| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"Immortalist" |
| Date: |
29 Dec 2005 12:41:15 PM |
| Object: |
Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
Relativism is sometimes identified (usually by its critics) as the
thesis that all points of view are equally valid. In ethics, this
amounts to saying that all moralities are equally good; in epistemology
it implies that all beliefs, or belief systems, are equally true.
Critics of relativism typically dismiss such views as incoherent since
they imply the validity even of the view that relativism is false. They
also charge that such views are pernicious since they undermine the
enterprise of trying to improve our ways of thinking.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/r/relativi.htm
The first clear statement of relativism comes with the Sophist
Protagoras, as quoted by Plato, "The way things appear to me, in that
way they exist for me; and the way things appears to you, in that way
they exist for you" (Theaetetus 152a). Thus, however I see things, that
is actually true -- for me. If you see things differently, then that is
true -- for you. There is no separate or objective truth apart from how
each individual happens to see things. Consequently, Protagoras says
that there is no such thing as falsehood. Unfortunately, this would
make Protagoras's own profession meaningless, since his business is to
teach people how to persuade others of their own beliefs. It would be
strange to tell others that what they believe is true but that they
should accept what you say nevertheless. So Protagoras qualified his
doctrine: while whatever anyone believes is true, things that some
people believe may be better than what others believe.
Plato thought that such a qualification reveals the inconsistency of
the whole doctrine. His basic argument against relativism is called the
"Turning the Tables" (Peritrop=E9, "turning around") argument, and it
goes something like this: "If the way things appear to me, in that way
they exist for me, and the way things appears to you, in that way they
exist for you, then it appears to me that your whole doctrine is
false." Since anything that appears to me is true, then it must be true
that Protagoras is wrong [1]. Relativism thus has the strange logical
property of not being able to deny the truth of its own contradiction.
Indeed, if Protagoras says that there is no falsehood, then he cannot
say that the opposite, the contradiction, of his own doctrine is false.
Protagoras wants to have it both ways -- that there is no falsehood but
that the denial of what he says is false -- and that is typical of
relativism. And if we say that relativism simply means that whatever I
believe is nobody else's business, then there is no reason why I should
tell anybody else what I believe, since it is then none of my business
to influence their beliefs.
http://www.friesian.com/relative.htm
Matt: I don't believe that all points of view are equally valid.
Jan: Why not?
Matt: Because it doesn't make sense that everything is relative. That
wouldn't be logical.
Jan: Ah, you see? That is your problem. You are using logic to refute
relativism and you cannot do that. Relativism isn't based upon logic.
It isn't the same thing. So you can't use logic to refute relativism.
Matt: If you say I cannot use logic to refute relativism, then you are
using logic to say this since you give me the logical statement and
conclusion that I cannot use logic to refute relativism because
relativism isn't based on logic. I hope you can see that you made a
logical case here for not using logic. If that is so, then your
complaint is self contradictory and invalid. Would you want me to
follow a system of thought that is self contradictory?
Jan: I can see why they call you slick. But, the point is that
relativism is true within itself and logic is not a necessary property
of relativism. It can be used within relativism, but it is not superior
to relativism.
Matt: To say that relativism is true within itself is an absolute
statement. Don't you see that you can't do that if relativism is true?
You would have to say something like, "Relativism is true some of the
time."
Jan: You are playing word games here.
Matt: I do not see how. I am simply responding to what you said. I
think what you are doing is simply making assertions without proof. You
are saying that it is true because it is true. In essence, you are
telling me an absolute truth that relativism is its own self-existing
truth. This is an absolute statement which again refutes the notion
that relativism is true. Furthermore, if relativism is true then
relativism itself is relative. In other words, if relativism is true,
then relativism may or may not be true in and of itself. If that is
true, then relativism can be false. If relativism can be false, then
relativism can't be true.
Jan: There you go using logic again. Logic is not the whole means by
which truth is determined. Relativism goes beyond logic to truths that
logic cannot prove.
Matt: Okay, then without using logic, can you tell why relativism is
true?
Jan: It is true because it is true that people believe different things
and that people have different perceptions of reality and what is right
for them.
Matt: I agree that people believe different things, but does believing
different things make them true because they are believed?
Jan: No, of course not. But you must understand that we perceive things
differently, and that these different perceptions are true for
different people.
Matt: I can agree with that, but I am not speaking about things that
really are relative like which side of the bed you should get out of in
the morning. I'm talking about things like lying, cheating, stealing,
etc. If relativism is true and all points of view are equally valid,
then someone's view that it is okay to steal, is valid.
Jan: Technically, it would be, depending on the circumstances. For
example, if it meant feeding your family or helping someone.
Matt: I see. Okay, give me your money right now. I want to steal it
from you. If I had a gun, I'd point it at you and rob you. Is that
okay?
Jan: Of course not.
Matt: Why not? My view is that in order to win the argument, I must rob
from you to demonstrate the absurdity of your position. Therefore, it
is right for me. You should approve.
Jan: But I cannot, because it isn't right for me that you steal from
me.
Matt: Oh, so relativism has boundaries? It is true only for the
individual, no one else?
Jan: In that case yes.
Matt: Then relativism isn't a universal truth is it? If it is only true
for individuals on an individual basis, it may or may not be true or
false or right or wrong or whatever. It is just a kind of "whatever you
want to do and feel" philosophy.
Jan: Sort of, but you can't harm anyone else.
Matt: Are you saying that it is an absolute that you are not to harm
anyone else?
Jan: There you go again turning this into an argument on absolutes.
Matt: But I am only following your lead. You're the one who said that
relativism is true because it is true. Correct?
Jan: Yes, I said that, but you have to understand that it is relative
to the individual.
Matt: If relativism is true because it is true, then can I say that it
is false because it is false?
Jan: You could if you wanted to.
Matt: Then would it be false or not?
Jan: It would be false for you.
Matt: But that isn't what I said. I said it was false.... "because it
is false." I didn't say it was false for me. I said that it is by
nature false. Don't you see? You said it was true "because it is true."
You spoke of it as being true "by nature." You implied an absolute
quality to relativism as a real truth. If I can do the same thing in
the opposite direction, then how does my assertion become different in
nature than yours? In other words, "by nature" it is true and "by
nature" it is false. Both cannot be true. Therefore relativism doesn't
work.
Jan: What you are doing is using logic again. Relativism and logic are
different things. You cannot use one thing to judge another.
Matt: But you just did. You made a statement and drew a conclusion. You
said that relativism and logic are different. Then you said that I
cannot use one to judge the other. In other words, you made a statement
and drew a logical conclusion. Look. If you want to validate relativism
using relativism, then why do you keep using logic to do it?
Jan: You keep going back to these logic games. You have to understand
that they are simply different.
Matt: So then, what you are saying is that I am not allowed to examine
relativism in a logical manner. Correct?
Jan: Correct.
Matt: You want truth, right?
Jan: Of course.
Matt: But, if I must accept that relativism is simply true, how can I
possibly know if it is ever false? What you are saying is that it is
never false. If it is never false, then it is always true. If it is
always true, then it isn't relative, is it?
Jan: There you go using logic again.
Matt: I'm trying to ask questions. But, it seems that you want me to
avoid thinking and just accept relativism as true. If I were to say
that relativism is true, then it is absolutely true that relativism is
true which would mean that the opposing view that relativism is false,
could not be true...which would mean that relativism is not true since
it states that all views are true. It seems to me that the only way
relativism is true, is if you stop thinking logically and just accept
it on blind faith that it is true.
Jan: This is the problem with the western, Aristotelian logic system.
It teaches you that there are absolutes when there are not.
Matt: But to say there are not absolutes is an absolute statement,
which is self refuting. Again, it seems that the only way to accept
relativism is to not think logically. You have to believe it on faith.
Jan: The nature of relativism is that it is not subject to logic. No
logical reasons are necessary to establish this. Relativism, by its
nature, is not of logic, but beyond logic. The essence of relativism is
that relativism itself, is true.
Matt: Then you are simply stating that relativism is true without
proving it. In other words, you can't prove it. You just say it is true
and that's it.
Jan: We are getting no where.
Matt: I disagree. I think we are making great progress.
Jan: See? It is how you perceive it, isn't it?
Matt: Then, is it valid that we have made progress? After all,
relativism says that all points of view are equally valid.
Jan: Its valid for you, not for me.
Matt: Here we go again...
http://www.carm.org/relativism/relativism_dialogue.htm
##################################
Protagorean Relativism;
truth is entirely subjective.
