Science > Philosophy > Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience]
| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"Immortalist" |
| Date: |
29 Dec 2006 01:11:41 PM |
| Object: |
Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Kant revolutionized philosophy. Kant showed that the mind, through its
innate categories, constructs our experience along certain lines
(space, time, causality, self, etc.). Thus, thinking and experiencing
give no access to things as they really are. We can think as hard as we
like, but we will never escape the innate constraints of our minds.
Kant forced philosophy to look seriously at the world for the agent
(what Kant calls the phenomenal world) independently of the real world
outside consciousness - the world in itself (the noumenal world).
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/KANT.HTM
---------------------------------
NEVER has a system of thought so dominated an epoch as the philosophy
of Immanuel Kant dominated the thought of the nineteenth century. After
almost three-score years of quiet and secluded development, the uncanny
Scot of Konigsberg roused the world from its "dogmatic slumber," in
1781, with his famous Critique of Pure Reason; and from that year to
our own the "critical philosophy" has ruled the speculative roost of
Europe.
The philosophy of Schopenhauer rose to brief power on the romantic wave
that broke in 1848; the theory of evolution swept everything before it
after 1859; and the exhilarating iconoclasm of Nietzsche won the center
of the philosophic stage as the century came to a close.
But these were secondary and surface developments; underneath them the
strong and steady current of the Kantian movement flowed on, always
wider and deeper; until today its essential theorems are the axioms of
all mature philosophy.
Nietzsche takes Kant for granted, and passes on; Schopenhauer calls the
Critique "the most important work in German literature," and considers
any man a child until he has understood Kant; Spencer could not
understand Kant, and for precisely that reason, perhaps, fell a little
short of the fullest philosophic stature.
To adapt Hegel's phrase about Spinoza: to be a philosopher, one must
first have been a Kantian...
The Story of Philosophy -WILL DURANT
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0671739166/
Kant's most original contribution to philosophy is his "Copernican
Revolution," that, as he puts it,
it is the representation that makes the
object possible rather than the object
that makes the representation possible.
This introduced the human mind as an active originator of experience
rather than just a passive recipient of perception. Something like this
now seems obvious: the mind could be a tabula rasa, a "blank tablet,"
no more than a bathtub full of silicon chips could be a digital
computer. Perceptual input must be processed, i.e. recognized, or it
would just be noise -- "less even than a dream" or "nothing to us," as
Kant alternatively puts it.
But if the mind actively generates perception, this raises the question
whether the result has anything to do with the world, or if so, how
much...
http://www.friesian.com/kant.htm
....And first to the naming and analysis of those elements in our
thought which are not so much given to the mind by perception as given
to perception by the mind; those levers which raise the "perceptual"
knowledge of objects into the "conceptual" knowledge of relationships,
sequences, and laws; those tools of the mind which refine experience
into science. Just as perceptions arranged sensations around objects in
space and time, so conception arranges perceptions (objects and events)
about the ideas of cause, unity, reciprocal relation, necessity,
contingency, etc.; these and other "categories" are the structure into
which perceptions are received, and by which they are classified and
moulded into the ordered concepts of thought. These are the very
essence and character of the mind; mind is the coordination of
experience...
....Sensation is unorganized stimulus, perception is organized
sensation, conception is organized perception, science is organized
knowledge, wisdom is organized life: each is a greater degree of order,
and sequence, and unity. Whence this order, this sequence, this unity?
Not from the things themselves; for they are known to us only by
sensations that come through a thousand channels at once in disorderly
multitude; it is our purpose that put order and sequence and unity upon
this importunate lawlessness; it is ourselves, our personalities, our
minds, that bring light upon these seas. Locke was wrong when he said,
"There is nothing in the intellect except what was first in the
senses"; Leibnitz was right when he added,-"nothing, except the
intellect itself." "Perceptions without conceptions," says Kant, "are
blind." If perceptions wove themselves automatically into ordered
thought, if mind were not an active effort hammering out order from
chaos, how could the same experience leave one man mediocre, and in a
more active and tireless soul be raised to the light of wisdom and the
beautiful logic of truth?...
The Story of Philosophy -WILL DURANT
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0671739166/
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
29 Dec 2006 07:50:29 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
Before Kant, the real theorizing about knowledge was done by
scientists and mathematicians, not by philosophers. After Kant,
the real theorizing about knowledge was done by scientists and
mathematicians, not by philosophers.
I don't see much of a change.
Kant revolutionized philosophy. Kant showed that the mind, through its
innate categories, constructs our experience along certain lines
(space, time, causality, self, etc.).
No, Kant did not show that. He asserted it. To *show* that would
be empirical science, not philosophy.
Incidently those "innate categories" seem to have changed since
Relativity and Quantum Theory entered the scene, so maybe they
weren't innate after all.
Thus, thinking and experiencing
give no access to things as they really are. We can think as hard as we
like, but we will never escape the innate constraints of our minds.
Kant forced philosophy to look seriously at the world for the agent
(what Kant calls the phenomenal world) independently of the real world
outside consciousness - the world in itself (the noumenal world).
Yet many modern philosophers seem to assume some kind of direct
realism, and to reject anything that suggests constructivism.
So maybe Kant's influence has died out, at least with respect
to epistemology.
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/KANT.HTM
I'm not sure if that's your web page, or just something you are
reporting.
The web page is probably okay, as far as it goes. I'm a bit
surprised by the statement "After Kant, the old debate between
rationalists and empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new
direction." Perhaps the author of that page is not familiar with
the Chomsky-Piaget debates. "Language and Learning: The Debate
between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky", Harvard University Press,
1980 (ed: Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini).
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
30 Dec 2006 07:45:40 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
If you descibe how it is you know that you will be doing word games
(epistemology redefined) and it is doubtful that you could be trusted,
as a mere game player that is, by your own stereotypical prejudaces.
Before Kant, the real theorizing about knowledge was done by
scientists and mathematicians, not by philosophers. After Kant,
the real theorizing about knowledge was done by scientists and
mathematicians, not by philosophers.
Actually real science started with Greek philosophers. Science became
more independents as philosophers discovered more. Most science,
physical or social was at one time philosophy, therefore you appear to
contradict historical concensus about the matter.
Although there is no exact equivalent to our term science in Greek,
Western science may still be said to have originated with the Greeks,
for they were the first to attempt to explain natural phenomena
consistently in naturalistic terms, and they initiated the practices of
rational criticism of scientific theories. This study traces Greek
science through the work of the Pythagoreans, the Presocratic natural
philosphers, the Hippocratic writers, Plato, the fourth-century B.C.
astronomers, and Aristotle. G. E. R. Lloyd also investigates the
relationships between science and philosophy and science and medicine;
he discusses the social and economic setting of early Greek science;
and he analyzes the motives and incentives of the different groups of
writers
http://www.wwnorton.com/catalog/backlist/000583.htm
Pre-historic humans were thought to have a pantheon of gods and
goddesses that ruled the world and its inhabitants. During the Golden
Age of Greece, science began to change to rationality and logic. With
the fall of Rome and its government, scientific thought changed again,
to the superstitions of the Middle Ages. At the end of the Middle Ages,
the Age of Reason and the Renaissance began the trend toward the
present, the Age of Information.
