| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"" |
| Date: |
01 Jan 2008 03:02:32 PM |
| Object: |
Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
Kant claims to have thwarted the skeptics who say that we cannot know
for certain how things really are.
Kant is audacious. He says that we DO know for certain how things
really are. He can justify this claim on the grounds that all
knowledge of things is grounded in spatio-temporality (or otherwise
temporality), and that spatiotemporality arises as the condition
through which objects, and knowledge, are given. This condition must
be certain if we are to speak about objects, for it is only by means
of it that objects can be talked about.
So the skeptic who says that 'we cannot know for certain how things
really are' undermines his own position. For to speak of objects and
knowledge, as the skeptic does, is not to merely talk about objects.
In order to speak about objects at all, we must ratify the conditions
through which objects and knowledge must be presented. The skeptic's
challenge is redirected. The skeptic cannot speak about uncertainty of
how things 'objects' really are. Why? Because certainty is not
properly directed at objects, but at the conditions that need to be in
place for objects to arise.
So Glock's claim that Kant is not so much directing his attention
against the skeptic as asserting a "new" metaphysics seems true. The
skeptic is not so much refuted, as steered around: objects are not the
concern of a 'certainty', but 'certainty' properly falls upon the
conditions through which objects are presented. Thus, in the absence
of the skeptics stand-alone object, it is the skeptic himself who is
left standing, while the Kantian world happily goes by. Kant's "new"
metaphysics, his 'Copernican Revolution' finds man at the centre of
empirical/scientific enterprise and proposes not that objects present
themselves, but that we, humankind, present the framework through
which talk of objects can take place.
A question stands out here. Can we not speak of knowledge of the
conditions for the presentation of objects? Can the skeptic now claim
that we cannot know for certain whether these conditions for the
appearances of objects exist? The first point is that these conditions
cannot be represented in a form that we could call knowledge. Why so?
For Kant, and indeed for all the scientifically minded people here and
elsewhere, knowledge is spatiotemporal. How then, could we describe
the conditions for spatiotemporal knowledge in terms of
spatiotemporality?
In this, Kant notes, we are tempted to speak of an object that is
represented by the conditions for spatiotemporality. The mistake made
by many authors hitherto, and which I put right now, is this. Kant is
not, as Henry Allison construes, talking about a spatiotemporal object
considered apart from the conditions required for spatiotemporal
existence. Neither is he, for Strawson, one of Allison's opponents,
talking about an object or thing in itself (of the skeptics kind),
void of spatiotemporality, that engages in peculiar 'A' relationships
with the world. No, Kant is talking about the problems associated with
considering the framework for the conditions of objects being
considered itself as an object. This may, very soon, be the topic of
my dissertation, so watch your plagiarist arses. Comments, corrections
and insights welcome.
Ta.
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| User: "thinker" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
01 Jan 2008 03:46:44 PM |
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<userjn845@aol.com> wrote in message
news:e752de64-742a-4f6c-b09f-315680deb16c@r60g2000hsc.googlegroups.com...
Kant claims to have thwarted the skeptics who say that we cannot know
for certain how things really are.
Kant is audacious. He says that we DO know for certain how things
really are. He can justify this claim on the grounds that all
knowledge of things is grounded in spatio-temporality (or otherwise
temporality), and that spatiotemporality arises as the condition
through which objects, and knowledge, are given. This condition must
be certain if we are to speak about objects, for it is only by means
of it that objects can be talked about.
So the skeptic who says that 'we cannot know for certain how things
really are' undermines his own position. For to speak of objects and
knowledge, as the skeptic does, is not to merely talk about objects.
In order to speak about objects at all, we must ratify the conditions
through which objects and knowledge must be presented. The skeptic's
challenge is redirected. The skeptic cannot speak about uncertainty of
how things 'objects' really are. Why? Because certainty is not
properly directed at objects, but at the conditions that need to be in
place for objects to arise.