##################################
Another necessary consequence of Protagorean relativism is that there
can be no disagreements, because the only meaningful context of truth
is in relation to oneself. Tom and Jane maintain that justice is two
different things, but since they are both correct, they cannot be in
disagreement. By definition, a disagreement requires that no more than
one party can be correct-they can of course all be wrong, but the
certainly cannot all be right. To maintain that there are no
disagreements is in direct contradiction of what we commonly observe in
everyday life. If we accept Protagorean relativism, then a great deal
of our discourse with each other would also be meaningless; there would
be no point in discussing the truth or falsity of anything with anyone,
because his truth is simply not relevant to our own. This is another
radical consequence of Protagorean relativism that makes it a much less
palatable theory.
In his dialogue the Theaetetus, Plato finds serious grounds upon which
to object to Protagorean relativism. In this dialogue Socrates and
Theaetetus are attempting to articulate a comprehensive definition of
knowledge. Theaetetus suggests that perhaps knowledge is perception.
Socrates then brings up the notion of Protagorean relativism as being
essentially the same as Theaetetus' account of knowledge. Socrates
notes that if this is the case, then no one can ever be more right than
anyone else-everyone is equally right. But of course even Protagoras
himself would hold that some people are wiser than others. This is an
unacceptable consequence, so Plato-via Socrates-begins his argument
against Protagorean relativism by noting that there are certainly a
great number of people who do not believe in the doctrine. By the very
nature of Protagorean relativism, Protagoras would necessarily have to
admit that their denial is true. Therefore Protagorean relativism is
false. So if Protagorean relativism is true, and even a single person
believes it to be false, then it must be false. And of course if
Protagorean relativism is false it doesn't matter whether anyone
thinks otherwise, it is still false. This is the self-contradiction
contained within the ides of Protagorean relativism.
Protagorean relativism requires that there be no objective
truths-that each person's opinion be the truth-and yet it
requires that there be at least one objective truth, specifically the
truth of the Protagorean relativism itself. This is what makes it a
self-refuting theory. If there are no objective truths, then there must
necessarily be no objective truth about Protagorean relativism itself.
A committed Protagorean relativist might try to bite the bullet and say
that for anyone who denies the theory, Protagorean relativism is of
course false, but for anyone who believes it-such as himself-the
theory is true. This will not work, because for the theory to be true
for anyone, it must necessarily be true for everyone.
http://www.prism-perfect.net/about/essays/Protagorean_Relativism_and_Its_Co=
nsequences/
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12731d.htm
.
|
|
| User: "Stephen Harris" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
29 Dec 2005 07:50:13 PM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1135881675.633776.40170@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com
<snippage>
"Plato thought that such a qualification reveals the inconsistency of
the whole doctrine. His basic argument against relativism is called the
"Turning the Tables" (Peritropé, "turning around") argument, and it
goes something like this: "If the way things appear to me, in that way
they exist for me, and the way things appears to you, in that way they
exist for you, then it appears to me that your whole doctrine is
false." Since anything that appears to me is true, then it must be true
that Protagoras is wrong [1]. Relativism thus has the strange logical
property of not being able to deny the truth of its own contradiction.
Indeed, if Protagoras says that there is no falsehood, then he cannot
say that the opposite, the contradiction, of his own doctrine is false.
Protagoras wants to have it both ways -- that there is no falsehood but
that the denial of what he says is false -- and that is typical of
relativism. And if we say that relativism simply means that whatever I
believe is nobody else's business, then there is no reason why I should
tell anybody else what I believe, since it is then none of my business
to influence their beliefs.
SH: Plato also used the Allegory of the Cave, his belief that the world
revealed by our senses is not the real world but only a reflection of it.
Since we are not in the same bodies(physically cannot occupy the
same space at the same time) nor do we have the same interpretation
mechanisms(our minds have different backgrounds and therefore attach
different weights to perceptions) the shadows cast by the fire on the
walls of the cave will be related by those minds to a host of apparitions,
like how the blind men describe an elephant.
Though that supports a relativistic description of our perceptions it
describes our appreciation of reality; it doesn't say that reality itself
is Relative, that there is no Absolute. That difference of opinion is
exemplified by 'If a tree falls in a forest, and nobody is around to hear
it, does it make a sound?' Some people will answer no, if nobody hears
the tree fall then it makes no sound. Others will say, yes, sound is a
vibration and the vibration exists whether or not some creature hears it.
The direction that a discussion of relativism takes is going to depend
on which side is taken for an underlying assumption: Is Truth identical
to Objective reality? Is Truth an abstract mental property which does
not exist independently of a perceiving mind, so that it is in a different
category than whether or not something physically exists.
For instance, accepting for the moment evolution theory, it would
be a physical fact of existence that the Earth was around far before
humans showed up who were capable of generating language which
contains such concepts as Truth. That is why I think there is an
objective reality which is independent of the concept of Truth. We
try to approximate or capture that reality with our descriptions based
upon our perceptions. Truth is how close our descriptions come to
matching that objective reality and that is not going to be a knowable
thing. I'm not sure it works to substitute another abstract notion, the
Absolute, for Objective reality-what simply is, without description.
If the Universe is all there is, that is, nothing exists outside or beyond
the Universe which causes the Universe to behave in some particular
way, then the Universe as a whole is self-determining. Now within the
Universe there are a huge number of events which are causally related,
their behavior is determined relative to the existence of other events. Is
it justified to draw the conclusion that because all the behavior within the
Universe is causally Relative, that this condition meets the requirements
for deciding that the Universe as a whole is _not_ causally self-deteriming?
I think another conclusion is supported, that the reasoning isn't happening
at the same categorical level. Like because you me the dog and the fish
are all composed of atoms doesn't support the conclusion that the fish
minds support abstract notions like charity or truth at their level of
cognitive organization which doesn't depend on some common causal
background description (we are all made of atoms).
##################################
Protagorean Relativism;
truth is entirely subjective.
##################################
Another necessary consequence of Protagorean relativism is that there
can be no disagreements, because the only meaningful context of truth
is in relation to oneself. Tom and Jane maintain that justice is two
different things, but since they are both correct, they cannot be in
disagreement. By definition, a disagreement requires that no more than
one party can be correct-they can of course all be wrong, but the
certainly cannot all be right. To maintain that there are no
disagreements is in direct contradiction of what we commonly observe in
everyday life. If we accept Protagorean relativism, then a great deal
of our discourse with each other would also be meaningless; there would
be no point in discussing the truth or falsity of anything with anyone,
because his truth is simply not relevant to our own. This is another
radical consequence of Protagorean relativism that makes it a much less
palatable theory.
Protagorean relativism requires that there be no objective
truths-that each person's opinion be the truth-and yet it
requires that there be at least one objective truth, specifically the
truth of the Protagorean relativism itself. This is what makes it a
self-refuting theory. If there are no objective truths, then there must
necessarily be no objective truth about Protagorean relativism itself.
A committed Protagorean relativist might try to bite the bullet and say
that for anyone who denies the theory, Protagorean relativism is of
course false, but for anyone who believes it-such as himself-the
theory is true. This will not work, because for the theory to be true
for anyone, it must necessarily be true for everyone.
SH: Absolute Truth, if it exists, could be defined as what is true for
everyone. That is, properties or conditions of physical reality which
place the same constraints on everyone. I think this topic confuses
objective physical reality (the Truth) for what can be known about
that Truth which is a myriad of _beliefs_ and theories.
If the Universe Relatively changes unceasingly,
is that ceaseless change a Universal Absolute?
Stephen
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
30 Dec 2005 01:45:18 PM |
|
|
Stephen Harris wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1135881675.633776.40170@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com
<snippage>
"Plato thought that such a qualification reveals the inconsistency of
the whole doctrine. His basic argument against relativism is called the
"Turning the Tables" (Peritrop=E9, "turning around") argument, and it
goes something like this: "If the way things appear to me, in that way
they exist for me, and the way things appears to you, in that way they
exist for you, then it appears to me that your whole doctrine is
false." Since anything that appears to me is true, then it must be true
that Protagoras is wrong [1]. Relativism thus has the strange logical
property of not being able to deny the truth of its own contradiction.
Indeed, if Protagoras says that there is no falsehood, then he cannot
say that the opposite, the contradiction, of his own doctrine is false.
Protagoras wants to have it both ways -- that there is no falsehood but
that the denial of what he says is false -- and that is typical of
relativism. And if we say that relativism simply means that whatever I
believe is nobody else's business, then there is no reason why I should
tell anybody else what I believe, since it is then none of my business
to influence their beliefs.
SH: Plato also used the Allegory of the Cave, his belief that the world
revealed by our senses is not the real world but only a reflection of it.
