Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism

Science > Philosophy > Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism

LINK TO THIS PAGE

rating : 0 | 0

Page 1 of 1

Topic:	Science > Philosophy
User:	"Chris Thomson"
Date:	14 Nov 2004 07:24:28 PM
Object:	Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism

It's a century and a half since Darwin published The Origin of
Species, and while the sciences have adapted quite well, it seems that
philosophically, a lot of people still go over the same problems,
trudging through the same tired arguments, ignoring the insight that
darwinism can offer us on some of the most important issues in
philosophy.
For example, two of the most persistent problems, Free Will vs
Determinism, and the Is/Ought problem, are fundamentally reframed by a
darwinist view of the human mind:
- Free Will vs Determinism:
The notion of causality and the notion of possibility are both
concepts that are found species-wide, and have obvious survival
benefits. The idea of causality allows us to abstract natural laws,
rules and social patterns from observation. Without these rules and
trends in our world-view, prediction would be impossible, and the
human would have no ability to form the plans we use to survive and
look after our offspring. Vital also to these plans is the ability to
construct, in your imagination, a future that hasn't happened, and
feel one way or the other about how desirable and likely it is.
Why should there be a conflict, when each way of thinking is just a
practical survival tool, and no practical survival tool can be useful
when taken to its absolute extreme, to the complete dismissal of all
others. Free will is true and useful as far as the fact that we can't
help believe in these possibilities our mind creates, and further that
it is good for our existence that we do so. This doesn't mean we have
to think of possible worlds as real physical worlds, or as independant
abstract entities that have some kind of reality outside of the mind.
We make them, we use them, we believe in them.
Looking at human decision making as completely deterministic (or as
far as quantum mechanics are ontologically random rather than just
epistemologically random; then looking at human decision making as
probablistic, but still subejct to the physical laws of nature that
are beyond our immediate control), can be useful as well, in order to
recognise patterns in how people behave and come up with theories as
to why. There is no reason this should over-ride ones concept of
freedom and choice, as long as both models are seen within their
limited pragmatic context.
Each solves a different problem: Causality is vital for creating
theories, Possibility is necessary for using them. At their most
basic, neither concept is is derived from observation, we're
hard-wired to make them, we're stuck with them, and they're mighty
useful, so what's the problem? Use whichever is appropriate at the
time.
- The Is/Ought Problem:
I can only imagine it's discomfort that stops much of the philosphical
world from acknowledging and openly embracing the fact that darwinism
provides an explanation our basic moral premises. Namely: instinct.
Sure, if the idea is new, then a few obvious problems arise, those of
art, suicide, altruism, and other things that, on the surface, seem to
have no basis in survival-behaviour. But these problems tend to
crumble under further inspection, and are often just the result of a
poor understanding of how the evolutionary process works. A lot of
arguments against the darwinist origins of our moral premises, seem to
use these problems as an excuse to stop thinking about it, rather than
an honest basis for further enquiry.
This is unfortunate, since what something *is*, can now tell us a lot
about what *ought* to be, or more accurately, what it means that we
think something ought to be anything, in the first place. These basic
moral premises exist within us (most of us), regardless of what we
believe, but believing that they arose out of accidental variations
that were naturally selected to stick around, helps us investigate
what specifically they are and why they are there. If we accept that
they are not universal or divine, but animal in nature, and exist
separately (and in different levels) in the brains of each individual
human, we can start to look at what we have in common, and what kind
of ethics we can derive in order to deal with conflicts, between
different instincts in our own mind, and between the intentions of
different humans.
Conflict between values is explicitly ruled out as a solvable problem,
in any definite or final sense, and the task moves on to pragmatism,
balance, game theory and social economics. It's complicated, I grant
you, and I suppose it's not hard to see why some people would prefer a
simpler, more certain, more black and white moral theory, but you
don't pick theories that are simply more comfortable, if you're goal
is to find theories that are useful.
Indeed, such an approach is entirely backwards. When you've got a
theory that fits better with the rest of your world view, you learn to
deal with and become comfortable with (and ultimately make use of)
that new theory. If darwinism of the mind, and therefore of the moral
senses, seems to be an obvious implication of a scientific theory you
accept, then its your moral views that need to change in order to
handle the implications. You can change the implications to suit your
moral views, but that is like taking an appetite suppressant when
you're in serious need of food.
I don't mind if people disagree with darwinism, but given how many
people accept it as a valid explanation for the origins of our our
specific biology, and how many people seem to accept that the mind is
in one way or another, based on, grounded in, or generated by, the
brain (and therefore our biology, and therefore, ultimately, by
genetic evolution); it seems like we are doing ourselves no favours by
leaving this theory out when it comes to arguing philosophical, moral
and (by extension), political issues.
.

User: "Tron"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	15 Nov 2004 08:58:32 AM

"Chris Thomson" <christhomsonshomepage@yahoo.com> skrev i melding
news:9b67858b.0411141736.17d1d18f@posting.google.com...

It's a century and a half since Darwin published The Origin of
Species, and while the sciences have adapted quite well, it seems that

/..../> philosophy.
The dichotomy science/philosophy is a false one, a matter of "mental
marxism", if you will (where the workers want to run the management, too).
Philosophy encompasses all science, including "secondary philosophy" or
philosophy of nature, and its practical application in various productive
disciplines and endeavours.

For example, two of the most persistent problems, Free Will vs >
Determinism, and the Is/Ought problem, are fundamentally reframed by a
darwinist view of the human mind:

- Free Will vs Determinism:
The notion of causality and the notion of possibility are both
concepts that are found species-wide,

Immanuel Kant welcomes the 30th runner-up, mr. Darwin.
and have obvious survival

benefits.

Strictly speaking, that remains to be seen ...
The idea of causality allows us to abstract natural laws,

rules and social patterns from observation. Without these rules and
trends in our world-view, prediction would be impossible, and the
human would have no ability to form the plans we use to survive and
look after our offspring. Vital also to these plans is the ability to
construct, in your imagination, a future that hasn't happened, and
feel one way or the other about how desirable and likely it is.

A theory of truth elevating subjectivity and utility to paramount criteria.
OK. Pragmatism. A valid (i.e. not yet refuted) epistemological position.
Any "fundamental reframing" not in sight, though.

Why should there be a conflict, when each way of thinking is just a
practical survival tool, and no practical survival tool can be useful
when taken to its absolute extreme, to the complete dismissal of all
others. Free will is true and useful as far as the fact that we can't
help believe in these possibilities our mind creates,

Immanuel Kant welcomes mr. Darwin, a second time, and cheers him on to catch
up.
........

- The Is/Ought Problem:
I can only imagine it's discomfort that stops much of the philosphical
world from acknowledging and openly embracing the fact that darwinism
provides an explanation our basic moral premises. Namely: instinct.
Sure, if the idea is new, then a few obvious problems arise, those of
art, suicide, altruism, and other things that, on the surface, seem to
have no basis in survival-behaviour.

Explaining action by self-interest isn't all that new, you know ...
"Instinct", btw, is just one of those tag-bags for phenomena, not really an
explanation; at least not for the more complex behaviour of man. An
explanation that posits one factor (like instinct) as the explanation for
every observable aspect of behaviour - even opposites - lacks a crucial
element. Don't believe me, check with Sir Karl.
......