So Glock's claim that Kant is not so much directing his attention
against the skeptic as asserting a "new" metaphysics seems true. The
skeptic is not so much refuted, as steered around: objects are not the
concern of a 'certainty', but 'certainty' properly falls upon the
conditions through which objects are presented. Thus, in the absence
of the skeptics stand-alone object, it is the skeptic himself who is
left standing, while the Kantian world happily goes by. Kant's "new"
metaphysics, his 'Copernican Revolution' finds man at the centre of
empirical/scientific enterprise and proposes not that objects present
themselves, but that we, humankind, present the framework through
which talk of objects can take place.
A question stands out here. Can we not speak of knowledge of the
conditions for the presentation of objects? Can the skeptic now claim
that we cannot know for certain whether these conditions for the
appearances of objects exist? The first point is that these conditions
cannot be represented in a form that we could call knowledge. Why so?
For Kant, and indeed for all the scientifically minded people here and
elsewhere, knowledge is spatiotemporal. How then, could we describe
the conditions for spatiotemporal knowledge in terms of
spatiotemporality?
In this, Kant notes, we are tempted to speak of an object that is
represented by the conditions for spatiotemporality. The mistake made
by many authors hitherto, and which I put right now, is this. Kant is
not, as Henry Allison construes, talking about a spatiotemporal object
considered apart from the conditions required for spatiotemporal
existence. Neither is he, for Strawson, one of Allison's opponents,
talking about an object or thing in itself (of the skeptics kind),
void of spatiotemporality, that engages in peculiar 'A' relationships
with the world. No, Kant is talking about the problems associated with
considering the framework for the conditions of objects being
considered itself as an object. This may, very soon, be the topic of
my dissertation, so watch your plagiarist arses. Comments, corrections
and insights welcome.
Ta.
Isn't Kant somewhat dated?
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
01 Jan 2008 04:40:51 PM |
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On Jan 1, 9:46=EF=BF=BDpm, "thinker"
Isn't Kant somewhat dated?- Hide quoted text -
- Show quoted text -
I suppose the date difference will be proportionally less in a few
hundred years.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 01:24:13 AM |
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On Jan 1, 1:02 pm, wrote:
Kant claims to have thwarted the skeptics who say that we cannot know
for certain how things really are.
Kant is audacious. He says that we DO know for certain how things
really are.
Where does he say that? Here are some things he might say;
According to Kant, it is vital always to distinguish between the
distinct realms of phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are the
appearances, which constitute the our experience; noumena are the
(presumed) things themselves, which constitute reality. All of our
synthetic a priori judgments apply only to the phenomenal realm, not
the noumenal. (It is only at this level, with respect to what we can
experience, that we are justified in imposing the structure of our
concepts onto the objects of our knowledge.) Since the thing in itself
(Ding an sich) would by definition be entirely independent of our
experience of it, we are utterly ignorant of the noumenal realm.
Thus, on Kant's view, the most fundamental laws of nature, like the
truths of mathematics, are knowable precisely because they make no
effort to describe the world as it really is but rather prescribe the
structure of the world as we experience it. By applying the pure forms
of sensible intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, we
achieve a systematic view of the phenomenal realm but learn nothing of
the noumenal realm. Math and science are certainly true of the
phenomena; only metaphysics claims to instruct us about the noumena.
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5g.htm#phen
Kant: Appearances and Things in Themselves ...what Kant understands by
'empirical idealism' is basically Berkeley's view (as well as the view
of the others mentioned above) - i.e., the claim that the mind has
immediate access only to its own ideas or representations.
'Transcendental realism,' by contrast, is the view that "mere
representations" are "things in themselves" (A490-1/B518-19), i.e.,
that things are as our sensibility maintains them to be.
In Kant's view of the history of philosophy, these two views are
frequently associated. If the mind knows only its own ideas, and
things are just what they seem to be, then Berkeley's conclusions seem
unavoidable: things are the ideas in our own minds. Total skepticism
is avoided only by identifying the "real" with the immediate objects
of consciousness.