Science now relies on data that can be reported, duplicated, verified.
It is linearly logical, rational, using numbers to compute, compare and
analyze information. This has not always been so. People use the
knowledge they have to explain the natural and physical world around
them. Ancient people and people without the technology available in the
Age of Information developed stories, myths and legends to explain
their world.
The people of pre-history are, by modern standards, thought to have
been very superstitious, with stories and characters to explain their
worlds. Our knowledge of their beliefs has been extrapolated from
contemporary, "primitive" societies and cultures such as the Maori of
New Zealand, the Hmong of Indochina, and the Inuits of Alaska.
Anthropologists have examined oral histories and religious practices of
these modern cultures and compared them to ancient, pre-historical
cultural artifacts. Both the modern and ancient cultures have various,
but often similar, stories to explain events in their world.
The Egyptians, ancient Greeks, and Romans had well self-documented
cultures, with explanations of beliefs as well as stories and myths.
Zeus, Jupiter, Hera and Juno are Greek and Roman gods that most
Westerners study at some point in their educational process. The Golden
Age of Greece produced people who thought about the world rationally.
These people developed answers that relied more on reason and
mathematics rather than on answers from the Gods. The Romans expanded
upon Greek ideas and utilized them until their civilization collapsed
from within. The barbarian attacks from without also contributed to the
fall of Rome and the rise of the superstitious Middle Ages.
The Middle Ages contributed to science via the many alchemists, the
last of whom is said to have been Sir Isaac Newton. Newton, along with
Galileo, Copernicus, Redi, Pasteur and many others, added their
contributions to the body of knowledge that explains the world in
rational, logical terms known to late twentieth century people as
science.
These paradigm shifts demonstrate that logic has not always been part
of science. Cultures around the world and across the ages developed
many different explanations for events in the natural world. There are
different cultural explanations of creation. Chinese, Native Americans
and Central Americans explain creation as the mating of the sun and the
moon. The ancient Greeks explained the beginning of the earth with the
Olympians Zeus and Hera. There are many other stories explaining other
natural events.
http://www.woodrow.org/teachers/bi/1994/myths_science.html
http://www.woodrow.org/teachers/bi/1994/myths_science.html
http://galileoandeinstein.physics.virginia.edu/lectures/thales.html
http://zebu.uoregon.edu/~js/lectures/science/history.html
http://homepage.mac.com/cparada/GML/ChildrenMyths.html
http://www.uh.edu/~cfreelan/courses/Lloyd.html
http://www.unesco.org/courier/2001_05/uk/doss22.htm
http://www.sciencedaily.com/encyclopedia/myth
http://users.erols.com/bcccsbs/c4paren.htm#greeks
[ http://www.spaceandmotion.com/Theology-Greek-Gods-Myths.htm ]
I don't see much of a change.
Kant revolutionized philosophy. Kant showed that the mind, through its
innate categories, constructs our experience along certain lines
(space, time, causality, self, etc.).
No, Kant did not show that. He asserted it. To *show* that would
be empirical science, not philosophy.
I suppose you would need a phrase to replace the word "show" with some
varient of "assert" hence Kant asserted with some sort of "logical
evidence" that such and such. Plus you need to establish the context
the author used when using "show" and then make a distinction with a
difference since you haven't made any counter theory about the unknown
and unjustified theories of his usage.
Incidently those "innate categories" seem to have changed since
Relativity and Quantum Theory entered the scene, so maybe they
weren't innate after all.
Look out at the horizon, your going to see the flat ground. You are
reminded constantly that the Earth is round. So much for science or QM
changing perceptual and conceptual reality. It seems there is a way to
even get Kant out of the seeming contradiction of these non-Euclidian
geometries. You see, that we can know of these other geometries with
our Euclidian "hardware" is merely like being able to use a two
dimensional peice of paper to give the illusion of three dimensions.
Trrying to find that part that hints at this in the Critique, help
someone.
Thus, thinking and experiencing
give no access to things as they really are. We can think as hard as we
like, but we will never escape the innate constraints of our minds.
Kant forced philosophy to look seriously at the world for the agent
(what Kant calls the phenomenal world) independently of the real world
outside consciousness - the world in itself (the noumenal world).
Yet many modern philosophers seem to assume some kind of direct
realism, and to reject anything that suggests constructivism.
So maybe Kant's influence has died out, at least with respect
to epistemology.
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/KANT.HTM
I'm not sure if that's your web page, or just something you are
reporting.
The web page is probably okay, as far as it goes. I'm a bit
surprised by the statement "After Kant, the old debate between
rationalists and empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new
direction." Perhaps the author of that page is not familiar with
the Chomsky-Piaget debates. "Language and Learning: The Debate
between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky", Harvard University Press,
1980 (ed: Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini).
Well it was after Kant that a third way, a mixture of the two
originated and the debate hasn't been the same since. But please try
and establish more clearly how it is that the "debate" the author uses
is identical to the one your pointing to. Is there some axiom or
standard you might reveal which will help us connect the two more
assuredly?
.
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
30 Dec 2006 08:59:34 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
If you descibe how it is you know that you will be doing word games
(epistemology redefined) and it is doubtful that you could be trusted,
as a mere game player that is, by your own stereotypical prejudaces.
It seems you want to recast this into something you can describe
as self-refuting. That is to say, you want to play word games.
Actually real science started with Greek philosophers. Science became
more independents as philosophers discovered more. Most science,
physical or social was at one time philosophy, therefore you appear to
contradict historical concensus about the matter.
What's the point you are making? Kant was well after the separation
of science from philosophy.
Kant revolutionized philosophy. Kant showed that the mind, through its
innate categories, constructs our experience along certain lines
(space, time, causality, self, etc.).
No, Kant did not show that. He asserted it. To *show* that would
be empirical science, not philosophy.
I suppose you would need a phrase to replace the word "show" with some
varient of "assert" hence Kant asserted with some sort of "logical
evidence" that such and such.
It isn't the kind of claim you could demonstrate with "logical
evidence".
Incidently those "innate categories" seem to have changed since
Relativity and Quantum Theory entered the scene, so maybe they
weren't innate after all.
