| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"jonathan swift" |
| Date: |
04 Jan 2007 08:30:53 PM |
| Object: |
is there an anti-realist view of understanding ? |
Hey guys,
I'm working on a paper about Wittgenstein's _Philosophical
Investigations_ that deals with his search for a criterium that would
enable us to tell whether a speaker understands the meaning of a given
expression. Obviously, if you're looking for such a criterium, it means
that you believe that there is some fact of the matter that make such
sentences as "I understand what 'red' means" true or false. This view
is perhaps too commonsensical to deserve a label, but let's call it
"realism about understanding". Right now I'm wondering if anyone so far
has ever argued for the opposite claim, namely that there is no fact of
the matter that could make understanding ascriptions (and even
self-ascriptions) true. Do you have any ideas about it ?
.
|
|
| User: "Bill Snyder" |
|
| Title: Re: is there an anti-realist view of understanding ? |
05 Jan 2007 12:49:41 PM |
|
|
"jonathan swift" <stringpatch@yahoo.fr> wrote in message
news:1167964253.549197.242060@51g2000cwl.googlegroups.com...
Hey guys,
I'm working on a paper about Wittgenstein's _Philosophical
Investigations_ that deals with his search for a criterium that would
enable us to tell whether a speaker understands the meaning of a given
expression. Obviously, if you're looking for such a criterium, it means
that you believe that there is some fact of the matter that make such
sentences as "I understand what 'red' means" true or false. This view
is perhaps too commonsensical to deserve a label, but let's call it
"realism about understanding". Right now I'm wondering if anyone so far
has ever argued for the opposite claim, namely that there is no fact of
the matter that could make understanding ascriptions (and even
self-ascriptions) true. Do you have any ideas about it ?
Maybe I am missing something subtle here. But, are not the facts which
substantiate the claim that I understand the meaning of the word "red"
simply the facts that I use the word properly? Why should we look for some
other "internal" or "external" "fact" that might substantiate the claim?
--
BS
"But I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
.
|
|
|
| User: "Wanker" |
|
| Title: Re: is there an anti-realist view of understanding ? |
08 Jan 2007 04:22:11 AM |
|
|
Bill Snyder wrote:
"jonathan swift" <stringpatch@yahoo.fr> wrote in message
news:1167964253.549197.242060@51g2000cwl.googlegroups.com...
Hey guys,
I'm working on a paper about Wittgenstein's _Philosophical
Investigations_ that deals with his search for a criterium that would
enable us to tell whether a speaker understands the meaning of a given
expression. Obviously, if you're looking for such a criterium, it means
that you believe that there is some fact of the matter that make such
sentences as "I understand what 'red' means" true or false. This view
is perhaps too commonsensical to deserve a label, but let's call it
"realism about understanding". Right now I'm wondering if anyone so far
has ever argued for the opposite claim, namely that there is no fact of
the matter that could make understanding ascriptions (and even
self-ascriptions) true. Do you have any ideas about it ?
Maybe I am missing something subtle here. But, are not the facts which
substantiate the claim that I understand the meaning of the word "red"
simply the facts that I use the word properly? Why should we look for some
other "internal" or "external" "fact" that might substantiate the claim?
Because (so saith "The Sceptic") we could be mistaken about correct
usage.
--
BS
"But I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
.
|
|
|
|
|
| User: "Russ Rose" |
|
| Title: Re: is there an anti-realist view of understanding ? |
05 Jan 2007 06:43:27 PM |
|
|
The word is "agreement".
A claim to understand 'red' would be judged "true" only by those that agree.
The opposite being disagreement, which can always be found on
alt.philosophy...
BTW 'red' means communist and 'anti-realist' is the Democrat Party... ;-)
"jonathan swift" <stringpatch@yahoo.fr> wrote in message
news:1167964253.549197.242060@51g2000cwl.googlegroups.com...
Hey guys,
I'm working on a paper about Wittgenstein's _Philosophical
Investigations_ that deals with his search for a criterium that would
enable us to tell whether a speaker understands the meaning of a given
expression. Obviously, if you're looking for such a criterium, it means
that you believe that there is some fact of the matter that make such
sentences as "I understand what 'red' means" true or false. This view
is perhaps too commonsensical to deserve a label, but let's call it
"realism about understanding". Right now I'm wondering if anyone so far
has ever argued for the opposite claim, namely that there is no fact of
the matter that could make understanding ascriptions (and even
self-ascriptions) true. Do you have any ideas about it ?
