| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"Bob" |
| Date: |
01 Oct 2005 10:01:16 AM |
| Object: |
Omniscience and Free Will |
According to Quantum Mechanics, the probability per unit time for
spontaneous emission to occur in the time interval t -> t+dt is a
constant out to second order in the electromagnetic field
perturbation. Heitler was one of the first to derive that result,
which is observed to great precision in such phenomena as certain
kinds of radioactive decay. The time distribution is first order
Poisson and the energy distribution is Lorentzian. These distributions
are related thru their Fourier transform. The Lorentzian distribution
is observed to great precision in the Mossbauer Effect, which provides
strong confirmation of the underlying theoretical foundations, namely
second order perturbation theory.
So let's accept the fact that the probability for a given atom to
decay spontaneously is a constant independent of time. The
implications of that are enormous. The most important implication is
that it is impossible to calculate when a particular atom will decay.
It is important to realize that the behavior of one atom is different
from the behavior of an ensemble of atoms. It is a mistake to claim
that because the ensemble obeys Poisson statistics, that the
individual atom does the same. An ensemble of atoms decays according
to the first order Poisson formula, which is a simple exponential in
time characterized by a time constant related to the "half life" of
the ensemble, which is the time for half the atoms in the ensemble to
decay.
It is incorrect to assume that an individual atom behaves in the same
way, namely that it exhibits a simple exponential behavior in terms of
its decay. The QM calculation says otherwise, namely that the
probabilty per unit time is a constant. Therefore the atom has an
equal probability per unit time to decay at *any* time - early,
intermediate or a long time.
The Universe is ruled by Quantum Mechanics. There has never been a
violation of QM - it is an absolutely correct fact of material
reality. Indeed it will be improved but never repealed. The
implication of this and the above facts leads us to postulate that
there are events in the Universe that are intrinsically unknowable.
The precise time when a particular atom will decay is one example.
Therefore, if there are event which possess aspects that are
intrinsically unknowable, then not even God can know them. And if God
cannot know them, and if man's behavior is governed by Quantum
Mechanics, as Penrose and others argue, then Free Will is
characterized by quantum unknowability.
You are faced with a decision which will be decided in a deterministic
manner just as radioactive decay is deterministic. The Schrodinger
Equation is deterministic because it uses Unitary operators. But
because of quantum uncertainty, neither you nor anyone else, including
God, knows ahead of time what your decision will be. Like the decay of
a specific radioactive atom, we will know when it will decay only when
it actually does decay and not an instant sooner.
Quantum Uncertainty modifies the theological meaning of Omniscience to
be consistent with Reality, namely God cannot be required to know
something in advance that has a uniform probability per unit time of
occurance. God cannot be required to make a rock so huge that He
cannot lift it. In both cases God would contradict Reality, which is
something we do not accept as possible if we are Realists.
Free Will is characterized by Quantum Uncertainty. Down to the last
instant before you make a decision, no one knows for certain what you
will choose. What you do choose is statistically determined by the
inputs to the decision, but as an individual you are not slavishly
subject to their demands, any more than a specific radioactive atom
must decay like an ensemble behaves.
.
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
01 Oct 2005 06:28:44 PM |
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"Bob" <spam@uce.gov> wrote in message
news:433e9fe6.1526156@news-server.houston.rr.com...
According to Quantum Mechanics, the probability per unit time for
spontaneous emission to occur in the time interval t -> t+dt is a
constant out to second order in the electromagnetic field
perturbation. Heitler was one of the first to derive that result,
which is observed to great precision in such phenomena as certain
kinds of radioactive decay. The time distribution is first order
Poisson and the energy distribution is Lorentzian. These distributions
are related thru their Fourier transform. The Lorentzian distribution
is observed to great precision in the Mossbauer Effect, which provides
strong confirmation of the underlying theoretical foundations, namely
second order perturbation theory.
SNIP...
Free Will is characterized by Quantum Uncertainty. Down to the last
instant before you make a decision, no one knows for certain what you
will choose. What you do choose is statistically determined by the
inputs to the decision, but as an individual you are not slavishly
subject to their demands, any more than a specific radioactive atom
must decay like an ensemble behaves.
More confirmation of the spiritual reality of "life".
One purpose for self realisation is to transend the group consciousness
'predictability'.
I am not made of atoms, atoms are made of me.
BOfL
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
07 Oct 2005 09:32:44 AM |
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The Universe is ruled by Quantum Mechanics.
Nix.
Quantum Mechanics is a mathematical model of the results of experiments
involving light and other wavicles. It doesn't describe 'The Universe'
- only the results of experiments involving light & other wavicles.
There has never been a violation of QM.
Nor an interpretation of it which is uncontroversial in some respect!
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
07 Oct 2005 11:08:30 AM |
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On 7 Oct 2005 07:32:44 -0700, "Sleepyhead" <simonharpham@usa.net>
wrote:
Quantum Mechanics is a mathematical model of the results of experiments
involving light and other wavicles.
It is a lot more than just a mathematical model. It is an ontological
statement of how the Universe behaves.
It doesn't describe 'The Universe'
- only the results of experiments involving light & other wavicles.
That is not orthodox QM.
There has never been a violation of QM.
Nor an interpretation of it which is uncontroversial in some respect!
Controversy is irrelevant.
There are a whole bunch of very serious physicsts who are using QM as
we speak who would come off as colossal fools if they were certain QM
works correctly.