Since we are not in the same bodies(physically cannot occupy the
same space at the same time) nor do we have the same interpretation
mechanisms(our minds have different backgrounds and therefore attach
different weights to perceptions) the shadows cast by the fire on the
walls of the cave will be related by those minds to a host of apparitions,
like how the blind men describe an elephant.
The theory of Forms may best be understood in terms of mathematical
entities. A circle, for instance, is defined as a plane figure composed
of a series of points, all of which are equidistant from a given point.
No one has ever actually seen such a figure, however.
What people have actually seen are drawn figures that are more or less
close approximations of the ideal circle. In fact, when mathematicians
define a circle, the points referred to are not spatial points at all;
they are logical points. They do not occupy space.
Nevertheless, although the Form of a circle has never been seen-indeed,
could never be seen-mathematicians and others do in fact know what a
circle is. That they can define a circle is evidence that they know
what it is.
For Plato, therefore, the Form "circularity" exists, but not in the
physical world of space and time.
It exists as a changeless object in the world of Forms or Ideas, which
can be known only by reason.
http://www.crystalinks.com/plato.html
Though that supports a relativistic description of our perceptions it
describes our appreciation of reality; it doesn't say that reality itself
is Relative, that there is no Absolute. That difference of opinion is
exemplified by 'If a tree falls in a forest, and nobody is around to hear
it, does it make a sound?' Some people will answer no, if nobody hears
the tree fall then it makes no sound. Others will say, yes, sound is a
vibration and the vibration exists whether or not some creature hears it.
The direction that a discussion of relativism takes is going to depend
on which side is taken for an underlying assumption: Is Truth identical
to Objective reality? Is Truth an abstract mental property which does
not exist independently of a perceiving mind, so that it is in a different
category than whether or not something physically exists.
For instance, accepting for the moment evolution theory, it would
be a physical fact of existence that the Earth was around far before
humans showed up who were capable of generating language which
contains such concepts as Truth. That is why I think there is an
objective reality which is independent of the concept of Truth. We
try to approximate or capture that reality with our descriptions based
upon our perceptions. Truth is how close our descriptions come to
matching that objective reality and that is not going to be a knowable
thing. I'm not sure it works to substitute another abstract notion, the
Absolute, for Objective reality-what simply is, without description.
But then at different times in history humans made these truths that
contradicted the truths of other times. I also believe that there is an
objective reality but that is merely a theory.
-------------------------------
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
C) New Knowledge as Undefeated Justification:
A Revisionist Alternative to the Skeptic
and the Epistemist
Let us reflect on the dispute between the skeptic and the epistemist.
The skeptic has proven that our perceptual beliefs and corrigible
beliefs generally are not completely justified in any way that
guarantees the truth of those beliefs and excludes all chance of error.
Must we concede the day to the skeptic? The arguments_of the skeptic
are formidable. What have we learned from her? We have learned that all
justification runs some risk of error. Any justification for what we
believe is fallible. When we seek a justification for what we believe,
the best we can find will inevitably fall short of guaranteeing the
truth of what we believe. Justification can aim at truth but cannot
eliminate the risk of error. If our search for knowledge is the quest
for complete justification and a guarantee of truth, we must admit our
ignorance and concede the day to the skeptic. There is another way,
however.
We can revise our conception of knowledge. We may redefine knowledge
without committing the redefinist fallacy by admitting that our new
conception is a revision. We can construct a new conception of
knowledge and make this new knowledge the object of our philosophical
quest. How can we do this? We begin by admitting that our justification
for what we believe remains fallibIe and falls short of a complete
justification. We continue by noting that the fallible justification we
do have tor our beliefs, the sort appealed to by the internalist, for
example, may prove a trustworthy and reliable guide to truth. Such
justification may lead us to truth without being based on any false
premise or assumption. These reflections show us how to revise our
conception of knowledge. The revisionist takes fallible justification
rather than complete justification as the basis of knowledge, and
affirms that when fallible justification for our beliefs does not
depend on error and leads us to truth, we attain a new kind of
knowledge. This kind of knowledge based on fallible justification
becomes the legitimate object of philosophical and scientific inquiry.
In this way, revisionism transcends epistemism and skepticism,
combining the insights of both. We have not been able to prove the
skeptical hypotheses to be false. We believe, however, that those
hypotheses are fanciful, false constructions of the imagination, rather
than a truthful account of our world. We believe that our perceptual
beliefs about the objects we see, hear, and touch inform us in a
trustworthy way about the truth of those objects. We believe,
therefore, that beliefs that are justified by our internal standards of
justification, though those standards be fallible guides to truth, are
also externally connected with truth in a trustworthy and reliable
manner. We believe all this.
Suppose, in fact, that our fallible internal justification for our
perceptual beliefs and other corrigible beliefs does not rest on error
but instead leads us to truth in some trustworthy and reliable manner,
as the externalist maintains. Then a revised conception of knowledge
lies shining before us. One component is fallibilism, which we take
from the skeptic. Another component is internal justification, which we
take from the epistemist and the internalist. The final component,
which we take from the epistemist and the externalist, is that of
justification that is undefeated by error and that connects us with
truth in a trustworthy and reliable manner. It is easy to assemble the
components, as we have seen, to obtain a revised conception of
knowledge. Undefeated fallible justification is the new knowledge that
we seek.
It is the object of our inquiry. We cannot prove, as the skeptic has
taught us, that our justification is undefeated by error. We have
learned from her that some forms of error are invincible and beyond
detection. If some skeptical hypothesis of invincible deception is
true, then our justification is defeated and our perceptual beliefs are
errors. In that case, our situation is epistemically desperate, and we
must remain ignorant. If, however, we are right in thinking that our
perceptual beliefs will lead us to truth in a trustworthy manner, as
our internal standards of justification tell us, then our fallible
justification is undefeated, and we have new knowledge, If there is an
appropriate match between our beliefs about ourselves and our
perceptual relation to the external world, then internal justification
matches external justification, fallible justification goes undefeated,
and we obtain a new kind of knowledge.
We must, in conclusion, thank the skeptic for undermining our dogmatism
and our arrogance. She has shown us our fallibility. We may,
nevertheless, seek reasoning and justification that lead us to truth in
a reliable manner. The nobility of the goal of truth sustains the
undertaking. We enoble ourselves in seeking truth, even when we realize
that we may fail to obtain that noble objective. If the justification
we find does not rest on error and enables us to reach the truth, we
shall have attained our revised kind of knowledge. This new knowledge
is based on a fallible quest for truth without any guarantee of sucess;
we may attain it, though we cannot prove that we will. To the skeptic
who asks for proof that we shall succeed, we must put our hands over
our mouths in silence. We have no proof. We may, however, invite her to
join our quest for truth and the new kind of knowledge we seek. Once we
admit to the skeptic that she is right and we have no guarantee of
success, she, being a woman of insight and character, who has,
moreover, freed us of our dogmatism and arrogance, may join as a
sympathetic friend in our noble undertaking. We may say to her, "Let us
reason further with one another to find some fallible justificafion to
lead us to the truth in what interests us, concerning freedom, mind,
God and morals," and she, our brilliant adversary, will become a friend
to our philosophical undertaking. The modesty resulting from a
recognition of our own fallibility becomes us, opens the road to
inquiry and removes the roadblocks to understanding. Revisionism
combines the insights of skepticism and epistemism in harmony.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
If the Universe is all there is, that is, nothing exists outside or beyond
the Universe which causes the Universe to behave in some particular
way, then the Universe as a whole is self-determining. Now within the
Universe there are a huge number of events which are causally related,
their behavior is determined relative to the existence of other events. Is
it justified to draw the conclusion that because all the behavior within =
the
Universe is causally Relative, that this condition meets the requirements
for deciding that the Universe as a whole is _not_ causally self-deterimi=
ng?
I think another conclusion is supported, that the reasoning isn't happeni=
ng
at the same categorical level. Like because you me the dog and the fish
are all composed of atoms doesn't support the conclusion that the fish
minds support abstract notions like charity or truth at their level of
cognitive organization which doesn't depend on some common causal
background description (we are all made of atoms).
##################################
Protagorean Relativism;
truth is entirely subjective.
##################################
Another necessary consequence of Protagorean relativism is that there
can be no disagreements, because the only meaningful context of truth
is in relation to oneself. Tom and Jane maintain that justice is two
different things, but since they are both correct, they cannot be in
disagreement. By definition, a disagreement requires that no more than
one party can be correct-they can of course all be wrong, but the
certainly cannot all be right. To maintain that there are no
disagreements is in direct contradiction of what we commonly observe in
everyday life. If we accept Protagorean relativism, then a great deal
of our discourse with each other would also be meaningless; there would
be no point in discussing the truth or falsity of anything with anyone,
because his truth is simply not relevant to our own. This is another
radical consequence of Protagorean relativism that makes it a much less
palatable theory.
