Non-belief: The reasonable default position

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Topic:	Science > Philosophy
User:	"George Dance"
Date:	24 Dec 2006 01:56:06 PM
Object:	Non-belief: The reasonable default position

When faced with a proposition for which there is no evidence, should
one believe it? Or believe its contradictory? Or believe neither?
Huxley's agnostic principle implies that one should not believe either
the proposition, or its contradictory, without a good reason. In that
case, though, it is reasonable to not believe Huxley's principle
without a good reason for it. So what's a good reason to believe
Huxley's principle?
Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
option.'
1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
reason.
2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)
Since the conclusion is false (as it is not reasonable to believe
contradictory things, 1 must be false. Therefore it is not reasonable
to believe propositions without a good reason, and therefore reasonable
to not believe those same propositons.
.

User: "Bill Snyder"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	24 Dec 2006 05:09:55 PM

"But I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1166990166.876126.257870@i12g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

When faced with a proposition for which there is no evidence, should
one believe it? Or believe its contradictory? Or believe neither?

Huxley's agnostic principle implies that one should not believe either
the proposition, or its contradictory, without a good reason. In that
case, though, it is reasonable to not believe Huxley's principle
without a good reason for it. So what's a good reason to believe
Huxley's principle?

Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
option.'

1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
reason.
2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)

Since the conclusion is false (as it is not reasonable to believe
contradictory things, 1 must be false. Therefore it is not reasonable
to believe propositions without a good reason, and therefore reasonable
to not believe those same propositons.

While I agree with your central point, there is a minor problem with your
delineated argument. Suppose you substitute for A, "it is not reasonable to
believe contradictory things." I think that you would end up with the
proposition that it is reasonable to believe both that it is reasonable to
believe in contradictory things and that it is not reasonable to believe in
contradictory things. But, I fully agree that if you have no good reason to
believe either A or -A then you should (and that is a moral should) not
believe either. The people who go about believing whatever strikes their
fancy when they have no good reason for believeing itt are moral delinquets.
BS
"But I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
.

User: "Bill Snyder"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	27 Dec 2006 03:33:23 PM

<derrick_abdulhakim@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1167192371.372868.229320@h40g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...

Bill Snyder wrote:

While I agree with your central point, there is a minor problem with your
delineated argument. Suppose you substitute for A, "it is not reasonable
to
believe contradictory things." I think that you would end up with the
proposition that it is reasonable to believe both that it is reasonable
to
believe in contradictory things and that it is not reasonable to believe
in
contradictory things. But, I fully agree that if you have no good reason
to
believe either A or -A then you should (and that is a moral should) not
believe either. The people who go about believing whatever strikes their
fancy when they have no good reason for believeing itt are moral
delinquets.

I'm a little worried about that moral imperative you're invoking.
Consider the proposition QI (Q-imperative):

QI: One should not believe propositions without good reason.

The problem here is that I must have good reason to believe QI. What if
I lack good reason to believe QI? It would follow that according to
your moral imperative I should not believe QI. Therefore, if one lacks
good reason to believe QI then one should not believe the proposition:
'One should not believe propositions without good reason.' I'm sensing
circularity here. Anyhow, would my non-belief in QI make me a moral
delinquent? Of course not. Given your point that one should not believe
A without good reason, I would be morally justified.

Following James, I would say between A and ~A faith would be a live
option. I can *trust* A.

Since I believe that all moral statements (including "imperatives") are, in
the final analysis, expressive of emotion, attitudes, and the like, you can
take me as merely expressing my prejudice that going around believing things
without justifying reasons is morally improper, especially when those
beliefs are expressed in such a loud and vigorous manner as to demand assent
to them or be regarded as a fool. I would no more associate with people who
behave that way than I would with a child molester.
BS
.

User: "George Dance"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	10 Jan 2007 01:59:27 PM

wrote:

Bill Snyder wrote:

[...] I fully agree that if you have no good reason to
believe either A or -A then you should (and that is a moral should) not
believe either. The people who go about believing whatever strikes their
fancy when they have no good reason for believeing itt are moral delinquets.

Unlike Bill, I'd claim that you do have a good reason to believe QI;
because QI is true. That was the original point of my argument, which
(revised version in response to Bill et al's criticism) now reads:
1. Every proposition is either true or false. *
2. No proposition is both true and false. *
3. One should not believe propositions that are false. *
4. Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to
believe either it or its contradictory (Def.).
5. There is no good reason to believe that A is true. (4)
6. There is no good reason to believe that A is false. (4)
7. "One should not believe propositions that there is no good reason to
believe" is either true or false. (1)
8. Assume that "One should not believe propositions that there is no
good reason to believe" is false. (AIP)
| 9. It is false that one should not believe that A is true. (4,8)
| 10. It is true that one should believe that A is true. (1,9)
| 11. One should believe that A is true. (10)
| 12. It is false that one should not believe that A is false. (6,8)
| 13. It is true that one should believe that A is false. (1,12)
| 14. One should believe that A is false. (13)
| 15. One should believe that A is both true and false. (11,14)
| 16. It is false that A is both true and false. (2)
| 17. One should not believe that A is both true and false. (3,16)
18. "One should not believe propositions that there is no good reason
to believe" is true. (8,15,17 IP)

Therefore, if one lacks
good reason to believe QI then one should not believe the proposition:
'One should not believe propositions without good reason.'

I'd call that a vacuous conditional; since the antecedent is false, it
implies othing about the consequent. (Similarly, of course, you can
question whether my argument implies its conclusion by questioning any
of the (* starred) premises.)

I'm sensing
circularity here.

I don't think there's any actual circularity (since none of the
premises of my argument require the conclusion); however, you're
welcome to demonstrate circularity.