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
14 Oct 2005 09:33:06 AM |
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It is a lot more than just a mathematical model. It is an ontological statement of how the Universe behaves.
Better tell that to John Gribbin and Richard Feynman then. Neither of
them believe(d) that QM said /anything/ about what atoms are like when
we're not looking at them. It's not a model of how the atom behaves -
it's a model of how the atom behaves during physics experiments.
And yes, Gribbin and Feynman both believe that the important thing in
physics are the mathematical equations - the other bits and bobs are
just there to help get one going with the maths - aide memoire - that
kind of thing. I happen to disagree with this viewpoint, for tedious
and complicated reasons that I can't be arsed to go into right now, but
it /is/ one that physicists hold for right or wrong. (cf.
http://www.rwc.uc.edu/koehler/biophys.2ed/intro.html ... "Physical
theories must be representable using mathematics; it is the basis of
their legitimacy.")
There has never been a violation of QM.
Nor an interpretation of it which is uncontroversial in some respect!
Controversy is irrelevant.
Again, nix. Controversy is relevant because if it's possible to
interpret QM in a number of logically consistent but incompatible ways
then you have to choose which interpretation you prefer and why.
There are a whole bunch of very serious physicsts who are using QM as we speak who would come off as colossal fools if they were certain QM works correctly.
There are? Who are they, and what are they investigating?
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
14 Oct 2005 10:22:24 AM |
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On 14 Oct 2005 07:33:06 -0700, "Sleepyhead" <simonharpham@usa.net>
wrote:
It is a lot more than just a mathematical model. It is an ontological statement of how the Universe behaves.
Better tell that to John Gribbin and Richard Feynman then. Neither of
them believe(d) that QM said /anything/ about what atoms are like when
we're not looking at them. It's not a model of how the atom behaves -
it's a model of how the atom behaves during physics experiments.
And yes, Gribbin and Feynman both believe that the important thing in
physics are the mathematical equations - the other bits and bobs are
just there to help get one going with the maths - aide memoire - that
kind of thing. I happen to disagree with this viewpoint, for tedious
and complicated reasons that I can't be arsed to go into right now, but
it /is/ one that physicists hold for right or wrong. (cf.
http://www.rwc.uc.edu/koehler/biophys.2ed/intro.html ... "Physical
theories must be representable using mathematics; it is the basis of
their legitimacy.")
I bet these two believed in the Copenhagen Interpretation too.
But let's drop the pretense of appeal to authority. I do not know what
these guys really believed, and neither do you. For the longest time
Bohr believed his own *****, until Einstein asked him if he really
believed the Moon would disappear when he stopped looking at it. That
comment caused Bohr to attempt a reformulation of his Copenhagen
Interpretation.
You can read about this in Authur Fine's book:
The Shaky Game: Einstein, Realism, and the Quantum Theory
by Arthur Fine
Paperback Reprint edition (October 1988)
University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226249476
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
17 Oct 2005 08:28:15 AM |
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I bet these two believed in the Copenhagen Interpretation too.
Can't vouch for Feynmann (haven't read anything by him), but Gribbin
doesn't, or at least he probably did, but then changed his mind. In the
first Shrodinger's book he reckons "Many-worlds" theory's the best bet,
but he'd changed his mind by 1996 to String theory.
As for knowing what they /really/ believed - I imagine they /really/
believed what they published, but that those beliefs were subject to
change over time. If you want to call one set of beliefs "What they
/really/ believed" that's up to you; personally I'd say my
description's more accurate (but then I would, wouldn't I?).
Einstein asked him if he really believed the Moon would disappear when he stopped looking at it ...
Interesting; I'll have to read that book out when I've got some spare
cash.
I don't think Einstein's observation is entirely to the point though.
The microscopic level of detail doesn't necessarily behave at all like
the macroscopic level. It's entirely possible little things should
behave weirdly. In fact - that's what the Copenhagen Interpretation's
all about - well if I've read-up correctly.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
17 Oct 2005 10:27:06 AM |
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On 17 Oct 2005 06:28:15 -0700, "Sleepyhead" <simonharpham@usa.net>
wrote:
In fact - that's what the Copenhagen Interpretation's
all about - well if I've read-up correctly.
Read some more - Copenhagen is dead, defunct, irrelevant.
Sixty years of group psychosis is laid to rest.
That's what happens when physicists who do not know any metaphysics
try to explain why QM behaves the way it does at the metaphysical
level.
Bohr latched onto the current theory in Europe which was called
Phenomenology. It has absolutely nothing to do with physics or
metaphysics - it is a psychology (Sartres claims it is a form of
psychoanalysis). Psychology relies on the Principle of the Vague
Theory to operate, and physics does not tolerate such nonsense.
Bohr starts off with the atomic world and concocts a theory of mind
(psychology) that interacts with the atomic world. He hides this with
weasel words like "measurement" and "observation". That, he claims,
allows him to quantize the mind. What a crock.
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| User: "Dianelos Georgoudis" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
18 Oct 2005 02:00:26 AM |
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Bob wrote:
On 17 Oct 2005 06:28:15 -0700, "Sleepyhead" <simonharpham@usa.net>
wrote:
In fact - that's what the Copenhagen Interpretation's
all about - well if I've read-up correctly.
Read some more - Copenhagen is dead, defunct, irrelevant.