This is unfortunate, since what something *is*, can now tell us a lot
about what *ought* to be,

Interesting. Do elaborate.
or more accurately, what it means that we

think something ought to be anything, in the first place.

These basic

moral premises exist within us (most of us), regardless of what we
believe, but believing that they arose out of accidental variations
that were naturally selected to stick around, helps us investigate
what specifically they are and why they are there.

So origin = guarantee of validity?
If we accept that

they are not universal or divine, but animal in nature, and exist
separately (and in different levels) in the brains of each individual
human, we can start to look at what we have in common, and what kind
of ethics we can derive in order to deal with conflicts, between
different instincts in our own mind, and between the intentions of
different humans.

One can do that whatever the status of "moral premises".
If darwinism of the mind, and therefore of the moral

senses, seems to be an obvious implication of a scientific theory you
accept,

Yes, that is the crux.
If you want to compare, it is easier if you know both the things you want to
compare.
Perhaps you should get some acquaintance with philosophy.
T
.

User: "Chris Thomson"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	15 Nov 2004 05:37:25 PM

"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote in message news:<dF3md.16809$Km6.189806@news4.e.nsc.no>...

"Chris Thomson" <christhomsonshomepage@yahoo.com> skrev i melding
news:9b67858b.0411141736.17d1d18f@posting.google.com...

It's a century and a half since Darwin published The Origin of
Species, and while the sciences have adapted quite well, it seems that

/..../> philosophy.

The dichotomy science/philosophy is a false one, a matter of "mental
marxism", if you will (where the workers want to run the management, too).
Philosophy encompasses all science, including "secondary philosophy" or
philosophy of nature, and its practical application in various productive
disciplines and endeavours.

No argument here, but the contrast in this case is one of what makes a
theory valid, or acceptable. Darwinism is acceptable to "science"
because it can inform the creation of a hypothesis that makes testable
predictions (especially true in biology but also for psychology).
Philosophy, as a more abstract pursuit, isn't constrained by concrete
testability, and you can apply a theory more liberally with
thought-experiments and the like. The point is that there is far more
application of darwinism in philosophy, than people seem to be using
for (or at least widely using it for).

Immanuel Kant welcomes the 30th runner-up, mr. Darwin.

Heh, at least wait till the end of the sentence.

and have obvious survival
benefits.

Strictly speaking, that remains to be seen ...

Argument for the survival benefits of causality and possibility
followed directly, feel free to argue with it.

The idea of causality allows us to abstract natural laws,
rules and social patterns from observation. Without these rules and
trends in our world-view, prediction would be impossible, and the
human would have no ability to form the plans we use to survive and
look after our offspring. Vital also to these plans is the ability to
construct, in your imagination, a future that hasn't happened, and
feel one way or the other about how desirable and likely it is.

A theory of truth elevating subjectivity and utility to paramount criteria.
OK. Pragmatism. A valid (i.e. not yet refuted) epistemological position.
Any "fundamental reframing" not in sight, though.

Pragmatism as a serious movement is post-darwinism and, I contend,
strongly influenced by it. Pragmatism can do a lot of work in the
confines of commonly accepted meanings of "pragmatic", or in
situations where everyone agrees what the practical concerns are, in
terms of what you know or can know. But when the edges of practicality
(both in derivation and application of knowledge) start to blur, where
do you turn? After all, practical implies a means to an end, and while
darwinism turns the idea of an end-purpose on its head (since it's an
end-purpose from the past), it's the best explanation we've got as to
what we're all trying to be practical towards.

Immanuel Kant welcomes mr. Darwin, a second time, and cheers him on to catch
up.

It's a tradgedy that neither Kant nor Hume could have read Darwin.
Besides adding more support to Kant's innate concepts (by linking this
theory to natural philosophy), darwinism can go some way to actually
explaining them - where they come from, what they really are, what
their so-called purpose is, and how to view apparent conflicts between
them - as we can start at "increased reproductive fitness at some
point in history" and work backwards to pretty much anything that is
innate about being human, including our concepts.

.......

Explaining action by self-interest isn't all that new, you know ...

Darwinism in its modern form isn't about (personal) self-interest,
that's just one of the side-effects of genetic "self-interest". Being
able to see where genes can succeed as an individual perishes, and
where they can do this, on average over time, independant of whether
an individual is consciously trying to help their genes reproduce or
not; all this adds a new dimension in explaining behaviour and morals
from a foundation of in-built drives.

"Instinct", btw, is just one of those tag-bags for phenomena,

Instinct isn't new with Darwin, of course, but its nature (as an idea)
was changed by darwinism in ways that are far from trivial.

not really an
explanation; at least not for the more complex behaviour of man.

Well I was talking here about basic moral premises. But since you
brought it up, we might assume that the moral instincts are only one
kind, and that they have to attack the world in concert with other
directional instincts (ie other emotional response systems), that we
may hesitate to call "moral" (food, sleep, curiosity maybe), and
conceptual/intellectual instincts, that allow us to form world views.
These world views would be pretty useless, if our directional
instincts didn't respond to them (as well as responding to immediate
sensory experiences). So I agree, you can't just say "instinct" as if
it explains everything, but you can explain a lot about human
behaviour by looking at the nature and the interaction of these
in-built neurological evaluation systems.

An
explanation that posits one factor (like instinct) as the explanation for
every observable aspect of behaviour - even opposites - lacks a crucial
element. Don't believe me, check with Sir Karl.

It's not so much the existence of instinct, as where they come from,
and what that says about what they are. Also it's not an explanation
for everything, so much as for the foundations.

.....

This is unfortunate, since what something *is*, can now tell us a lot
about what *ought* to be,

Interesting. Do elaborate.

Ok, but again you'll need the rest of the sentence:

or more accurately, what it means that we
think something ought to be anything, in the first place.

A lot of people have tried to derive moral premises by proving that
reality is a certain way; but "is" and "ought" each have their own
beginnings, the premises of one are not derived from the conclusions
of the other. All is not lost, however, since we can now see (through
our understanding of what 'is') the process by which they (our moral
premises from which we decide what 'ought' to be) were created.
Namely, the process is reproduction + variation + natural selection +
repeat.
If the moral premises are there anyway, it's not their existence we're
trying to get to with our investigations, it's just a better
understanding of their nature, and how to use them, and in this
context, the theory of evolution is a very useful basis for moral
theory.

These basic
moral premises exist within us (most of us), regardless of what we
believe, but believing that they arose out of accidental variations
that were naturally selected to stick around, helps us investigate
what specifically they are and why they are there.

So origin = guarantee of validity?

You ask that as if the concept of validity can stand on its own,
without qualification or context, and can judge our other ideas and
desires from the outside. This may not be what you mean here, but I'm
afraid I don't understand what you mean. Could you elaborate?

If we accept that
they are not universal or divine, but animal in nature, and exist
separately (and in different levels) in the brains of each individual
human, we can start to look at what we have in common, and what kind
of ethics we can derive in order to deal with conflicts, between
different instincts in our own mind, and between the intentions of
different humans.

One can do that whatever the status of "moral premises".

Sure, but why emphasise it so strongly if you think there are ultimate
or objective moral truths that you can figure out? Surely they'd be
more interesting to look for, and when you think you've found them, to
hit other people over the head with, so to speak.

If darwinism of the mind, and therefore of the moral
senses, seems to be an obvious implication of a scientific theory you
accept,

Yes, that is the crux.