Protagorean relativism requires that there be no objective
truths-that each person's opinion be the truth-and yet it
requires that there be at least one objective truth, specifically the
truth of the Protagorean relativism itself. This is what makes it a
self-refuting theory. If there are no objective truths, then there must
necessarily be no objective truth about Protagorean relativism itself.
A committed Protagorean relativist might try to bite the bullet and say
that for anyone who denies the theory, Protagorean relativism is of
course false, but for anyone who believes it-such as himself-the
theory is true. This will not work, because for the theory to be true
for anyone, it must necessarily be true for everyone.
SH: Absolute Truth, if it exists, could be defined as what is true for
everyone. That is, properties or conditions of physical reality which
place the same constraints on everyone. I think this topic confuses
objective physical reality (the Truth) for what can be known about
that Truth which is a myriad of _beliefs_ and theories.
But the objective physical reality is a theory, not much better than a
shadow on a cave wall, right?
If the Universe Relatively changes unceasingly,
is that ceaseless change a Universal Absolute?
If the universe is ceaslessly changing is the ceasless change in this
universe absolute? If ALL change is ceaseless and Universal Absolute
translates to ALL change, then yes.
Stephen
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| User: "Stephen Harris" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
30 Dec 2005 07:55:49 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1135971918.191835.73080@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
Stephen Harris wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1135881675.633776.40170@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com
<snippage>
"Plato thought that such a qualification reveals the inconsistency of
the whole doctrine. His basic argument against relativism is called the
"Turning the Tables" (Peritropé, "turning around") argument, and it
goes something like this: "If the way things appear to me, in that way
they exist for me, and the way things appears to you, in that way they
exist for you, then it appears to me that your whole doctrine is
false." Since anything that appears to me is true, then it must be true
that Protagoras is wrong [1]. Relativism thus has the strange logical
property of not being able to deny the truth of its own contradiction.
Indeed, if Protagoras says that there is no falsehood, then he cannot
say that the opposite, the contradiction, of his own doctrine is false.
Protagoras wants to have it both ways -- that there is no falsehood but
that the denial of what he says is false -- and that is typical of
relativism. And if we say that relativism simply means that whatever I
believe is nobody else's business, then there is no reason why I should
tell anybody else what I believe, since it is then none of my business
to influence their beliefs.
SH: Plato also used the Allegory of the Cave, his belief that the world
revealed by our senses is not the real world but only a reflection of it.
Since we are not in the same bodies(physically cannot occupy the
same space at the same time) nor do we have the same interpretation
mechanisms(our minds have different backgrounds and therefore attach
different weights to perceptions) the shadows cast by the fire on the
walls of the cave will be related by those minds to a host of apparitions,
like how the blind men describe an elephant.
The theory of Forms may best be understood in terms of mathematical
entities. A circle, for instance, is defined as a plane figure composed
of a series of points, all of which are equidistant from a given point.
No one has ever actually seen such a figure, however.
What people have actually seen are drawn figures that are more or less
close approximations of the ideal circle. In fact, when mathematicians
define a circle, the points referred to are not spatial points at all;
they are logical points. They do not occupy space.
Nevertheless, although the Form of a circle has never been seen-indeed,
could never be seen-mathematicians and others do in fact know what a
circle is. That they can define a circle is evidence that they know
what it is.
For Plato, therefore, the Form "circularity" exists, but not in the
physical world of space and time.
It exists as a changeless object in the world of Forms or Ideas, which
can be known only by reason.
http://www.crystalinks.com/plato.html
SH: I know about this a bit since I'm interested in Penrose who is
likely a mathematical platonist or mathematical realist. As you know,
Penrose is judged as having failed in his attempt to apply a result of
mathematical logic, Godel's Inc. Theorem (GIT), to physical reality.
He claimed that a human mathematician (physical brain and mind
generated by that brain) could discover truths that a physical robot
running a physical program could not. A meta description of his
attempt was that Penrose was trying to use a formal result to impose
a constraint upon physical reality.
I'm not quite sure why you brought up Forms. The Cave allegory
means that everyone has a slightly different view of reality, hence
some total reality is not fully known. Thus there is some leeway for
the existence of an abstract mathematical realm which contains all
eternal mathematical verities. But establishing the point that such a
possibility cannot be eliminated does not serve as an argument that
such a realm does actually exist. I don't know if Plato tried to make
such a connection seem plausible.
But I do think it is much easier to draw an analogy between Plato's
'everybody sees a different shadow cast on the cave wall which is
reflected and interpreted by each individual consciousness' and the
view 'everything is relative'. I speak to the merit of the metaphor
rather than Plato's personal opinion of what engenders plausibility.
The two notions are quite a bit apart, I don't see why one needs to
understand both-- why Forms amplifies the Cave or derives from it,
or vice versa. Yes, maybe to understand Plato, but no to compare the
Cave Allgory to Relativism as a similar concept.
What is objectively true for humans amounts to a consensus. We all
perceive a physical object, "tree" and decide to invent a word to
describe that thing, and we all use it. From that standard, the Cave
Allegory is respected and the Platonic realm is suspect.
Though that supports a relativistic description of our perceptions it
describes our appreciation of reality; it doesn't say that reality itself
is Relative, that there is no Absolute. That difference of opinion is
exemplified by 'If a tree falls in a forest, and nobody is around to hear
it, does it make a sound?' Some people will answer no, if nobody hears
the tree fall then it makes no sound. Others will say, yes, sound is a
vibration and the vibration exists whether or not some creature hears it.
The direction that a discussion of relativism takes is going to depend
on which side is taken for an underlying assumption: Is Truth identical
to Objective reality? Is Truth an abstract mental property which does
not exist independently of a perceiving mind, so that it is in a different
category than whether or not something physically exists.
For instance, accepting for the moment evolution theory, it would
be a physical fact of existence that the Earth was around far before
humans showed up who were capable of generating language which
contains such concepts as Truth. That is why I think there is an
objective reality which is independent of the concept of Truth. We
try to approximate or capture that reality with our descriptions based
upon our perceptions. Truth is how close our descriptions come to
matching that objective reality and that is not going to be a knowable
thing. I'm not sure it works to substitute another abstract notion, the
Absolute, for Objective reality-what simply is, without description.
But then at different times in history humans made these truths that
contradicted the truths of other times. I also believe that there is an
objective reality but that is merely a theory.
SH: What is objectively true for humans amounts to a consensus.
The consensus changes over time. You use the word "truths" and
I think the correct word is beliefs, which you capture in the next line:
"I also believe that there is an objective reality but that is merely a
theory."
We fundamentally believe that we and the universe exist, how that
came to be is merely a theory, Big Bang and the universe contracts
but now it may be that it accelerates forever. Schopenhaur's theory:
http://www.directessays.com/viewpaper/20185.html
"Arthur Schopenhaur was a German philosopher born in Danzig, Poland.
The two philosophers he admired most were Kant and Plato, but he was
also influenced by Goethe and Eckhart. Schopenhaur extracted three important
points from Kant's distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal:
firstly, reality is a phenomenal world that is an illusion created by our
own sense and understanding; secondly, spatiality, temporality, and
causality are imparted onto the world by the mind, and cannot be asserted
of reality itself; and finally, the noumenal world 'can' be known, but only
immediately, by one's identification with it. He disagreed with Kant that
the thing-in-itself cannot be known. Schopenhaur claimed that we can know
reality, as it is in itself, because each of us, in our own nature, is that
reality. What we find in our own nature, is not just a physical body, or
rational mind, but will itself. All the other aspects of ourselves are just
an expression of this will. This will is the thing-in-itself."
SH: "cogito, ergo sum" (traditionally translated as "I think, therefore I
am", but more accurately as "I am thinking, therefore I exist") although the
Vedas
would express it as 'I am, therefore I think.'
So that there is a reality in which I am located and in which I eat follows
from adopting, I think, therefore I am, as axiomatic of existence. I don't
see that arguing that we cannot perfectly describe or even know that
reality/objective_existence means that we need to doubt the existence of
that reality and therefore doubt the existence of ourselves/consciousness.