Anyhow, would my non-belief in QI make me a moral
delinquent? Of course not. Given your point that one should not believe
A without good reason, I would be morally justified.

Only if QI is an example of A; if there is indeed no good reason to
believe QI.

Following James, I would say between A and ~A faith would be a live
option.

But believing A vs. believing -A is not a forced option, as one can
disbelieve both. For example, I'm not at work today; it may be true or
false that Sue is doing my job in my absence, but I don't know either
way. The alternatives are: I can that Sue is doing my job today; or I
can believe that Sue is not doing my job today; or I can believe
neither.

I can *trust* A.

Best wishes,

Derrick Abdul-Hakim

User: "George Dance"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	10 Jan 2007 11:17:06 AM

Bill Snyder wrote:

"But I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1166990166.876126.257870@i12g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

When faced with a proposition for which there is no evidence, should
one believe it? Or believe its contradictory? Or believe neither?

Huxley's agnostic principle implies that one should not believe either
the proposition, or its contradictory, without a good reason. In that
case, though, it is reasonable to not believe Huxley's principle
without a good reason for it. So what's a good reason to believe
Huxley's principle?

Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
option.'

1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
reason.
2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)

Since the conclusion is false (as it is not reasonable to believe
contradictory things, 1 must be false. Therefore it is not reasonable
to believe propositions without a good reason, and therefore reasonable
to not believe those same propositons.

Which would be equally absurd. You are right that the argument needs
to be better formulated (as even the fat that it was meant as an RAA
did not come through clearly. Let me take a second shot at formalizing
the whole thing, including my background premises (marked with *).
1. Every proposition is either true or false. *
2. No proposition is both true and false. *
3. One should not believe propositions that are false. *
4. Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to
believe either it or its contradictory (Def.).
5. There is no good reason to believe that A is true. (4)
6. There is no good reason to believe that A is false. (4)
7. "One should not believe propositions that there is no good reason to
believe" is either true or false. (1)
8. Assume that "One should not believe propositions that there is no
good reason to believe" is false. (AIP)
| 9. It is false that one should not believe that A is true. (4,8)
| 10. It is true that one should believe that A is true. (1,9)
| 11. One should believe that A is true. (10)
| 12. It is false that one should not believe that A is false. (6,8)
| 13. It is true that one should believe that A is false. (1,12)
| 14. One should believe that A is false. (13)
| 15. One should believe that A is both true and false. (11,14)
| 16. It is false that A is both true and false. (2)
| 17. One should not believe that A is both true and false. (3,16)
18. "One should not believe propositions that there is no good reason
to believe" is true. (8,15,17 IP)

But, I fully agree that if you have no good reason to
believe either A or -A then you should (and that is a moral should) not
believe either.

I've copied your use of 'should' throughout, changing "It is reasonable
to..." to "One should ...", to eliminate the 'reasonable/good reason'
ambiguity that zinnic commented on. I'm not sure if I'd call this
sense of should a 'moral' duty - it's not clear that moral duties apply
to beliefs as well as actions - however, I would agree that there are
epistemic duties, and I've given the relevant one I'm appealing to as
my third premise.

The people who go about believing whatever strikes their
fancy when they have no good reason for believeing itt are moral delinquets.

Agreed.
.

User: "ta"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	29 Dec 2006 11:58:42 AM

Bill Snyder wrote:

"But I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1166990166.876126.257870@i12g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

When faced with a proposition for which there is no evidence, should
one believe it? Or believe its contradictory? Or believe neither?

Huxley's agnostic principle implies that one should not believe either
the proposition, or its contradictory, without a good reason. In that
case, though, it is reasonable to not believe Huxley's principle
without a good reason for it. So what's a good reason to believe
Huxley's principle?

Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
option.'

1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
reason.
2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)

Since the conclusion is false (as it is not reasonable to believe
contradictory things, 1 must be false. Therefore it is not reasonable
to believe propositions without a good reason, and therefore reasonable
to not believe those same propositons.

How would you define a "good" reason?

BS
"But I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."

User: "George Dance"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	10 Jan 2007 11:26:06 AM

ta wrote:

Bill Snyder wrote:

"But I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1166990166.876126.257870@i12g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

When faced with a proposition for which there is no evidence, should
one believe it? Or believe its contradictory? Or believe neither?

Huxley's agnostic principle implies that one should not believe either
the proposition, or its contradictory, without a good reason. In that
case, though, it is reasonable to not believe Huxley's principle
without a good reason for it. So what's a good reason to believe
Huxley's principle?

Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
option.'

1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
reason.
2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)

Since the conclusion is false (as it is not reasonable to believe
contradictory things, 1 must be false. Therefore it is not reasonable
to believe propositions without a good reason, and therefore reasonable
to not believe those same propositons.

How would you define a "good" reason?

While you asked Bill, I'll chime in here with my definition (since I'm
responsible for introducing the term first). I'll define a 'good
reason' as 'either a justification or a warrant', as epistemologists
use those terms - if it's justified to believe X, and belief in X
justifies belief in Y, then X is a good reason to believe Y. I don't
want to tie this policy to any particular method of justification, but
I'll have to add (as I'm using it as my own proof method) that I'm
counting logical validity as fully justifying and therefore a good
reason.
.

User: "Martin Phipps"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	06 Jan 2007 11:33:10 PM

"Reasonable" and "default" tend to be contradictory. People are not
reasonable by default. It would be nice if they were. :)
Martin
.

User: "Mozdev"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	07 Jan 2007 01:35:15 AM

Martin Phipps wrote:

"Reasonable" and "default" tend to be contradictory.