If you want to compare, it is easier if you know both the things you want to
compare.
Perhaps you should get some acquaintance with philosophy.

Cold.

User: "Tron"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	16 Nov 2004 08:54:50 AM

"Chris Thomson" <christhomsonshomepage@yahoo.com> skrev i melding
news:9b67858b.0411151549.34156bc3@posting.google.com...

"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote in message
news:<dF3md.16809$Km6.189806@news4.e.nsc.no>...

"Chris Thomson" <christhomsonshomepage@yahoo.com> skrev i melding
news:9b67858b.0411141736.17d1d18f@posting.google.com...

It's a century and a half since Darwin published The Origin of
Species, and while the sciences have adapted quite well, it seems that

/..../> philosophy.

Hi there,
My previous response was a knee-jerk reaction to a
possibly uninformed polemic based on the assumed philosophy/science
dichotomy; which I see was unjustified. Frankly, I do believe that the
wording of the title of your post indeed offers this angle of attack, should
anyone be so inclined; and in answering your post, I was looking to merely
contradict it as arguments for a presumed assertion in the title.
I haven't really that much to contribute when it comes to Darwinism. For the
record, though, I am a Darwinist, a neo-Darwinist even, and I have no
problems agreeing with you, once all the proper modifications and
reservations are in place. Some parts of philosophy lag behind some parts of
natural science in some respects, hence .... etc. I do believe that that is
not the most productive kind of feedback (one person on Usenet sort of
agrees ... huiii ...). So I'll go pinging the undercarriages for that ring
of truth; that is, nitpick.

No argument here, but the contrast in this case is one of what makes a
theory valid, or acceptable.

Still arguing contrast Ph/Sc.: Science works with theories, philosophy, IMO,
doesn't. (Unless one accepts "theoria" for any non-artisan study. When I say
"Science works with theories", then I mean that sort of "regional ontology"
with entities, forces, natural laws, etc. as in e.g. modern physics.)
Philosophy is doing productive work in those areas where there is no
accepted methodology for arriving at true or, as it were, useful answers.
Where science stops, philosophy begins. Hence, a lot of categories which
validate science are simply not applicable to philosophy. The exception must
be if you use philosophy in the sense of "Weltanschauung", any one's
personal accept of (a body of) tenets from philosophy as maxims for life.
Personally, I would reserve the term philosophy for research in metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics, the standard disciplines (with their
sub-disciplines) of philosophy.
Darwinism is acceptable to "science"

because it can inform the creation of a hypothesis that makes testable
predictions (especially true in biology but also for psychology).

I'd be interested to know more about any experiments where such testable
predictions have been tested, and where the conclusion has been that the
results can be interpreted as verificational support for the underlying
theory. As the Opponent here, I'd focus on the possibility of the experimant
allowing other interpretations as to causal factors.

Philosophy, as a more abstract pursuit

"More theoretical pursuit" ...? ( ... in the general sense ...)
isn't constrained by concrete

testability, and you can apply a theory more liberally with
thought-experiments and the like.

I'd say it is the aim of philosophy to arrive at criteria etc. that
constitute an accepted methodology for arriving at valid answers,
transforming an area of study from philosophy to a science.
The point is that there is far more

application of darwinism in philosophy, than people seem to be using
for (or at least widely using it for).

OK.
/.../

and have obvious survival
benefits.

Strictly speaking, that remains to be seen ...

Argument for the survival benefits of causality and possibility
followed directly, feel free to argue with it.

What I meant was that if our technological advances, made possible by our
ability to se causes and possibilities, has us drown in our own .... entropy
...... like fruitflies in a jar, then they did not have survival benefits.

A theory of truth elevating subjectivity and utility to paramount
criteria.
OK. Pragmatism. A valid (i.e. not yet refuted) epistemological position.
Any "fundamental reframing" not in sight, though.

Pragmatism as a serious movement is post-darwinism and, I contend,
strongly influenced by it.

"My" first pragmatist is Marx, with his insistence on Praxis as determining
understanding. As an epistemologist, Marx was a pragmatist through and
through. He startet publishing serious stuff, including ""Die Deutsche
Ideologie" (where he discusses this issue also) around 1846. Second place
goes to Nietzsche; I don't know how much of a Darwinist he was; although I
gather that some of the more vulgar Spencerians seemed to like him.
Pragmatism can do a lot of work in .... situations where everyone agrees
what the practical concerns are, in

terms of what you know or can know. But when the edges of practicality
(both in derivation and application of knowledge) start to blur, where
do you turn? After all, practical implies a means to an end, and while
darwinism turns the idea of an end-purpose on its head (since it's an
end-purpose from the past), it's the best explanation we've got as to
what we're all trying to be practical towards.

Yes, well, although darwinism may explain why we are pragmatists, darwinism
per se is not (yet) a philosophical principle. The edges of practicality
blur where the end is unclear, thus also barring us from identifying means.
Darwinism must also clear up its own is/ought-issue. It states that we are
survival machines, but cannot show that we ought to be survival machines, as
opposed to e.g. Schopenhauer's pessimist stance on the desirability of life.

As another poster has pointed out, I think you see too much value in knowing
the origins of something. Of course knowing the origin is better than not
knowing it, but even so we're just part of the way.
Generally, I think most darwinists-turned-philosophers fail to see one
fundamental problem, that of .... I don't know the proper english word, but
let med call it some sort of "meta-reflexivity", which is a very bad word
for something really simple.
Beings adapt, and have different reproduction quotas according to the degree
of adaptation. In case of e.g. animals, the vye for food and mates. (More or
less) Conscious Man, once we realize this, can each turn competition into
war by aiming directly to increase one's own reproductive success and at the
same time sabotaging those of the competitors. Fitness is no longer measured
by adaptation to natural environments, but to the social environment; or, as
Marx possibly might have said it, Man creates, or Man IS his own
environment. So in a "meta-" manner we may have a social environment
including weird feedback loops, relating to, reflecting and changing the
outcome of lower levels. Etc. Of course we can try the opposite move,
eliminating war and competition, the "Reign of Justice" (which immediately
gives us the "Problem of Evil", Dawkins' "Hawks" in the population of
"Doves". etc.)

.......

I believe that to always look for a direct link between behaviour and
survival is a rather vulgar fallacy (forgetting the "all else equal" of
Occams Razor, or the Principle of sufficient Specification, Kant's corollary
to Occam). It reminds me of Marxists who, since Marx said "It's the economy,
stupid", were always looking for direct financial profit as the motive for
any event. The world was just too full of counterexamples. What they were
missing, were some of the "gears" - like e.g. darwinism could have
provided - that transform the up-and-down movement of economy's pistons into
the cyclical revolutions of the wheels turning.
As a result of evolution, we may have a too big brain, a sort of cognitive
Irish Giant Elk. Perhaps our ability to relate to ourselves, that is, to
create a sort of "meta-environment" complicates the simple connection
behaviour - survival.

Explaining action by self-interest isn't all that new, you know ...

Darwinism in its modern form isn't about (personal) self-interest,
that's just one of the side-effects of genetic "self-interest".

