"Craig Franck" wrote:

"George Dance"

I can see how it looks that way, from the way that sentence was
written. But 'direct perception' (and the ontological theory that
follows from it, 'direct realism') does have a non-strawman meaning in
philosophy; not that we can sense things without using our senses, but
that in sensing our mind is experiencing the things themselves,
rather than mental images or representations ('representatonal
realism').

This works as an analysis of natural language, but it fails in
that if it is an argument of how perception works, then it is
really a scientific question. Science says all we ever perceive
is the workings of our nervous system which have causal links
to objects in the environment.

I'm sorry, Craig, but that last sentence lost me. I don't perceive
the workings of my nervous system at all. I'll grant that scientists
can and do perceive the workings of subjects' nervous systems, but not
that they look at all like what the subjects are perceiving.

For example, a subject is looking at a lamp, while a scientist is
observing the workings of his nervous system. I doubt that the
scientist and the subject will be perceiving the same thing; that the
scientist ever detects a lamp in there, no matter how hard he looks.
Yet a lamp is precisely what the subject sees (or, if realism is
false, thinks he sees).

On Jan 30, 1:29 pm, "Residential" <drksn_b...@yahoo.com> wrote:

George Dance wrote:

On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:

On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:

On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.

http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.htmlThatlinkwas
entertaining! But it seemed more like a rant or cheer

for one of two sports teams with no real refutations of "in
itself."
Perhaps we start at the beginning. It seemed like a bumper sticker
mentality, "blank slate plasiticity, or die." Or what counter
theory
way he trying to defend?
Thing in itself - Things in themselves (ding an sich in German)
are
the ultimate constituents of reality.
However, we can never perceive things in themselves directly.

This is a misuse of the word 'direct' in relation to the word
'perceive'. In particular it implies that any perception which is
mediated (by a sense organ, or some other means of perception) is an
indirect perception, yet it provides no alternative model which would
enable us to identify what a direct perception would be. A direct
perception on this view, would be something that doesn't involve
being
a perception at all.

We only perceive their appearances with our senses and mental
faculties.

Grammatical rule for the use of the word 'perceive'.

I can see how it looks that way, from the way that sentence was
written. But 'direct perception' (and the ontological theory that
follows from it, 'direct realism') does have a non-strawman meaning in
philosophy; not that we can sense things without using our senses, but
that in sensing our mind is experiencing the things themselves,
rather than mental images or representations ('representatonal
realism'). It's one attempt to answer the knowledge problem posed by
r.r. (the Kantian dictum that we don't know anything about the things
"in themselves" being another); the other horn of that dilemma, with
its own problems.

Here's a link to the wiki page, with some information on its first
advocate, Thomas Reid. Notice how Reid predicts the skeptical
outcome, of which the original post gives several examples, that
follows from the other horn of that dilemma:

<quote>
Examples of the direct realist approach
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid lived at the same time as David Hume.
Reid argued strenuously against the notion that ideas, or sense-data,
are the immediate objects of perception at all - he rejected
representationalism.
One of Reid's arguments was very simple, and went like this: If
representationalism is correct, then we are forced to either
skepticism or phenomenalism. But skepticism and phenomenalism are both
absurd; there surely is an external world, and we surely do have
knowledge of it. So, by reductio ad absurdum, we must reject any
theory that would force us to accept either skepticism or
phenomenalism. So, we must reject representationalism.
What would it mean to reject representationalism? It would mean
accepting that we do not perceive sense data at all. When I look at my
hand, I do not immediately perceive a bundle or series of hand sense
data which represent my actual hand. No, I immediately perceive my
hand. I do not perceive any hand sense-data at all. So the view up for
consideration now is that we immediately, directly perceive the
external world. </q>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_realism

My actual hand or a distant star in direct realism's *external world*
wouldn't be in my head when I perceive it. Information about them
would be relayed to my brain via a mediator and then turned into an
image experience with other mediating processes.

I'm no expert on Reid, but what I've read doesn't contradict that.
It's compatible with the physics - that light hits from the object
hits your eye, which then sends a nerve impuls to your brain. What it
denies is the non-physical part of the explanation, that involving the
'imaging experience'. Nothing at all about hands and stars inside
your skull.