Not so. 'Reasonable' means in accord with the principles of sound
reasoning (valid argument). In any case where there is a proposition in
question such as 'There might be X' (whatever X is imagined to be, but
is not in evidence) the only reasonable default presumption is the null,
'No X'. That stands forever or until knocked down by logically
satisfactory evidence of X, whichever occurs first.
This is standard scientific method. It's called testing the null.
For a good example of testing the null, see SETI
http://www.setileague.org/editor/null.htm
http://www.setileague.org/articles/setihoax.htm
.

User: ""
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	10 Jan 2007 03:21:40 PM

Mozdev schreef:

Martin Phipps wrote:

"Reasonable" and "default" tend to be contradictory.

Not so. 'Reasonable' means in accord with the principles of sound
reasoning (valid argument). In any case where there is a proposition in
question such as 'There might be X' (whatever X is imagined to be, but
is not in evidence) the only reasonable default presumption is the null,
'No X'. That stands forever or until knocked down by logically
satisfactory evidence of X, whichever occurs first.

This is standard scientific method. It's called testing the null.

For a good example of testing the null, see SETI

http://www.setileague.org/editor/null.htm

http://www.setileague.org/articles/setihoax.htm

For verifivation purposes this might not always the best option.
if it is easier to falsify the opposit possibilty, you start with the
not null option instead.
(not that I can easily come up with an example)
try the proposition: "there is an invisable man in the toilet".
Peter van Velzen
January 2007
Amstelveen
The Netherlands
.

User: "a_friend"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	27 Dec 2006 09:57:35 AM

wrote:

Ohhh what a shame, you fooled me into answering damn you!

When I read the tilte of the post I assumend that it would be a post
about the default position, or what is considered normal behaviour.
Nope it is instead about logics, or critical thought and some such
precept of that.

In realality then it bears no relation to it's title, and I will have
to engage in threadnapping to get across the point I was going to make.

What is the default position, when it comes to a subject where their is
no evidance? I all depends on where the knowledge comes from. Your
mum and dad? Thne the defauklt position is to trust what they say,
teachers, the same, that old strange man down the road? I guess it all
depends on what you feel about him.

Default positions? Heh as many as there are stars in the sky!

wrote:

I suggest that you were entirely in control of responding.
The issue is exactly that. We both believe that the moon is large body
in the sky. However, we hold this default proposition through other
means. We do not have direct knowledge or evidence as to the size of
the moon.
In your example, the 'uneducated' makes a direct observation not having
been told, taught, or reading otherwise.
To 'know' that the moon is not too small for a large spaceship you must
trust a number of things.
What is the evidence?
.

User: ""
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	27 Dec 2006 01:43:54 PM

a_friend wrote:

lee@rdfmedia.com wrote:
lee@rdfmedia.com wrote:

I suggest that you were entirely in control of responding.

The issue is exactly that. We both believe that the moon is large body
in the sky. However, we hold this default proposition through other
means. We do not have direct knowledge or evidence as to the size of
the moon.

In your example, the 'uneducated' makes a direct observation not having
been told, taught, or reading otherwise.

To 'know' that the moon is not too small for a large spaceship you must
trust a number of things.

What is the evidence?

To whom are you responding? My (Question) was whether or not it is
reasonable for an 'uneducated' person to base his/her conclusion on
"direct observation". That person would not have the advantage of the
prolific evidence that the moon is very large. As to what is 'our'
evidence. One word. Paralax.
If you do not accept that as evidence then we are on different planets
!!
Regards
Zinnic
.

User: "George Dance"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	05 Jan 2007 09:39:32 PM

wrote:

You're assuming that being logical and thinking critically are not
normal behavior; which looks like one reason for the disagreement in
our positions.

In realality then it bears no relation to it's title, and I will have
to engage in threadnapping to get across the point I was going to make.

What is the default position, when it comes to a subject where their is
no evidance? I all depends on where the knowledge comes from. Your
mum and dad? Thne the defauklt position is to trust what they say,
teachers, the same, that old strange man down the road? I guess it all
depends on what you feel about him.

Default positions? Heh as many as there are stars in the sky!

Remember,though, that the topic is a 'reasonable' default position.
Just what is 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' about any of the positions
you've mentioned?
.

User: "zinnic"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	25 Dec 2006 09:23:21 AM

George Dance wrote:

Let A be any proposition for which there is no good reason to believe
either it or its contradictory (to believe A or ~A). One can either
believe A or not believe A; there is no other alternative. Either
believing A, or not believing A, is what William James calls a 'forced
option.'

1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
reason.
2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)

The 'conclusion' of this 'argument' is that assumption 1 is false.
This is apparent from inspection of 1 alone and has no need of 2-6 to
prove it. 2-6 is a word game requiring an unjustified disconnect
between the meanings of "reasonable" and reason.
This is 'unreasonable! Good example of how language is used to pervert
logic.
Zinnic
.

User: "George Dance"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	25 Dec 2006 10:07:48 AM

zinnic wrote:

George Dance wrote:

The 'conclusion' of this 'argument' is that assumption 1 is false.

Yes it is. That method of proof is called reductio ad absurdum;
showing that a proposition is false because it implies an absurd
(self-contradictory conclusion).

This is apparent from inspection of 1 alone and has no need of 2-6 to
prove it. 2-6 is a word game requiring an unjustified disconnect
between the meanings of "reasonable" and reason.