-------------------------------
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
C) New Knowledge as Undefeated Justification:
A Revisionist Alternative to the Skeptic
and the Epistemist
SH: I snipped the interesting quote about Revisionism. It seemed
reasonable. I don't know that it escapes the quandary of how to
pull oneself up by one's own bootstraps.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
If the Universe is all there is, that is, nothing exists outside or beyond
the Universe which causes the Universe to behave in some particular
way, then the Universe as a whole is self-determining. Now within the
Universe there are a huge number of events which are causally related,
their behavior is determined relative to the existence of other events. Is
it justified to draw the conclusion that because all the behavior within
the
Universe is causally Relative, that this condition meets the requirements
for deciding that the Universe as a whole is _not_ causally
self-deteriming?
I think another conclusion is supported, that the reasoning isn't
happening
at the same categorical level. Like because you me the dog and the fish
are all composed of atoms doesn't support the conclusion that the fish
minds support abstract notions like charity or truth at their level of
cognitive organization which doesn't depend on some common causal
background description (we are all made of atoms).
##################################
Protagorean Relativism;
truth is entirely subjective.
##################################
Another necessary consequence of Protagorean relativism is that there
can be no disagreements, because the only meaningful context of truth
is in relation to oneself. Tom and Jane maintain that justice is two
different things, but since they are both correct, they cannot be in
disagreement. By definition, a disagreement requires that no more than
one party can be correct-they can of course all be wrong, but the
certainly cannot all be right. To maintain that there are no
disagreements is in direct contradiction of what we commonly observe in
everyday life. If we accept Protagorean relativism, then a great deal
of our discourse with each other would also be meaningless; there would
be no point in discussing the truth or falsity of anything with anyone,
because his truth is simply not relevant to our own. This is another
radical consequence of Protagorean relativism that makes it a much less
palatable theory.
Protagorean relativism requires that there be no objective
truths-that each person's opinion be the truth-and yet it
requires that there be at least one objective truth, specifically the
truth of the Protagorean relativism itself. This is what makes it a
self-refuting theory. If there are no objective truths, then there must
necessarily be no objective truth about Protagorean relativism itself.
A committed Protagorean relativist might try to bite the bullet and say
that for anyone who denies the theory, Protagorean relativism is of
course false, but for anyone who believes it-such as himself-the
theory is true. This will not work, because for the theory to be true
for anyone, it must necessarily be true for everyone.
SH: Absolute Truth, if it exists, could be defined as what is true for
everyone. That is, properties or conditions of physical reality which
place the same constraints on everyone. I think this topic confuses
objective physical reality (the Truth) for what can be known about
that Truth which is a myriad of _beliefs_ and theories.
But the objective physical reality is a theory, not much better than a
shadow on a cave wall, right?
SH: Perhaps it can be called a theory; but much better than just
another shadow on a cave wall. Because there are many points of
view doesn't mean that they all have equal scopes of definition,
which introduces plausibility measurement. I think that I think that
I exist and that I exist somewhere which agrees with other people's
perception that they exist so that we mutually perceive culture has
a physical basis. In some sense this can be described as a shared
illusion because reality most likely contains more parts beyond what
can register on the field of a brain sensing apparatus. Measuring tools
extend the range of what we can perceive without aid. I think that
means our understanding of reality can grow.
"We finally come to the prospective also know as the productive.
Myhill's characterization of it is this: "A prospective character is
one by which we cannot either recognize or create by a series of
reasoned but in general unpredictable acts." Thus it is neither
effective nor constructive.
It eludes production by any finite set of rules. However--and
this is important--it can be *approximated* to a higher and
higher degree of accuracy by a series of bigger and better
sets of generative rules.
Such rules tell you (or a machine) how to churn out members
of this prospective category. In mathematical logic, works
by Tarski and Goedel establish that *truth* has this open-
ended, prospective character. This means that you can produce
all sorts of examples of truth--unlimitedly many-- but no
set of rules is ever sufficient to characterize them *all*.
The prospective character eludes capture in any finite set."
SH: Recall the standard notion that an infinite set cannot
be added to, or subtracted from, I mean it still is considered
to remain the same size. But it seems like Myhill's set of infinite
truths is capable of being approached or approximated, but not
necessarily accomplished/reached by using the tool of reasoning.
And it doesn't seem to complement Plato's claim: "It exists
as a changeless object in the world of Forms or Ideas, which
can be known only by reason." [SH: seems not Prospective]
Pragmatically,
Stephen
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| User: "Stephen Harris" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
31 Dec 2005 11:27:16 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1135971918.191835.73080@o13g2000cwo.googlegroups.com...
Stephen Harris wrote:
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1135881675.633776.40170@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com
<snippage>
SH: Plato also used the Allegory of the Cave, his belief that the world
revealed by our senses is not the real world but only a reflection of it.
Since we are not in the same bodies(physically cannot occupy the
same space at the same time) nor do we have the same interpretation
mechanisms(our minds have different backgrounds and therefore attach
different weights to perceptions) the shadows cast by the fire on the
walls of the cave will be related by those minds to a host of apparitions,
like how the blind men describe an elephant.
The theory of Forms may best be understood in terms of mathematical
entities. A circle, for instance, is defined as a plane figure composed
of a series of points, all of which are equidistant from a given point.
No one has ever actually seen such a figure, however.
What people have actually seen are drawn figures that are more or less
close approximations of the ideal circle. In fact, when mathematicians
define a circle, the points referred to are not spatial points at all;
they are logical points. They do not occupy space.
Nevertheless, although the Form of a circle has never been seen-indeed,
could never be seen-mathematicians and others do in fact know what a
circle is. That they can define a circle is evidence that they know
what it is.
SH: "For example if we consider a line segment on a computer monitor,
then imagination can infinitely bisect it, whereas empirically there are
'levels of reality', 'pixels' 'glass particles' and 'subparticles' and so
on."
What is your point? The abstract mathematical notion of a circle does
not depend upon Platonic Forms in order to be communicated. Likewise,
other Platonic Forms such as Justice do not have to physically exist in
order for the abstract notion of justice to be communicated. You can
associate some physical representation of justice with an event, but that
is an approximation to ephemeral abstract concept --- which can certainly
be conceived completely without any extra Platonic philosophical baggage.
However, I supported Myhill on prospective sets: It eludes production
by any finite set of rules. However--andthis is important--it can be
*approximated* to a higher andhigher degree of accuracy by a series
of bigger and better sets of generative rules
So I think Plato's reality-as-such, is approximatable, which is why
Myhill's advice "treat mathematical objects as material-like objects"
is why Physics is reasonably effective. But you don't need Plato's
idea of Forms to do that. Our sense perceptions interpret reality
well enough for us to survive and thrive, whether or not that reality
can ever be completely grasped by our reasoning capacity.
My point is that the Allegory of the Cave reveals a myriad point of
views which are relativized in terms of other human viewpoints.
Plato's notions of Ideal Forms is about an eternal verity existing
outside of time and space. How can that be relativistic? I don't
think his ideas on Forms and the Cave support each other, they
are not consistent. I'm not sure they are contradictory because
the ideas may not have even that much relevancy to each other.
-----------------------------------------------------------
For Plato, therefore, the Form "circularity" exists, but not in the
physical world of space and time.
It exists as a changeless object in the world of Forms or Ideas, which
can be known only by reason.
http://www.crystalinks.com/plato.html
http://www.sofiatopia.org/equiaeon/brainmind_mind.htm
"Carnap, in his article "Empiricism, semantics and ontology" (1950),
argued that the Platonic realism which states that abstract entities may
have an existence outside their linguistic frameworks (an absolute
existence or reality-as-such) should be rejected.
Instead, it is acceptable to speak about abstract objects which are
defined by the rules of these frameworks. "Existence", "reality",
"to be real" and "to recognize something as a real thing" should
never be used outside the linguistic framework in which they appear.
So this framework defines the possible "designata". According
to Carnap it is only possible to ask questions which are internal,
meaning that their answers are given by means of the rules of the
given framework. External questions, focusing on (a) the system
of entities "as a whole" and (b) the existence of these entities
without a linguistic framework are considered as "pseudo-questions",
"quasi-cognitive" or "quasi-theoretical".
These views became highly fashionable and thus considered as
the corner-stones of the logical-positivistic edifice carrying the
new artificial language of science. ...