As I have pointed out to you there is a recent paper by an MIT physics
professor that compares the Copenhagen and multiple worlds
interpretations. So it can't be quite true that "Copenhagen is dead,
defunct, irrelevant".
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
18 Oct 2005 09:02:24 AM |
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On 18 Oct 2005 00:00:26 -0700, "Dianelos Georgoudis"
<dianelos@tecapro.com> wrote:
Read some more - Copenhagen is dead, defunct, irrelevant.
As I have pointed out to you there is a recent paper by an MIT physics
professor that compares the Copenhagen and multiple worlds
interpretations. So it can't be quite true that "Copenhagen is dead,
defunct, irrelevant".
If you are going to base your claim on the writing of one academic,
than you do not belong in physics.
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
18 Oct 2005 02:55:23 PM |
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Interesting. Well I admit any opinions I hold about Quantum Mechanics
are based on:
a) A dreadful mathematical capacity (i.e. it's all got to be analogy or
I don't understand it. I'm working on this - teaching myself maths from
the ground up, but it's a long haul and although I think I understand
the philosophical side of QM and the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) I'm
far from clear on what mathematical constructs would drive you to the
conclusions that CI claims).
b) Reading material that's about 10 years out of date. Mainly on
account of me not understanding much about maths (see reason (a)).
So I'm quite prepared to reconsider my views on QM in the light of any,
perhaps less philosophically 'challenging', interpretations.
What's the latest thing in QM. Are strings still the big thing, or has
that gone out of the window in favour of other less exotic
interpretations?
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
19 Oct 2005 07:55:03 AM |
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On 18 Oct 2005 12:55:23 -0700, "Sleepyhead" <simonharpham@usa.net>
wrote:
What's the latest thing in QM. Are strings still the big thing, or has
that gone out of the window in favour of other less exotic
interpretations?
The Fabric of the Cosmos: Space, Time, and the Texture of Reality
by Brian Greene
Hardcover: 576 pages
Knopf; 1st edition (February 10, 2004)
ISBN: 0375412883
--
If you build a man a fire and he will be warm for a day. If you
set a man on fire, he will be warm for the rest of his life.
.
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
19 Oct 2005 09:21:59 AM |
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Thanks.
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| User: "Henri" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
20 Oct 2005 04:15:12 PM |
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Bob wrote:
According to Quantum Mechanics, the probability per unit time for
spontaneous emission to occur in the time interval t -> t+dt is a
constant out to second order in the electromagnetic field
perturbation. Heitler was one of the first to derive that result,
which is observed to great precision in such phenomena as certain
kinds of radioactive decay. The time distribution is first order
Poisson and the energy distribution is Lorentzian. These distributions
are related thru their Fourier transform. The Lorentzian distribution
is observed to great precision in the Mossbauer Effect, which provides
strong confirmation of the underlying theoretical foundations, namely
second order perturbation theory.
So let's accept the fact that the probability for a given atom to
decay spontaneously is a constant independent of time. The
implications of that are enormous. The most important implication is
that it is impossible to calculate when a particular atom will decay.
It is important to realize that the behavior of one atom is different
from the behavior of an ensemble of atoms. It is a mistake to claim
that because the ensemble obeys Poisson statistics, that the
individual atom does the same. An ensemble of atoms decays according
to the first order Poisson formula, which is a simple exponential in
time characterized by a time constant related to the "half life" of
the ensemble, which is the time for half the atoms in the ensemble to
decay.
It is incorrect to assume that an individual atom behaves in the same
way, namely that it exhibits a simple exponential behavior in terms of
its decay. The QM calculation says otherwise, namely that the
probabilty per unit time is a constant. Therefore the atom has an
equal probability per unit time to decay at *any* time - early,
intermediate or a long time.
The Universe is ruled by Quantum Mechanics.
I thought quantum physics applied to the infinitely tiny, to the world
of atoms and particles. That the laws that govern the behavior of bigger
bodies, from stones to planets, were not the same as those of quantum
physics. I thought physicist were hard at work on a "unified" theory,
one that would reconciliate the "regular" physics and quantum physics.
There has never been a
violation of QM - it is an absolutely correct fact of material
reality. Indeed it will be improved but never repealed. The
implication of this and the above facts leads us to postulate that
there are events in the Universe that are intrinsically unknowable.
The precise time when a particular atom will decay is one example.
Therefore, if there are event which possess aspects that are
intrinsically unknowable, then not even God can know them. And if God
cannot know them, and if man's behavior is governed by Quantum
Mechanics, as Penrose and others argue, then Free Will is
characterized by quantum unknowability.
But quantum physics deals with matter, does it? Free will is not about
matter, but about mind. Don't you think so?
You are faced with a decision which will be decided in a deterministic
manner just as radioactive decay is deterministic. The Schrodinger
Equation is deterministic because it uses Unitary operators. But
because of quantum uncertainty, neither you nor anyone else, including
God, knows ahead of time what your decision will be. Like the decay of
a specific radioactive atom, we will know when it will decay only when
it actually does decay and not an instant sooner.
Quantum Uncertainty modifies the theological meaning of Omniscience to
be consistent with Reality, namely God cannot be required to know
something in advance that has a uniform probability per unit time of
occurance. God cannot be required to make a rock so huge that He
cannot lift it. In both cases God would contradict Reality, which is
something we do not accept as possible if we are Realists.