Nor is self-interest necessarily (personal) self-interest when it comes to
philosophy. Many philosophers claim that ethics is ultimate, universal self
interest; extended into forever as a planning horizon and encompassing any
rational, in some cases even every sentient being.
Being

able to see where genes can succeed as an individual perishes, and
where they can do this, on average over time, independant of whether
an individual is consciously trying to help their genes reproduce or
not; all this adds a new dimension in explaining behaviour and morals
from a foundation of in-built drives.

Pardon me, but AFAICS you include in your version of Darwinism quite a few
tenets that do not belong to the theory proper, but rather to some of the
more infotaining popularizations. Any talk of self-interest is necessarily
metaphorical, and it is only by overextending such analogies that darwinism
can enter the field of e.g. ethics. Darwinism may explain the origins of
moral principles, but doesn't help us an iota further in evaluating them
_unless_ you commit the darwinist naturalist fallacy, "man is made to
survive so man ought to survive". Given the moral principle "man ought to
survive", of course you can construct a rather elaborate discipline of
evolutionary ethics, with all the factions (Mankind or individual man?
Merely survive or live the good life? In the greatest possible number?), the
whole �berbau.

That is wrong. The ought is simply a mental expression of interest
(including self-interest, including the personal kind). That is where it is
created.
How matter comes to have interest is a dark area even in Darwinism (I
sincerely hope). Darwin explained how such a structure, once created, was
retained by reproduction - transmission, and how it evolved to manifest this
interest in different ways, the "origin of species", for want of a better
term ....
existence we're

trying to get to with our investigations, it's just a better
understanding of their nature, and how to use them, and in this
context, the theory of evolution is a very useful basis for moral
theory.

That is a philosophical position in its own right, which is only true if the
pragmatist epistemology theory of darwinism is also true ...
e basic

So origin = guarantee of validity?

The other repsondent to this topic put this, amongst other things, much
better than I did, and I would refer you to him for further discussion.

One can do that whatever the status of "moral premises".

What would I mean by saying that moral tenets exist separately in the brains
of each individual?
In analogy with math, I wouldn't say that "my number '2' " is different from
"your number '2' ".
Neither would I expect e.g. Kant's Categorical IMperative to show individual
variations.
However, we seem to not be subject to any "ethical determinism" (being good
or being bad as a matter of natural law). This implies that even if there
are ultimate and objective moral truths, they would still need to be
propagated; perhaps not everybody would be aware of them at the same time.
What I think you have in mind is, what if we agree that there are _no_ moral
principles, only the interest which definetly lodges in everyone of us,
excluding the Schopenhauerians and the odd Bodhisattva, and which
furthermore is different for each of us (in that it takes a different object
for each of us, i.e. "me")? Then we'd better start to look etc. as you said.
And since this can be done even when the status of moral premises is
"non-existant", one can do that in all cases except where moral premises are
directly imprinted in our mind, leaving us no options (thus making it a
matter of morality no longer). The point is that darwinism doesn't really
bring us anything new there; all the polemic in this paragraph goes to that
difference between science and philosophy.
to

hit other people over the head with, so to speak.

Ah. Blow philosophy's cover, will you?
T

User: "Chris Thomson"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	16 Nov 2004 08:58:53 PM

"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote in message news:<5Iomd.8120$rh1.208258@news2.e.nsc.no>...
[...]

agrees ... huiii ...). So I'll go pinging the undercarriages for that ring
of truth; that is, nitpick.

Excellent.
[...]

Personally, I would reserve the term philosophy for research in metaphysics,
epistemology and ethics, the standard disciplines (with their
sub-disciplines) of philosophy.

Personally I try not to reserve words. Not for one single meaning, at
least. I believe it's more important that the meaning is clear in a
specific context when it's used. Apologies if I failed in this
instance.

Darwinism is acceptable to "science"
because it can inform the creation of a hypothesis that makes testable
predictions (especially true in biology but also for psychology).

Certainly you could come up with other explanations, what matters
though is that darwnism led to the experiment being conducted in the
first place.
A good example is viruses. Any method of dealing with viruses that
works, could be found by just trying everything until you find it, but
darwinism has allowed the emphasis to be put on more useful kinds of
experiment. For example, if you attack aids (I think it was aids, the
experiment I'm thinking of), with a wide range of different drugs,
then leave it alone for a while, let it get complacent a bit, and
attack it again when its numbers are back up, you'll do better than a
continuous application of one drug after another, replacing each
treatement when the virus has adapted to be resistant to the last
drug.
This is because, the latter approach encourages the virus to gradually
- and more dependably - adapt resistence to an increasing collection
of drugs, and it ends up being resistent to pretty much everything.
The former approach suprises the virus, kills off a large number of
it, and leaves it alone to reproduce in whatever way works best. But,
"whatever way works best" does not include being resistent to drugs,
since no drugs are being applied at this time.
Clever, no?

Philosophy, as a more abstract pursuit

"More theoretical pursuit" ...? ( ... in the general sense ...)

Yeah, more abstract as in, not dealing so much with immediate
measurements.

isn't constrained by concrete
testability, and you can apply a theory more liberally with
thought-experiments and the like.

I'd say it is the aim of philosophy to arrive at criteria etc. that
constitute an accepted methodology for arriving at valid answers,
transforming an area of study from philosophy to a science.

Sounds like a good aim to me. Of course there is that other kind of
philosophy, that of having a useful world view of your own, with which
to approach life. Also there's just plain and simple satisfaction of
curiosity. Not something to be dismissed in its own right.
[...]

Argument for the survival benefits of causality and possibility
followed directly, feel free to argue with it.

What I meant was that if our technological advances, made possible by our
ability to se causes and possibilities, has us drown in our own .... entropy
..... like fruitflies in a jar, then they did not have survival benefits.

Every species goes extinct. As far as the future environment will
differ from the past, evolution doesn't care about fitness at all. But
now, and throughout our past evolution, these features have served us
(or more specifically our genes) quite well. Whether we send ourselves
extinct, or get invaded by an alien race, or stick around till the sun
blows up, evolution doesn't guarantee anything about the future, it
just provides a basis to start thinking about it for yourself.

Pragmatism as a serious movement is post-darwinism and, I contend,
strongly influenced by it.

Fair enough, but the term, and the movement of "Pragmatism", with a
clearer separate identity, arose somewhere close to the beginning of
the 20th century (the term was coined in 1898, I believe), several
decades after "Origin of Species". Indeed, Darwin is mentioned in a
great many accounts of the history of pragmatism.

It presents a promising lead in this area, suggesting that "ought",
the concept itself, is an integral part of this survival machine. More
specifically, part of one of the component survival machines, namely,
the brain. This is more than just an interesting idea, it changes
entirely the way in which seek to resolve moral dilemmas, both
theoretically and practically.
[...]

How much the origin of something can tell depends on the something,
and the origin. You're right that we're only part of the way, but
without starting from the right foundation, it's hard to get any
further.

Generally, I think most darwinists-turned-philosophers fail to see one
fundamental problem, that of .... I don't know the proper english word, but
let med call it some sort of "meta-reflexivity", which is a very bad word
for something really simple.
Beings adapt, and have different reproduction quotas according to the degree
of adaptation. In case of e.g. animals, the vye for food and mates. (More or
less) Conscious Man, once we realize this, can each turn competition into
war by aiming directly to increase one's own reproductive success and at the
same time sabotaging those of the competitors. Fitness is no longer measured
by adaptation to natural environments, but to the social environment; or, as
Marx possibly might have said it, Man creates, or Man IS his own
environment. So in a "meta-" manner we may have a social environment
including weird feedback loops, relating to, reflecting and changing the
outcome of lower levels. Etc. Of course we can try the opposite move,
eliminating war and competition, the "Reign of Justice" (which immediately
gives us the "Problem of Evil", Dawkins' "Hawks" in the population of
"Doves". etc.)