Direct realism, like
so many other doctrines or arguments, only makes sense if the reader
ceases to pursue the crazy reality that its consequences lead to.

That's why the knowledge problem is an ongoing problem; all views have
some crazy consequences, and partisans of other views are quite
willing to find them.

My television set doesn't fold into a solipsist because it represents
a Paris street on its screen rather than the orignal --
representationalism is possible.

Certainly; but Direct Realism doesn't deny that film and video are
representations, any more than paintings. What it denies is the
existence of purely mental representations.

The word "Moon" can symbolize the
phenomenon of Moon in language without resembling the phenomenon.

That's the strongest of your arguments, I think; because when I (at
least) hear or think the word "Moon", I can close my eyes and
visualize a picture of the moon. So that's evidence that minds do
think in terms of representations (which of course is the mainstream
theory).

Indirect realism is possible.

True; but that theory leads to its problems of its own. As witness,
take the argument I'm having in the thread "objectivity is collective
subjectivity", with an antagonist who has concluded, simply on the
basis of the theory of indirect realism, that knowledge of an external
world is impossible.

On Jan 30, 1:29 pm, "Residential" <drksn_b...@yahoo.com> wrote:

George Dance wrote:

On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:

On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:

On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.

http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.htmlThatlinkwasentertaining! But it seemed more like a rant or cheer

for one of two sports teams with no real refutations of "in itself."
Perhaps we start at the beginning. It seemed like a bumper sticker
mentality, "blank slate plasiticity, or die." Or what counter theory
way he trying to defend?
Thing in itself - Things in themselves (ding an sich in German) are
the ultimate constituents of reality.
However, we can never perceive things in themselves directly.

This is a misuse of the word 'direct' in relation to the word
'perceive'. In particular it implies that any perception which is
mediated (by a sense organ, or some other means of perception) is an
indirect perception, yet it provides no alternative model which would
enable us to identify what a direct perception would be. A direct
perception on this view, would be something that doesn't involve being
a perception at all.

We only perceive their appearances with our senses and mental faculties.

Grammatical rule for the use of the word 'perceive'.

I can see how it looks that way, from the way that sentence was
written. But 'direct perception' (and the ontological theory that
follows from it, 'direct realism') does have a non-strawman meaning in
philosophy; not that we can sense things without using our senses, but
that in sensing our mind is experiencing the things themselves,
rather than mental images or representations ('representatonal
realism'). It's one attempt to answer the knowledge problem posed by
r.r. (the Kantian dictum that we don't know anything about the things
"in themselves" being another); the other horn of that dilemma, with
its own problems.

Here's a link to the wiki page, with some information on its first
advocate, Thomas Reid. Notice how Reid predicts the skeptical
outcome, of which the original post gives several examples, that
follows from the other horn of that dilemma:

<quote>
Examples of the direct realist approach
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid lived at the same time as David Hume.
Reid argued strenuously against the notion that ideas, or sense-data,
are the immediate objects of perception at all - he rejected
representationalism.
One of Reid's arguments was very simple, and went like this: If
representationalism is correct, then we are forced to either
skepticism or phenomenalism. But skepticism and phenomenalism are both
absurd; there surely is an external world, and we surely do have
knowledge of it. So, by reductio ad absurdum, we must reject any
theory that would force us to accept either skepticism or
phenomenalism. So, we must reject representationalism.
What would it mean to reject representationalism? It would mean
accepting that we do not perceive sense data at all. When I look at my
hand, I do not immediately perceive a bundle or series of hand sense
data which represent my actual hand. No, I immediately perceive my
hand. I do not perceive any hand sense-data at all. So the view up for
consideration now is that we immediately, directly perceive the
external world. </q>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_realism

My actual hand or a distant star in direct realism's *external world*
wouldn't be in my head when I perceive it. Information about them
would be relayed to my brain via a mediator and then turned into an
image experience with other mediating processes.

I'm no expert on Reid, but what I've read doesn't contradict that.
It's compatible with the physics - that light hits from the object
hits your eye, which then sends a nerve impuls to your brain. What it
denies is the non-physical part of the explanation, that involving the
'imaging experience'. Nothing at all about hands and stars inside
your skull.