"Reasonable" does not mean "having a good reason". You can define
"reasonable" to mean "having a good reason," in which case there's no
need of RAA - OTOH, you can just as easily define "reasonable" to mean
something else, as you do immediately after:

This is 'unreasonable! Good example of how language is used to pervert
logic.
Zinnic

User: ""
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	25 Dec 2006 11:36:25 AM

George Dance wrote:

1. Assume it is reasonable to believe any proposition without a good
reason.
2. There is no good reason to believe A. (def.)
3. It is reasonable to believe A. (1,2)
4. There is no good reason to believe ~A. (def.)
5. It is reasonable to believe ~A. (1,3)
6. It is reasonable to believe both A and ~A. (5,6)

The 'conclusion' of this 'argument' is that assumption 1 is false.

Yes it is. That method of proof is called reductio ad absurdum;
showing that a proposition is false because it implies an absurd
(self-contradictory conclusion).

This is apparent from inspection of 1 alone and has no need of 2-6 to
prove it. 2-6 is a word game requiring an unjustified disconnect
between the meanings of "reasonable" and reason.

This is 'unreasonable! Good example of how language is used to pervert
logic.

I hear the sound of 'tap dancing'. Give me your "easy" definition of
reasonable that is not directly or indirectly based on a "good reason"
or on reason itself (rationality).
Would ignorance be a good or a bad reason to believe "A"? Would it be
reasonable or unreasonable for an uneducated person to believe that the
moon is too small to accomodate a large spaceship?
zinnic
.

User: "George Dance"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	05 Jan 2007 06:49:08 PM

wrote:

George Dance wrote:

The 'conclusion' of this 'argument' is that assumption 1 is false.

Yes it is. That method of proof is called reductio ad absurdum;
showing that a proposition is false because it implies an absurd
(self-contradictory conclusion).

This is apparent from inspection of 1 alone and has no need of 2-6 to
prove it. 2-6 is a word game requiring an unjustified disconnect
between the meanings of "reasonable" and reason.

This is 'unreasonable! Good example of how language is used to pervert
logic.

I hear the sound of 'tap dancing'. Give me your "easy" definition of
reasonable that is not directly or indirectly based on a "good reason"
or on reason itself (rationality).

Where did you get the idea that I offered any such definition? I was
commenting on your claim that examining a position logically (as
opposed to some non-logical process of 'inspection') is "unreasonable"
- which appears to depend on defining 'reasonable' as 'non-logical.'
I'd define 'reasonable' as being open to, or able to be convinced by,
reasoning; IOW, a reasonable person believes x what he has good reason
to believe. That is not the same as the other definition you appeared
to be asserting: that a reasonable person does not believe what there
is no good reason to believe. (That's a logical distinction, and if
you consider all logic to be "word games" I could see why you'd miss
it.)

Would ignorance be a good or a bad reason to believe "A"?

Obviously that would depend on the content of A. If A were a statement
of the form, "I don't know that B," then ignorance of B would be a very
good reason to believe A; whereas it would not in other cases.

Would it be
reasonable or unreasonable for an uneducated person to believe that the
moon is too small to accomodate a large spaceship?

By 'uneducated,' you mean a person who knows absolutely nothing about
moons or spaceships? That would be unreasonable, by my argument (or
"word game," if you prefer to call it that). It would be equally
unreasonable to believe that the moon is large enough to accommodate a
large spaceship; as long as one knows nothing about moons or
spaceships, it's not reasonablle to believe anything about them.
.

User: ""
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	27 Dec 2006 01:21:25 PM

a_friend wrote:

zeenric2@gate.net wrote:

Have you been to the moon? How did you come to believe this?

How did I "come to beleive" exactly what?
If you reread my post more carefully, you may recognize that your
response reflects badly on your reading comprehension!
Zinnic
.

User: "a_friend"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	27 Dec 2006 01:43:30 PM

wrote:

a_friend wrote:

wrote:

Have you been to the moon? How did you come to believe this?

How did I "come to beleive" exactly what?
If you reread my post more carefully, you may recognize that your
response reflects badly on your reading comprehension!
Zinnic

Hardly.
Your evidence, if you please. You have presented two polar claims and
no evidence for either.
The first issue that George presented is whether evidence exists, then
the second is issue is in the absence of evidence, what is a good
reason to believe X.
I would appreciate evidence for either position -- the moon can or the
moon cannot accommodate...
Educated people once believed the Earth was flat. Education is not a
good reason to believe X without evidence.
.

User: ""
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	27 Dec 2006 01:58:02 PM

a_friend wrote:

zeenric2@gate.net wrote:

a_friend wrote:

zeenric2@gate.net wrote:

Have you been to the moon? How did you come to believe this?

How did I "come to beleive" exactly what?
If you reread my post more carefully, you may recognize that your
response reflects badly on your reading comprehension!
Zinnic

Hardly.
Your evidence, if you please. You have presented two polar claims and
no evidence for either.

Since you are not willing to reread my post let me make it easier for
you.
My post "Would it be reasonable or unreasonable for an uneducated
person to believe that the moon is too small to accomodate a large
spaceship?"
Note well, this is a question, not a presentation of two polar claims.

The first issue that George presented is whether evidence exists, then
the second is issue is in the absence of evidence, what is a good
reason to believe X.

I would appreciate evidence for either position -- the moon can or the

moon cannot accommodate...
Educated people once believed the Earth was flat. Education is not a
good reason to believe X without evidence.

My question to George was what constitutes a "good reason" for a person
who knows no better. I am not interested in discussing what you believe
it is to "know'.
Zinnic
.

User: "David Schwartz"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	27 Dec 2006 02:02:58 PM

George Dance wrote:

The problem is that "there is a god" is not a proposition. It only has
the form of a proposition. Another good example is "the last digit in
the decimal expansion of Pi is 7". These are not propositions, they
simply have their logical form.
DS
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	28 Dec 2006 02:30:42 AM

"David Schwartz" <davids@webmaster.com> wrote in message
news:1167249778.417035.37140@a3g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...