Free Will is characterized by Quantum Uncertainty. Down to the last
instant before you make a decision, no one knows for certain what you
will choose. What you do choose is statistically determined by the
inputs to the decision, but as an individual you are not slavishly
subject to their demands, any more than a specific radioactive atom
must decay like an ensemble behaves.
--
The Dude once said,
"Yeah, well, you know, that's just, like, your opinion, man."
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
21 Oct 2005 07:38:40 AM |
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On Thu, 20 Oct 2005 23:15:12 +0200, Henri <hank@be.free.fr> wrote:
I thought quantum physics applied to the infinitely tiny, to the world
of atoms and particles. That the laws that govern the behavior of bigger
bodies, from stones to planets, were not the same as those of quantum
physics. I thought physicist were hard at work on a "unified" theory,
one that would reconciliate the "regular" physics and quantum physics.
You think wrong.
There are bulk quantum effects in macroscopic objects, such as the
Mossbauer Effect, Quantum Hall Effect, etc.. In fact most
semiconductor effects depend on quantum mechanics (eg. Fermi Surface,
Brillouin Zone band gap, transport properties, et al) and yet the
samples are macroscopic.
It would help if you actually spent the time studying quantum
mechanics rather than wasting it on posts like this.
--
If you build a man a fire and he will be warm for a day. If you
set a man on fire, he will be warm for the rest of his life.
.
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
21 Oct 2005 10:44:50 AM |
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... that the laws that govern the behavior of bigger bodies, from stones to planets, were not the same as those of quantum physics.
You think wrong.
So gravitational distortions can be described using QM?
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
21 Oct 2005 12:07:02 PM |
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On 21 Oct 2005 08:44:50 -0700, "Sleepyhead" <simonharpham@usa.net>
wrote:
... that the laws that govern the behavior of bigger bodies, from stones to planets, were not the same as those of quantum physics.
You think wrong.
So gravitational distortions can be described using QM?
We both know that there is no theory of quantum gravity. So what's
your point?
--
If you build a man a fire and he will be warm for a day. If you
set a man on fire, he will be warm for the rest of his life.
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
01 Oct 2005 10:46:27 AM |
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Bob wrote:
According to Quantum Mechanics, the probability per unit time for
spontaneous emission to occur in the time interval t -> t+dt is a
constant out to second order in the electromagnetic field
perturbation. Heitler was one of the first to derive that result,
which is observed to great precision in such phenomena as certain
kinds of radioactive decay. The time distribution is first order
Poisson and the energy distribution is Lorentzian. These distributions
are related thru their Fourier transform. The Lorentzian distribution
is observed to great precision in the Mossbauer Effect, which provides
strong confirmation of the underlying theoretical foundations, namely
second order perturbation theory.
So let's accept the fact that the probability for a given atom to
decay spontaneously is a constant independent of time. The
implications of that are enormous. The most important implication is
that it is impossible to calculate when a particular atom will decay.
It is important to realize that the behavior of one atom is different
from the behavior of an ensemble of atoms. It is a mistake to claim
that because the ensemble obeys Poisson statistics, that the
individual atom does the same. An ensemble of atoms decays according
to the first order Poisson formula, which is a simple exponential in
time characterized by a time constant related to the "half life" of
the ensemble, which is the time for half the atoms in the ensemble to
decay.
It is incorrect to assume that an individual atom behaves in the same
way, namely that it exhibits a simple exponential behavior in terms of
its decay. The QM calculation says otherwise, namely that the
probabilty per unit time is a constant. Therefore the atom has an
equal probability per unit time to decay at *any* time - early,
intermediate or a long time.
The Universe is ruled by Quantum Mechanics. There has never been a
violation of QM - it is an absolutely correct fact of material
reality. Indeed it will be improved but never repealed. The
implication of this and the above facts leads us to postulate that
there are events in the Universe that are intrinsically unknowable.
The precise time when a particular atom will decay is one example.
Therefore, if there are event which possess aspects that are
intrinsically unknowable, then not even God can know them. And if God
cannot know them, and if man's behavior is governed by Quantum
Mechanics, as Penrose and others argue, then Free Will is
characterized by quantum unknowability.
You are faced with a decision which will be decided in a deterministic
manner just as radioactive decay is deterministic. The Schrodinger
Equation is deterministic because it uses Unitary operators. But
because of quantum uncertainty, neither you nor anyone else, including
God, knows ahead of time what your decision will be. Like the decay of
a specific radioactive atom, we will know when it will decay only when
it actually does decay and not an instant sooner.
Quantum Uncertainty modifies the theological meaning of Omniscience to
be consistent with Reality, namely God cannot be required to know
something in advance that has a uniform probability per unit time of
occurance. God cannot be required to make a rock so huge that He
cannot lift it. In both cases God would contradict Reality, which is
something we do not accept as possible if we are Realists.
Free Will is characterized by Quantum Uncertainty. Down to the last
instant before you make a decision, no one knows for certain what you
will choose. What you do choose is statistically determined by the
inputs to the decision, but as an individual you are not slavishly
subject to their demands, any more than a specific radioactive atom
must decay like an ensemble behaves.
If a God/gods exists and had omnipotence, all powers to do anything
logically consistent that is, and non-contradictory, of course it could
create a rock to hard for it to lift, duh.
Are you claiming that these truely random events are not the "cause" (?)
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 11:30:07 AM |
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Immortalist wrote:
If a God/gods exists and had omnipotence, all powers to do anything
logically consistent that is, and non-contradictory, of course it could
create a rock to hard for it to lift, duh.