All animals affect their own environment to some degree, and so create
their own environment, to some degree. Humans are better at it, no
contest (well, maybe hive insects would give us a run for our money,
coral too, I suppose, but we're better than the other primates and
pack-hunting mammals at least). Fitness is measured by genetic
reproduction, whatever the environment. I don't think the human
ability to manipulate our environment so much, presents a theoretical
problem, but what you really seem to be saying is there's a practical
problem, "Ok we know about natural selection, but what the hell do we
do about it?". Good question. My first suggestion is try to ask
yourself that question more often.
[...]

I agree, present-personal-survival-value is just the most obvious
starting point when trying to explain morals from a darwinist
perspective. What one needs to get to is
past-genetic-reproductive-value, which is much harder to think about,
but more accurate.
[...]

Like I say before (included below), I'm not trying to establish moral
premises, just understand the ones that our species appear to be stuck
with (for the time being, at least).

[...]

our understanding of what 'is') the process by which they (our moral
premises from which we decide what 'ought' to be) were created.
Namely, the process is reproduction + variation + natural selection +
repeat.

I don't think we have the capacity to fully resolve seeing brains from
the outside (neurology, biology, etc), and seeing them from the inside
(recognisng that we are conscious of our consciousness). They are
fundamentally different ways of thinking, each has their own use, but
I'm not holding my breath to integrate the two entirely. It's kind of
like trying to get a computer program that evaluates its own source
code instructions at the same time as it's trying to run them. More
that practically impossible, it may well be that it's logically
impossible, that no brain of any kind could ever achieve it. Either
way, I'm not too fussed.

existence we're

trying to get to with our investigations, it's just a better
understanding of their nature, and how to use them, and in this
context, the theory of evolution is a very useful basis for moral
theory.

That is a philosophical position in its own right, which is only true if the
pragmatist epistemology theory of darwinism is also true ...

Yes, it's all related.

[...]

What would I mean by saying that moral tenets exist separately in the brains
of each individual?
In analogy with math, I wouldn't say that "my number '2' " is different from
"your number '2' ".

In this particular case, I can see what you mean by that statement,
and I can even agree. Your number two is a distinct entity, existing
in your mind. Again it depends on practical context. What are we
talking about and why? If we're talking about using the number two as
a representation of something in the outside world, to accomplish some
meaningful calculation in order to manipulate the world in some
specific way; then it helps to talk (and think) about it in the
context of a common "outside world" that we all share (it's not
necessary to do this, but it saves time, and is more intuitive).

Neither would I expect e.g. Kant's Categorical IMperative to show individual
variations.

However, we seem to not be subject to any "ethical determinism" (being good
or being bad as a matter of natural law). This implies that even if there
are ultimate and objective moral truths, they would still need to be
propagated; perhaps not everybody would be aware of them at the same time.

What I think you have in mind is, what if we agree that there are _no_ moral
principles, only the interest which definetly lodges in everyone of us,
excluding the Schopenhauerians and the odd Bodhisattva, and which
furthermore is different for each of us (in that it takes a different object
for each of us, i.e. "me")? Then we'd better start to look etc. as you said.
And since this can be done even when the status of moral premises is
"non-existant", one can do that in all cases except where moral premises are
directly imprinted in our mind, leaving us no options (thus making it a
matter of morality no longer). The point is that darwinism doesn't really
bring us anything new there; all the polemic in this paragraph goes to that
difference between science and philosophy.

I suggest that any theory *about* morality, is secondary to the
universal existence of some concept of morality in humans. That moral
principles have some existence outside of the mind of each individual,
is one such theory. We attach value to things in the world (or in our
model of the world), and in many situations we don't need to think
about this beyond what is good and bad in the world. Sometimes,
though, we like to reflect on what it really means that we do this,
why we do this, and what its ultimate significance is (if any) to the
rest of the species and the universe. For this case, I suggest it's
useful to think of them as ideas that we are hard-wired to produce.
Again, I must assert that we can't apply the rules of one mode of
thinking, to every situation. We are born with a patchwork, pluralist
thinking machine. I'm not so sure that it's a productive use of our
time to try and make it all unified, or hierarchical, in any absolute
sense that is supposed to apply to all situations. It is integrated to
an important degree; the parts interact and even co-operate, but they
still fight sometimes, that doesn't mean we have to take sides,
necessarily. If we do take sides, it doesn't mean we have to keep the
same allegience in every case.

to hit other people over the head with, so to speak.

Ah. Blow philosophy's cover, will you?

lol

User: "Tron"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	18 Nov 2004 04:29:55 AM

"Chris Thomson" <christhomsonshomepage@yahoo.com> skrev i melding
news:9b67858b.0411161911.3fca61f0@posting.google.com...

"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote in message
news:<5Iomd.8120$rh1.208258@news2.e.nsc.no>...
[...]

......> Personally I try not to reserve words. Not for one single meaning, at

least.

I just happen to speak a language which has separate words for this, so in
this one case I can afford me that small luxury.

Certainly you could come up with other explanations, what matters
though is that darwnism led to the experiment being conducted in the
first place.

You're not implying that observation is theory-driven, are you ....?

........>

Clever, no?

Yes. Hooray for Darwin and Mendel.

Philosophy, as a more abstract pursuit

"More theoretical pursuit" ...? ( ... in the general sense ...)

Yeah, more abstract as in, not dealing so much with immediate
measurements.

Measurement is an abstraction par excellence. But I get your point.
Non-quantifiable science.

......>

[...]

Argument for the survival benefits of causality and possibility
followed directly, feel free to argue with it.

What I meant was that if our technological advances, made possible by our
ability to se causes and possibilities, has us drown in our own ....
entropy
..... like fruitflies in a jar, then they did not have survival benefits.

There is a whole philosophical topoic in its own right, there. There are, as
I mentioned a lot of people, P.O. Vale of Tears, that would disagree.
But I meant it as a sort of joke. And all this explaining doen't make it
better ....
Whether we send ourselves

extinct, or get invaded by an alien race, or stick around till the sun
blows up, evolution doesn't guarantee anything about the future, it
just provides a basis to start thinking about it for yourself.

My main concern is still to salvage the dignity of philosophy, so I'd have
to say that Darwinism is a _result_ of a lot of people thinking about in
for themselves, which began a long, long time before Darwin.
......>

OK.

It presents a promising lead in this area, suggesting that "ought",
the concept itself, is an integral part of this survival machine.

But that is old news. Philosophers like Kant etc. based their whole ethical
philosophy on "ought" being an integral part of being human. Darwinism
provides a causal explanation (which is, of course, nice). That is why
Darwin is a Johnny-come-lately (?) in ethics.
More

specifically, part of one of the component survival machines, namely,
the brain. This is more than just an interesting idea, it changes
entirely the way in which seek to resolve moral dilemmas, both
theoretically and practically.

I don't think so. This is where I suspect that a fuller acquaintance with
philosophy is necessary to see that this isn't so.
.........