Look out at the horizon, your going to see the flat ground. You are
reminded constantly that the Earth is round. So much for science or QM
changing perceptual and conceptual reality. It seems there is a way to
even get Kant out of the seeming contradiction of these non-Euclidian
geometries. You see, that we can know of these other geometries with
our Euclidian "hardware" is merely like being able to use a two
dimensional peice of paper to give the illusion of three dimensions.
If you are suggesting that this has to do with naive prescientific
categories, such as might be held by a young child, then that's
a useful clarification. But in that case, non-Euclidean geometry
doesn't seem relevant, and perhaps even Euclidean geometry is of
questionable relevance.
The web page is probably okay, as far as it goes. I'm a bit
surprised by the statement "After Kant, the old debate between
rationalists and empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new
direction." Perhaps the author of that page is not familiar with
the Chomsky-Piaget debates. "Language and Learning: The Debate
between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky", Harvard University Press,
1980 (ed: Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini).
Well it was after Kant that a third way, a mixture of the two
originated and the debate hasn't been the same since. But please try
and establish more clearly how it is that the "debate" the author uses
is identical to the one your pointing to. Is there some axiom or
standard you might reveal which will help us connect the two more
assuredly?
So I guess you are going to sit there and pontificate, without
even taking a look at the reference I gave. Thanks you for the
excellent demonstration of how to play word games.
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
31 Dec 2006 04:15:43 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
If you descibe how it is you know that you will be doing word games
(epistemology redefined) and it is doubtful that you could be trusted,
as a mere game player that is, by your own stereotypical prejudaces.
It seems you want to recast this into something you can describe
as self-refuting. That is to say, you want to play word games.
Actually I just wanted to point out that any time you refer to any
theory of knowledge which you use to defend your assertions, then you
use epistemology. This goes for all scientists. We are talking about
the very justification possibilities of you making your last statement
included.
Actually real science started with Greek philosophers. Science became
more independents as philosophers discovered more. Most science,
physical or social was at one time philosophy, therefore you appear to
contradict historical concensus about the matter.
What's the point you are making? Kant was well after the separation
of science from philosophy.
Do you have any support for your belief in the seperation of science
and philosophy? When was this division (comleted?)?
1. complete division at some point
2. science and philosophy are connected with each other to some degree
always
3. science is still philosophy
You are claiming to evidence for your belief that the right conclusion
is (1)
Kant revolutionized philosophy. Kant showed that the mind, through its
innate categories, constructs our experience along certain lines
(space, time, causality, self, etc.).
No, Kant did not show that. He asserted it. To *show* that would
be empirical science, not philosophy.
I suppose you would need a phrase to replace the word "show" with some
varient of "assert" hence Kant asserted with some sort of "logical
evidence" that such and such.
It isn't the kind of claim you could demonstrate with "logical
evidence".
Science consists of "inductive theorization" [to know-that] and
"know-how" experimentation with percentages of trials etc... , for;
In science, a theory is an explanation. Evolution is a theory, just
like gravitation. Gravity is not a law of nature but an explaination of
observations. If you drop something, it's going to fall. That's an
observation: unsupported things fall. But you explain that observation
with the theory of gravity, which is that the mass of what whatever it
is you dropped, a pencil or a pen or something, is attracted by the
mass...it's really a theory of gravity? But remember, a theory is an
explanation.
Incidently those "innate categories" seem to have changed since
Relativity and Quantum Theory entered the scene, so maybe they
weren't innate after all.
Look out at the horizon, your going to see the flat ground. You are
reminded constantly that the Earth is round. So much for science or QM
changing perceptual and conceptual reality. It seems there is a way to
even get Kant out of the seeming contradiction of these non-Euclidian
geometries. You see, that we can know of these other geometries with
our Euclidian "hardware" is merely like being able to use a two
dimensional peice of paper to give the illusion of three dimensions.
If you are suggesting that this has to do with naive prescientific
categories, such as might be held by a young child, then that's
a useful clarification. But in that case, non-Euclidean geometry
doesn't seem relevant, and perhaps even Euclidean geometry is of
questionable relevance.
Nope, I am suggesting that all human perception & conception are
trapped within a Euclidean geometrical perspective which can be used to
create an artificial idea of other dimensions that seem right in our
Euclidean dillemma.
THE PROBABILITY INSTINCT
It looks as if Kant, who thought our minds structure our perceptions,
was right. Probability was built into our minds. Our minds, the
electrochemical symphony that our narrowly evolved neural ganglia play,
impose an infrastructure on our thinking. The mind imposes a background
of time and space and causal connectedness. Scientists have never seen
a "causality" in the wild. They have seen, and they predict, only
space-time events that follow space-time events. Apples on the tree,
then apples in the air, then apples on the ground. Equations and
correlations have replaced causes, just as science has largely replaced
philosophy and religion as a theory of things. No causal germ in one
event unfolds into another event. But the mind, as eighteenth-century
philosopher David Hume observed, makes it seem so and inserts the
causal links in the event chain.
Probability seems to be part of the same mental infrastructure. It
forms part of our mental background or viewing screen along with time
and space and causality and similarity and the topological notions of
continuity and connectedness. We see probability everywhere because it
lies in our glasses.
I believe that probability or "randomness" is a psychic instinct or
Jungian archetype or mental trend that helps us organize our
perceptions and memories and most of all our expectations. Probability
gives structure to our competing causal predictions about how the
future will unfold in the next instant or day or season or millennium.
Probability ranks or weights the future alternatives. Our expectations
then blend or average these future alternatives into a single
probability-weighted average. The probability weights do not exist
outside our minds. They have no physical reality but have a powerful
psychological reality rooted in our neural mi-crostructure. Hume also
thought that we make up probability as we go and use it to fill in gaps
in our mind schemes or world views: "Though there be no such thing as
chance in the world, our ignorance of the real cause of any event has
the same influence on the understanding and begets a like species of
belief."
This probability instinct seems to cut across cultures and may cut
across species. Besides the probability-laden psychology of scientists
and most nonscientists, the widespread gambling and games of chance in
primitive and modern cultures suggest that probability "reasoning" may
be a cultural constant like hero worship or fertility rituals or incest
and adultery taboos. A cultural constant suggests a biological
substrate, and that requires an evolutionary history.
Ranking future alternatives can help pass on genes. Those who could so
rank may have eaten those who could not. It allows us to bet before we
act and improve the outcome of acting. That forward-looking ability has
supreme survival value in biological evolution, the genetic variation
and selection in the last few million years that has finely sculpted
our brains and minds, and in the prior evolution that sculpted the
brains and minds of our mammalian ancestors in the last 220 million
years. Natural selection filters out organisms as they cross the fuzzy
line from the present to the future. Natural selection favors brain
mechanisms that help an organism make its next move in a changing and
dangerous world. These forward-looking brain mechanisms may run deep in
the structure of mammalian and even reptilian brains. Future studies
may find that the brains of chimps and apes and lesser-brained mammals
house a forward-looking probability instinct. At the other extreme we
should not be surprised that scientists have exalted probability
ranking into their grand organizing principle of maximum probability.