Most theologians grant consent to the insight that the definition of
the concept of divine omnipotence has to be qualified as follows:
"x is omnipotent" =def "x can do everything that is logically possible
and compatible with x's essence"
That is, there are logically possible actions which cannot be performed
by God.
For example, committing suicide is surely a logically possible action,
but since God is necessarily existent, he cannot cease to exist and so
cannot put an end to his existence.
And since God is essentially infinitely strong (in the physical sense),
any stone he creates must be liftable for him (by sheer supernatural
willpower of course, since God has no physical body). But this
circumstance doesn't diminish his omnipotence, for there is no
incoherence in stating that God is omnipotent in spite of there being
some logically possible actions which are unperformable for him due to
the pecularities of his essence.
Regards
PH
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| User: "Bert Clanton" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 12:25:08 PM |
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In article <1128357007.370577.134870@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com>,
"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
Immortalist wrote:
If a God/gods exists and had omnipotence, all powers to do anything
logically consistent that is, and non-contradictory, of course it could
create a rock to hard for it to lift, duh.
Most theologians grant consent to the insight that the definition of
the concept of divine omnipotence has to be qualified as follows:
"x is omnipotent" =def "x can do everything that is logically possible
and compatible with x's essence"
That is, there are logically possible actions which cannot be performed
by God.
For example, committing suicide is surely a logically possible action,
but since God is necessarily existent, he cannot cease to exist and so
cannot put an end to his existence.
And since God is essentially infinitely strong (in the physical sense),
any stone he creates must be liftable for him (by sheer supernatural
willpower of course, since God has no physical body). But this
circumstance doesn't diminish his omnipotence, for there is no
incoherence in stating that God is omnipotent in spite of there being
some logically possible actions which are unperformable for him due to
the pecularities of his essence.
Regards
PH
To me the difficulty with supposing that God is omnipotent *and* that I
have free will has nothing to do with causality. It has to do only with
the *logical* fact that if you assert that God correctly knows what I
will decide in the future, but that I can truly decide any way I choose,
you have contradicted yourself, and therefore uttered a falsehood.
If God knows, from all eternity, that I will get up on the right-hand
side of my bed at 8:31 am on October 27, 2005, then in what sense am I
free to choose to get up on the *left-hand* side of my bed at that date
and time? My answer: if whatever God knows is true, and God knows which
side of the bed I'll get up on at that date and time, then I *can't*
choose to act differently--not for any reason involving causality, but
simply because of the conventional meaning of the terms "omniscient" and
"free will". I can't truthfully propose that both apply. The
conventional meaning of "omniscient" includes "true knowledge of what
I'll do in the future" and the conventional meaning of the term "free
will" involves "being able, without constraint, to choose what I do". I
suggest that both of the given propositions can't jointly be true.
Interestingly enough: omniscience isn't required to demonstrate the
contradiction. Truthful precognitive ability is sufficient.
Best wishes,
Bert
--
"Without faith we might relapse into scientific or rational thinking,
which leads by a slippery slope toward constitutional democracy."
- Robert Anton Wilson
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 12:58:51 PM |
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Bert Clanton wrote:
"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
Most theologians grant consent to the insight that the definition of
the concept of divine omnipotence has to be qualified as follows:
"x is omnipotent" =def "x can do everything that is logically possible
and compatible with x's essence"
That is, there are logically possible actions which cannot be performed
by God.
For example, committing suicide is surely a logically possible action,
but since God is necessarily existent, he cannot cease to exist and so
cannot put an end to his existence.
And since God is essentially infinitely strong (in the physical sense),
any stone he creates must be liftable for him (by sheer supernatural
willpower of course, since God has no physical body). But this
circumstance doesn't diminish his omnipotence, for there is no
incoherence in stating that God is omnipotent in spite of there being
some logically possible actions which are unperformable for him due to
the pecularities of his essence.
To me the difficulty with supposing that God is omnipotent *and* that I
have free will has nothing to do with causality. It has to do only with
the *logical* fact that if you assert that God correctly knows what I
will decide in the future, but that I can truly decide any way I choose,
you have contradicted yourself, and therefore uttered a falsehood.
If God knows, from all eternity, that I will get up on the right-hand
side of my bed at 8:31 am on October 27, 2005, then in what sense am I
free to choose to get up on the *left-hand* side of my bed at that date
and time? My answer: if whatever God knows is true, and God knows which
side of the bed I'll get up on at that date and time, then I *can't*
choose to act differently--not for any reason involving causality, but
simply because of the conventional meaning of the terms "omniscient" and
"free will". I can't truthfully propose that both apply.
There indeed arises an intricate theological problem, of which the
theologians have been aware for a very long time (see:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge). But I think
it is doubtful whether any of the proposed solutions is fully
satisfactory.
One of the very few alleged solutions that has a certain plausibility
to it and seems at least consistent is the following one:
If God can infallibly know only those propositions which already now
possess a truth-value, and future contingents such as "Bert Clanton
gets up on the right-hand side of his bed at 8:31 am on October 27,
2005" do not yet possess any truth-value, then God cannot know them in
advance for logical reasons, and, thus, cannot be declared
non-omniscient for not knowing their truth-value--for there is none.
So God can be omniscient and we can possess free will.
Of course, this view entails a particular philosophy of time, which may
be rejected.