I think this problem pops up in that other thread you initiated: somebody
pointed out that "success among humans" is independent of fitness (in a
purely physical sense, it seems). My point is that we can now determine what
fitness is supposed to mean. the criteria for achieving genetic reproduction
are (in a large part) defined by us (e.g. wealth, quite apart from physical
fitness).
I like your computer program simile.

[...]

I don't think we have the capacity to fully resolve seeing brains from
the outside (neurology, biology, etc), and seeing them from the inside
(recognisng that we are conscious of our consciousness). They are
fundamentally different ways of thinking, each has their own use, but
I'm not holding my breath to integrate the two entirely. It's kind of
like trying to get a computer program that evaluates its own source
code instructions at the same time as it's trying to run them. More
that practically impossible, it may well be that it's logically
impossible, that no brain of any kind could ever achieve it.
[...]

Neither would I expect e.g. Kant's Categorical IMperative to show
individual
variations.

.......

OK, as long as the answers are not hard-wired, ending in genetic
determinism.

Again, I must assert that we can't apply the rules of one mode of
thinking, to every situation. We are born with a patchwork, pluralist
thinking machine. I'm not so sure that it's a productive use of our
time to try and make it all unified, or hierarchical, in any absolute
sense that is supposed to apply to all situations. It is integrated to
an important degree; the parts interact and even co-operate, but they
still fight sometimes, that doesn't mean we have to take sides,
necessarily. If we do take sides, it doesn't mean we have to keep the
same allegience in every case.

No Unified Field Theory for the human mind, then.
Seems like it is pretty clear where we should agree to disagree, now.
Thx for your time and thoughts.
T
.

User: "Chris Thomson"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	23 Nov 2004 09:20:27 PM

"Tron" <tronfuru@frisurf.no> wrote in message news:<10%md.8387$rh1.217794@news2.e.nsc.no>...
[...]

Certainly you could come up with other explanations, what matters
though is that darwnism led to the experiment being conducted in the
first place.

You're not implying that observation is theory-driven, are you ....?

No, that we can judge theories better by the observation they predict,
than by whether they can be created or twisted post-hoc to fit with
observation (both are important, though).
[...]

Whether we send ourselves

Right, associating the name with the theory can be misleading or
misinterpreted. By darwinism, I mean the theory of evolution by
natural selection, as understood today, with much progress since
Darwin's time, but fundamentally the same basic process that he
described more completely and clearly than anyone before.
A great deal of the philosophy you see around, especially ethical and
political philosophy, doesn't take into account the implications of
this theory, about why we have the tendencies that we do.
[...]

It presents a promising lead in this area, suggesting that "ought",
the concept itself, is an integral part of this survival machine.

But this causal explanation links it with tendencies conducive to
genetic reproduction, which provides an relevant context we can use in
addressing the specifics, (e.g. where does *this* (for any given value
of this) ethical tendency come from, how is likely to be "satisfied",
what are its practical limits, etc).

[...]

What's the problem, specifically?
[...]

OK, as long as the answers are not hard-wired, ending in genetic
determinism.

Right, only the raw ingredients at the start are hard wired. Our genes
build our brains, and then our brains build more of themselves in
response to conditions and from the results of existing
judgement-making faculties.

No Unified Field Theory for the human mind, then.

The best analogy I think is a community. There is co-operation, there
is conflict, but the only "unity" is that which we create for
ourselves, it's not an existing or eternal unity we can discover. Our
different moral, emotional, intellectual instincts will sometimes
conflict and sometimes co-operate inside our own mind. One of the most
important evolutionary reasons for our higher-level faculties of
abstraction and theorising, is to integrate, to create some unity for
the whole set of mental instincts.

Seems like it is pretty clear where we should agree to disagree, now.
Thx for your time and thoughts.

Thank you as well.
.

User: ""
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	17 Nov 2004 02:37:19 AM

(Chris=A0Thomson) wrote:

It's a century and a half since Darwin published The Origin of

Species, and while the sciences have adapted quite well, it seems that
philosophically, a lot of people still go over the same problems,
trudging through the same tired arguments, ignoring the insight that
darwinism can offer us on some of the most important issues in
philosophy....[snip....

....I don't mind if people disagree with darwinism, but given how many

people accept it as a valid explanation for the origins of our our
specific biology, and how many people seem to accept that the mind is in
one way or another, based on, grounded in, or generated by, the brain
(and therefore our biology, and therefore, ultimately, by genetic
evolution); it seems like we are doing ourselves no favours by leaving
this theory out when it comes to arguing philosophical, moral and (by
extension), political issues.
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
[j] And its also two centuries and almost two decades since Jeremy
Bentham wrote "An Introductionto the Principles of Morals and
Legislation", the treatise of morals based on the instinctive guides of
the pleasure and pain principle. He reframed the Is/Ought problem
without the absolute condition rooted in any non-biological base. We
call this view utilitariansim and this philosophy has evolved into the
modern world.
Jillar
.

User: "Chris Thomson"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	17 Nov 2004 07:16:58 PM

wrote in message news:<3201-419B0DBF-2@storefull-3311.bay.webtv.net>...
[...]

========

[j] And its also two centuries and almost two decades since Jeremy
Bentham wrote "An Introductionto the Principles of Morals and
Legislation", the treatise of morals based on the instinctive guides of
the pleasure and pain principle. He reframed the Is/Ought problem
without the absolute condition rooted in any non-biological base. We
call this view utilitariansim and this philosophy has evolved into the
modern world.

Jillar

Understanding the causes of pleasure and pain (from an evolutionary
perspective) provides, I think, some missing pieces to utilitarianism.
It gives a basis for linking pleasure to other ideas of "utility"
(e.g. health, family, understanding), as well as giving some insight
into what kinds of attitudes, habits and policies are more likely to
promote the greatest pleasure for the greatest number (or just the
individual) over the long term.
It also challenges the external value of pleasure, but since we all
like pleasure internally, this isn't necessarily a huge problem. (Not
everyone dislikes pain, but you could substitute "displeasure").
.

User: "1Z"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	16 Nov 2004 06:58:11 AM

(Chris Thomson) wrote in message news:<9b67858b.0411141736.17d1d18f@posting.google.com>...

There nonethless is a conflict in spite of he survival-value of
both these ideas. Why shouldn't there be a conflict ? All that means
is that there is no survival-value in achieving complete logical conscilience
between our rag-bag of survival-enhancing competencies. A Darwinian
approach cannot directly resolve philosophical problems because
survival-value is not a direct substitute for truth.

Free will is true and useful as far as the fact that we can't
help believe in these possibilities our mind creates, and further that
it is good for our existence that we do so. This doesn't mean we have
to think of possible worlds as real physical worlds, or as independant
abstract entities that have some kind of reality outside of the mind.
We make them, we use them, we believe in them.

You *could* have said we don't have to believe in the physical laws
we cook up as having any bindining force. This is not a Darwinian
synthesis of FW and determinism, it is a philosophical resolution
based on relegating one half of the dichotomy , teh FW and possibility
half, to the status of mere hypothesis.