.
|
|
|
|
| User: "Wanker" |
|
| Title: Re: is there an anti-realist view of understanding ? |
05 Jan 2007 09:07:16 AM |
|
|
jonathan swift wrote:
Hey guys,
I'm working on a paper about Wittgenstein's _Philosophical
Investigations_ that deals with his search for a criterium that would
enable us to tell whether a speaker understands the meaning of a given
expression. Obviously, if you're looking for such a criterium, it means
that you believe that there is some fact of the matter that make such
sentences as "I understand what 'red' means" true or false.
True, except that 'criterion' (and thus 'fact of the matter') could
mean anything from "An utterance" to "Something I point at".
This view is perhaps too commonsensical to deserve a label, but let's call it
"realism about understanding". Right now I'm wondering if anyone so far
has ever argued for the opposite claim, namely that there is no fact of
the matter that could make understanding ascriptions (and even
self-ascriptions) true. Do you have any ideas about it ?
Well you could argue sceptically against linguistic criteria in
general, perhaps by focussing on the slipperiness of the phrase "I
understand what red means" (there isn't necessarily /one/ criterion of
understanding - according to LW - either for each instance of that
utterance, or across all instances). Once you've established that
language is a bit slippery you can use that and some Cartesian doubt to
work that logical knife into the bowels of the realist enemy. Or
something.
.
|
|
|
|
| User: "Ed" |
|
| Title: Re: is there an anti-realist view of understanding ? |
04 Jan 2007 09:11:59 PM |
|
|
jonathan swift wrote:
Hey guys,
I'm working on a paper about Wittgenstein's _Philosophical
Investigations_ that deals with his search for a criterium that would
enable us to tell whether a speaker understands the meaning of a given
expression. Obviously, if you're looking for such a criterium, it means
that you believe that there is some fact of the matter that make such
sentences as "I understand what 'red' means" true or false. This view
is perhaps too commonsensical to deserve a label, but let's call it
"realism about understanding". Right now I'm wondering if anyone so far
has ever argued for the opposite claim, namely that there is no fact of
the matter that could make understanding ascriptions (and even
self-ascriptions) true. Do you have any ideas about it ?
I have no idea about the general case but there are some statements for
which it may be true that there is no fact of the matter which
determines truth. How about " I experience exactly the same sensations
as he does when he says he is seeing "red"." It is an old
phillosophical saw that we cannot know if I feel what you feel or
sense. If one cannot determine the issue, if there is no logical way
to determine the truth, then there is no fact of the matter.
Ed
.
|
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: is there an anti-realist view of understanding ? |
05 Jan 2007 12:15:15 AM |
|
|
jonathan swift wrote:
Hey guys,
I'm working on a paper about Wittgenstein's _Philosophical
Investigations_ that deals with his search for a criterium that would
enable us to tell whether a speaker understands the meaning of a given
expression. Obviously, if you're looking for such a criterium, it means
that you believe that there is some fact of the matter that make such
sentences as "I understand what 'red' means" true or false. This view
is perhaps too commonsensical to deserve a label, but let's call it
"realism about understanding". Right now I'm wondering if anyone so far
has ever argued for the opposite claim, namely that there is no fact of
the matter that could make understanding ascriptions (and even
self-ascriptions) true. Do you have any ideas about it ?
Interesting, I have to think on this more but when I read what you said
I first thought of the circle game refutation of Descartes "cogito."
But I might change my mind by tommorrow;
Cogito, Ergo Sum (The Circle Game) Descartes
THE CIRCLE GAME: "Descartes was a philosophical disaster!" Attacking
Descate's Cogito from within Descartes's own logical structure rather
than from a modern context.
Examining Descartes's philosophy from within its own logical structure,
we see that Descartes is unable to escape the necessity of an observer
in his attempt to find a foundation for his philosophy. As I will show,
he grounds his philosophy on the postulates of his ability to discern
truth from fiction and his own existence. Descartes foundationalist
philosophy fails, as a result, because neither the infallibility and
integrity of the observer nor the observer's existence are certain.
Descartes attempts to create a foundationalist philosophy based on a
single, undeniable truth which he knows to be "fixed and assured". He
takes "I think, therefore I am" "as the first principle of the
philosophy I was seeking", believing that this is the only truth which
is necessary to found a philosophy. His logical structure , however,
relies on a second postulate. He claims that "the capacity to judge
correctly and to distinguish the true from the false is naturally equal
in all men". This postulate is more fundamental to his logical
structure than the cogito because without it, he cannot escape the
skepticism of his foundationalist structure.