Regards
PH
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| User: "Bert Clanton" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 01:24:16 PM |
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In article <1128362331.602156.144340@g47g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>,
"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
One of the very few alleged solutions that has a certain plausibility
to it and seems at least consistent is the following one:
If God can infallibly know only those propositions which already now
possess a truth-value, and future contingents such as "Bert Clanton
gets up on the right-hand side of his bed at 8:31 am on October 27,
2005" do not yet possess any truth-value, then God cannot know them in
advance for logical reasons, and, thus, cannot be declared
non-omniscient for not knowing their truth-value--for there is none.
So God can be omniscient and we can possess free will.
Of course, this view entails a particular philosophy of time, which may
be rejected.
Regards
PH
I'd reject this solution simply because it seems to re-define
"omniscient" in a way that doesn't accord with conventional usage, and
IMHO it does this *in order to* make it "verbally OK" to hold the usual
Christian theological view. If so, that seems to me like "dirty pool".
Best wishes,
Bert
--
"Without faith we might relapse into scientific or rational thinking,
which leads by a slippery slope toward constitutional democracy."
- Robert Anton Wilson
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 02:16:49 PM |
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Bert Clanton wrote:
"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
One of the very few alleged solutions that has a certain plausibility
to it and seems at least consistent is the following one:
If God can infallibly know only those propositions which already now
possess a truth-value, and future contingents such as "Bert Clanton
gets up on the right-hand side of his bed at 8:31 am on October 27,
2005" do not yet possess any truth-value, then God cannot know them in
advance for logical reasons, and, thus, cannot be declared
non-omniscient for not knowing their truth-value--for there is none.
So God can be omniscient and we can possess free will.
Of course, this view entails a particular philosophy of time, which may
be rejected.
I'd reject this solution simply because it seems to re-define
"omniscient" in a way that doesn't accord with conventional usage, and
IMHO it does this *in order to* make it "verbally OK" to hold the usual
Christian theological view. If so, that seems to me like "dirty pool".
"At the present time, there is no consensus among Christian or theistic
philosophers, or among theologians, concerning which is the best
response to the argument from foreknowledge (or divine forebelief) to
the nonexistence of free will. [...] More than a thousand years of
discussion have not managed to settle the issue. But in just the last
few years, we have succeeded in attaining new levels of clarity
concerning what exactly the problem is, what the alternative responses
to it might be, and where both their strengths and weaknesses lie."
[Morris, Th. V. (1991). /Our idea of God: An introduction to
philosophical theology/: Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press. (p. 102)]
See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge
Regards
PH
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 03:19:08 PM |
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On Mon, 03 Oct 2005 11:24:16 -0700, Bert Clanton
<eubiotist@starstream.net> wrote:
I'd reject this solution simply because it seems to re-define
"omniscient" in a way that doesn't accord with conventional usage,
If defines omniscience for the real objective world. The definition
you are referring to belongs to the subjective world of the mind.
The real objective world imposes restrictions on Being, one of which
is that contradictions are not allowed. If that truly bothers you,
then I suppose you could indulge the fantasies of the subjective world
where contradiction is allowed.
My Free Will is based in the Quantum Mechanical nature of the real
objective world. The laws of Physics arise because of the restrictions
placed on this real objective world, such as the requirement for
consistency and causality. Remove those restrictions and all Order
disappears - and so does everything that is physical.
In order for there to be a real objective world at all, the principles
of consistency and causality must be imposed. They are what create
Order. Without them, anything goes and that means complete randomness
in everything, in which case a real objective ordered world is not
possible.
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| User: "Bert Clanton" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 08:43:10 PM |
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In article <434190e6.17051406@news-server.houston.rr.com>,
(Bob) wrote:
On Mon, 03 Oct 2005 11:24:16 -0700, Bert Clanton
<eubiotist@starstream.net> wrote:
I'd reject this solution simply because it seems to re-define
"omniscient" in a way that doesn't accord with conventional usage,
[It] defines omniscience for the real objective world. The definition
you are referring to belongs to the subjective world of the mind.
The real objective world imposes restrictions on Being, one of which
is that contradictions are not allowed. If that truly bothers you,
then I suppose you could indulge the fantasies of the subjective world
where contradiction is allowed.
That doesn't bother me at all. I completely agree with it.
Contradictions don't occur in the real objective world. Hence any
proposition that asserts a contradiction is not true of the real
objective world. But the proposition that God is omniscient *and* I have
free will is such a contradictory proposition. Hence it is false as
applied to the real objective world.
My Free Will is based in the Quantum Mechanical nature of the real
objective world. The laws of Physics arise because of the restrictions
placed on this real objective world, such as the requirement for
consistency and causality. Remove those restrictions and all Order
disappears - and so does everything that is physical.
Okay.
In order for there to be a real objective world at all, the principles
of consistency and causality must be imposed. They are what create
Order. Without them, anything goes and that means complete randomness
in everything, in which case a real objective ordered world is not
possible.
Okay. But what's the relevance of all this to my simple argument?
Best wishes,
Bert
--
"Without faith we might relapse into scientific or rational thinking,
which leads by a slippery slope toward constitutional democracy."
- Robert Anton Wilson
.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
04 Oct 2005 06:22:28 AM |
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On Mon, 03 Oct 2005 18:43:10 -0700, Bert Clanton
<eubiotist@starstream.net> wrote:
the proposition that God is omniscient *and* I have
free will is such a contradictory proposition. Hence it is false as
applied to the real objective world.