Looking at human decision making as completely deterministic (or as
far as quantum mechanics are ontologically random rather than just
epistemologically random; then looking at human decision making as
probablistic, but still subejct to the physical laws of nature that
are beyond our immediate control),

FW doesn't require that you control the laws of nature, only that you control
yourself. The questions is whether a self-controlling entity can exist
within a deterministic or indeterministic, or both, or neither, universe.

can be useful as well, in order to
recognise patterns in how people behave and come up with theories as
to why. There is no reason this should over-ride ones concept of
freedom and choice, as long as both models are seen within their
limited pragmatic context.
Each solves a different problem: Causality is vital for creating
theories, Possibility is necessary for using them. At their most
basic, neither concept is is derived from observation, we're
hard-wired to make them, we're stuck with them, and they're mighty
useful, so what's the problem? Use whichever is appropriate at the
time.

Firsty, the pragmatic-pluralist solution doesn't ctually resolve the concpetual
problem, it merely sidesteps it. Secondly, you don't need to appeal
to Darwin to do that. Thirdly, a genuine, concpetual solution to the
problem would itslef do something useful, in telling us about how our
thinking works.

Explaining moral behaviour as instinct does not answer any
moral questions -- questions about what good is and what things are good --
except in the negative sense that nothing is really good, and that
if your instincts incline you towards canibalism, that is OK.
However, the mere fact that we can pose the question "is goodness instinct?"
shows that our concpet of goodness is different as a concept to our
concept of instinct (even if nothing matches it in reality) and that
appeals to behaviour or instinct cannot, again, be substituted for
moral worth.

Sure, if the idea is new, then a few obvious problems arise, those of
art, suicide, altruism, and other things that, on the surface, seem to
have no basis in survival-behaviour. But these problems tend to
crumble under further inspection,

The only accounts that make theses phenomena seem plausible are ones
in which we are portrayed as more than instinct machines.

and are often just the result of a
poor understanding of how the evolutionary process works. A lot of
arguments against the darwinist origins of our moral premises, seem to
use these problems as an excuse to stop thinking about it, rather than
an honest basis for further enquiry.
This is unfortunate, since what something *is*, can now tell us a lot
about what *ought* to be, or more accurately, what it means that we
think something ought to be anything, in the first place.

It can if there is a logical, conceptual route from how
things ar to how they ought to be , but how can such a route
be based on Darwinian thinking ?

It is no help at all in understanding them *as* moral, rather than
a value-neutral piece of behaviour.

Genetic fallacy: understanding where something comes from does
not tell youwhat it is.

Conflict between values is explicitly ruled out as a solvable problem,
in any definite or final sense, and the task moves on to pragmatism,
balance, game theory and social economics. It's complicated, I grant
you, and I suppose it's not hard to see why some people would prefer a
simpler, more certain, more black and white moral theory, but you
don't pick theories that are simply more comfortable, if you're goal
is to find theories that are useful.
Indeed, such an approach is entirely backwards. When you've got a
theory that fits better with the rest of your world view, you learn to
deal with and become comfortable with (and ultimately make use of)
that new theory. If darwinism of the mind, and therefore of the moral
senses, seems to be an obvious implication of a scientific theory you
accept, then its your moral views that need to change in order to
handle the implications. You can change the implications to suit your
moral views, but that is like taking an appetite suppressant when
you're in serious need of food.

Darwinism only CAN affect ones moral views if there is a route
from fact (a scientific theory) to value. But such a solution cannot
be provided by Darwinism per se.

I don't mind if people disagree with darwinism, but given how many
people accept it as a valid explanation for the origins of our our
specific biology, and how many people seem to accept that the mind is
in one way or another, based on, grounded in, or generated by, the
brain (and therefore our biology, and therefore, ultimately, by
genetic evolution); it seems like we are doing ourselves no favours by
leaving this theory out when it comes to arguing philosophical, moral
and (by extension), political issues.

User: "Chris Thomson"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	16 Nov 2004 06:10:07 PM

(1Z) wrote in message news:<fd762132.0411160510.66d12456@posting.google.com>...
[...]

My point is not a moral one, that you should just think about survival
value. My point is an epistemological one. We simply can't extend any
of our innate means of knowing, to their absolute extreme, dismissing
other factors we innately know to apply. Causality is true when you're
trying to understand how something works and predict what it will do,
and indeed we can't help but think in terms of cause and effect in
these areas. Free will is "true" when you're trying to decide what
future is desirable, or what you want to happen, and indeed we can't
help but think of multiple possibilities when thinking about such
things.
Conflict only arises if you assume any principle of thought applies
absolutely. Again I'm not talking about how you should use these modes
of thinking, I'm saying how you can use them and how you can't. A good
example is separate and unique identity of objects. I assume you can
see how thinking of things as having a separate existence (being able
to see that it's this chair not that chair), can be useful, but start
replacing pieces of the chair one by one and when does it cease to be
the same chair? I don't think there is a "correct" answer to this
question. Every way of thinking is like a computer program, and can
only be run sucessfully for certain kinds of problems.
Determinism, as a way of thinking, has no business in the actual
choosing between possibilities. One reason for this is that no
finite-reasoning machine (such as the brain) can predict the outcome
of any system in which its predictions make a difference to that
outcome, because it would need to calculate everything in the system
including its own calculations. But even if it wasn't logically
impossible for us to apply determinism to our own choices, we wouldn't
have evolved the ability anyway, if it's wasn't especially helpful.
The problem I see is a widespread tendency to think that our different
mental faculties are supposed to provide us with a concept of truth,
of how the world really is. I think it's more accurate to say they are
all there to provide us with plans, and when you look at a particular,
species-wide, innate way of thinking and ask, how can it contribute to
making a useful plan, their limitations make a lot more sense. Truth
is just one concept we use to make plans.

The whole point of recognising physical laws is that they have binding
force, we need to believe that to make use of them. Possibilities we
need to believe in also, we just don't need to believe that they
presently exist outside of our mind. Believing they "can" exist is a
different kind of belief entirely, and this, in my opinion, is where
possibility belongs.
[...]

Sure, but the self is patchwork, some parts control other parts. We
are half master and half slave of own minds, and this might be
uncomfortable for some, but again, none of our bits make sense on
their own, the ability to mentally isolate parts of a system for
examination is useful of course, but only up to a point, after that
you've gotta start to look at how it fits in to the whole.
I know I'm repeating myself, and I apologise, but I'm afraid I'm not
being clear so hopefully I'll say it right once, at least.

Each solves a different problem: Causality is vital for creating
theories, Possibility is necessary for using them. At their most
basic, neither concept is is derived from observation, we're
hard-wired to make them, we're stuck with them, and they're mighty
useful, so what's the problem? Use whichever is appropriate at the
time.

Side-stepping implies you could have stayed there and dealt with it,
I'm suggesting rather that the problem belongs in the same category as
trying to definitively answer if "This statement is a lie" is true or
not. I'm not just being lazy (or if I am, I've done a good job of
convincing myself that it's something more intellectual than that).

Explaining moral behaviour as instinct does not answer any
moral questions -- questions about what good is and what things are good --
except in the negative sense that nothing is really good, and that
if your instincts incline you towards canibalism, that is OK.

However, the mere fact that we can pose the question "is goodness instinct?"
shows that our concpet of goodness is different as a concept to our
concept of instinct (even if nothing matches it in reality) and that
appeals to behaviour or instinct cannot, again, be substituted for
moral worth.

I'm not trying to equate the two ideas, but rather suggest instinct as
the basis or creator of our idea of goodness. Our idea of instinct,
appears to be, ironically, far less instinctive than our idea of
goodness. But this fairly complicated and aquired idea of what human
instincts are and why they are the way they are, suggests a pretty
good (in my opinion), explanation of where our idea of goodness comes
from, and why it is there.