The distinction between appearances and things in themselves occurs in
both empirical and transcendental forms, and Kant thinks it crucial to
keep from running these two sets of distinctions together.
http://ocean.otr.usm.edu/~sbruton/Appearances.htm
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 02:37:28 PM |
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On Jan 2, 12:24 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Jan 1, 1:02 pm, wrote:
Kant claims to have thwarted the skeptics who say that we cannot know
for certain how things really are.
Kant is audacious. He says that we DO know for certain how things
really are.
Where does he say that? Here are some things he might say;
According to Kant, it is vital always to distinguish between the
distinct realms of phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are the
appearances, which constitute the our experience; noumena are the
(presumed) things themselves, which constitute reality. All of our
synthetic a priori judgments apply only to the phenomenal realm, not
the noumenal. (It is only at this level, with respect to what we can
experience, that we are justified in imposing the structure of our
concepts onto the objects of our knowledge.) Since the thing in itself
(Ding an sich) would by definition be entirely independent of our
experience of it, we are utterly ignorant of the noumenal realm.
Thus, on Kant's view, the most fundamental laws of nature, like the
truths of mathematics, are knowable precisely because they make no
effort to describe the world as it really is but rather prescribe the
structure of the world as we experience it. By applying the pure forms
of sensible intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, we
achieve a systematic view of the phenomenal realm but learn nothing of
the noumenal realm. Math and science are certainly true of the
phenomena; only metaphysics claims to instruct us about the noumena.
Not exactly. The phenomenal realm is indeed the domain of pure
concepts of Understanding. Pure practical reason, pure reason in
its practical employment, instructs us as to the noumenal, that is,
the moral realm.
http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/5g.htm#phen
Kant: Appearances and Things in Themselves ...what Kant understands by
'empirical idealism' is basically Berkeley's view (as well as the view
of the others mentioned above) - i.e., the claim that the mind has
immediate access only to its own ideas or representations.
'Transcendental realism,' by contrast, is the view that "mere
representations" are "things in themselves" (A490-1/B518-19), i.e.,
that things are as our sensibility maintains them to be.
In Kant's view of the history of philosophy, these two views are
frequently associated.
Or conflated.
If the mind knows only its own ideas, and
things are just what they seem to be, then Berkeley's conclusions seem
unavoidable: things are the ideas in our own minds. Total skepticism
is avoided only by identifying the "real" with the immediate objects
of consciousness.
The distinction between appearances and things in themselves occurs in
both empirical and transcendental forms, and Kant thinks it crucial to
keep from running these two sets of distinctions together.
That's the transcendental distinction.
http://ocean.otr.usm.edu/~sbruton/Appearances.htm
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
01 Jan 2008 08:35:58 PM |
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On Jan 1, 2:02 pm, wrote:
Kant claims to have thwarted the skeptics who say that we cannot know
for certain how things really are.
Kant is audacious. He says that we DO know for certain how things
really are. He can justify this claim on the grounds that all
knowledge of things is grounded in spatio-temporality (or otherwise
temporality), and that spatiotemporality arises as the condition
through which objects, and knowledge, are given. This condition must
be certain if we are to speak about objects, for it is only by means
of it that objects can be talked about.
The issue lies in your assumption that all knowledge for Kant
must be grounded in spatio-temporality. He considered
his moral theory to be grounded in a certainty which is
non-empirical using an argument which is transcendental
in nature.
So the skeptic who says that 'we cannot know for certain how things
really are' undermines his own position. For to speak of objects and
knowledge, as the skeptic does, is not to merely talk about objects.
In order to speak about objects at all, we must ratify the conditions
through which objects and knowledge must be presented. The skeptic's
challenge is redirected. The skeptic cannot speak about uncertainty of
how things 'objects' really are. Why? Because certainty is not
properly directed at objects, but at the conditions that need to be in
place for objects to arise.