I do not know what your meaning of "omniscient" is. If it is the
conventional theological definition, then I agree with your
conclusion.
But if omniscience is limited to knowing everything that is knowable
and not knowing things that are intrinsically unknowable, then I do
not see any contradiction between that kind of omniscience and free
will.
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 03:13:03 PM |
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On 3 Oct 2005 10:58:51 -0700, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
If God can infallibly know only those propositions which already now
possess a truth-value, and future contingents such as "Bert Clanton
gets up on the right-hand side of his bed at 8:31 am on October 27,
2005" do not yet possess any truth-value, then God cannot know them in
advance for logical reasons, and, thus, cannot be declared
non-omniscient for not knowing their truth-value--for there is none.
So God can be omniscient and we can possess free will.
That is essentially what Quantum Mechanics is telling us about the
real objective world.
Of course, this view entails a particular philosophy of time, which may
be rejected.
How can time be rejected when it is part of the real objective world
described by physics?
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
03 Oct 2005 10:13:32 PM |
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Bob wrote:
"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
If God can infallibly know only those propositions which already now
possess a truth-value, and future contingents such as "Bert Clanton
gets up on the right-hand side of his bed at 8:31 am on October 27,
2005" do not yet possess any truth-value, then God cannot know them in
advance for logical reasons, and, thus, cannot be declared
non-omniscient for not knowing their truth-value--for there is none.
So God can be omniscient and we can possess free will.
That is essentially what Quantum Mechanics is telling us about the
real objective world.
But it's a long way from quantum indeterminacy or randomness on the
atomic or subatomic level to free will on the level of highly complex
neurobiological systems like us.
"To say that free will is at least possible if there is a quantum
mechanical explanation of consciousness is not to say that this is
actually how it works or even that this is how it could work. It is
only to say that, as far as we know, the only established
nondeterministic element in nature is the quantum level, and if we are
to suppose that consciousness is nondeterministic, that the gap is not
only psychologically real but neurobiologically real, then, given the
present state of physics and neurobiology, we have to suppose that
there is a quantum mechanical component in the explanation of
consciousness. I see no way to avoid this conclusion. Of course, the
hypothesis that the random indeterminacy at the quantum level leads to
an indeterminacy of a nonrandom kind at the conscious intentionalistic
level, seems very unlikely and implausible."
[Searle, John (2004). /Mind: A brief introduction/. New York: Oxford
University Press. (p. 232)]
Of course, this view entails a particular philosophy of time, which may
be rejected.
How can time be rejected when it is part of the real objective world
described by physics?
I wasn't talking about the possibility of rejecting time itself, but of
rejecting a particular philosophy of time, namely, the one commonly
called "presentism".
The predominant theory of time in physics is relativistic, which
circumstance virtually inevitably leads to the following conclusion as
e.g. drawn by Hilary Putnam in his famous paper "Time and Physical
Geometry" (1967):
"I showed that contingent statements about future events already have a
truth-value. In consequence, the 'tenseless' notion of existence (i.e.
the notion that amounts to 'will exist, or has existed, or exists right
now') is perfectly well-defined. This is fortunate, since the upshot of
the first part of the paper could also have been stated by saying that
the notion of being 'real' turns out to be coextensive with the
tenseless notion of existence. I conclude that the problem of the
reality and the determinateness of future events is now solved."
So, if future contingents in fact already do have a truth-value "now",
then God must be able to know their respective truth-values, which
would again mean that unpredestined free will is an illusion.
Regards
PH
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
04 Oct 2005 06:17:57 AM |
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On 3 Oct 2005 20:13:32 -0700, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
That is essentially what Quantum Mechanics is telling us about the
real objective world.
But it's a long way from quantum indeterminacy or randomness on the
atomic or subatomic level to free will on the level of highly complex
neurobiological systems like us.
Not if you accept the proposition that the brain is a quantum device,
as Roger Penrose and others argue.
[Searle, John (2004). /Mind: A brief introduction/. New York: Oxford
University Press. (p. 232)]
Sorry, but I consider Searle to be one of the psychology hacks. Like
Kant and others of his ilk, their collected works are not worth the
powder to blow them to hell.
The probkem with these junk scientists is they are not real
scientists. Psychology suffers from the problem of vague theories,
whereby you can concoct theories so vague that they will explain
anything, including contradictory phenomena.
Their work is of no use to a physicist, who works in the real
objective world.
So, if future contingents in fact already do have a truth-value "now",
then God must be able to know their respective truth-values, which
would again mean that unpredestined free will is an illusion.
I remind you that no one has satisfactorily integrated relativity and
quantum mechanics fully. There are some profound problems, and the one
you describe is a perfect example.
Let's consider our radioactive decay example. According to QM, the
probability per unit time for any atom to decay is a constant
independent of time. But according to relativity, the decay of a
particular atom is a space-time event, embedded in the space-time
continuum as a single point. That means that the event is not
probabilistic but actual - that is, the time when a particular atom
will decay is fixed even before the decay.
ET Jaynes offers his insight into the apparent
epistemological-ontological dilemna, but he died before he could
complete his work so we will never know from him where he was going
with his notions.
I am a true believer in Quantum Mechanics, and if there are any
dilemnas posed by other theories then it is they that need to be
fixed, not QM. So I reject the proposition posed by the cite you
presented. I never liked the space-time continuum picture anyway. It
generates far too many problems. But since I have no way to replace
it, it has to be considered the dominant theory in terms of the
structure of space and time.