Scientists follow their probability instincts as their hominid
forefathers followed theirs. Scientists just know more math.
Fuzzy Thinking - The New Science of Fuzzy Logic
Bart Kosko
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/078688021X/
The web page is probably okay, as far as it goes. I'm a bit
surprised by the statement "After Kant, the old debate between
rationalists and empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new
direction." Perhaps the author of that page is not familiar with
the Chomsky-Piaget debates. "Language and Learning: The Debate
between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky", Harvard University Press,
1980 (ed: Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini).
Well it was after Kant that a third way, a mixture of the two
originated and the debate hasn't been the same since. But please try
and establish more clearly how it is that the "debate" the author uses
is identical to the one your pointing to. Is there some axiom or
standard you might reveal which will help us connect the two more
assuredly?
So I guess you are going to sit there and pontificate, without
even taking a look at the reference I gave. Thanks you for the
excellent demonstration of how to play word games.
What link? Are you so busy you can't summerize your position with a
couple of added links? Shifting the burden of linking I say!
hypothetical anhilation of yern argermunt
Kant -invents phone 1900
Chomsky-Piaget -invent tone dialing
YOU - claim talking on the phone has not been invented yet
excuse the on the fly donought shop mumblein
.
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
01 Jan 2007 11:49:46 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
If you descibe how it is you know that you will be doing word games
(epistemology redefined) and it is doubtful that you could be trusted,
as a mere game player that is, by your own stereotypical prejudaces.
It seems you want to recast this into something you can describe
as self-refuting. That is to say, you want to play word games.
Actually I just wanted to point out that any time you refer to any
theory of knowledge which you use to defend your assertions, then you
use epistemology. This goes for all scientists. We are talking about
the very justification possibilities of you making your last statement
included.
It depends on what you mean by "epistemology." I take its normal
meaning to be that body of work that is studied by people who call
themselves epistemologists (and who are typically philosophers).
Since it is possible to study knowledge, independent of that body
of work, one can do so without doing using epistemology.
Do you have any support for your belief in the seperation of science
and philosophy? When was this division (comleted?)?
This seems to be headed in a diversionary direction.
I suppose you would need a phrase to replace the word "show" with some
varient of "assert" hence Kant asserted with some sort of "logical
evidence" that such and such.
It isn't the kind of claim you could demonstrate with "logical
evidence".
Science consists of "inductive theorization" [to know-that] and
"know-how" experimentation with percentages of trials etc... , for;
In science, a theory is an explanation. Evolution is a theory, just
like gravitation. Gravity is not a law of nature but an explaination of
observations. If you drop something, it's going to fall. That's an
observation: unsupported things fall. But you explain that observation
with the theory of gravity, which is that the mass of what whatever it
is you dropped, a pencil or a pen or something, is attracted by the
mass...it's really a theory of gravity? But remember, a theory is an
explanation.
That's one view of science. I don't much agree with it. What's
important about a scientific theory are the empirical practices
associated with that theory.
In any case we are wandering far from Kant. My original point was
that the importance of Kant seems to have been overstated in the
initial post of this thread.
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| User: "Atalanta, original G." |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
02 Jan 2007 03:58:00 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
If you descibe how it is you know that you will be doing word games
(epistemology redefined) and it is doubtful that you could be trusted,
as a mere game player that is, by your own stereotypical prejudaces.
It seems you want to recast this into something you can describe
as self-refuting. That is to say, you want to play word games.
Actually I just wanted to point out that any time you refer to any
theory of knowledge which you use to defend your assertions, then you
use epistemology. This goes for all scientists. We are talking about
the very justification possibilities of you making your last statement
included.
It depends on what you mean by "epistemology." I take its normal
meaning to be that body of work that is studied by people who call
themselves epistemologists (and who are typically philosophers).
Since it is possible to study knowledge, independent of that body
of work, one can do so without doing using epistemology.
Do you have any support for your belief in the seperation of science
and philosophy? When was this division (comleted?)?
This seems to be headed in a diversionary direction.
I suppose you would need a phrase to replace the word "show" with some
varient of "assert" hence Kant asserted with some sort of "logical
evidence" that such and such.
It isn't the kind of claim you could demonstrate with "logical
evidence".
Science consists of "inductive theorization" [to know-that] and
"know-how" experimentation with percentages of trials etc... , for;
In science, a theory is an explanation. Evolution is a theory, just
like gravitation. Gravity is not a law of nature but an explaination of
observations. If you drop something, it's going to fall. That's an
observation: unsupported things fall. But you explain that observation
with the theory of gravity, which is that the mass of what whatever it
is you dropped, a pencil or a pen or something, is attracted by the
mass...it's really a theory of gravity? But remember, a theory is an
explanation.
That's one view of science. I don't much agree with it. What's
important about a scientific theory are the empirical practices
associated with that theory.
In any case we are wandering far from Kant. My original point was
that the importance of Kant seems to have been overstated in the
initial post of this thread.
Statements about the importance of anything at all can't be evaluated
as to their own importance, can they? I'm not a philosopher, but how
exactly could you say whether a valuation (which is what a statement of
importance is) is anything but the valuation of the person making it?
How are people not entitled to make such valuations? What makes the
original valuation "overstated"? Isn't this just your own overstated
opinion back at the OP?
It's my personal belief (based on a wide variety of factors, including
life experience, thinking and reading) that Kant can't possibly be
overvalued at this historical juncture.
But that's just me. I am pretty good at watching people wander
Kantless through my mental landscape and observing their antics, I have
nothing more in particular against them merely for being Kantless.
What they choose to do instead, however, is sometimes irritating,
resulting in banishment from my own mental kingdom.
A.
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
02 Jan 2007 11:09:23 PM |
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"Atalanta, original G." <atalanta.brilliante@gmail.com> writes:
Statements about the importance of anything at all can't be evaluated
as to their own importance, can they? I'm not a philosopher, but how
exactly could you say whether a valuation (which is what a statement of
importance is) is anything but the valuation of the person making it?
Sure, an assessment of importance is subjective.
How are people not entitled to make such valuations? What makes the
original valuation "overstated"? Isn't this just your own overstated
opinion back at the OP?
Immortalist expressed opinion as fact. I dissented, with a differing
opinion. That's what happens in discussions.
I didn't expect to persuade Immortalist. I assumed he would
disagree with me. But, instead of simply disagreeing, he seems
to be trying to present a proof. The trouble is that his "proof"
is fact free, so he is just playing word games. By his behavior,
he is implicitly providing support to my earlier post in this thread.
