Daniel T. wrote:

They cannot claim that any act benefits them more than another, they
cannot even claim that they are acting. To claim that one act is more
beneficial than another, they must first assert that they have knowledge
of the results such that they can make a distinction. To claim they are
acting, they must first assert that they can accurately distinguish
between acting and not acting. All of which defeats their initial
assumption.

Well, let me start with Kant, since his way around it is the most
obvious: What Kant would likely claim is that the conclusions he would
draw are indeed true ... about the world of appearances. But you
didn't think that the world of appearances was the REAL world, did you?

Daniel T. wrote:

"Allan C Cybulskie" <allan_c_cybulskie@yahoo.ca> wrote:

Daniel T. wrote:

"Allan C Cybulskie" <allan_c_cybulskie@yahoo.ca> wrote:

As important -- we sometimes fail to predict part of the
behavior of the world. Because of this fact, we can assert
that some perceptions of the world are more accurate than
others (because some have shown that they are more likely
to correctly predict future events.)

But the question is: Accurate about what?

Take the "brain in the vat" example. Certain perceptual
experiences fit inside the reality that is being generated
for the brain in the vat. Yet sometimes "real" experiences
bleed through. But since those aren't consistent with the
generated reality, those experiences fail to predict future
events and so are "less accurate". But less accurate about
what? The false reality. It's the less accurate experiences
that are about REAL reality.

To say that "real" experiences bleed through is to once again
assert that some experiences are correct (even if they are in
the minority.) An assertion that the skeptic refuses to make.

Ah, but the skeptic can indeed accept the assertion in order to
show that it leads to a contradiction.

In order to accept the assertion, even for the purposes you state,
he must first claim knowledge that the assertion has been made. He
cannot do that without undermining his position.

Well the skeptic can step around this challenge: As seen below, the
skeptic can simply state that they need no such knowledge. They can
claim that they do not KNOW that the proposition has been made, but
that they believe that it has.

So we may assert that some perceptions are "more accurate",
but that assumes that our perceptions are at all accurate to
start with.

Exactly. Such an assertion is inescapable.

Actually, no it isn't. Take Kant, for example. He avoids this
assertion by claiming that he has no idea if our perceptions are
at all accurate but that they are how things appear to us and
that it is useful for us to follow them. Also the solipsist
avoids this by claiming that they are only justified in
asserting that THEY exist but again that it benefits them to act
on the appearances that are being generated by their own mind.

They cannot claim that any act benefits them more than another,
they cannot even claim that they are acting. To claim that one act
is more beneficial than another, they must first assert that they
have knowledge of the results such that they can make a
distinction. To claim they are acting, they must first assert that
they can accurately distinguish between acting and not acting. All
of which defeats their initial assumption.

Well, let me start with Kant, since his way around it is the most
obvious: What Kant would likely claim is that the conclusions he
would draw are indeed true ... about the world of appearances.

The solipsist, then, can be seen to take a similar tack. They can
act as if the act benefits them based on what they know about their
own subjective experiences.

You may ask at this point: so what's the big deal? They end up
acting the same way as the realists anyway. The reply is that it
matters when perceptions of ourselves and others differ.

No assertion, no matter how obvious, can be either true or false
to the skeptic. A skeptic can't even distinguish between a valid
and invalid argument because he can't assert the truth or falsity
of logic itself. He is left, literally, without reason.

Well, there are a number of ways out here:

1) They can say they believe in logic, but don't know that it is valid.

2) They can claim that the laws of logic (and likely mathematics) are
necessarily true.

3) They can claim that the laws of logic are a priori and thus
necessary. They can then claim only to doubt perceptual experiences
and not a priori truths (there is some doubt to this).

4) They can claim that the laws of logic and mathematics are analytic
truths ... truth by virtue of the meanings of the laws. Or, if you
like, true by definition (not quite the same thing, but it will suffice
for now).

The realist then cannot turn around and grant the same
status to perceptual truths because then why couldn't someone do that
willy-nilly for ANYTHING they wanted to justify? Gods, ghosts,
supernatural claims, and so on? Most realists won't accept this.