So Glock's claim that Kant is not so much directing his attention
against the skeptic as asserting a "new" metaphysics seems true. The
skeptic is not so much refuted, as steered around: objects are not the
concern of a 'certainty', but 'certainty' properly falls upon the
conditions through which objects are presented. Thus, in the absence
of the skeptics stand-alone object, it is the skeptic himself who is
left standing, while the Kantian world happily goes by. Kant's "new"
metaphysics, his 'Copernican Revolution' finds man at the centre of
empirical/scientific enterprise and proposes not that objects present
themselves, but that we, humankind, present the framework through
which talk of objects can take place.
A question stands out here. Can we not speak of knowledge of the
conditions for the presentation of objects? Can the skeptic now claim
that we cannot know for certain whether these conditions for the
appearances of objects exist? The first point is that these conditions
cannot be represented in a form that we could call knowledge. Why so?
For Kant, and indeed for all the scientifically minded people here and
elsewhere, knowledge is spatiotemporal. How then, could we describe
the conditions for spatiotemporal knowledge in terms of
spatiotemporality?
In this, Kant notes, we are tempted to speak of an object that is
represented by the conditions for spatiotemporality. The mistake made
by many authors hitherto, and which I put right now, is this. Kant is
not, as Henry Allison construes, talking about a spatiotemporal object
considered apart from the conditions required for spatiotemporal
existence. Neither is he, for Strawson, one of Allison's opponents,
talking about an object or thing in itself (of the skeptics kind),
void of spatiotemporality, that engages in peculiar 'A' relationships
with the world. No, Kant is talking about the problems associated with
considering the framework for the conditions of objects being
considered itself as an object. This may, very soon, be the topic of
my dissertation, so watch your plagiarist arses. Comments, corrections
and insights welcome.
Ta.
.
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| User: "Michael Gordge" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
01 Jan 2008 09:44:04 PM |
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On Jan 2, 11:35=A0am, wrote:
He considered
his moral theory to be grounded in a certainty which is
non-empirical using an argument which is transcendental
in nature.
Given to him by a certain knowledege fairy in other words? No sensory
evidence offered? Thats called FAITH Mal, "I have made rooom for
faith" says Kant in relation to his standard of all moral values.
MG
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 01:26:30 AM |
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On Jan 1, 7:44=A0pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
On Jan 2, 11:35=A0am, wrote:
He considered
his moral theory to be grounded in a certainty which is
non-empirical using an argument which is transcendental
in nature.
Given to him by a certain knowledege fairy in other words? No sensory
evidence offered? Thats called FAITH Mal, "I have made rooom for
faith" says Kant in relation to his standard of all moral values.
MG
Is that like the strong faith you have that non-contradictory-
identification needs no justification? Such confidence does seem
apish, eh?
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 02:17:15 PM |
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On Jan 2, 12:26 am, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On Jan 1, 7:44 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
On Jan 2, 11:35 am, wrote:
He considered
his moral theory to be grounded in a certainty which is
non-empirical using an argument which is transcendental
in nature.
Given to him by a certain knowledege fairy in other words? No sensory
evidence offered? Thats called FAITH Mal, "I have made rooom for
faith" says Kant in relation to his standard of all moral values.
MG
Is that like the strong faith you have that non-contradictory-
identification needs no justification? Such confidence does seem
apish, eh?
In this case the Randroid apes need to have confidence or faith
in their ability to identify or to engage in identification.
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| User: "Michael Gordge" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 03:53:48 PM |
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On Jan 3, 5:17=A0am, wrote:
In this case the Randroid apes........
Why did you say that Mal?
What is it about the definition of faith I have given that you dont
like and dont agree with?
It didn't sit too good with Kant's oxymoronic crap huh?
Tell me Mal, HOW can it be rational for a human being to accept and
act upon just any old or new idea where there is absolutely no, none
at all, sensory evidence offered?