Your second formula certainly is a proposition, which is false. It is the
conjunct of the two propositions:
(a) The decimal expansion of Pi has a last digit, and
(b) The value of that digit is 7.
Since (a) is false, so is the conjunct.
You are correct, though, that the first formula ("there is a god") is not a
proposition. It is merely an existential quantifier (There exists an X). To
become a proposition, it must be predicated: (There exists an X such that
[statements]).
Of course, for most believers the formula ("There is a god") is merely a
shorthand for a complete proposition ("There is a being who created the
Universe and who is omnipotent, eternal, infinitely benificent . . .") When
so expanded, the proposition becomes at least somewhat susceptible to
evaluation.
.

User: "JoelKatz"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	28 Dec 2006 03:10:49 PM

Publius wrote:

"David Schwartz" <davids@webmaster.com> wrote in message
news:1167249778.417035.37140@a3g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...

No, I did not say, "the last digit in the decimal expansion of Pi
exists and has the value 7". That would be a conjunct. I said, "the
last digit in the decimal expansion of Pi is 7". The negation would be
"the last digit in the decimal expansion of Pi is not 7".
You *converted* my statement into a formal logical proposition because
it *looked* like one. That was error. Human beings do not exchange
formal logical propositions, at least, not normally.

You are correct, though, that the first formula ("there is a god") is not a
proposition. It is merely an existential quantifier (There exists an X). To
become a proposition, it must be predicated: (There exists an X such that
[statements]).

Of course, for most believers the formula ("There is a god") is merely a
shorthand for a complete proposition ("There is a being who created the
Universe and who is omnipotent, eternal, infinitely benificent . . .") When
so expanded, the proposition becomes at least somewhat susceptible to
evaluation.

No, I don't think so. I think you will encounter a fundamental problem.
If you don't include words like "omnipotent", you won't be talking
about god. And if you do include words like "omnipotent", you will have
something that is not a proposition. (Because the word is
incomprehensible.)
DS
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	28 Dec 2006 05:08:25 PM

"JoelKatz" <davids@webmaster.com> wrote in
news:1167340249.655455.105290@48g2000cwx.googlegroups.com:

No --- the negation would be, "It is not the case that the last digit in the
decimal expansion of Pi is 7." The negation thus is true if either of the
conjuncts is false.

You *converted* my statement into a formal logical proposition because
it *looked* like one. That was error. Human beings do not exchange
formal logical propositions, at least, not normally.

True --- it was a conversion to a form which renders the proposition coherent
and cognitive. The existence of the last digit is implied by assigning it a
value. The conversion thus makes explicit what was implicit.

Human beings do not exchange formal logical propositions, at least, not
normally.

Sure they do, all the time. They ask, "Did you mean . . . ?" And proceed to
suggest a less ambiguous or vague formulation.

Of course, for most believers the formula ("There is a god") is merely
a shorthand for a complete proposition ("There is a being who created
the Universe and who is omnipotent, eternal, infinitely benificent . .
.") When so expanded, the proposition becomes at least somewhat
susceptible to evaluation.

Sure you will have a proposition --- one that will (in all likelihood) be
false.
.

User: "JoelKatz"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	28 Dec 2006 06:41:32 PM

Publius wrote:

You *converted* my statement into a formal logical proposition because
it *looked* like one. That was error. Human beings do not exchange
formal logical propositions, at least, not normally.

Right. If you had to convert it into a proposition, it wasn't one
before. Similarly, "propositions" about god require such conversion.
The conversion *changes* the claim.

Human beings do not exchange formal logical propositions, at least, not
normally.

Sure they do, all the time. They ask, "Did you mean . . . ?" And proceed to
suggest a less ambiguous or vague formulation.

They don't. Hardly ever. Consider the following conversation:
Jack: Your wife is cheating on you.
John: You just stated a logical proposition that might or might not be
true.
Sound plausible? I don't think so. When Jack said, "your wife is
cheating on you", he is not stating a logical proposition, he is
*vouching* for a state of affairs (pardon the pun). (Making claims
about his own knowledge as well.)
Often humans make statements that have the same form as a formal
logical proposition might, so it's easy to think that they are a formal
logical proposition. But they only very rarely are.
It is error to assume that when a human says "God exists", he is
stating a logical proposition that one can label "P" and then
meaningfully talk about things like "P v ~P". His statement is not a
proposition in any formal logical system -- human statements *very*
rarely are of this type.

Sure you will have a proposition --- one that will (in all likelihood) be
false.

No, you will not have a proposition because it will contain words that
are incomprehensible. "All fqwvxs are mxylplic" has the form of a
proposition, but it is not one because it is incomprehensible.
DS
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	28 Dec 2006 08:35:36 PM

"JoelKatz" <davids@webmaster.com> wrote in message
news:1167352892.469809.97900@48g2000cwx.googlegroups.com...

True --- it was a conversion to a form which renders the proposition
coherent and cognitive. The existence of the last digit is implied by
assigning it a value. The conversion thus makes explicit what was
implicit.

Right. If you had to convert it into a proposition, it wasn't one
before. Similarly, "propositions" about god require such conversion.
The conversion *changes* the claim.

The conversion was not from a non-proposition to a proposition, but from an
ill-formed (hidden assumption) proposition to one that is well-formed. A
string of symbols is a proposition if it attaches a predicate to a subject,
or asserts a relation among *n* subjects. An ungrammatical sentence is still
a sentence. Were there no proposition asserted in your first example, we
wouldn't be able to do that conversion --- we wouldn't know where to start,
just as we couldn't correct the grammar of a sentence if we could not grasp
a string of sounds as a sentence.
That is why you are correct with the second example, "God exists." That is
not a proposition because nothing is predicated or related.