It's my personal belief (based on a wide variety of factors, including
life experience, thinking and reading) that Kant can't possibly be
overvalued at this historical juncture.
That's okay. So we have differing opinions. I don't have a problem
with that.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
02 Jan 2007 04:43:18 PM |
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Atalanta, original G. wrote:
What they choose to do instead, however, is sometimes irritating,
resulting in banishment from my own mental kingdom.
Thats only because you want to keep feeling there's nothing wrong in
going to church and or being a socialist.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
02 Jan 2007 12:48:02 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
If you descibe how it is you know that you will be doing word games
(epistemology redefined) and it is doubtful that you could be trusted,
as a mere game player that is, by your own stereotypical prejudaces.
It seems you want to recast this into something you can describe
as self-refuting. That is to say, you want to play word games.
Actually I just wanted to point out that any time you refer to any
theory of knowledge which you use to defend your assertions, then you
use epistemology. This goes for all scientists. We are talking about
the very justification possibilities of you making your last statement
included.
It depends on what you mean by "epistemology." I take its normal
meaning to be that body of work that is studied by people who call
themselves epistemologists (and who are typically philosophers).
Since it is possible to study knowledge, independent of that body
of work, one can do so without doing using epistemology.
Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of Western philosophy
that studies the nature and scope of knowledge and belief.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology
Is the quantification ALL or SOME in reference to the phrase "and scope
of knowledge and belief?"
If if the quantity is ALL you are wrong but if the quantity is SOME
your are correct for pointing it out. Can you defend your proposed
change of quantification from ALL to SOME?
In this article, and in epistemology in general, the kind of knowledge
usually discussed is propositional knowledge, also known as
"knowledge-that" as opposed to "know-how". For example: in mathematics,
it is knowing that 2 + 2 = 4, but there is also knowing how to add two
numbers. Or, one knows how to ride a bicycle and one knows that a
bicycle has two wheels.
The distinction is between theoretical reason and practical reason,
with epistemology being interested primarily in knowledge of the
theoretical kind.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemology#Defining_knowledge
Therefore the proposal stands and it is the case that the common
definition of epistemology necessarily extends to all propositional
assertions of any kind. In this way a grammarian is a special type of
epistemologist, like a micro-biologist compared to a zoologist.
Do you have any support for your belief in the seperation of science
and philosophy? When was this division (comleted?)?
This seems to be headed in a diversionary direction.
You mean that you have changed you beliefs about the relation of
science and philosophy and are reminding me of your consession? OK.
I suppose you would need a phrase to replace the word "show" with some
varient of "assert" hence Kant asserted with some sort of "logical
evidence" that such and such.
It isn't the kind of claim you could demonstrate with "logical
evidence".
Science consists of "inductive theorization" [to know-that] and
"know-how" experimentation with percentages of trials etc... , for;
In science, a theory is an explanation. Evolution is a theory, just
like gravitation. Gravity is not a law of nature but an explaination of
observations. If you drop something, it's going to fall. That's an
observation: unsupported things fall. But you explain that observation
with the theory of gravity, which is that the mass of what whatever it
is you dropped, a pencil or a pen or something, is attracted by the
mass...it's really a theory of gravity? But remember, a theory is an
explanation.
That's one view of science. I don't much agree with it. What's
important about a scientific theory are the empirical practices
associated with that theory.
I agree that theories and experiments cover the range of knowing-that
and knowing-how, which is what I have been trying to tell you.
In any case we are wandering far from Kant. My original point was
that the importance of Kant seems to have been overstated in the
initial post of this thread.
So if you try and explain how it has been overstated that any
contention to that will be off topic. Quite a way to debate, i say.
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
02 Jan 2007 11:01:02 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
Actually I just wanted to point out that any time you refer to any
theory of knowledge which you use to defend your assertions, then you
use epistemology. This goes for all scientists. We are talking about
the very justification possibilities of you making your last statement
included.
It depends on what you mean by "epistemology." I take its normal
meaning to be that body of work that is studied by people who call
themselves epistemologists (and who are typically philosophers).
Since it is possible to study knowledge, independent of that body
of work, one can do so without doing using epistemology.
Epistemology or theory of knowledge is the branch of Western philosophy
that studies the nature and scope of knowledge and belief.
Note the "branch of Western philosophy" there. A study of knowledge
that is done outside of philosophy therefore would not fit the
definition.
It seems that you are making my point.
This seems to be headed in a diversionary direction.
You mean that you have changed you beliefs about the relation of
science and philosophy and are reminding me of your consession? OK.
It means only what it says.
.
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| User: "1Z" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
30 Dec 2006 06:22:01 AM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
Before Kant, the real theorizing about knowledge was done by
scientists and mathematicians, not by philosophers. After Kant,
the real theorizing about knowledge was done by scientists and
mathematicians, not by philosophers.
"Kant's philosophy undoubtedly influenced Bohr in various ways as many
scholars in recent years have noticed (Hooker 1972; Folse 1985; Honnor
1987; Faye 1991; Kaiser 1992; and Chevalley 1994). Bohr was definitely
neither a subjectivist nor a positivist philosopher, as Karl Popper
(1967) and Mario Bunge (1967) have claimed."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/
.
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| User: "Randroid Terminator" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
30 Dec 2006 12:12:10 PM |
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1Z wrote:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
Before Kant, the real theorizing about knowledge was done by
scientists and mathematicians, not by philosophers. After Kant,
the real theorizing about knowledge was done by scientists and
mathematicians, not by philosophers.
"Kant's philosophy undoubtedly influenced Bohr in various ways as many
scholars in recent years have noticed (Hooker 1972; Folse 1985; Honnor
1987; Faye 1991; Kaiser 1992; and Chevalley 1994). Bohr was definitely
neither a subjectivist nor a positivist philosopher, as Karl Popper
(1967) and Mario Bunge (1967) have claimed."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/
"Not unlike Kant, Bohr thought that we could have objective
knowledge only in case we can distinguish between the experiential
subject and the experienced object." Objectivism failed at this.
Objectivism cannot produce objective knowledge.
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
05 Jan 2007 08:25:27 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> writes:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
Before Kant, epstimology was just
a much of Jesuits raising eyebrows
at Thomas Aquinas.
After Kant it was pretty much all
Maxwell proving that mathematicians
are the worst excuse for probabilty
theory since zeno, and Darwin
proving that all of Europeon Science and
Philosophy is exactlly what it started as:
Aristotle-on-a-Stick.
Before Kant, the real theorizing about knowledge was done by
scientists and mathematicians, not by philosophers. After Kant,
the real theorizing about knowledge was done by scientists and
mathematicians, not by philosophers.
I don't see much of a change.
Kant revolutionized philosophy. Kant showed that the mind, through its
innate categories, constructs our experience along certain lines
(space, time, causality, self, etc.).