It is clear that Carnap suggested (without defining it) the existence
of an immanent metaphysics, construed by the rules of the linguistic
framework of the language-users. When we ask "What is being?"
we are unable to step outside all possible linguistic frameworks,
implying that no absolute answer exists if no universal linguistic
framework can be discovered (it can never be defined from the
outside, but must be found from within, i.e. it is discovered or
recovered by studying the practice of speculative thought around
the globe)."
http://examinedlifejournal.com/articles/template.php?shorttitle=immediacyborody&authorid=86
"Especially noteworthy in light of the connection between the Ideas to a
Pure
Phenomenology and the Republic is an article by one of Husserl's students,
Eugene Fink, entitled What Does the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl Want to
Accomplish?[11] This article was apparently written to counter
the influence Heidegger's Being and Time. Besides reading like a clearly
directed tirade against Heidegger for not appreciating the full implications
of Husserl's phenomenology, this article defends Husserl in terms of the
allegory of the cave.
According to Fink, Plato, "from out of the power of mythical intuition,
discovered the great, visionary symbol of all philosophizing."[12] The
struggle of education (paideia) to attain the kind of aletheia that is dealt
with in the allegory of the cave also symbolizes, says Fink, the struggle
of Husserl's phenomenology." earlier ...
"In this regard, as early as the Investigations Husserl himself felt it
necessary to defend the methodology of phenomenology against the
charge that the Investigations merely reformulated Plato's epistemology
in the language of the "logical realism" of the day. To this charge
Husserl replies that his so-called "Platonism" does not consist in
assuming an a priori doctrine of essences, "but rather in the simple
reference to a type of 'givens' that usually, however, are falsely
explained away."[8]
The ultimate standard of all theorizing and philosophizing, Husserl
contends in this passage, is "that which is given in plain seeing and is,
therefore, original."[9] Husserl maintains that any "substructure in" or
"theories about" the given must come after the experience of the given
as it is, in itself. Even if we discover, which we in fact do according to
Husserl, that the "given" has its own essential structure, this structural
aspect has nothing directly in common with Plato's notion of the Idea."
Topologically,
Stephen
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| User: "Tim" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
29 Dec 2005 02:01:30 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1135881675.633776.40170@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
<google spasm snipped>
smokeeee wrote:
Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes?
Reply to smokeeee:
Depends (not the undergarments you wear).
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
25 Jan 2006 08:11:20 PM |
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Every person who believes Relativism to be false contributes to the
empirical evidence for Relativism.
8-)
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| User: "Fluidly Unsure" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
29 Dec 2005 04:50:48 PM |
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Immortalist wrote:
Jan: Ah, you see? That is your problem. You are using logic to refute
relativism and you cannot do that. Relativism isn't based upon logic.
It isn't the same thing. So you can't use logic to refute relativism.
Given:
X != Y
W = individual entity
Z = action of W
X = perception #1
Y = perception #2
Then:
X * (W + Z) != Y * (W + Z)
The fact that X or Y qualifies W may not be apparent to W. But the entities
actions are still true to the entity even though they are not true when the
actions from one perception of a situation is compared with another perception.
I'm not formally trained in logic. How close am I?
[snip]
Matt: To say that relativism is true within itself is an absolute
statement. Don't you see that you can't do that if relativism is true?
You would have to say something like, "Relativism is true some of the
time."
what if X is equivalent to Y.
X = 3 + 4
Y = 5 + 2
They are not the exact same but the main logic is equal.
[snip]
Matt: Okay, then without using logic, can you tell why relativism is
true?
Human interpretation is influenced by the situation they have been in over the
years and they are in at the current time.
Human reactions are rarely logical at all.
[snip]
Matt: I can agree with that, but I am not speaking about things that
really are relative like which side of the bed you should get out of in
the morning. I'm talking about things like lying, cheating, stealing,
etc. If relativism is true and all points of view are equally valid,
then someone's view that it is okay to steal, is valid.
Jan: Technically, it would be, depending on the circumstances. For
example, if it meant feeding your family or helping someone.
Matt: I see. Okay, give me your money right now. I want to steal it
from you. If I had a gun, I'd point it at you and rob you. Is that
okay?
Depending on your past experiences it may be either simple survival or a
defense/reaction to the others abuses of you.
To me Robin Hood was only a Hood who stole from Peter to give to Paul. To others
he was a bright red bird that brought hope into the lives of the abused.
While I may disagree on his tactical approach to solving poverty, I cannot
refute that his intentions were pure. (At least not by what evidence I have
right now)
Matt: Then relativism isn't a universal truth is it? If it is only true
for individuals on an individual basis, it may or may not be true or
false or right or wrong or whatever. It is just a kind of "whatever you
want to do and feel" philosophy.
Justification is not the same as relativism although Justification sometimes
uses relativism.
Matt: Are you saying that it is an absolute that you are not to harm
anyone else?
To assist in solving this quagmire, modern justice systems consider different
levels of harm. Manslaughter is different than preconceived murder, but they
have both take a life away from someone.
Matt: If relativism is true because it is true, then can I say that it
is false because it is false?
I haven't heard anyone say that outside your little playground.
Another necessary consequence of Protagorean relativism is that there
can be no disagreements, because the only meaningful context of truth
is in relation to oneself. Tom and Jane maintain that justice is two
different things, but since they are both correct, they cannot be in
disagreement. By definition, a disagreement requires that no more than
one party can be correct-they can of course all be wrong, but the
certainly cannot all be right. To maintain that there are no
disagreements is in direct contradiction of what we commonly observe in
everyday life. If we accept Protagorean relativism, then a great deal
of our discourse with each other would also be meaningless; there would
be no point in discussing the truth or falsity of anything with anyone,
because his truth is simply not relevant to our own. This is another
radical consequence of Protagorean relativism that makes it a much less
palatable theory.
You are qualifying relativism to something I have not studied enough to remark
on. Protagoras may very well have taken relativism to the nth degree. I am not
talking about fanatical belief here.
I know of many disagreements that do not meet the requirements that you speak of.
On an advertisement: 30% * X = 1/3 * X
In a calculator: 30% * X = .3 * X != 1/3 * X
In a checkbook: .01% * 7.89 = .08
Inside a computer : .01% * 7.89 = .0789
To me: Robin Hood was stealing
To others: Robin Hood was just leveling the playing field
Reality doesn't always play well in a theoretical universe like Plato.
Relativism is simply a way to factor in human emotions, human interpretations,
and mathematical rounding errors.
[snip]
--
Liquid
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
30 Dec 2005 01:13:49 PM |
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Fluidly Unsure wrote:
Immortalist wrote:
Jan: Ah, you see? That is your problem. You are using logic to refute
relativism and you cannot do that. Relativism isn't based upon logic.
It isn't the same thing. So you can't use logic to refute relativism.
Given:
Hold it right there before we proceed. Is this a direct challenge to
the sceptic's contention that nothing can be known with certainty.
Here we see an attempt to show that there is something whose existence
cannot be denied and which is such that we can and do know it with
certainty. It is commonly referred to as 'the given'. It is what is
immediately presented to consciousness. Even in erroneous perception,
we will be told to just accept, something is still perceived. Neither
illusion nor hallucination is characterized by perceptual vacuity -
there always is something given. Berkeley spoke of 'the proper object
of the senses', and A. J. Ayer and others of 'sense-data'.
What all foundationalist theories do have in common is the view that
all justification ends with evidence that justifies but is justified by
nothing else. Such stopping points are the foundations of all
justification, and therefore of all knowledge. An absurd claim will be
made that this stopping point is not simply a "basic belief," but some
experience in itself. But we will find that a resort is made to some
belief or other about the state of this being and it's reason for being
or even that it *be.* Any version of foundationalism of this sort is
"doxastic" foundationalism, that is, a version where the foundational
evidence is a belief. (The Greek word 'doxa' signifies 'belief' in
English.)
Next we will be told that, even if it does turn out to be a belief that
is used as the final justification, next the attempt will be made to
confuse this belief with some meaningless propositions that can't
properly stand for what is -being- addressed.
But there will be no escape, basic beliefs must be justified in order
to justify other beliefs. Since they are not justified by anything
else, the basic beliefs could only be self-justified. As we will see, a
foundationalism described in the way will have a hard time getting off
the ground.
http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/phi102/lecmenu.htm
The Given
The epistemological sceptic notes that our faculties of knowledge, in
short reason and the senses, are fallible. Fallacious reasoning occurs,
just as sensory illusions and hallucinations occur. On account of this
fallibility of our faculties of knowledge, the sceptic is disposed to
conclude that through reliance on them nothing can be known with
certainty. There are many ways in which attempts have been made to
answer the epistemological sceptic. Sometimes, the sceptic's claims
have been said to be incoherent in the sense that to be true, or even
to make sense at all, they require assumptions which make them false.