Sure they do, all the time. They ask, "Did you mean . . . ?" And
proceed to suggest a less ambiguous or vague formulation.

It is implausible because John is not responding to the substance of the
assertion, but commenting on its logical form. Since Jack's statement is
perfectly clear, John's comment is off-the-wall. We ask for logical
clarifications only when the original proposition is amibguous, vague, or
otherwise difficult to interpret.

Often humans make statements that have the same form as a formal
logical proposition might, so it's easy to think that they are a formal
logical proposition. But they only very rarely are.

If they have the same form as a *formal* logical proposition, then they are
one. A proposition is defined by its form, and nothing else.

It is error to assume that when a human says "God exists", he is
stating a logical proposition that one can label "P" and then
meaningfully talk about things like "P v ~P". His statement is not a
proposition in any formal logical system -- human statements *very*
rarely are of this type.

I agree with you in substance on that one. "God exists" is, in itself, not a
proposition, because nothing is asserted (nothing is predicated).

No, I don't think so. I think you will encounter a fundamental
problem. If you don't include words like "omnipotent", you won't be
talking about god. And if you do include words like "omnipotent", you
will have something that is not a proposition. (Because the word is
incomprehensible.)

Sure you will have a proposition --- one that will (in all likelihood)
be false.

No, you will not have a proposition because it will contain words that
are incomprehensible. "All fqwvxs are mxylplic" has the form of a
proposition, but it is not one because it is incomprehensible.

Bad parallel. "mxylplic" is incomprehensible; "omnipotent" and "infinite"
are not. They are both well-defined and function in other contexts
unproblematically. The problems arise when one begins to speak of (for
example) an "infinite being." A thing cannot be identified or recognized as
a *being* unless it can be distinguished from other things. But if it can be
so distinguished, it cannot be infinite, since it is not strictly identical
with those other things.
Propositions about God are not necessarily incomprehensible, but they are
often false, because they are self-contradictory. But even a
self-contradictory proposition is still a proposition.
.

User: "JoelKatz"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	29 Dec 2006 02:08:55 PM

Publius wrote:

"JoelKatz" <davids@webmaster.com> wrote in message
news:1167352892.469809.97900@48g2000cwx.googlegroups.com...

True --- it was a conversion to a form which renders the proposition
coherent and cognitive. The existence of the last digit is implied by
assigning it a value. The conversion thus makes explicit what was
implicit.

Right. If you had to convert it into a proposition, it wasn't one
before. Similarly, "propositions" about god require such conversion.
The conversion *changes* the claim.

The conversion was not from a non-proposition to a proposition, but from an
ill-formed (hidden assumption) proposition to one that is well-formed.

You may call it an "ill-formed proposition", but if that's what it is,
then it's *NOT* equivalent to one that is well-formed. You had to
*change* it. In other words, I said something that as not a well-formed
logical proposition and you changed it into something that it wasn't so
that you could analyze it using formal logic. This is *error*. What you
are analyzing is not what I said but something else, and the
justification that the something else is easier to analyze is
unacceptable.

A
string of symbols is a proposition if it attaches a predicate to a subject,
or asserts a relation among *n* subjects. An ungrammatical sentence is still
a sentence. Were there no proposition asserted in your first example, we
wouldn't be able to do that conversion --- we wouldn't know where to start,
just as we couldn't correct the grammar of a sentence if we could not grasp
a string of sounds as a sentence.

You hide all the important things in that little word "assert". When
human beings "assert propositions", they aren't just proposing them the
way you might in a class on formal logic. They are vouching for them
and making implicit claims about knowledge. You cannot ignore these
differences.

That is why you are correct with the second example, "God exists." That is
not a proposition because nothing is predicated or related.

And also because it is not part of a formal logical system.

Sure they do, all the time. They ask, "Did you mean . . . ?" And
proceed to suggest a less ambiguous or vague formulation.

They don't. Hardly ever. Consider the following conversation:

Jack: Your wife is cheating on you.

John: You just stated a logical proposition that might or might not be
true.
Sound plausible? I don't think so. When Jack said, "your wife is
cheating on you", he is not stating a logical proposition, he is
*vouching* for a state of affairs (pardon the pun). (Making claims
about his own knowledge as well.)

It is implausible because John is not responding to the substance of the
assertion, but commenting on its logical form.

Ahh, now you hide things in the word "assertion". What does it mean to
"assert" something? And is an "assertion" the same as a proposition?

Since Jack's statement is
perfectly clear, John's comment is off-the-wall. We ask for logical
clarifications only when the original proposition is amibguous, vague, or
otherwise difficult to interpret.

It's not whether Jack's statement is clear or not, it's what it is Jack
is saying. Even though his statement has the form of a pure logical
proposition, it is clear in context that Jack is not simply mentioning
a logical proposition. He is *vouching* for the *actual truth* (meaning
correspondence with reality, not any formal notion) of the
"proposition".

Often humans make statements that have the same form as a formal
logical proposition might, so it's easy to think that they are a formal
logical proposition. But they only very rarely are.

If they have the same form as a *formal* logical proposition, then they are
one. A proposition is defined by its form, and nothing else.

Fine, just don't think you can treat them as propositions and expect
them to follow the rules of formal logic. They are propositions only
because they have that form. They do not follow the rules of formal
logic propositions.
For example, if you call such a proposition "P", you cannot use formal
logic to show that either "P" or "~P" is true. Why? Because the rules
of formal logic only apply to propositions inside a system of formal
logic.
When humans talk, they very rarely exchange propositions inside a
system of formal logic. You can call them propositions if you want,
because of their form, but they don't mean the same thing.
For example, Jack's "your wife is cheating on you" has the form of a
proposition, but what John has ever right to assume Jack means is that
he has some evidence or reason to believe that Jack's wife is cheating
on him. You cannot express in any simple formal what such a statement
means.