No, Kant did not show that. He asserted it. To *show* that would
be empirical science, not philosophy.
Incidently those "innate categories" seem to have changed since
Relativity and Quantum Theory entered the scene, so maybe they
weren't innate after all.
Thus, thinking and experiencing
give no access to things as they really are. We can think as hard as we
like, but we will never escape the innate constraints of our minds.
Kant forced philosophy to look seriously at the world for the agent
(what Kant calls the phenomenal world) independently of the real world
outside consciousness - the world in itself (the noumenal world).
Yet many modern philosophers seem to assume some kind of direct
realism, and to reject anything that suggests constructivism.
So maybe Kant's influence has died out, at least with respect
to epistemology.
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/KANT.HTM
I'm not sure if that's your web page, or just something you are
reporting.
The web page is probably okay, as far as it goes. I'm a bit
surprised by the statement "After Kant, the old debate between
rationalists and empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new
direction." Perhaps the author of that page is not familiar with
the Chomsky-Piaget debates. "Language and Learning: The Debate
between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky", Harvard University Press,
1980 (ed: Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini).
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| User: "Jos Horikx" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
03 Jan 2007 07:25:27 AM |
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On Sat, 30 Dec 2006 01:50:29 GMT, Neil W Rickert
<rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
But it were not the _same_ word games anymore. (That is why
Kant is important: he changed the rules with good arguments
and every earnest guy have to meet them)
It is nice to see that one of the early writers about the role of
play (see Huizinga, Homo Ludens, the play element of culture,
1938) can be considered as a neo or post Kantian. (one of the
elements of this is his engagement with (moral) duty, he does _not_
consider plight and duty as some kind of antigonist of the play, but
rather as a necessary condition)
JH
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
03 Jan 2007 03:14:37 PM |
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Jos Horikx <REMOVECAPITALS.jhorikx@chello.nl> writes:
On Sat, 30 Dec 2006 01:50:29 GMT, Neil W Rickert
<rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
But it were not the _same_ word games anymore. (That is why
Kant is important: he changed the rules with good arguments
and every earnest guy have to meet them)
LOL
I'll have to admit that you make a good point there.
.
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| User: "knucmo" |
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| Title: Re: Immanuel Kant's "Copernican revolution of philosophy" [human mind as an active originator of experience] |
03 Jan 2007 06:52:48 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
Jos Horikx <REMOVECAPITALS.jhorikx@chello.nl> writes:
On Sat, 30 Dec 2006 01:50:29 GMT, Neil W Rickert
<rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
Scholasticism, before Kant, was the only notable movement that focused
on problems of minute significance. Descartes breathed life back into
epistemological questions. After Kant, with linguistic philosophy, we
have a regression to that era.
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| User: "galathaea" |
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| Title: ever since plato |
03 Jan 2007 04:09:59 PM |
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Jos Horikx wrote:
On Sat, 30 Dec 2006 01:50:29 GMT, Neil W Rickert
<rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
But it were not the _same_ word games anymore. (That is why
Kant is important: he changed the rules with good arguments
and every earnest guy have to meet them)
ever since plato
idealists have been trying to find a way
to make rational thought necessary
this pipe dream of the absolute
kant stunned a large community
by claiming to have shown how necessity was possible
and still be synthetic
but knowledge has always been contingent
and that rule plays out every time
something gets marked as absolute and then questioned
kant failed that game
even with "good arguments"
It is nice to see that one of the early writers about the role of
play (see Huizinga, Homo Ludens, the play element of culture,
1938) can be considered as a neo or post Kantian. (one of the
elements of this is his engagement with (moral) duty, he does _not_
consider plight and duty as some kind of antigonist of the play, but
rather as a necessary condition)
constructivists always end up
having to confront kant or submit
thus your previous comment and every earnest girl...
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
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| User: "Jos Horikx" |
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| Title: Re: ever since plato |
03 Jan 2007 06:31:42 PM |
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On 3 Jan 2007 14:09:59 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
Jos Horikx wrote:
On Sat, 30 Dec 2006 01:50:29 GMT, Neil W Rickert wrote:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
But it were not the _same_ word games anymore. (That is why
Kant is important: he changed the rules with good arguments
and every earnest guy have to meet them)
ever since plato
idealists have been trying to find a way
to make rational thought necessary
Well, if I try to recall Fichte, Schelling and Hegel in my mind,
than I do not always and immediately and necessarily associate those
with rationalism.
this pipe dream of the absolute
kant stunned a large community
by claiming to have shown how necessity was possible
and still be synthetic
Sure, math _is_ synthetic, isn't is? Or do you think that the
Mandelbrot-set exists as a Platonic Idea?
(By the way, Plato was both: idealist and rationalist)
but knowledge has always been contingent
and that rule plays out every time
something gets marked as absolute and then questioned
There is nothing wrong with considering math and logic as more or
less (so to say) absolute (Kant does so, see e.g. the first critique
Bviii, B190-192, I post this reply from the Kant-group)
What certainly is absolute in Kants philosophy is the distinction
between the a-priori and empirical knowledhe (B3)
kant failed that game
even with "good arguments"
You have to explain why he "failed", because I find his arguments
more convincing than yours.
It is nice to see that one of the early writers about the role of
play (see Huizinga, Homo Ludens, the play element of culture,
1938) can be considered as a neo or post Kantian. (one of the
elements of this is his engagement with (moral) duty, he does _not_
consider plight and duty as some kind of antigonist of the play, but
rather as a necessary condition)
constructivists always end up
having to confront kant or submit
Huizinga's "Homo Ludens" is of an "constructivist" character ??
thus your previous comment and every earnest girl...
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
Hmm, I immediately believe, say, 3/4 of that... No, I'll be kind: I
believe half of it...
JH
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| User: "galathaea" |
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| Title: ever since plato |
03 Jan 2007 08:13:15 PM |
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Jos Horikx wrote:
On 3 Jan 2007 14:09:59 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
Jos Horikx wrote:
On Sat, 30 Dec 2006 01:50:29 GMT, Neil W Rickert wrote:
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is sometimes called the
"Copernican revolution of philosophy" to emphasize its novelty and
huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and
empiricists ended, and epistemology went in a new direction. After
Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and
knowledge.
Before Kant, epistemology was mostly word games. After Kant, epistemology
was mostly word games.
