In your original post, you said:
"If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together."
What if only one part is contingent?
-tg
#PH
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 10:59:52 AM |
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tg schrieb:
In your original post, you said:
"If every part of a whole is contingent, then the whole (which is
identical to its parts) is contingent. In other words, if every part
can cease to exist, then all parts can cease to exist together."
What if only one part is contingent?
That's a different assumption.
If not all parts of a whole are contingent, i.e. if some parts are
necessary (I mean "necessary as beings as such", not "necessary as
parts"), then the whole is necessary.
#PH
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 11:15:07 AM |
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Paul Holbach schrieb:
If not all parts of a whole are contingent, i.e. if some parts are
necessary (I mean "necessary as beings as such", not "necessary as
parts"), then the whole is necessary.
Probably things are more complicated.
Is a whole that is composed of both contingent and necessary entities
contingent or necessary.
For example, let's say numbers are necessary beings.
Is then the sum (the whole) of the number 4 and Paul Holbach contingent
or necessary?
(C(Paul Holbach) & N4) -> N(Paul_Holbach + 4) ???
The more I think about it, the more I lack an ad hoc answer.
(Forget my "quickshot reply" above.)
You've raised an interesting question.
#PH
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| User: "Citizen Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 11:45:18 AM |
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On 24 Nov 2006 08:59:52 -0800, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
If not all parts of a whole are contingent, i.e. if some parts are
necessary (I mean "necessary as beings as such", not "necessary as
parts"), then the whole is necessary.
But the whole is defined as the sum of its parts, so if one of the
parts is contingent, the whole must be contingent, because of that one
contingent part ceases to exist, the whole will also cease to exist
because it is no longer the totality of the parts that originally made
it whole.
--
Rope, Tree, Journalist - some assembly required.
Chain, Pickup, Politician - some assembly required.
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Contingent Things |
24 Nov 2006 12:09:00 PM |
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Citizen Bob schrieb:
On 24 Nov 2006 08:59:52 -0800, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
If not all parts of a whole are contingent, i.e. if some parts are
necessary (I mean "necessary as beings as such", not "necessary as
parts"), then the whole is necessary.
But the whole is defined as the sum of its parts, so if one of the
parts is contingent, the whole must be contingent, because of that one
contingent part ceases to exist, the whole will also cease to exist
because it is no longer the totality of the parts that originally made
it whole.
I concede my reply was rash.
You're probably right.
#PH
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