Someone says to you, "hey Mal sulphuric acid is no longer a harmful
substance to human beings and I dont have any evidence at all to say
that, I have nothing in reality to back that statement up, but its
true, its the absolute truth, you can trust me, you can believe any
and everything I say, even though I cant prove anything I say is the
truth, there is nothing in practice I have no pratical evidence, I can
offer you nothing but my belief and faith that you will be safe, here
place your head in this bucket of pure 100% sulphuric acid, which you
can test is pure by this piece of litmus paper and by desolving
phosphate rock in it, but its true you can trust me you can believe
me, I have a very strong belief based on nothing but my feelings,
hopes and wishes that it is perfectly rational behaviour for you to
stick your head in this bucket of acid and all wll be just fine, no
harm will come to you at all because I believe and I have faith in the
idea that any and all harm is just a figment of man's subjective
imagination"
Mal are you starting to see now just how fucking stupid and idiotic
contradicting crap Kant's "rational faith" is?
Perhaps YOU have a version where you can mix truth faith belief and
make perfect sense.
Michael Gordge
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 08:19:44 PM |
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On Jan 2, 2:53 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
On Jan 3, 5:17 am, wrote:
In this case the Randroid apes........
Why did you say that Mal?
What is it about the definition of faith I have given that you dont
like and dont agree with?
It didn't sit too good with Kant's oxymoronic crap huh?
Tell me Mal, HOW can it be rational for a human being to accept and
act upon just any old or new idea where there is absolutely no, none
at all, sensory evidence offered?
Someone says to you, "hey Mal sulphuric acid is no longer a harmful
substance to human beings and I dont have any evidence at all to say
that, I have nothing in reality to back that statement up, but its
true, its the absolute truth, you can trust me, you can believe any
and everything I say, even though I cant prove anything I say is the
truth, there is nothing in practice I have no pratical evidence, I can
offer you nothing but my belief and faith that you will be safe, here
place your head in this bucket of pure 100% sulphuric acid, which you
can test is pure by this piece of litmus paper and by desolving
phosphate rock in it, but its true you can trust me you can believe
me, I have a very strong belief based on nothing but my feelings,
hopes and wishes that it is perfectly rational behaviour for you to
stick your head in this bucket of acid and all wll be just fine, no
harm will come to you at all because I believe and I have faith in the
idea that any and all harm is just a figment of man's subjective
imagination"
Mal are you starting to see now just how fucking stupid and idiotic
contradicting crap Kant's "rational faith" is?
Perhaps YOU have a version where you can mix truth faith belief and
make perfect sense.
Michael Gordge
"Rational faith" is Kant's obvious rejection of irrationally based
faith.
But since Rand never told you that faith could be rational you
will never believe it. It is merely a question of where knowledge
of morality comes from.
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| User: "Michael Gordge" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 04:32:00 AM |
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On Jan 2, 4:26=A0pm, Immortalist <reanimater_2...@yahoo.com> wrote:
Is that like the strong faith you have that non-contradictory-
identification needs no justification?
The justification of anything, according to you, is just the
application of another theory and which according to you again, can
never been proven as anything but an unproven uncertain theory. The
faith is yours.
Tell me Mortal, would you be looking for a contradiction in my answer
so as you could say I'm wrong and you right?
Wanting your cake and to eat it too?
MG
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
01 Jan 2008 10:16:28 PM |
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On Jan 1, 8:44 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
On Jan 2, 11:35 am, wrote:
He considered
his moral theory to be grounded in a certainty which is
non-empirical using an argument which is transcendental
in nature.
Given to him by a certain knowledege fairy in other words? No sensory
evidence offered? Thats called FAITH Mal, "I have made rooom for
faith" says Kant in relation to his standard of all moral values.
MG
Which definition of "faith"?
www.m-w.com
FAITH
1 a: allegiance to duty or a person : loyalty b (1): fidelity
to one's promises (2): sincerity of intentions2 a (1): belief
and trust in and loyalty to God (2): belief in the traditional
doctrines of a religion b (1): firm belief in something for
which there is no proof (2): complete trust3: something
that is believed especially with strong conviction; especially :
a system of religious beliefs <the Protestant faith>
synonyms see belief
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| User: "Michael Gordge" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
01 Jan 2008 11:29:45 PM |
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On Jan 2, 1:16=A0pm, wrote:
Which definition of "faith"?