Alternatively, the claims have been said to be unintelligible in the
sense that facts about the nature of language and its use preclude
them. Also, the sceptic's arguments themselves have been challenged on
the score of invalidity - it is denied that they succeed in showing
what they purport to show. More and more today, it has been maintained
that the sceptic is misdirected about the nature of existence and of
knowledge.
There is one other way, different from all of these, in which the
sceptic's position has been opposed. This involves a direct challenge
to the sceptic's contention that nothing can be known with certainty.
Here, an attempt is made to show that there is something whose
existence cannot be denied and which is such that we can and do know it
with certainty. It is commonly referred to as 'the given'. It is what
is immediately presented to consciousness. Even in erroneous
perception, we are told, something is still perceived. Neither illusion
nor hallucination is characterized by perceptual vacuity - there always
is something given. Berkeley spoke of 'the proper object of the
senses', and A. J. Ayer and others of 'sense-data'. When one supposedly
sees a penny, according to these philosophers, one sees not the penny
itself but an elliptical sense-datum.
This view of sense-data as the incorrigibly given in perception is
connected with foundationalism. Beginning from sense-data,
foundationalism seeks to show how, from such elements, we construct
objects like the penny. The methods of construction are intended to
transfer to our knowledge-claims concerning three-dimensional objects
something of the certainty of knowledge associated with sense-data.
Rudolf Carnap made strides towards bringing about such a construction,
but W. V. Quine's systematic criticisms of the programme and its
devices have made it evident to many that it will not be completed. And
the assumption of sense-data known incorrigibly has not been without
its critics (e.g. the later Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin).
http://xrefer.com/entry.jsp?xrefid=552176
-------------------------------
Therefore how can you convince me to agree to use this "given" thing
before we proceed, please persuade me that this is the best way to
proceed.
X != Y
W = individual entity
Z = action of W
X = perception #1
Y = perception #2
Then:
X * (W + Z) != Y * (W + Z)
The fact that X or Y qualifies W may not be apparent to W. But the entities
actions are still true to the entity even though they are not true when the
actions from one perception of a situation is compared with another perception.
I'm not formally trained in logic. How close am I?
[snip]
Matt: To say that relativism is true within itself is an absolute
statement. Don't you see that you can't do that if relativism is true?
You would have to say something like, "Relativism is true some of the
time."
what if X is equivalent to Y.
X = 3 + 4
Y = 5 + 2
They are not the exact same but the main logic is equal.
[snip]
Matt: Okay, then without using logic, can you tell why relativism is
true?
Human interpretation is influenced by the situation they have been in over the
years and they are in at the current time.
Human reactions are rarely logical at all.
[snip]
Matt: I can agree with that, but I am not speaking about things that
really are relative like which side of the bed you should get out of in
the morning. I'm talking about things like lying, cheating, stealing,
etc. If relativism is true and all points of view are equally valid,
then someone's view that it is okay to steal, is valid.
Jan: Technically, it would be, depending on the circumstances. For
example, if it meant feeding your family or helping someone.
Matt: I see. Okay, give me your money right now. I want to steal it
from you. If I had a gun, I'd point it at you and rob you. Is that
okay?
Depending on your past experiences it may be either simple survival or a
defense/reaction to the others abuses of you.
To me Robin Hood was only a Hood who stole from Peter to give to Paul. To others
he was a bright red bird that brought hope into the lives of the abused.
While I may disagree on his tactical approach to solving poverty, I cannot
refute that his intentions were pure. (At least not by what evidence I have
right now)
Matt: Then relativism isn't a universal truth is it? If it is only true
for individuals on an individual basis, it may or may not be true or
false or right or wrong or whatever. It is just a kind of "whatever you
want to do and feel" philosophy.
Justification is not the same as relativism although Justification sometimes
uses relativism.
Matt: Are you saying that it is an absolute that you are not to harm
anyone else?
To assist in solving this quagmire, modern justice systems consider different
levels of harm. Manslaughter is different than preconceived murder, but they
have both take a life away from someone.
Matt: If relativism is true because it is true, then can I say that it
is false because it is false?
I haven't heard anyone say that outside your little playground.
Another necessary consequence of Protagorean relativism is that there
can be no disagreements, because the only meaningful context of truth
is in relation to oneself. Tom and Jane maintain that justice is two
different things, but since they are both correct, they cannot be in
disagreement. By definition, a disagreement requires that no more than
one party can be correct-they can of course all be wrong, but the
certainly cannot all be right. To maintain that there are no
disagreements is in direct contradiction of what we commonly observe in
everyday life. If we accept Protagorean relativism, then a great deal
of our discourse with each other would also be meaningless; there would
be no point in discussing the truth or falsity of anything with anyone,
because his truth is simply not relevant to our own. This is another
radical consequence of Protagorean relativism that makes it a much less
palatable theory.
You are qualifying relativism to something I have not studied enough to remark
on. Protagoras may very well have taken relativism to the nth degree. I am not
talking about fanatical belief here.
I know of many disagreements that do not meet the requirements that you speak of.
On an advertisement: 30% * X = 1/3 * X
In a calculator: 30% * X = .3 * X != 1/3 * X
It is not an equivalence but room for counter-theory. If you cannot
eliminate the counter-hypothesis it is contingent upon future events
which way it goes and not whether it is numerically the same.
Therefore the need for parameters and algebraic equalization.
30% * X = 1/3 * X != .3 * X || 30% * X = .3 * X != 1/3 * X
(||) = OR in JavaScript
In a checkbook: .01% * 7.89 = .08
Inside a computer : .01% * 7.89 = .0789
To me: Robin Hood was stealing
To others: Robin Hood was just leveling the playing field
Reality doesn't always play well in a theoretical universe like Plato.
Relativism is simply a way to factor in human emotions, human interpretations,
and mathematical rounding errors.
But your proposition about rounding has not been shown to be
un-rounded!
The Problem of the Criterion
A general argument against the invocation of any standard for knowledge
has come to be known as "the problem of the criterion." As we have just
seen, there have been disputes about standards of knowledge. Some are
about particular kinds of arguments that provide evidence for knowledge
claims. As we will see shortly, others are about the degree of
evidential support or reliability required for knowledge. The
Pyrrhonian skeptics argued that such disputes cannot be settled.
If the dispute is to be settled rationally, there must be some means
for settling it. It would do no good of each side simply to assert its
position without argument. So how would a standard of knowledge (or
"criterion of truth," in the language of the Stoics) be defended? It
could only be defended by reference to some standard or other. If the
standard under dispute is invoked, then the question has been begged.
If another standard is appealed to, the question arises again, to be
answered either by circular reasoning or by appeal to yet another
standard. So either the process of invoking standards does not
terminate, or it ends in circular reasoning, and thus the dispute over
the standard cannot be settled rationally.
Lehrer takes on the problem of criterion in the guise of the question
whether he can justify his acceptance of his own theory of
justification. He rejects the appeal to a higher-order theory of
justification as well as dogmatic acceptance of the theory (p. 228).
This leaves only circularity, or a "loop" of justification. Lehrer
defends the loop of justification as being virtuous.
.... "When we construct a complete justification, a special issue arises
when we ask whether the theory itself is justified" (p. 228). The range
of answers he proposes shows that he is not really concerned with
justifying a theory of justification (providing an
"meta-justification"), but with whether we can use the theory to
explain why we are justified in accepting the theory of justification.
Couched in these terms, the task is much easier, since when we explain
why something is the case, we suppose that it actually is the case. I
would not try to explain why there are thirty people in my office right
now, because I am the only one here. But I might try to explain why I
am alone in the office.
http://comm.ucdavis.edu/phi102/lecmenu.htm
[snip]
--
Liquid
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
29 Dec 2005 10:45:32 PM |
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Immortalist wrote:
Relativism is sometimes identified (usually by its critics) as the
thesis that all points of view are equally valid.
In philsophy it's always been that way. Since they're the
only people on Earth who don't make any distinction between
the concepts of relative, relation, and relative motion.
In ethics, this
amounts to saying that all moralities are equally good; in epistemology
it implies that all beliefs, or belief systems, are equally true.
In psychology that's true. Since many psychologists
believe it's universally ethical to practicing medicine
and engineering without a licence.
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| User: "al" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
30 Dec 2005 10:17:00 AM |
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<zzbunker@netscape.net> wrote in message
news:1135917932.252338.235290@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Immortalist wrote:
Relativism is sometimes identified (usually by its critics) as the
thesis that all points of view are equally valid.
Snip
In ethics, this
amounts to saying that all moralities are equally good; in epistemology
it implies that all beliefs, or belief systems, are equally true.
Is it even possible to make judgments without logic?