Unpacking the significance of this postulate is somewhat of a
metaphysical thicket, but the effort is well rewarded. There is no
question that by thinking "I think, therefore I am", Descartes is
thinking. Beyond the statement of his existence, however, Descartes
cannot form any other conclusion unless he has the ability to discern
the truth of a thought-except the conclusion that he is, there is no
method to discern a true thought from a thought implanted into his head
by an other being unless he can make the distinction himself. If he is
to make any progress in his philosophy, he must rely on this second
postulate.
Even with this condition, Descartes's philosophy remains unstable. His
first postulate, the cogito, fails because it depends on the integrity
of the subject, the ego. Unlike a similar postulate of mathematics,
such as x+0=x, which does not depend on the integrity of the observer
in order to be true, Descartes's postulate is singularly tied to the
subject because the subject, the "I", is an integral part of the
statement. In the postulate, the "I" must be distinct since the cogito
makes no claims about the existence of anything outside the mind.
Descartes admits, however, that the mind is subject to failings caused
by the body:
"the mind depends so much on the temperament and on the disposition of
the organs of the body, that if it is possible to find some means of
rendering men as a whole wiser and more dexterous than they have been
hitherto, I believe it must be sought in medicine".
Furthermore, the mind cannot be sure of even its own state. Descartes
admits that "there are no conclusive signs by means of which one can
distinguish clearly between being awake and being asleep". Most
significantly, however, Descartes requires the fallibility of his mind
in order to prove the existence of God. Within his proof, Descartes
gives as an antecedent to his argument the observation that "my being
was not completely perfect" when it was created. But the infallible
ability to discern truth is, by nature of its indisputeability, a form
of perfection. He appears to be directly contradicting his second
postulate, the ability to discern truth from fiction. This logical
breakdown within Descartes's argument hints at a much greater problem,
however.
Descartes has a problem of authorship. That he exists and that he
conceives of his existence are synonymous according to the cogito
postulate. Furthermore, the existence of anything outside of his mind
depends on his own existence. He is assured of the existence of the
rest of the Universe by his perception of thinking of it. If the
observer stops observing himself, he ceases to exist, however. Thus the
reality of the Universe within Descartes's system depends on his
ability to conceive of it, which in turn requires that he exist. This
introduces a rather interesting problem in to his philosophy.
By the time he has completed his proof of the existence of God,
Descartes concludes that his own existence is dependent of the
existence of God. Because he creates a foundationalist philosophy,
Descartes must believe that the laws of the Universe are deriveable
from the cogito postulate. After attempting to establish the existence
of God, however, he admits that "I have observed certain laws which God
has so established in nature and of which he has impressed such notions
in our souls". According to his postulates, all that is in Descartes's
mind is the result of the fact that he thinks, yet here he seems to be
adding yet another subject to the set of actors upon which his
philosophy rests. The validity of the claims he has already made are
again questioned by further doubt over the author of existence:
"And who can give me the assurance that this God has not arranged that
there should be no earth, no heaven, no extended body, no figure, no
magnitude, or place, and that nevertheless I should have the perception
of all these things, and the persuasion that they do not exist other
than as I see them?"
Clearly, Descartes would not want to add dependency on a second subject
to his philosophy but he nonetheless accepts the notion that not all
existence can be attributed to his thoughts alone. God, he qualifies,
must also have authorship:
"if the objective reality of any one of my ideas is such that I know
clearly that it is not within me, either formally or eminently, and
that consequently I cannot myself be its cause, it follows necessarily
from this that I am not alone in the world, but that there is besides
some other being who exists, and who is the cause of this idea."
It is illogical that such a being, whose existence in the Universe is
dependent on the thoughts and observations of an observer could also be
the author of the same observer's thoughts. Surely Descartes realized
this but he seems to ignore its significance. He declares "God is
necessarily the author of my existence" and so falls into a circular
dependency, where his own existence is dependent on a God whose
existence in the Universe is dependent on Descartes's ability to
conceive of God and to determine the truth of such a perception.
Because the observer is thus permanently trapped within Descartes's web
of logic, the entire foundation of the structure is unsound.
With the foundation of Descartes carefully laid structure crumbling in
front of close examination, it appears, a philosophical failure. Such
an evaluation is made strong if it comes from within the logical
structure that Descartes presents. The job is easy, however, because
Descartes establishes such a dependent, recursive structure that his
entire fabrication falls under its own twisted weight.
http://www.stanford.edu/~bwark/papers/circle_game.html
http://www.iep.utm.edu/b/berkeley.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Berkeley
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_other_minds
.
|
|
|
|
|
Related Articles |
|
|