No, I don't think so. I think you will encounter a fundamental
problem. If you don't include words like "omnipotent", you won't be
talking about god. And if you do include words like "omnipotent", you
will have something that is not a proposition. (Because the word is
incomprehensible.)

Sure you will have a proposition --- one that will (in all likelihood)
be false.

No, you will not have a proposition because it will contain words that
are incomprehensible. "All fqwvxs are mxylplic" has the form of a
proposition, but it is not one because it is incomprehensible.

Bad parallel. "mxylplic" is incomprehensible; "omnipotent" and "infinite"
are not. They are both well-defined and function in other contexts
unproblematically.

Really? Can an omnipotent being do the impossible? If so, then the
existence of an omnipotent being is itself impossible and we save
ourselves a lot of trouble. If not, then how is omnipotency different
from normal potency? (What is the difference between saying "I can't
turn invisible" and "it's impossible for me to become invisible.) The
term "omnipotent" is not well-defined, it's incomprehensible.

The problems arise when one begins to speak of (for
example) an "infinite being." A thing cannot be identified or recognized as
a *being* unless it can be distinguished from other things. But if it can be
so distinguished, it cannot be infinite, since it is not strictly identical
with those other things.

I agree. In fact, I am firmly convinced that the whole gist of the
concept "god" is that it is incomprehensible. Anything comprehensible
will be rejected as not being god. This means that "god exists" can
never be a well-formed proposition.

Propositions about God are not necessarily incomprehensible, but they are
often false, because they are self-contradictory. But even a
self-contradictory proposition is still a proposition.

I think they are necessarily incomprehensible. In any event, you can
call them propositions based on their form, but they do not (and do not
have to) follow the rules of some particular formal logical system.
DS
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	29 Dec 2006 10:28:40 PM

"JoelKatz" <davids@webmaster.com> wrote in
news:1167422935.869684.160920@h40g2000cwb.googlegroups.com:

The conversion was not from a non-proposition to a proposition, but
from an ill-formed (hidden assumption) proposition to one that is
well-formed.

It is not an "error" if the translation is acceptable to the speaker. If it
is not, then you can ask him to rephrase his utterance in such a way that
it becomes susceptible to evaluation. Are we trying to discern the
speaker's intent here, or gloat over his infelicity with words?

Well, of course. In a logic class, propositions are often *mentioned* for
purposes of analysis or example. In common discourse (and in most other
philosophy classes) they are *used* to assert states of affairs. But if
they are not well-formed they will not communicate what the speaker
probably wishes to communicate. Hence such questions as, "Did you mean that
.. . . ?"

Ahh, now you hide things in the word "assertion". What does it mean to
"assert" something? And is an "assertion" the same as a proposition?

Not quite. A proposition is a form of words or symbols having a certain
structure. One makes assertions --- communicates states of affairs ---
*using* propositions. Unless the propositions used conform reasonably well
with the structural rules, no communication occurs.

Of course. He is using a certain proposition (form of words) to communicate
what he believes to be a state of affairs.

For example, Jack's "your wife is cheating on you" has the form of a
proposition, but what John has ever right to assume Jack means is that
he has some evidence or reason to believe that Jack's wife is cheating
on him. You cannot express in any simple formal what such a statement
means.

Why not? Seems to me that Jack (the speaker) does that quite well. There is
nothing logically wrong with his utterance. Hence the hearer can set about,
without ado, to evaluate its truth.

Really? Can an omnipotent being do the impossible?

It could not do what is *logically* impossible. Omnipotence does not
require allowing contradictions. Normally, it means that the agent can
accomplish whatever it may wish to do (but not the logically impossible).

Not as such. But, as I said, it is usually a shorthand for a well-formed
(but often false) proposition.

They do if they are expected to communicate.
.

User: "JoelKatz"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	30 Dec 2006 01:19:25 PM

Publius wrote:

"JoelKatz" <davids@webmaster.com> wrote in
news:1167422935.869684.160920@h40g2000cwb.googlegroups.com:
It is not an "error" if the translation is acceptable to the speaker. If it
is not, then you can ask him to rephrase his utterance in such a way that
it becomes susceptible to evaluation. Are we trying to discern the
speaker's intent here, or gloat over his infelicity with words?

I don't accept this argument at all. Human beings do *not* assert
formal logical propositions and it's an error to try to force them to
do so. When Jack says, "your wife is cheating on you", his claim is
*not* identical to any formal logical proposition. He is *vouching* for
the truth of a claim, and there is nothing in formal logic even
remotely analogous to vouching.
You can get people to say something else that might be a logical
proposition. But then you are analyzing something *else*.

That is simply not true. When I say, "your wife is cheating on you",
only an idiot would respond with "did you mean ...". It's clear what I
meant. I'm making a complex claim about both truth and my knowledge of
it that *is* *not* in any way a formal logical proposition, even though
the words I chose to use have that form.
You can stamp you feet and insist that it must be or act like a
proposition in formal logic, but it is not and does not. Reason is not
a formal logic system.

Ahh, now you hide things in the word "assertion". What does it mean to
"assert" something? And is an "assertion" the same as a proposition?

You mean using words that have the form of propositions, but the actual
things communicated are *not* propositions. A proposition is a model of
an element of human reason, but it is not the actual element.

Of course. He is using a certain proposition (form of words) to communicate
what he believes to be a state of affairs.