But it were not the _same_ word games anymore. (That is why
Kant is important: he changed the rules with good arguments
and every earnest guy have to meet them)
ever since plato
idealists have been trying to find a way
to make rational thought necessary
Well, if I try to recall Fichte, Schelling and Hegel in my mind,
than I do not always and immediately and necessarily associate those
with rationalism.
this pipe dream of the absolute
kant stunned a large community
by claiming to have shown how necessity was possible
and still be synthetic
Sure, math _is_ synthetic, isn't is? Or do you think that the
Mandelbrot-set exists as a Platonic Idea?
its the necessity
the a priori
part i question
what i see sometimes happen in discussions over kant
is that synthetic gets mistaken as "based on experience"
when it has a more specific meaning
of relations of predicates to subjects in inference and deduction
and then i see the "a priori" point
of "synthetic a priori"
get blurred away by the synthetic mistake
so that when one points out
that kant made very specific statements about physics
and how certain "truths" of his era were "a priori"
and yet these were later shown to be mistaken
it gets brushed away as
"but they were synthetic!"
kant claimed to have found foundations
on which to base knowledge in the a priori
and i see a lot of excuses for his mistakes
things like (paraphrased from a fictional conversation in my head)
" well he didn't mean all the geometry he talked about
when he applied it to space
he only meant that the general 'notions' of space
and maybe logical connectives
don't have to always be distributive in our observed world
(due to quantum noncommutativity)
but the 'general sense' of logic still stands"
i am a very ignorant person
and make mistakes all of the time
so maybe i am avoiding some obvious "truth" here
but when a theory claiming to found all absolute knowledge
makes mistakes about knowledge
i become skeptical of the enterprise
did the dialectics change meaning?
how can these absolute foundations
on which the notions of geometry and logic were formed
in explicit detail
become contingent when they were "shown" to be a priori?
the resolution that i see
is that kant overstepped his bounds
he provided a testable theory of mind
and as with all testable theories
it was put on the chopping block of science
and it couldn't succeed there
in the face of modern models...
(By the way, Plato was both: idealist and rationalist)
i agree
the eleatics had beguiled...
but knowledge has always been contingent
and that rule plays out every time
something gets marked as absolute and then questioned
There is nothing wrong with considering math and logic as more or
less (so to say) absolute (Kant does so, see e.g. the first critique
Bviii, B190-192, I post this reply from the Kant-group)
What certainly is absolute in Kants philosophy is the distinction
between the a-priori and empirical knowledhe (B3)
wiggle words like "so to say"
betray
the concepts themselves
have changed immensely since his time
the idea of infinity
has fractured into a multitude of infinities
each with different properties
a number
can now belong to many different number systems
absolute is a strange adjective
to apply to such transient things
kant failed that game
even with "good arguments"
You have to explain why he "failed", because I find his arguments
more convincing than yours.
if you believe his arguments sound
could you provide a synthetic a priori judgement
that i might evaluate?
kant provides many
but if you could point to one in particular
which you look at and consider
" that is a good example of something we can know
which is synthetic and yet obvious to our intuitions
and provides real knowledge "
it would help me learn where i may be mistaken
It is nice to see that one of the early writers about the role of
play (see Huizinga, Homo Ludens, the play element of culture,
1938) can be considered as a neo or post Kantian. (one of the
elements of this is his engagement with (moral) duty, he does _not_
consider plight and duty as some kind of antigonist of the play, but
rather as a necessary condition)
constructivists always end up
having to confront kant or submit
Huizinga's "Homo Ludens" is of an "constructivist" character ??
[...]
well
he does view the games people play
as instrumental in constructing our society
and he views our knowledge of these games
and our knowledge of history
as intuitive reflection
he does show strong signs of "intuitionism"
but i could be reading too much into him
perhaps his position could be called "distinctly dutch"?
(no offense intended :p)
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galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
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| User: "Jos Horikx" |
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| Title: Re: ever since plato |
04 Jan 2007 07:41:49 AM |
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On 3 Jan 2007 18:13:15 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
if you believe his arguments sound
could you provide a synthetic a priori judgement
that i might evaluate?
Suppose a random spot on earth (not too close to the poles):
Go 100 steps to the north and from there 100 steps to the east. When
you want to go to your point of departure (shortest way)
you have to make 141 steps (and a little one).
JH
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| User: "galathaea" |
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| Title: Re: ever since plato |
04 Jan 2007 03:06:30 PM |
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Jos Horikx wrote:
On 3 Jan 2007 18:13:15 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
if you believe his arguments sound
could you provide a synthetic a priori judgement
that i might evaluate?
Suppose a random spot on earth (not too close to the poles):
Go 100 steps to the north and from there 100 steps to the east. When
you want to go to your point of departure (shortest way)
you have to make 141 steps (and a little one).
i find this a strange example
because it is so vague and empirical
to stake "a priori" on
of course
141 is not the exact distance (in measures of steps)
which you admit with the "little one"
and if i walked from the outside southwest corner of my house
my house would be in the way
and the steps back to start would be closer to 200
also
if the terrain is uneven (hilly, etc.)
the distance could change depending on paths taken
(even assuming shortest!)
but i'm pretty confident you mean something
more absolute
something like (allow me to put words in your mouth!):
" If you take away obstacles and measure only the
intervening space, taking only paths that are truly
straight and not made uneven by the terrain, then
the result of this right angle walk will leave you a
distance of '\/20000 steps. "
the point is that the absolute properties of space
as kant mentions extensively in pure and the prolegomena
can be a priori known
to follow the rules laid out by euclid and others
but it is wrong
general relativity has shown the metric of space
is more likely noneuclidean
and there is observational evidence
that supports the model
that the type of measurement mentioned above
done on astronomical scales
produces different results than euclidean geometry would predict
if we were to perform this experiment
near the surface of a black hole
(where the metric shows angular compression)
the result would likely be much smaller than 141
so where is the kantian error?
how is this result
wrong in the models we currently use about our world
supposed to allow access to necessary truth?
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galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
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| User: "Jos Horikx" |
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| Title: Re: ever since plato |
04 Jan 2007 05:19:13 PM |
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On 4 Jan 2007 13:06:30 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
Jos Horikx wrote:
On 3 Jan 2007 18:13:15 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
if you believe his arguments sound
could you provide a synthetic a priori judgement
that i might evaluate?
Suppose a random spot on earth (not too close to the poles):
Go 100 steps to the north and from there 100 steps to the east. When
you want to go to your point of departure (shortest way)
you have to make 141 steps (and a little one).
i find this a strange example
because it is so vague and empirical
to stake "a priori" on
Kant thinks otherwise, Prolegomena section 11 (begin) says:
"...The problem of the present section is therefore solved. Pure
mathematics, as synthetical cognition a priori, is only possible by
referring to no other objects than those of the senses."
JH
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| User: "galathaea" |
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| Title: ever since plato |
04 Jan 2007 06:10:12 PM |
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Jos Horikx wrote:
On 4 Jan 2007 13:06:30 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
Jos Horikx wrote:
On 3 Jan 2007 18:13:15 -0800, "galathaea" wrote:
if you believe his arguments sound
could you provide a synthetic a priori judgement
that i might evaluate?