The only accounts that make theses phenomena seem plausible are ones
in which we are portrayed as more than instinct machines.

We are far more than instinct machines, we are gene copying machines.
Instincts are just one tool our genes use to propagate themselves.
Lots of life forms have no brain, and therefore no instinct, in the
human sense.
But that's not what you mean is it? Maybe you can tell me what gaps
you see when using, say, our social and tribal instincts to explain
charity. Or pick another example where you think the theory falls
short if the ultimate basis is assumed to be instinct (drugs, and
other outside brain-interference should probably be left out for the
time being).

This is unfortunate, since what something *is*, can now tell us a lot
about what *ought* to be, or more accurately, what it means that we
think something ought to be anything, in the first place.

It can if there is a logical, conceptual route from how
things ar to how they ought to be , but how can such a route
be based on Darwinian thinking ?

Extending it to an evolutionary psychology implies that things only
"ought" to be anything, in our own animal minds, in our opinion, in
our feelings. That the basis of our opinions is very similar to the
rest of our species, is the reason it's so easy to assume that these
values exist outside our minds, and have an independant existence of
their own, as moral values. I know this subjectivist point of view is
not new with darwin, but accepting his explanation for the origin of
our biology, including our brain, I don't see any other theory that's
even close, in terms of being a realistic explanation that fits, not
just with experience, but what we know about the physical and
historical nature of our mind.

It is no help at all in understanding them *as* moral, rather than
a value-neutral piece of behaviour.

Only from an universalist/objectivist/(I'm sure there's a proper word
for it) view of what it means for something to be moral.

Genetic fallacy: understanding where something comes from does
not tell youwhat it is.

It depends what you want to know. From the point of view of explaining
and predicting its behaviour, as far as the practical application of
something is what matters about what the thing "is", then origin can
be very instructive if it's an origin that affects its nature. The
evolutionary process is not random with regard to what features it
lets continue, and so we can use this theory as part of our attempts
to understand, explain, and ultimately use, our own moral/emotional
senses.
[...]

Darwinism only CAN affect ones moral views if there is a route
from fact (a scientific theory) to value. But such a solution cannot
be provided by Darwinism per se.

It seems to puts the idea of value in its place. Ruling out
essentialist, objectivist, or universalist interpretations and giving
us the cold shower of moral individualism and subjectivism, which is
far more complicated, but if it's more reasonable and more useful, I
say it's worth taking on.
.

User: "1Z"
Title: Re: Philosophy still catching up to Darwinism	19 Nov 2004 10:12:41 AM

(Chris Thomson) wrote in message news:<9b67858b.0411161622.8bee6e4@posting.google.com>...

peterdjones@yahoo.com (1Z) wrote in message news:<fd762132.0411160510.66d12456@posting.google.com>...
[...]

We *do* have the option of saying that one useful idea is basically
true and another useful idea ia basically fictive, since we can
distinguish truth from usefulness, despite your attempts to associate
them. Note that you actually make use of this manouevre in your
treatment
of FW vs. determinism -- you favour determinism.

Causality is true

useful

when you're
trying to understand how something works and predict what it will do,
and indeed we can't help but think in terms of cause and effect in
these areas. Free will is "true"

Also useful, and possibly true (non-scare-quoted) too.

when you're trying to decide what
future is desirable, or what you want to happen, and indeed we can't
help but think of multiple possibilities when thinking about such
things.

Conflict only arises if you assume any principle of thought applies
absolutely.

You can remove the question of what is true by declaring that nothing,
or everything is. But what justifies that ? Is certainly is not the
only way of thinking about truth that is available ot us.

Again I'm not talking about how you should use these modes
of thinking, I'm saying how you can use them and how you can't. A good
example is separate and unique identity of objects. I assume you can
see how thinking of things as having a separate existence (being able
to see that it's this chair not that chair), can be useful, but start
replacing pieces of the chair one by one and when does it cease to be
the same chair? I don't think there is a "correct" answer to this
question. Every way of thinking is like a computer program, and can
only be run sucessfully for certain kinds of problems.

We can arrive at exact answers to those questions by stipulating
what is a chair (etc) in the first place. The pseudo-problem ariss
from thinking that the definition of 'chair' must be given by the
senses.

Determinism, as a way of thinking, has no business in the actual
choosing between possibilities. One reason for this is that no
finite-reasoning machine (such as the brain) can predict the outcome
of any system in which its predictions make a difference to that
outcome, because it would need to calculate everything in the system
including its own calculations. But even if it wasn't logically
impossible for us to apply determinism to our own choices, we wouldn't
have evolved the ability anyway, if it's wasn't especially helpful.

The problem I see is a widespread tendency to think that our different
mental faculties are supposed to provide us with a concept of truth,
of how the world really is. I think it's more accurate to say they are
all there to provide us with plans, and when you look at a particular,
species-wide, innate way of thinking and ask, how can it contribute to
making a useful plan, their limitations make a lot more sense. Truth
is just one concept we use to make plans.

The mere fact that we can discuss, as we are dicsussing, the
relationship between
our rag-bag of mental faculties and truth shows that the concept of
truth
we actually have is capable of trnascending our mental bag-of-tricks.

The whole point of recognising physical laws is that they have binding
force, we need to believe that to make use of them.

We can suppose that there are strict physical laws...and the
supposition can turn out to be wrong. The fact that we 'need' them
doesn't make them true:
that would be magical thinking.

Possibilities we
need to believe in also, we just don't need to believe that they
presently exist outside of our mind.

If the usefulness of strict determinism as a theory can be equated
with its truth in reality (I don't hink it can, but that is what you
are doing), then so can the usefulness
of possibilites. Of course, they can't both be actually true, but that
just
underlines my other claim, that usefulness is not directly equatable
with truth.

Believing they "can" exist is a
different kind of belief entirely, and this, in my opinion, is where
possibility belongs.

[...]

Whatever. It's just that FW might be an aspect of that comple
interaction,
not something irreducible and atomic.

I know I'm repeating myself, and I apologise, but I'm afraid I'm not
being clear so hopefully I'll say it right once, at least.

But we can see why we can't answer "this statment is a lie".
Neither possible answer is logically acceptable. However *both*
answers to determinism and possibility are logically acceptable.
No analogous.

Explaining moral behaviour as instinct does not answer any
moral questions -- questions about what good is and what things are good --
except in the negative sense that nothing is really good, and that
if your instincts incline you towards canibalism, that is OK.

However, the mere fact that we can pose the question "is goodness instinct?"
shows that our concpet of goodness is different as a concept to our
concept of instinct (even if nothing matches it in reality) and that
appeals to behaviour or instinct cannot, again, be substituted for
moral worth.

Being able to give a Darwinian account of *why* we have moral
inclinations
still doesn't answer moral questions per se.

The only accounts that make theses phenomena seem plausible are ones

in which we are portrayed as more than instinct machines.

This is all gap. To say that individuals are charitable because
society
makes them so, explains nothing, because it doesn't explains why
society works that way intghe first place. And anyway, it doesn't even
touch on the
question of whether charity is really good.

Or pick another example where you think the theory falls
short if the ultimate basis is assumed to be instinct (drugs, and
other outside brain-interferen