A is A
A is not B C D E F G H I J K.........till timbuckedtwo
What a stupid but not unexpected question from a Kantian whose habit
it is to have as many defintions as is possible for each and any
concept so as anything can mean everything, meaning there's no meaning
for anything.
There is only one meaning for faith and its the exact opposite to
reason.
Faith:
Faith is the acceptance of an idea for which there is no evidence, no
sensory evidence offered for the acceptance of that idea.
Reason:
Requires evidence, sensory evidence Mal.
Just as:
Good gives evil its meaning
Right gives wrong its meaning
Light gives dark its meaning
Reality gives imagination its meaning
Sooo too does reason give faith its meaning.
NOTE trust anywhere near faith is oxymoronic trash, you can trust and
rationally believe where or when there is evidence, sensory evidence.
Michael Gordge
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 02:15:56 PM |
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On Jan 1, 10:29 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
On Jan 2, 1:16 pm, wrote:
Which definition of "faith"?
A is A
A is not B C D E F G H I J K.........till timbuckedtwo
What a stupid but not unexpected question from a Kantian whose habit
it is to have as many defintions as is possible for each and any
concept so as anything can mean everything, meaning there's no meaning
for anything.
There is only one meaning for faith and its the exact opposite to
reason.
Faith:
Faith is the acceptance of an idea for which there is no evidence, no
sensory evidence offered for the acceptance of that idea.
Reason:
Requires evidence, sensory evidence Mal.
Then why does Kant call it a "rational faith" in the Critique
of Practical Reason?
"Considered in respect of this alone, as a
principle of explanation, it may be called a hypothesis, but
in reference to the intelligibility of an object given us by the
moral law (the summum bonum), and consequently of a
requirement for practical purposes, it may be called faith,
that is to say a pure RATIONAL FAITH, since pure reason
(both in its theoretical and practical use) is the sole source
from which it springs."
"In order to prevent misconception in the use of a notion
as yet so unusual as that of a faith of pure practical reason,
let me be permitted to add one more remark. It might almost
seem as if this RATIONAL FAITH were here announced as
itself a command, namely, that we should assume the
summum bonum as possible. But a faith that is commanded
is nonsense." (Emphases added.)
Just as:
Good gives evil its meaning
Right gives wrong its meaning
Light gives dark its meaning
Reality gives imagination its meaning
Sooo too does reason give faith its meaning.
NOTE trust anywhere near faith is oxymoronic trash, you can trust and
rationally believe where or when there is evidence, sensory evidence.
Michael Gordge
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| User: "Michael Gordge" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 03:36:33 PM |
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On Jan 3, 5:15=A0am, wrote:
Then why does Kant call it a "rational faith" in the Critique
of Practical Reason?
Ummmm thinking, because he was a fucking idiot?
"Rational faith" is oxymoronic idiotic trash and Kant was good at
finding and inventing those.
Looook Mal do yourself a favour, when using a dictionary for
definittions, check the meaning of other concepts used within the
defintition and then check those, against the meaning of the original
concept.
You're looking for what even you like to believe you are good at
finding, CONTRADICTIONS, but within a definition. Modern dictionaries
especially are renouned for it. e.g. in the case of faith, look up the
meaning of trust and belief, it does NOT state in those definitions,
statements such "acceptance of ideas without proof".
Yes it is true, that mystics have stolen belief and trust and use them
in ther nonsebse and therefore some dictionaries will show mishmash
definitions with a mixture of all three, BUT, you will NOT find "the
acceptance of ideas wthout proof" in ANY of the definitions of belief
and trust.
Again I say:
Just as:
Good gives evil its meaning
Right gives wrong its meaning
Light gives dark its meaning
Reality gives imagination its meaning
Sooo too does reason give faith its meaning.
NOTE trust anywhere near faith is oxymoronic trash, you can trust and
rationally believe where or when there is evidence, sensory evidence.