Is there not a need to weed out the fraudulent, the harmful and the
dishonest?
al
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
30 Dec 2005 01:48:50 PM |
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al wrote:
<zzbunker@netscape.net> wrote in message
news:1135917932.252338.235290@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Immortalist wrote:
Relativism is sometimes identified (usually by its critics) as the
thesis that all points of view are equally valid.
Snip
In ethics, this
amounts to saying that all moralities are equally good; in epistemology
it implies that all beliefs, or belief systems, are equally true.
Is it even possible to make judgments without logic?
Is there not a need to weed out the fraudulent, the harmful and the
dishonest?
al
In a paleolithic environment I suppose that evolution would favor
individuals who could do that and possibly incorporate this trait into
our human nature so that instinctual inference systems make these kinds
of judgments more likely and an influence upon the daily run of
thoughts and experiences.
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| User: "al" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
30 Dec 2005 04:48:56 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1135972129.928411.125030@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
al wrote:
<zzbunker@netscape.net> wrote in message
news:1135917932.252338.235290@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
Immortalist wrote:
Relativism is sometimes identified (usually by its critics) as the
thesis that all points of view are equally valid.
Snip
In ethics, this
amounts to saying that all moralities are equally good; in
epistemology
it implies that all beliefs, or belief systems, are equally true.
Is it even possible to make judgments without logic?
Is there not a need to weed out the fraudulent, the harmful and the
dishonest?
al
In a paleolithic environment I suppose that evolution would favor
individuals who could do that and possibly incorporate this trait into
our human nature so that instinctual inference systems make these kinds
of judgments more likely and an influence upon the daily run of
thoughts and experiences.
So I assume that what you are infering is that as we are no longer in a
paleolithic environment?
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| User: "Rupert" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
30 Dec 2005 10:46:53 PM |
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Immortalist wrote:
Relativism is sometimes identified (usually by its critics) as the
thesis that all points of view are equally valid. In ethics, this
amounts to saying that all moralities are equally good; in epistemology
it implies that all beliefs, or belief systems, are equally true.
Critics of relativism typically dismiss such views as incoherent since
they imply the validity even of the view that relativism is false. They
also charge that such views are pernicious since they undermine the
enterprise of trying to improve our ways of thinking.
In "Invariances", Robert Nozick claims that relativism about truth is a
coherent position. He writes: "Is the claim that relativism is
universally and without exception true undercut by that familiar
question: is this relativist view relative or not? It seems that surely
it is, for if we suppose that the (unrelaxed) relativist position R
(which holds that *all* truth is relative) itself is relative, then...
Then what? Then it is only relative, and so what authority does it have
over me; why should I believe it? The relativist might reply that
although R is only relative, I fall within its domain. R is relative to
a group I am in, or to a property that I have, etc. And so the
relativist answer to the question of why I should believe R, even
though it is merely a relative truth, is that it *is* true relative to
something about me. So I am stuck with it as true. (And about that
statement that R is true relative to something about me, I ask: is
*that* statement only a relative truth? Yes, replies the relativist,
and it too is true relative to something about me. And as to that
something about me, I wonder: is its holding only a relative truth?
Yes, the relativist replies, but...) If R is true relative to property
P, and if I have property P and do not lose it through knowing that
truth is relative (and knowing is it relative to P and knowing that I
have P), then R *is* true relative to this property that I have, so
shouldn't I believe it?"
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| User: "Lawrence Wong From:" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
05 Jan 2006 12:19:04 PM |
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"Rupert" <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> writes:
In "Invariances", Robert Nozick claims that relativism about truth is a
coherent position. He writes: "Is the claim that relativism is
universally and without exception true undercut by that familiar
question: is this relativist view relative or not? It seems that surely
it is, for if we suppose that the (unrelaxed) relativist position R
(which holds that *all* truth is relative) itself is relative, then...
Then what? Then it is only relative, and so what authority does it have
over me; why should I believe it? The relativist might reply that
although R is only relative, I fall within its domain. R is relative to
a group I am in, or to a property that I have, etc. And so the
relativist answer to the question of why I should believe R, even
though it is merely a relative truth, is that it *is* true relative to
something about me. So I am stuck with it as true. (And about that
statement that R is true relative to something about me, I ask: is
*that* statement only a relative truth? Yes, replies the relativist,
and it too is true relative to something about me. And as to that
something about me, I wonder: is its holding only a relative truth?
Yes, the relativist replies, but...) If R is true relative to property
P, and if I have property P and do not lose it through knowing that
truth is relative (and knowing is it relative to P and knowing that I
have P), then R *is* true relative to this property that I have, so
shouldn't I believe it?"
I think you're missing the point. If all truth is relative then it is true
that "absolutely all truth is relative" which is either false (under the
relativist worldview) or is absolute, showing that the relativist
worldview is self-refuting.
RAZA 2006
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| User: "Stephen Harris" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
06 Jan 2006 01:10:23 AM |
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"Lawrence Wong From:" <s371388@student.uq.edu.au> wrote in message
news:dpjnuo$2bcb$1@bunyip2.cc.uq.edu.au...
"Rupert" <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> writes:
I think you're missing the point. If all truth is relative then it is true
that "absolutely all truth is relative" which is either false (under the
relativist worldview) or is absolute, showing that the relativist
worldview is self-refuting.
RAZA 2006
http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/subjective_objective.html
There are more categories here than meet the eye.
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| User: "Rupert" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
07 Jan 2006 02:06:46 AM |
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wrote:
"Rupert" <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> writes:
In "Invariances", Robert Nozick claims that relativism about truth is a
coherent position. He writes: "Is the claim that relativism is
universally and without exception true undercut by that familiar
question: is this relativist view relative or not? It seems that surely
it is, for if we suppose that the (unrelaxed) relativist position R
(which holds that *all* truth is relative) itself is relative, then...
Then what? Then it is only relative, and so what authority does it have
over me; why should I believe it? The relativist might reply that
although R is only relative, I fall within its domain. R is relative to
a group I am in, or to a property that I have, etc. And so the
relativist answer to the question of why I should believe R, even
though it is merely a relative truth, is that it *is* true relative to
something about me. So I am stuck with it as true. (And about that
statement that R is true relative to something about me, I ask: is
*that* statement only a relative truth? Yes, replies the relativist,
and it too is true relative to something about me. And as to that
something about me, I wonder: is its holding only a relative truth?
Yes, the relativist replies, but...) If R is true relative to property
P, and if I have property P and do not lose it through knowing that
truth is relative (and knowing is it relative to P and knowing that I
have P), then R *is* true relative to this property that I have, so
shouldn't I believe it?"
I think you're missing the point. If all truth is relative then it is true
that "absolutely all truth is relative" which is either false (under the
relativist worldview) or is absolute, showing that the relativist
worldview is self-refuting.
Why can't it be relatively true?
RAZA 2006
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| User: "Lawrence Wong From:" |
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| Title: Re: Is Relativism Always Self-Refuting Or Just Sometimes? |
13 Jan 2006 01:23:19 PM |
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"Rupert" <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> writes:
s371388@student.uq.edu.au wrote:
"Rupert" <rupertmccallum@yahoo.com> writes:
In "Invariances", Robert Nozick claims that relativism about truth is a
coherent position. He writes: "Is the claim that relativism is
universally and without exception true undercut by that familiar
question: is this relativist view relative or not? It seems that surely
it is, for if we suppose that the (unrelaxed) relativist position R
(which holds that *all* truth is relative) itself is relative, then...
Then what? Then it is only relative, and so what authority does it have
over me; why should I believe it? The relativist might reply that
although R is only relative, I fall within its domain. R is relative to
a group I am in, or to a property that I have, etc. And so the
relativist answer to the question of why I should believe R, even
though it is merely a relative truth, is that it *is* true relative to
something about me. So I am stuck with it as true. (And about that
statement that R is true relative to something about me, I ask: is
*that* statement only a relative truth? Yes, replies the relativist,
and it too is true relative to something about me. And as to that
something about me, I wonder: is its holding only a relative truth?
Yes, the relativist replies, but...) If R is true relative to property
P, and if I have property P and do not lose it through knowing that
truth is relative (and knowing is it relative to P and knowing that I
have P), then R *is* true relative to this property that I have, so
shouldn't I believe it?"
I think you're missing the point. If all truth is relative then it is true
that "absolutely all truth is relative" which is either false (under the
relativist worldview) or is absolute, showing that the relativist
worldview is self-refuting.
Why can't it be relatively true?
If all things are relatively true, then that statement itself is
relatively true. Which is the same as saying somethings are relatively
true and others aren't (ie. they are absolute!)
RAZA 2006
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