However, I remind you of Einstein's thoughts on this matter:
"Space and time are modes by which we think, not conditions under
which we live."
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| User: "Paul Holbach" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
04 Oct 2005 01:05:25 PM |
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Bob wrote:
"Paul Holbach" <paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
But it's a long way from quantum indeterminacy or randomness on the
atomic or subatomic level to free will on the level of highly complex
neurobiological systems like us.
Not if you accept the proposition that the brain is a quantum device,
as Roger Penrose and others argue.
But Penrose's view has attracted substantial criticism, seeming rather
problematic.
For example, the physicist Max Tegmark, states:
"Based on a calculation of neural decoherence rates, we argue that that
the degrees of freedom of the human brain that relate to cognitive
processes should be thought of as a classical rather than quantum
system, ie, that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the current
classical approach to neural network simulations. We find that the
decoherence timescales ~10^{-13}-10^{-20} seconds are typically much
shorter than the relevant dynamical timescales (~0.001-0.1 seconds),
both for regular neuron firing and for kink-like polarization
excitations in microtubules. This conclusion disagrees with suggestions
by Penrose and others that the brain acts as a quantum computer. Our
result is also difficult to reconcile with the Stapp model where
thought processes correspond to top-level multi-neuron quantum events."
[Source: http://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/brain.html]
[... quote ...]
[Searle, John (2004). /Mind: A brief introduction/. New York: Oxford
University Press. (p. 232)]
Sorry, but I consider Searle to be one of the psychology hacks. Like
Kant and others of his ilk, their collected works are not worth the
powder to blow them to hell.
You can't be really serious here!
The problem with these junk scientists is they are not real
scientists.
You don't happen to be in favour of reductionist physicalism, do you?!
Psychology suffers from the problem of vague theories,
whereby you can concoct theories so vague that they will explain
anything, including contradictory phenomena.
Don't you think this wholesale objection to psychology is a bit
oversimple?!
Their work is of no use to a physicist, who works in the real
objective world.
In what world do you think the psychologists work ...?
I suspect your basic mistake is to suppose that everything real is
ontically objective, such that everything that is not ontically
objective must be unreal. But that's not true because the real world
contains real phenomena which are ontically subjective, i.e. exist only
insofar as they are experienced by a conscious 'self' (which needn't be
thought of as a Cartesian substance). The entire realm of consciousness
is ontically subjective. Therein being is being experienced. But that
does in no way mean that the phenomenal contents of the field of
consciousness are not real natural parts of Nature, for there can very
well be epistemically objective facts concerning the ontically
subjective, as Searle has expounded convincingly.
However, I remind you of Einstein's thoughts on this matter:
"Space and time are modes by which we think, not conditions under
which we live."
"Although the issue is still debated, [...], the most straightforward
reading of Einstein and his general relativity is that spacetime can
provide [the ultimate reference for motion]: spacetime is a something.
[Note:] The mathematically inclined reader might find it enlightening
to learn that Einstein believed that spacetime had no existence
independent of its metric (the mathematical device that gives distance
relations in spacetime), so that if one were to remove
everything--including the metric--spacetime would not be a something.
By 'spacetime' I always mean a manifold together with a metric that
solves the Einstein equations, and so the conclusion we've reached, in
mathematical language, is that metrical spacetime is a something."
[Greene, Brian (2004). /The fabric of the cosmos: Space, time, and the
texture of reality/. London: Penguin. (pp. 75+499)]
Regards
PH
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| User: "Bob" |
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| Title: Re: Omniscience and Free Will |
04 Oct 2005 02:45:44 PM |
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On 4 Oct 2005 11:05:25 -0700, "Paul Holbach"
<paulholbachDELETETHENAME@freenet.de> wrote:
But Penrose's view has attracted substantial criticism, seeming rather
problematic.
Yes, they are. But so were Einstein's and Planck's ideas.
For example, the physicist Max Tegmark, states:
"Based on a calculation of neural decoherence rates, we argue that that
the degrees of freedom of the human brain that relate to cognitive
processes should be thought of as a classical rather than quantum
system,
Academic pontification.
Sorry, but I consider Searle to be one of the psychology hacks. Like
Kant and others of his ilk, their collected works are not worth the
powder to blow them to hell.
You can't be really serious here!
I am very serious here. I have no use for psychologists pretending to
be philosophers.
Don't you think this wholesale objection to psychology is a bit
oversimple?!
It is not oversimple when it comes to psychologists pretending to be
philosophers. I accept psychology for what it is, and it is not a
science by any stretch of the imagination. It is based on vague
theories many of which lead to contradictory results.
Richard Feynman gave an example in his Feynman lectures:
"The police caught a teenager breaking into someone house and they
could not figure out why he did it, so they asked a psychologist to
figure it out. After a brief interview she told the police that the
explanation was obvious - this teenager was deprived of material goods
all his life because he lived in poverty. The police later discovered
that the teenager actually came from a wealthy family, so when they
confronted the psychologist she said that obviously the reason for his
behavior is that he was pampered all his life."
Feynman called it the Principle of the Vague Theory. In the
non-sciences practitioners can concoct any theory they want and the
more vague it is the better it is at explaining anything, including
contradictory opposites. Psychology is overflowing with vague
theories, and all together they are not worth the powder to blow them
all to Hell.
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