He is using words that have a propositional form, but what he is
actually communicating has nothing to do with a proposition. Human
reason does not consist of propositions.

Why not?

Because reason is not formal logic. Period. Humans do not communicate
using formal logic. Period.

Seems to me that Jack (the speaker) does that quite well. There is
nothing logically wrong with his utterance. Hence the hearer can set about,
without ado, to evaluate its truth.

That would be the dumbest possible thing they could do, and I submit
that no rational human being would ever actually do that. To put it
simply, if Jack is simply mentioning a proposition, as you claim, what
possible reason would the listener have to investigate the truth of
that proposition that they didn't have before Jack mentioned the
proposition? The answer is *none*. But Jack is not mentioning the
proposition, he is *vouching* for its truth.
The statement "your wife is cheating on you" is an act of vouching for
the truth of a proposition. There is nothing analogous to vouching
(claiming knowledge of truth) in formal logic. The statement *is* a
vouching. There are no vouchings in formal logic. It's that simple.

Really? Can an omnipotent being do the impossible?

It does not mean anything for something to be "logically" impossible
outside a system of formal logic. Since the claims we are evaluating
are outside systems of formal logic, the concept of "logical
impossibility" is completely inapplicable.

Not as such. But, as I said, it is usually a shorthand for a well-formed
(but often false) proposition.

I have never ever seen it used as such, and I find your "usually" claim
to be completely incredible. On the contrary, someone who says "god
exists" is vouching, just as someone who says "your wife is cheating on
you" is.

They do if they are expected to communicate.

Quite the contrary, communication would be impossible if we tried to
communicate by exchanging propositions of formal logic. Formal logic is
almost devoid of meaning, and meaning is important.
DS
.

User: "Publius"
Title: Re: Non-belief: The reasonable default position	31 Dec 2006 12:53:37 AM

"JoelKatz" <davids@webmaster.com> wrote in message
news:1167506365.003838.263700@k21g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

It is not an "error" if the translation is acceptable to the speaker.
If it is not, then you can ask him to rephrase his utterance in such a
way that it becomes susceptible to evaluation. Are we trying to discern
the speaker's intent here, or gloat over his infelicity with words?

I'm afraid I'm having difficulty grasping the point you seem to be trying to
make. Jack's assertion is indeed not (strictly) identical with any
particular proposition. It is a communicative act on Jack's part, having an
intention and a purpose. The proposition --- a particular form of words or
symbols --- is the tool he uses to carry out that communicative act. Unless
he uses that tool in conformance with rules he shares with John, then the
communication will not succeed. His assertion is not strictly identical with
the rules of grammar, either --- but unless he constructs his utterance in
accordance with those rules, the communication will (again) not succeed.
You might wish to google for a classical book by JL Austin entitled, *How to
Do Things with Words*. Declarations (assertions) are one type of "speech
act." They are transfers of information, and may be true or false (not all
speech acts have truth values). Often, before a hearer acts on information
received via such a communication, he will wish to evaluate its truth.
Unless the proposition used to communicate the information was properly
formed, that evaluation may not be possible. The *tool* is not the *act*.
But the tool must be correctly deployed in order to accomplish the desired
act.

Well, of course. In a logic class, propositions are often *mentioned*
for purposes of analysis or example. In common discourse (and in most
other philosophy classes) they are *used* to assert states of affairs.
But if they are not well-formed they will not communicate what the
speaker probably wishes to communicate. Hence such questions as, "Did
you mean that . . . ?"

I didn't suggest the question, "Did you mean . . .?" would be asked of
Jack's utterance. Indeed, I said it would not be asked, because the
proposition Jack used to communicate his information was well-formed. In the
case of your original example involving the value of Pi, however, the
proposition was not well-formed, and so "Did you mean . . .?" might well be
asked. What John might ask in this case is, "What evidence leads you to that
belief?" Etc.

What is communicated is information. The proposition is the conveyance that
carries that information. Unless it is properly constructed, it will not
accomplish that task, just as a badly designed airplane will not convey its
passengers to their destinations.

He is using words that have a propositional form, but what he is
actually communicating has nothing to do with a proposition. Human
reason does not consist of propositions.

It does when it is effective. But of course, much of it what is offered as
human reason is not conducted via well-formed propositions. And as a result
it is ineffective.

Because reason is not formal logic. Period. Humans do not communicate
using formal logic. Period.

Only when they wish to be understood and/or taken seriously.

To put it
simply, if Jack is simply mentioning a proposition, as you claim, what
possible reason would the listener have to investigate the truth of
that proposition that they didn't have before Jack mentioned the
proposition?

I didn't say that Jack was merely mentioning a proposition. I said he was
*using* one. Please re-read.

The statement "your wife is cheating on you" is an act of vouching for
the truth of a proposition. There is nothing analogous to vouching
(claiming knowledge of truth) in formal logic. The statement *is* a
vouching. There are no vouchings in formal logic. It's that simple.

You are getting close there. Jack's declaration is a speech act. It is an
act accomplished by uttering a well-formed proposition. He is also vouching
for its truth. It is then up to John to evaluate the truth of that
proposition (perhaps by asking Jack to state his evidence, and then
independently verifying that evidence). But John cannot do those things if
Jack's claim is unclear, which it will be if the proposition he used was
badly formed.

All claims are subject to the rules of "formal logic" --- if they are
expected to be understood and taken seriously.

Quite the contrary, communication would be impossible if we tried to
communicate by exchanging propositions of formal logic. Formal logic is
almost devoid of meaning, and meaning is important.

Not sure what you mean by "exchanging propositions of formal logic." What we
do is transfer information via propositions, which must conform to certain
logical rules if one expects them to be understood.
.