Suppose a random spot on earth (not too close to the poles):
Go 100 steps to the north and from there 100 steps to the east. When
you want to go to your point of departure (shortest way)
you have to make 141 steps (and a little one).
i find this a strange example
because it is so vague and empirical
to stake "a priori" on
Kant thinks otherwise, Prolegomena section 11 (begin) says:
"...The problem of the present section is therefore solved. Pure
mathematics, as synthetical cognition a priori, is only possible by
referring to no other objects than those of the senses."
exactly
that's why i stated:
" the point is that the absolute properties of space
as kant mentions extensively in pure and the prolegomena
can be a priori known
to follow the rules laid out by euclid and others
but it is wrong
general relativity has shown the metric of space
is more likely noneuclidean
and there is observational evidence
that supports the model
that the type of measurement mentioned above
done on astronomical scales
produces different results than euclidean geometry would predict
"
which is why i do not understand
how kant's philosophy can even be considered
these days
it shows he assumed
what he intended to prove
failed in his proof
and built no real basis for knowledge or metaphysics
there is evidence
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galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
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| User: "knucmo" |
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| Title: Re: ever since plato |
04 Jan 2007 07:26:01 PM |
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galathaea wrote:
but it is wrong
general relativity has shown the metric of space
is more likely noneuclidean
and there is observational evidence
that supports the model
that the type of measurement mentioned above
done on astronomical scales
produces different results than euclidean geometry would predict
"
which is why i do not understand
how kant's philosophy can even be considered
these days
it shows he assumed
what he intended to prove
failed in his proof
and built no real basis for knowledge or metaphysics
there is evidence
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galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
Yes Galathaea, you are indeed a liar, for you know NOTHING about Kant.
The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry vindicates Kant, it doesn't
refute him. And it certainly DOES not refute his metaphysics as you
think. To say that non-euclidean geometry refutes Kant ignores his
point that our knowledge of Euclidean geometry is synthetic a priori.
ANY synthetic a priori proposition can be denied without contradiction.
The opposite of an ANALYTIC proposition implies logical impossibility.
The opposite of a synthetic proposition does not imply any logical
impossibility, and in fact, confirms the logical possibility of a
non-Euclidean geometry. Nowhere does Kant say that non-Euclidean
geometry is impossible, and this is because Kant does not think that
geometry is logically true.
I ask that you cease posting on this topic, in your near
incomprehensible manner, until you study Kant. Then you can make up
your own mind about what he thought.
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| User: "galathaea" |
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| Title: kant |
05 Jan 2007 03:24:33 AM |
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knucmo wrote:
galathaea wrote:
but it is wrong
general relativity has shown the metric of space
is more likely noneuclidean
and there is observational evidence
that supports the model
that the type of measurement mentioned above
done on astronomical scales
produces different results than euclidean geometry would predict
"
which is why i do not understand
how kant's philosophy can even be considered
these days
it shows he assumed
what he intended to prove
failed in his proof
and built no real basis for knowledge or metaphysics
there is evidence
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galathaea: prankster, fablist, magician, liar
Yes Galathaea, you are indeed a liar, for you know NOTHING about Kant.
The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry vindicates Kant, it doesn't
refute him. And it certainly DOES not refute his metaphysics as you
think. To say that non-euclidean geometry refutes Kant ignores his
point that our knowledge of Euclidean geometry is synthetic a priori.
ANY synthetic a priori proposition can be denied without contradiction.
The opposite of an ANALYTIC proposition implies logical impossibility.
The opposite of a synthetic proposition does not imply any logical
impossibility, and in fact, confirms the logical possibility of a
non-Euclidean geometry. Nowhere does Kant say that non-Euclidean
geometry is impossible, and this is because Kant does not think that
geometry is logically true.
what do you believe distinguishes kant from the empiricists?
i believe i understand the analytic / synthetic dichotomy
i believe i also understand the a priori and a posteriori
please point to where i am mistaken
so i may learn:
*) analytical reasoning
is a process of rational derivation
this type of knowledge is what our logic produces
from introspection and logical application
@) synthetic reasoning
brings predicate truth beyond the information contained in the
subject
this is our sensual input
and other information generating mechanisms
(kant describes others)
#) a priori knowledge
is knowledge that must exist
it is necessary truth
universal to all possible worlds
things like 2 + 2 = 4
..) a posteriori knowledge
is contingent on further information
counterfactually
it could have been different in another possible world
-----------------------------------------
are these clear or already lacking?
-----------------------------------------
the four kantian questions in the prolegomena are:
(p 27 carus)
" how is pure mathematics possible?
how is pure natural science possible?
how is metaphysics in general possible?
how is metaphysics as a science possible? "
his answer is that synthetic reasoning
can produce a priori knowledge
-----------------------------------------
am i doing okay or i am already way off?
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kant believes that anything absolutely necessary
cannot be empirical
he says
when attacking the first question above:
(p 28)
" Here is a great and established branch of knowledge, encompassing
even now a wonderfully large domain and promissing an unlimited
extension in the future, yet carrying with it thoroughly apodictic
certainty, that is, absolute necessity, and therefore resting upon
no empirical grounds. "
so the sensory path to synthetic reasoning is not available
this is where kant provides his theory of mind
for synthetic reasoning of a priori knowledge
pure intuition:
" But we find that all mathematical cognition has this peculiarity:
it must first exhibit its concept in intuition and indeed a priori;
therefore in an intuition which is not empirical but pure. "
-----------------------------------------
is this description proper?
-----------------------------------------
after exploring mathematics
kant turned to science
here he distinguishes empirical sources from universal laws of nature
and provides his tables intending to illustrate
how logical judgements arise from transcendental ideas
quantity, quality, relation, modality
he explored this connection of the a priori
and fundamental ("dynamical") laws of science
and concluded:
(p 53)
" The principles of possible experience are then at the same
time universal laws of nature, which can be known a priori.
And thus the problem of our second question, 'How is the
pure science of nature possible?' is solved...
Finally the principles, by means of which all phenomena are
subsumed under these concepts, constitute a physical, that
is, a system of nature, which precedes all empirical
knowledge of nature, and makes it possible. It may in
strictness be denominated the universal and pure science
of nature. "
since this is a theory of universal mind
and not individual minds
based on local fluctuations in the environment
kant stresses this mind-influences-the-interpretation-of-reality angle
that many had before him
he gives an example:
(p 67)
" If we consider the properties of the circle, by which this figure
combines in itself so many arbitrary determinations of space
in a universal rule, we cannot avoid attributing a constitution
to this geometrical thing. Two straight lines, for example, which
intersect each other and the circle, howsoever they may be
drawn, are always divided so that the rectangle constructed
with the segments of the one is equal to that constructed with
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