Michael Gordge
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Kant today, via Strawson, Allison and the ontological skeptic |
02 Jan 2008 08:10:18 PM |
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On Jan 2, 2:36 pm, Michael Gordge <mikegor...@xtra.co.nz> wrote:
On Jan 3, 5:15 am, wrote:
Then why does Kant call it a "rational faith" in the Critique
of Practical Reason?
Ummmm thinking, because he was a fucking idiot?
"Rational faith" is oxymoronic idiotic trash and Kant was good at
finding and inventing those.
You mean idiotic trash like Rand's "(implicit) concept"? Or the
axiomatic concept which wasn't?
Looook Mal do yourself a favour, when using a dictionary for
definittions, check the meaning of other concepts used within the
defintition and then check those, against the meaning of the original
concept.
You're looking for what even you like to believe you are good at
finding, CONTRADICTIONS, but within a definition. Modern dictionaries
especially are renouned for it.
All Randroids believe that older dictionaries are more faithful
to a word's definition. She hated "modern dictionaries" (and
"modern art" as well as "modern philosophers"). In The Art of
Fiction, Ayn Rand wrote:"If you are not sure of a word, look it
up in a dictionary (preferably an old dictionary, because the
modern ones are nonobjective)." Then there is this private letter
circa 1965 in which Rand wrote: "I sympathize with your problem,
particularly in regard to modern dictionaries. Perhaps the older
dictionaries (of about thirty years ago) may be somewhat more
helpful. Therefore Randroids have come to believe they must
use older dictionaries.
However, Rand quoted from a dictionary published in 1966
for an article she published in her 1971 newsletter.
"Polarization" is a term borrowed from physics; a dictionary
defines "polarity" as: "the presence or manifestation of two
opposite or contrasting principles or tendencies." (Random
House Dictionary, 1966.)
The Ayn Rand Letter
Vol. 1, No. 1 October 11, 1971
Credibility and polarization
She apparently quoted the same 1966 dictionary in 1974:
"Inflation" is defined in the dictionary as "undue expansion
or increase of the currency of a country, esp. by the issuing
of paper money not redeemable in specie." (Random House
Dictionary.)
The Ayn Rand Letter
Vol. III, No. 12 March 11, 1974
Moral Inflation
At her 1964 Ford Hall Forum lecture Rand quoted
The American College Dictionary, New York: Random House,
1957.
Therefore Rand trusted "modern" dictionaries at least most
of the time, and I have never seen her quote from a much
older one than at the time she was writing.
But how old must a dictionary go before Randroids must
consider it objective? Rand doesn't tell us. But in
The Fountainhead, Introduction to the Twenty-fifth
Anniversary Edition, she wrote:
"The error is semantic: the use of the word "egotist" in
Roark's courtroom speech, while actually the word should
have been "egoist." The error was caused by my reliance
on a dictionary which gave such misleading definitions of
these two words that "egotist" seemed closer to the
meaning I intended (Webster's Daily Use Dictionary, 1933).
(Modern philosophers, however, are guiltier than
lexicographers in regard to these two terms.)
So -- Mr. Gouge, since even the 1933 Webster's Daily Use
Dictionary held to an unreliable definition of "egotist,"
tell us, in your objective opinion, how old a dictionary must
be before one can consider it a valid source of definitions?
e.g. in the case of faith, look up the
meaning of trust and belief, it does NOT state in those definitions,
statements such "acceptance of ideas without proof".
Yes it is true, that mystics have stolen belief and trust and use them
in ther nonsebse and therefore some dictionaries will show mishmash
definitions with a mixture of all three, BUT, you will NOT find "the
acceptance of ideas wthout proof" in ANY of the definitions of belief
and trust.
Again I say:
Just as:
Good gives evil its meaning
Right gives wrong its meaning
Light gives dark its meaning
Reality gives imagination its meaning
Sooo too does reason give faith its meaning.
That sounds like a good summation of Kant's argument
for rational faith.
NOTE trust anywhere near faith is oxymoronic trash, you can trust and
rationally believe where or when there is evidence, sensory evidence.
Nobody said otherwise here.
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