Daniel T. wrote:

The entire example is rendered irrelevant by the skeptics own belief. To
his view, it is entirely unreasonable for me to even accept that he has
presented an argument for not accepting what I perceive.

In attempting to argue against perception, the skeptic denies his own
existence.

Skeptics tend to point their suspicion and doubt to the exterior world
-- rarely are those investigations directed inwards.

Daniel T. wrote:

"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote:

Usualy the skeptic is merely trying to point out that a
particular state of affairs and the beliefs about it may not be
as certain as stated, usually with great confidence by
over-believers in the possibility of good and gooder evidence.

But in order to deny perception, the skeptic must first accept
that it is true, else why is he pointing it out to someone who he
doesn't even accept the existence of?

If we are sometimes mistaken in our perceptual beliefs, then it is
always logically possible that our perceptual beliefs are false.

I am not to this point yet, but let us skip over the dreams,
hallucinations, brains in vat and proceed to this idea of
skepticism, you first, your defending it?

Daniel T. wrote:

"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote:

Daniel T. wrote:

Immortalist wrote:

- Can't always be dreaming

It would not make sense to say that my whole life is a dream. If I were
dreaming all the time, then I would have no concept of a dream: I would
have nothing with which to contrast dreaming since I would have no
concept of being awake. We can only make sense of the idea of a forged
banknote when genuine banknotes exist with which to compare it;
similarly the idea of a dream only makes sense when we can compare it
to waking life.

This is true, but it does not destroy the sceptic's position. What the
sceptic is arguing is not that we might be dreaming all the time, but
rather that at any one moment we cannot know for certain whether or not
we are actually dreaming.

I can't help but wonder who the sceptic thinks he's talking to when he
thinks he is making such an argument. Given his position, he has no
reason to reason, so no one can reason with him.

Usualy the skeptic is merely trying to point out that a particular
state of affairs and the beliefs about it may not be as certain as
stated, usually with great confidence by over-believers in the
possibility of good and gooder evidence.

But in order to deny perception, the skeptic must first accept that it
is true, else why is he pointing it out to someone who he doesn't even
accept the existence of?

If we are sometimes mistaken in our perceptual beliefs, then it is
always logically possible that our perceptual beliefs are false.

Thats not denying perceptual beliefs but just claiming that it is a
matter of luck when we decide whether we are hallucinating or not. If
we are hallucinating it isn't necessary for perception to be denied
since that hallucination was perceptual, loc.

...suppose that two people are looking through different windows. The
first person reports that there is a sphere on a table outside her
window; she sees the sphere to be green. She sees this no matter from
what vantage point she views things. Suppose further that the second
person, looking through her own window, sees and reports the very same
thing. Each person has exactly the same justification for claiming to
know that there is a green sphere outside his window. Each is in just
as good a position to know this as the other. Surely, the only correct
conclusion to reach is that either each person knows there is a green
sphere outside her window or that neither of them knows this. It would
be entirely arbitrary, and hence unreasonable, to say that one person
knows this and the other does not.

The entire example is rendered irrelevant by the skeptics own belief. To
his view, it is entirely unreasonable for me to even accept that he has
presented an argument for not accepting what I perceive.

In attempting to argue against perception, the skeptic denies his own
existence.

[1] - Positive Universal Skepticism:


In its positive form it consists
of the doctrine that man
can know nothing.


This belief can be easily dismissed, because anyone who defends it
finds himself immersed in hopeless absurdities.


In asserting that there is no knowledge, the skeptic is asserting a
knowledge claim-which according to his own theory is impossible.


The universal skeptic wishes to
claim truth for a theory that
denies man's ability to arrive
at truth, and this puts the
skeptic in the unenviable
position of uttering
nonsense.


...he cannot even begin to argue for his position, because the
"possibility of knowledge is presupposed in the very possibility of
argument, in the very possibility of having recourse to reasons." [8]
As Francis Parker explains:


There is such a
thing as knowledge.


The assertion of this proposition is necessarily true if there is to be

any assertion at all, for its contradictory is self-contradictory.


If the assertion
"There is no knowledge"
is true, then it is false


...for that assertion itself purports to be an instance of knowledge.
Thus the only alternative to the recognition of the existence of
knowledge is, as Aristotle said, a return to the vegetative state where

no assertions whatever can be made.


---------------------------------------
[2] - Negative Universal Skepticism:


The second form of universal skepticism
consists of the doctrine that we must
doubt every alleged instance
of knowledge.


Through this negative formulation,


the universal skeptic seeks to avoid
the contradiction of asserting a
knowledge claim while denying
the existence of knowledge.


But the doctrine that we should doubt every knowledge claim
translates_into the positive assertion that man can never attain
certainty-and this version of skepticism fares no better than the
preceding.


We must ask if this "principle of
universal doubt" is itself certain,
or is it open to doubt as well?


If it is known with certainty, at
least one thing is beyond doubt,
which makes the principle false.


If, however, the principle is
open to doubt-i.e., if it
is not certain-then on what
grounds can the skeptic claim
greater plausibility for his
theory than any other?


The logician C. N. Bittle elaborates on this problem:


Skeptics either have valid reasons for


alt.philosophy > Know-Nothing Universal Skepticism: Positive & Negative
Forms
http://groups.google.com/group/alt.philosophy/msg/b86ea8051203c7f6

I am not to this point yet, but let us skip over the dreams,
hallucinations, brains in vat and proceed to this idea of skepticism,
you first, your defending it?

abo wrote:

Immortalist wrote:

3. If it is always logically possible that our perceptual beliefs are
false,

True

then no one ever knows that any of our perceptual beliefs are
true.

This is only true under a restricted meaning of "know".

Under the usual meaning of "know," I know that the Red Sox won the
World Series in 2004, but it is logically possible that they didn't.
Not all knowledge needs to be logically necessary.

Actually, the question is if it is logically possible that the Red Sox
did not win the World Series in 2004 after they have indeed won it.
Yes, it is possible that they might NOT have won the World Series but
you could not have "known" that they would win the World Series before
they won it. And after they have won it, it is not possible that they
have not won it.