5) This move is mostly a summation: Since you accept above that without
believing in the laws of logic no argument or anything else can be
done, the skeptic can say that we MUST accept and believe them even if
they are not justified. At least SOME form of logic must be employed.

But they could point out that that is not the case for perceptual
beliefs ...

or, at least the case that perceptual beliefs reflect the
or a real objective reality. So while they think it certainly
reasonable to accept some form of logic without justification because
of the utter import of those beliefs, perceptual beliefs do not get
such a free ride.

The key thing you keep missing is that the skeptic does not in any
way need to claim that they know anything. They can simply claim to
believe it, unjustified. This causes them little grief but much to
the person who wants to claim that one should only hold justified
beliefs.

The second key issue here is that I think the distinction between
"reality-skepticism" and "epistemological skepticism" is being
missed. The reality skeptic -- the solipsist, for example -- will
claim that he is skeptical that an objective reality exists at all.

His reasons will be that he thinks he should only accept beliefs
that are justified and that the only belief that he has that is
justified is that he is having experiences.

The epistemological skeptic simply says that perceptual beliefs are
UNJUSTIFIED. What that means is left to those who care about
justification (and the skeptic may or may not be such a person).

In the face of such an experiment, it is ridiculous to claim
that the color blind person's perception is no less accurate
than mine.

Well, if you can provide the details of such an experiment that
actually works, then I'd agree with you. So far, I haven't seen
it [grin].

A thought experiment then. Albert can paint two pictures that look
absolutely identical to the rest of us. We will, for the sake of
argument, label one a "red picture" and the other a "green
picture". No matter how anyone else tries to confuse the issue, no
matter how scientifically sound the experiment, Albert can always
tell which picture is red and which is green. We, on the other
hand, have to rely on elaborate means to keep track of the
distinction between the two pictures (a very careful tracking
system, after all we don't want to mark either picture.)

Note, Albert is very much in the minority yet the non-skeptic has
to admit that Albert is able to perceive something distinctive
between the two pictures. Your whole argument about majority rule
becomes moot.

Hmm. I'm not sure how this relates to what I was talking about with
colour-blindness, but let me take a stab at the example and
explaining what I was saying using it:

What we have is the case that Albert can tell the difference between
two pictures and we cannot. So for us the pictures are identical and
for Albert they are not. So what can we say here about the way
things REALLY? Well, we can say that the pictures, in reality,
really ARE identical and that Albert's perception of a difference is
really an illusion, like others that we know we have. Or we can say
that there really is a difference in the pictures but that we simply
can't see it and yet Albert can. Which of these is right?

What we'd say is that it is likely -- and more reasonable -- to
think that Albert is perceiving it correctly mostly because we can't
see what could form such an illusion. But this is certainly not
certain. We cannot plead that reality must be a certain way because
of ignorance of how it could be otherwise. So here we don't really
KNOW which proposition is true -- or even if they are both false --
but that we take a stance on it. But is this sufficient for
justification?

My comment on colour-blindness was attempting to highlight this
exact point: Are what most people see as the colours correct, or are
the "colour-blind" people correct?

And the critical answer has to be
that we don't really know. Now colour is a bad example because a lot
of people claim quite justifiably that that quality isn't in the
object itself anyway, but is in the perceiver. But the question
applies itself to any qualities: how do you know which quality
really belongs to the object itself independent of your perceptions?
The skeptic answer is that you don't.

The epistemological objection is that we do not have
justification for thinking that our perceptions are
accurate. This makes any knowledge that we have that is
based on perceptual evidence unjustified ... and thus not
knowledge at all. And the skeptical claim is that we CANNOT
justify sense experiences. So if that is the case we have no
knowledge of anything based primarily on sense experiences,
as those claims are now unjustified. Since most of our
knowledge IS based primarily on sense experiences, that's a
devastating blow to epistemology and to our knowledge.

Someone who accepts the above argument, cannot state it. The
mere fact that you are able to write the above, and proof it
to make sure is says what you want it to say, refutes the
argument you are presenting.

Again, you are assigning an argument to the skeptic that the
skeptic need not make. The skeptic need not claim that one