Direct realism, like
so many other doctrines or arguments, only makes sense if the reader
ceases to pursue the crazy reality that its consequences lead to.

That's why the knowledge problem is an ongoing problem; all views have
some crazy consequences, and partisans of other views are quite
willing to find them.

My television set doesn't fold into a solipsist because it represents
a Paris street on its screen rather than the orignal --
representationalism is possible.

Certainly; but Direct Realism doesn't deny that film and video are
representations, any more than paintings. What it denies is the
existence of purely mental representations.

The word "Moon" can symbolize the
phenomenon of Moon in language without resembling the phenomenon.

That's the strongest of your arguments, I think; because when I (at
least) hear or think the word "Moon", I can close my eyes and
visualize a picture of the moon. So that's evidence that minds do
think in terms of representations (which of course is the mainstream
theory).

Indirect realism is possible.

True; but that theory leads to its problems of its own. As witness,
take the argument I'm having in the thread "objectivity is collective
subjectivity", with an antagonist who has concluded, simply on the
basis of the theory of indirect realism, that knowledge of an external
world is impossible.- Hide quoted text -

On Jan 31, 6:07 am, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:

On 30 Jan, 18:03, "George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote:

On Jan 30, 12:13 pm, "Wanker" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:

On 30 Jan, 16:03, "Immortalist" <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:

On Jan 30, 7:20 am, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

A typically knockabout polemic form David Stove.

http://web.maths.unsw.edu.au/~jim/worst.htmlThatlinkwasentertaining!But it seemed more like a rant or cheer

for one of two sports teams with no real refutations of "in itself."
Perhaps we start at the beginning. It seemed like a bumper sticker
mentality, "blank slate plasiticity, or die." Or what counter theory
way he trying to defend?
Thing in itself - Things in themselves (ding an sich in German) are
the ultimate constituents of reality.
However, we can never perceive things in themselves directly.

This is a misuse of the word 'direct' in relation to the word
'perceive'. In particular it implies that any perception which is
mediated (by a sense organ, or some other means of perception) is an
indirect perception, yet it provides no alternative model which would
enable us to identify what a direct perception would be. A direct
perception on this view, would be something that doesn't involve being
a perception at all.

We only perceive their appearances with our senses and mental faculties.

Grammatical rule for the use of the word 'perceive'.

I can see how it looks that way, from the way that sentence was
written. But 'direct perception' (and the ontological theory that
follows from it, 'direct realism') does have a non-strawman meaning in
philosophy; not that we can sense things without using our senses, but
that in sensing our mind is experiencing the things themselves,
rather than mental images or representations ('representatonal
realism'). It's one attempt to answer the knowledge problem posed by
r.r. (the Kantian dictum that we don't know anything about the things
"in themselves" being another); the other horn of that dilemma, with
its own problems.

Sure - there's a lot of that idea in 18th century philosophy - the
idea that the mind can reach out and grab something without the body
coming into contact with it. The idea of an unmediated perception. I
guess what I think about that is that - given what the word
'perception' means - it's both a misunderstanding of the meaning of
the word and a wrong-headed analogy.

As far as the meaning of the word 'perceive' goes, to perceive is to
per-ceive, both elements coming from Latin - the 'ceive' bit means to
'lay hold of', or 'to take', and the 'per' bit meaning 'through' -
thus the whole word means "To lay hold of through" .. (one's senses,
one's eyes, etc.). IOW there's no such thing as 'direct' perception
because perception is intrinsically indirect, and thus in virtue of
that intrinsic indirection can never be direct without redefining the
meaning of the word.

On top of that the 'grasping with the mind' idea relies on a metaphor
- that I grasp with my mind in way that is analogous to the way I
grasp with my hand, only more so. I do it without the intervention of
my hand, eye, or whatever. I suggest this isn't a good analogy because
of the lack of consistency in the analogy. For example: if I see an
apple using a pair of binocular that might be called indirect
perception because my perceptions are being mediated via the
binoculars. If I grasp the apple with my hands that might be called
direct perception as nothing mediates between my hand and the object.
Similarly if I grasp an argument not only is this a different use of
the word 'grasp' (could you mentally grasp an argument via some
binoculars?) but it's difficult to see how the distinction direct/
indirect can be applied here - what's would be a good analogy between
looking at something through binoculars and mentally grasping an
argument? Is there any mental object of which we'd be willing to say -
this mental object is not being grasped directly, but via another
mental object which I do grasp directly? Would an analogy might be a
candidate for this kind of mental object? But how so, seeing as once I
grasp the analogy I grasp the viewpoint the analogy leads me to? This
isn't like seeing with binoculars - when I see an object via
binoculars the binoculars don't magically go away.

Here's a link to the wiki page, with some information on its first
advocate, Thomas Reid. Notice how Reid predicts the skeptical
outcome, of which the original post gives several examples, that
follows from the other horn of that dilemma:

<quote>
Examples of the direct realist approach
Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid lived at the same time as David Hume.
Reid argued strenuously against the notion that ideas, or sense-data,
are the immediate objects of perception at all - he rejected
representationalism.
One of Reid's arguments was very simple, and went like this: If
representationalism is correct, then we are forced to either
skepticism or phenomenalism. But skepticism and phenomenalism are both
absurd; there surely is an external world, and we surely do have
knowledge of it. So, by reductio ad absurdum, we must reject any
theory that would force us to accept either skepticism or
phenomenalism. So, we must reject representationalism.
What would it mean to reject representationalism? It would mean
accepting that we do not perceive sense data at all. When I look at my
hand, I do not immediately perceive a bundle or series of hand sense
data which represent my actual hand. No, I immediately perceive my
hand. I do not perceive any hand sense-data at all. So the view up for
consideration now is that we immediately, directly perceive the
external world. </q>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_realism

But we perceive the world (I won't say the 'external world' because I,
like LW, believe this internal / external metaphor is also wrong-
headed) via our senses. Whether you want to call this direct or
indirect rather depends on whether or not you can think of a good idea
as to how we might perceive the world without any kind of mediation.
But the problem here (apart from the misunderstanding of the word
'perceive') is that even if you could imagine that you were connected
to the world in the same way as you were to your arms that wouldn't
help any as /this/ kind of perception would still be regarded as
mediated via our bodies.

The idea, IOW, is that the mind grasps its own objects directly, but
the things which are mediated to us via those objects are grasped
indirectly. But if you can't have an indirect grasp of a mental object
(I put this forward as an uncontroversial and generally held
philosophical belief), how could you have a direct grasp of that
thing? This would be a misuse of the direct / indirect distinction - a
case taking away one half of an equation while saying "This equation
still means the same as it did before".- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -

- Show quoted text -

Re: grasping with the hand vs. with the mind,

It seems to me that physically holding an object merely gives you the
*illusion* of control and a higher understanding than if you were
viewing the object at a distance, or seeing a picture of the object.

Yet, the existence/base reality/form or whatever you might call it is
not what is perceived, even if the object is in your hand.

You are still filtering, categorizing, judging the item through the imperfect,
impressionable wiring of your nervous system.

Have you ever had a beer served in a plastic pint "glass"? Not the
cheap, disposable kind, but a container identical to a regular --
well, pint glass made of glass? The weight is off. And the beer tastes
different. Is the beer different?

Tremendous effort could be made to
indicate that there would be a slight difference in temperature or in
some other glass vs. plastic variable. But really, the beer does taste
the same.

I do not detect the 0.2 degree temperature difference. What
I notice is that it seems somehow "cheaper" and less pleasurable
because the "glass" does not have the same heft as usual. This imparts
a feeling of slight disappointment, as at least some of the pleasure
in drinking is still attributed to it being an adult activity. I'm 31,
by the way, but I still get that feeling, at least very slightly.
Drinking out of plastic is associated with a childish activity. As
such, the act of drinking beer out of a plastic glass carries an
emotional "value" that twists the actual taste--even though the lab
equipment would say it is basically the same. This is merely one
component of the several thoughts and moods and level of attention
that may distort the true nature of the beer in the glass.

You cannot understand an object's true nature, I argue, whether you
see it from afar, or hold it in your hand, or drink it with some
buffalo wings on the side.

Although I recommend testing the latter
activity as often as possible, just to ascertain the validity of my
argument. I know that can't logically disprove it, but dammit it's
worth a shot.